Protecting the Urban
The Dangers of Planning for Terrorism

Jon Coaffee

Abstract
Urban areas are prime targets for international terrorists given the array of valuable physical and social infrastructure they contain. Whereas traditionally governmental, financial, critical infrastructure or military targets have been attacked, increasingly terrorism is targeted at everyday crowded urban spaces which are by their very nature difficult to defend. Subsequently this has led to a wave of pre-emptive and anticipatory counter-terrorism policy in the West in an attempt to secure the defence of the future city. In such policy-making urban terror attacks are viewed as inevitable and unavoidable, but the nature of such attacks is seen as fluid. Notably, recent commando-style attacks against non-western cities – in Mumbai and Lahore in late 2008 and early 2009 respectively – and against soft, unprotected targets has led to a reassessment of western urban security strategies and an assumption that such terrorist modus operandi will migrate to western cities. Such an uncritical reading, as exemplified by the western bias in media reporting in the aftermath of these events, highlights the need for scholars and policy-makers to engage with alternative readings of these events and illuminate the contextual factors underlying terrorism and its tactics, and target selection in particular locations. In developing a more rounded and reflexive understanding of terrorism as a method, planners and policy-makers might be in a better position to progress more nuanced security strategies that aim to tackle the underlying causes of terrorism rather than simply reacting through militarizing an increasing array of urban spaces.

Key words
counter-terrorism ■ Lahore ■ Mumbai ■ terrorism ■ western cities

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Since the events of 9/11, the response of urban security managers to enhanced terrorist threat has largely centred upon a relatively uncontested western discourse of restricting the opportunities for terrorists to strike, and in preparing for what is often seen as the inevitable attack. In other words, it is not a case of whether a major city will be targeted but where, when and how – a situation that often requires pre-emptive anticipatory planning. Materially, this often leads to the increased fortification and militarization of the city (Graham, 2002). This is not only a policymaking scenario that is open to the criticism of insularity in terms of those responsible for its construction, and of manipulation by powerful vested interests, but one that also raises broader questions regarding the frequency and type of potential terrorist incidents that we, in the West, are supposedly protecting ourselves from.

In this paper, in the wake of the terror attacks in Mumbai, India, in November 2008 against a series of public and touristic locations, and those in Lahore, Pakistan, in March 2009 against the Sri Lankan cricket team, a range of emergent policy questions will be addressed. In particular, the paper will highlight what these unconventional experiences of non-western attacks mean for western counter-terrorism activity. In the West, this is presently a political priority given concerns that such terrorist modus operandi might migrate and be unleashed against western cities and everyday targets, as yet largely unaffected by the war on terror – hotels, sporting events, shopping centres, nightclubs, tourist destinations and other largely symbolic, but crowded, locations.

Risk, Spatial Planning and the City as Inescapable Target

A primary function of strategic spatial planning is to reduce social risk by normalizing the future through creating a situation of increasing stability and security (Connell, 2009). Although this is a contested discourse, this risk management function for planning has assumed increased currency in recent years given the supposedly ever-present threat from international terrorism against urban areas. Although the rhetoric of the inevitable urban terror attack is not new in the western-dominated ‘war on terror’ discourse, or indeed in prior international threat scenarios, most notably the Cold War threat of nuclear attack (Bishop and Clancey, 2004), such discourse tends to hone in on feelings of vulnerability and threat, and the subsequent requirement for additional security or enhanced resilience. At the urban scale a number of accounts have highlighted how the events of 9/11 served to influence the technological and physical infrastructure of targeted cities so vulnerabilities and impediments to urban flows can be planned-out or made more resilient (Coaffee et al., 2008b; Graham, 2002). In so doing, the tendency amongst policy-makers is to pay far less attention to the more complex historical, cultural, social, and geographical variables that underpin the dynamic and fluid terrorism process.

Some cities, we are told through western media and political pronouncements, cannot now escape attacks, especially those aimed at ‘soft
targets’ and crowded public places rather than more traditional targets such as embassies, military sites, financial districts and critical national infrastructure. This pre-emptive requirement for security as a result of likely attack has led western counter-terrorist experts to talk now about the ‘new normality’ we have entered after 9/11 where ‘risks can only be managed, not completely eradicated’ and which requires ‘active anticipation and “reflexive” risk management strategies’ (Heng, 2006: 70).²

Being prepared for the inevitable terror attack has emerged as a key driver of reconceptualized western security policy in the post-9/11 world (Coaffee, 2006; see also Murakami Wood and Coaffee, 2007). In this scenario, urban planning has become a key mechanism of risk management, intended to colonize the future and reduce future insecurity. In practical planning and socio-spatial terms, emerging scholarship and policy-making has highlighted the risks that pre-emptive counter-terrorism measures pose for the functional integrity of cities (see, for example, Lyon, 2003; Coaffee, 2009) and how post-9/11 anticipatory risk management has served to increase urban fear (Furedi, 2006).³ Moreover, in relation to the so-called ‘war on terror’, Elmer and Opel (2006: 477) have highlighted how ‘what if’ scenarios, relating to the likelihood of attack, have been replaced by ‘when, then’ scenarios. In other words, the inevitability of further attack is assumed and should be pre-planned for (see also Massumi, 2005; Coaffee, 2009). This has subsequently resulted in a reduction in the democratic involvement in security-related urban planning and construction and, in extreme cases, the increasing militarization of urban design where state security services become increasingly powerful players within the city planning process, and where ‘[security] features are implemented precisely because of their public visibility, which are potentially calculated to manipulate awareness of the threat of terrorism’ (Marcuse, 2006: 921).

More recently in the West, concern has been expressed with regard to attacks against the everyday public places of the city, particularly with the threat posed by person-borne explosive devices or armed attack in a multitude of ‘crowded’ areas such as hospitals, schools, shopping promenades and sports stadia (Coaffee et al., 2008a).⁴ The fear of this type of targeting is setting new challenges for state security agencies. These crowded areas, often described as ‘soft targets’, share common vulnerabilities such as their lack of access control, and this has led to a largely reactive and protective counter-terror response in many western cities through the employment of overt security features. The requirement for security has also been embodied within planning and urban design guidance and regulation, increasingly leading to the greater involvement of planners, architects and urban designers in the designing-in of security features. The message from governments in many western states appears clear and is disseminated widely: defence of the city – of the places where people work, relax and live – is promoted as being central to wider national security (Coaffee et al., 2009).

But what can the, in many aspects, unconventional (to the West) terror attacks in Mumbai and more recently Lahore tell us about the application
of counter-terror policy in cities and the western bias of much traditional terrorism research? And how might more critical terrorism studies be advanced through the increased consideration of contextual factors and more grounded research techniques?

In recent years the fields of critical security and terrorism studies, and others, have forwarded arguments for increasingly interpretative and emancipatory ways of analysing and researching terrorism and counter-terrorism (see for example Bleiker, 2003; Smith, 2005; Moore, 2006). Such arguments have sought to reframe security studies orthodoxy that was popularly utilized to explore the immediate post-9/11 terror threat, and which for many was seen as superficial (Jackson, 2007). This is particularly the case when delving into the complexities of why acts of terror are committed and why certain targets are selected. In short, the modus operandi of terror groups, or networks, requires further (careful) elaboration, especially when there is a tendency for policy-makers to infer that non-western terror trends will migrate into the West and influence urban counter-terrorism policies, and that the groups committing these atrocities are often unproblematically labelled as associates of Al-Qaeda.

**Migrating Modus Operandi**

The modus operandi of international terrorist groups or networks is fluid and transcends national borders. Ever advancing communications clearly means that tactics and targeting options can be exchanged more readily. This situation has also meant that increased attention is being paid by western security services to the techniques of non-western terrorism given the fear of the migration of terror tactics to the western city. In the media we see, on an almost daily basis, a plethora of vehicle-borne or person-borne (suicide) attacks in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, targeting crowded public places such as markets, schools, hotels and hospitals, as well as sites of symbolic and iconic value such as religious and tourist locations. These types of ‘spectacular’ attack (often seen by many as synonymous with Al-Qaeda) aim to maximize causalities and garner media exposure, and utilize multiple coordinated attacks, increasingly relying on hostage-taking.5 They are just the type of attack that is feared might be emulated in a western city. In this regard, the events in Mumbai and Lahore, and how they were reported in the western media, help us critique the bias and over-simplicity of these accounts and help argue for an increasingly nuanced and contextual understanding of the impact of non-western terrorism in the West to inform more appropriate security policy-making.

Whereas it became popular to refer to the attacks in Mumbai in November 2008 as ‘India’s 9/11’, this should not deflect attention from a series of prior attacks the city (and India more generally) has suffered in recent years, and which are relevant to the discussion here. In 1993 a series of coordinated explosions in Mumbai’s central business area left over 260 people dead.6 Bombings during 2006 on the Mumbai rail network, again using multiple coordinated attacks, left over 200 dead. Most recently, in the
period May–September 2008, and just prior to the Mumbai attacks, a series of improvised explosive devices were detonated in and around crowded public places in a number of Indian cities including Jaipur, Bangalore, Ahmedabad and Delhi, at locations including markets, bus stops, car parks and restaurants. Suspicion for the blasts immediately centred upon Pakistani-based organizations, notably Lashkar-e-Taiba, which have only tenuous links with Al-Qaeda (Sageman, 2008) but are committed to fighting against Indian control in Kashmir.

The attacks in Mumbai in late 2008, where small co-ordinated teams of terrorists attacked a number of pre-selected targets with grenades and automatic weapons and used strategies such as mass hostage-taking (killing over 170 and injuring more than 300), were a relatively novel mode of operation and did not necessarily fit the ‘pattern’ of prior Al-Qaeda attacks of recent years. As reported in the UK’s Guardian newspaper: ‘the targets for the attacks were clearly chosen for their iconic value, whether as symbols of Mumbai’s power and wealth, cultural centres associated with western values or places where foreigners gathered’. There were clearly deep cultural and historic forces at play in terms of target selection, although in the immediate aftermath of attack the framing of the western media discourse showed a remarkable, if not unexpected, western bias.

Immediately comparisons were made between these attacks and those normally associated with Al-Qaeda. In some western newspapers this connection was presented as an almost bona fide ‘fact’. In the UK the front page of The Times noted the (apparent) link between Al-Qaeda and the attacks: ‘the coordinated attacks on soft western targets showed all the signs of an Al-Qaeda strategy. Intelligence “chatter” in recent weeks indicated that Al-Qaeda was plotting an attack’. The paper continued by citing ‘unnamed’ counter-terrorism ‘experts’ who argued that the selection of India for the latest ‘spectacular’ was linked to the forthcoming inauguration of US President-elect Obama, ‘probably because that’s where Al-Qaeda has sufficient resources to carry out an attack on this scale’. Security sources cited also noted the attack was ‘typical Al-Qaeda activity’ (The Times, 2008b), although this was immediately contradicted by a perhaps more rational judgement proposed by ‘other sources’ used for the same story. India, it was noted, ‘was home of a complicated network of terrorists and it might be too early to jump to the conclusion that it was an Al-Qaeda operation’ (The Times, 2008b). Indeed, other open source media argued that it was highly likely that there were only marginal links to the network. The Guardian, for example, noted that ‘certainly, the style of attack – more a mass guerrilla assault on a series of soft targets in a major city than the standard spectacular and suicidal blasts that have become associated with strikes linked closely to the Al-Qaeda hardcore – seems to indicate a group that is at best an affiliate of Osama bin Laden’s organisation’ (Guardian, 2008b).

Other features of the immediate western media coverage included a focus upon the proportionally small number of western causalities; the
possibility that some of the gunmen were from the UK; the economic impact of the attacks on Mumbai's standing as a global city; pronouncements about how western leaders would unite to destroy terror networks; and how such attacks could migrate to the western world. These attacks, as Wills and Moore (2009) note, should be viewed with care in that they 'generalise rather than pay attention to the specific context or local interpretations of events', and have the effect of associating Mumbai indelibly with Islamic atrocities. An editorial in the *Guardian* newspaper the week after the attacks articulated this 'western gaze' in relation to two key narratives (*Guardian*, 2008c: 36). First, the explanation that this was 'an assault on capitalist modernity'. Second, that attacks were part of a broader 'war on terror' policy agenda and 'as a continuation of the story that began on September 11th 2001' and that 'until the problems of the Middle East are resolved . . . this is to be expected'. Refreshingly, such knee-jerk responses were problematized and it was concluded that 'both these explanations seek to fit the attacks on India into a western story. Whether it is capitalism under fire or blowback from the Middle East, this is somehow our narrative in a foreign script' (*Guardian*, 2008c: 36).

**Attacking the Soft Sporting Target**

Following the Mumbai attacks cities around the world sought to upgrade their security preparation for potential copycat attack. When this inevitable attack occurred it came not in the West but across the border in Pakistan, when an attack in Lahore in March 2009 against a soft sporting target led once again to the questioning of existing terrorist orthodoxy in terms of tactics and target selection.

Sporting events, with the exception of the attacks at the 1972 Summer Olympics, have remained relatively untouched by international terrorism, although 'security' fears are often used as a justification for cancelling an event. As Simon Barnes noted in *The Times*: 'sport is the world's great soft target, yet has led a relatively charmed life . . . until now'. He continued by noting that it is hard to work out why this is the case: 'Sport, with its huge crowds and big spaces, is essentially insecure. Sport is already a stage and the world is watching. All a terrorist has to do is alter the script and the publicity in the world is his to command' (*The Times*, 2009c). As a result, if major sporting events do take place in 'at risk' states or cities, they often proceed against the backdrop of 'lockdown' security (Coaffee and Murakami Wood, 2006).9

The western reading of the November 2008 Mumbai atrocity was particularly noticeable in the large amount of column inches in all major UK papers regarding the impact of the attacks on the touring English cricket team who flew home immediately following the attacks, given concerns over security. The team were scheduled to have stayed in one of the hotels (the Taj Mahal) that was attacked, during a forthcoming test match. The players did eventually return to India to complete the two test-match series but the location of the matches had changed and security was significantly
enhanced in and around the grounds, with a heavy military presence for the duration of the matches.

In March 2009 armed gunman in Lahore attacked a vehicle convoy of Sri Lankan cricketers and cricket officials, killing eight. The attack bore the hallmarks of the Mumbai atrocities. In the wake of the attack, much of the newspaper coverage focused on its impact upon the global commodity of sport and in particular sport in the West. The headline on the front page of *The Times* the following day noted that sport was ‘in the line of fire as terrorists switch tactics’, adding in the proceeding text that ‘security arrangements for all major sporting events have been cast into doubt after Islamist extremists adopted deadly new terror tactics by attacking international sportsmen’ (*The Times*, 2009a). The inference here was that terror tactics were shifting from suicide attacks towards pre-planned commando-style attacks by well drilled and well armed gunmen against the crowded spaces of sporting spectacle. In particular, there was concern that events in the UK’s so-called ‘golden decade of sport’ would be prime targets, including the World Twenty20 tournament in England (June 2009), the 2012 summer Olympics, the 2014 Commonwealth Games, the 2018 cricket World Cup, the 2015 Rugby Union World Cup, and potentially the 2019 football World Cup (*Guardian*, 2009a).10

In the wake of the Lahore attacks, western media reports were also quick to label Pakistan a ‘failed’ state (*The Times*, 2009b: 4) due to its inability to control security although, as many western states acknowledge, preventing attacks against crowded and easily accessible public places is extremely challenging. The reporting of the Lahore attack, like that in Mumbai, also portrayed it as a further escalation of insecurity that had witnessed over 1500 people killed in the previous two years and had seen certain urban sites fortified:

After the devastating bombing of the Marriot Hotel in Islamabad last year,11 foreign business fled and blast barriers sprung up around hotels and embassies, leaving few significant targets for terrorists to strike. . . . Foreign diplomats are hunkered down in their fortified compounds and travel by armoured car. . . . Quite simply, there was nowhere left to bomb that would grab international headlines. In their minibus, relying on police escorts, the Sri Lankan cricket team was the softest target that could be found. (*The Times*, 2009b: 4)

The impact of the Lahore attack on cricket on the South Asian subcontinent has been immense. Immediately afterwards the New Zealand cricket team cancelled its planned tour in Pakistan due to begin in November 2009. The New Zealand cricket team were also forced to curtail their 2002 tour to Pakistan after a suicide bomber blew up a bus outside the team’s hotel in Karachi. In the wake of the Lahore attack Pakistan was removed as a host venue for the 2011 Cricket World Cup that it was to co-host with Sri Lanka and India. In India the much hyped Indian Premier (cricket) League (IPL) for 2009 was relocated to South Africa for security...
reasons (and because the dates clashed with the upcoming general election).

Towards a Better Understanding of Urban Terrorism

The reaction in the West to the recent events in Mumbai and Lahore has generated much publicity. Whilst the vulnerability of open ‘soft’ urban targets, particularly crowded public places, has long been a concern of security specialists, the commando-style attacks and hostage-taking tactics deployed in India and Pakistan posed urgent questions regarding whether urban areas in the West were prepared for similar style attacks.12

The combined narrative from the attacks in Mumbai and Lahore raise a series of questions for both critical scholars and policy-makers. For example, what are the implications for the West of these attacks? How should the western discourse on terrorism and counter-terrorism attempt to connect to these non-western events? How should the changing and fluid terrorist modus operandi displayed in these attacks be interpreted in different contexts? And, does the securing of cities against possible copycat atrocities give adequate time for policy-makers and security specialists to reflect upon their praxis, rather than reacting in haste? In seeking to explore these questions we can perhaps draw out a number of broad implications of these attacks for future planning and security policy in western cities.

First, what do the seemingly novel (at least in western terms) attacks in Mumbai and Lahore mean for the current direction and operation of urban security policies in the West? If the assumption is that the types of tactics deployed will migrate to western cities, what does this tell us about the limited capacity to prevent such attacks against soft targets through planned-in urban fortification techniques that appear almost de rigueur? Although, in many cases, current urban trajectories emphasize the role of planning in risk management and in enhancing the stability and security of the urban realm, the inevitable complexities and uncertainties involved in ‘foresighting’ urban futures, given expanding, interconnected and ever-diversifying cities, calls for greater attention to be paid to historical and long-term social impacts of current decision-making. The broader implication here is that, just as in Mumbai, western policy-makers need to improve their understanding of the contextual factors and motivations of those who might wish to terrorize rather than simply attempting to ‘design-out’ terrorism using military fortification techniques. Reducing urban vulnerability, it might be argued, can be better achieved through longer-term strategies of education and cross-cultural dialogue in order to better understand the processes by which people become terrorists or lend support to their activities. By such action the threat of attack can, it is hoped, be reduced by changing the mode of anticipatory policy – from one of short-term reaction to one of longer-term reflection through approaches that try to understand the radicalization process and the path towards violent extremism. Anti-radicalization policies, although often highly controversial in the West due
to inherent linkages with immigration, have grown in stature and are increasingly prominent in overarching security and counter-terror policy.

Second, attacks such as those on Mumbai and Lahore have, in many western cities, served to ratchet up fear of imminent terrorism against everyday urban spaces such as shopping centres, sporting events and even the neighbourhood. A key aspect of terrorism, and indeed its escalation, lies in the ability of groups to inculcate a sense of fear — often through indiscriminate or unpredictable attacks or the risk from future attack. Here, as part of a well rounded counter-terrorism strategy, government and media pronouncements have a key role to play in not exaggerating the threat of attack or in not acting too hastily or on the basis of partial intelligence. A recent case in point occurred over the 2009 Easter period in the UK where a number of individuals suspected of planning an imminent ‘Mumbai-style’ spectacular — what Prime Minster Gordon Brown referred to as a ‘very big terrorist plot’ — supposedly against an array of shopping areas in northwest England, were arrested in dawn raids under anti-terrorist legalisation (Manchester Evening News, 2009a). They were all subsequently released uncharged (or deported), leaving an indelible unjustified suspicion of criminalization over local Muslim communities (Manchester Evening News, 2009b), which could, it is feared, assist violent extremism (Guardian, 2009b). Here there is a clear need to enhance communication between citizens and the state regarding national security in ways that do not generate fear of terrorism as an ambient characteristic of urban areas.

Third, how might those engaged in the study of terrorism develop a more rounded view of the process, tactics and targeting of terrorism? As emerging work in critical terrorism studies is arguing, what is required are accounts and studies which focus on local contingency and ideas of post-colonialism rather than broader, largely western-based and eurocentric discourses to explain the causes and implications of non-western terrorism. For example, recent work on Indian terrorism by Wills and Moore (2009: 4) has argued that to fully understand the cause and effect of recent urban attacks, a contrapuntal reading is required so as to ‘draw attention to the complex webs of interactions between metropolitan history and other histories dominated by it’. This would enrich more focused analytical studies which have shed much needed light on the emergence of groups and social networks, their internal differences and their implications for specific regions.13 This, like better understanding radicalization, is a long-term project that is all too easily subsumed by the need for policy-makers to ‘react now’ rather than reflecting upon the long-term consequences of their action.

Overall, the westernized responses to the attacks in Mumbai and Lahore present a limited account of the complex historical, cultural, political and geographical context. They also unproblematically assert that the attacks were Al-Qaeda-related, fitting the narrative neatly into the broader and dominant European and US-centric ‘war on terror’ discourse. If, however, terrorism is seen as a strategy, where particular modus operandi can relatively easily migrate between groups, this infers that strong
ideological connections simply on the basis of similar tactics should not be made (Wills and Moore, 2009). Increasingly, though, more critical work is producing alternative readings that highlight the complexities and motivations of terrorists groups and the wider socio-cultural and everyday impacts of terrorism and counter-terrorism responses on urban citizens.

In short, making traditional assumptions and deploying broad-brush terms to cover ‘a spectrum of violent activity’ (Neumann and Smith, 2008: 2) will produce ‘superficial results’ that have led many to question the veracity of current debates regarding the actual threat posed to urban areas from international terrorism, the types of targets that might be attacked as well as the justification for the current trend of urban militarization to counter this apparently inevitable threat. The challenge is for a more nuanced and reflexive approach to emerge for counter-terror and security policy-making, and by extension urban planning; one where adequate time is taken for reflection and for developing a longer-term view of what is the appropriate response linked to local contingences of place and one which can better balance risk management with the public interest.

Notes
1. For example, speaking in the wake of the 2004 Madrid train attacks and in relation to a threat against central London, the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police noted that a terror attack on London was ‘inevitable’ (BBC News, 2004).
2. The pre-emptive anticipatory logic of this form of security policy-making can, in many ways, be viewed as a consolidation of Ulrich Beck’s risk society thesis where risk is seen as an unacceptable danger framed as a sense of impending and seemingly unavoidable threat (Beck, 1992, 1995, 1999). In Beck’s more recent world risk society thesis attention centred upon large-scale risk, particularly given concerns regarding nuclear power generation and climate change. But whilst such perils represented Acts 1 and 2 of the world risk society ‘play’, the events of 11 September represented the commencement of a third act, and signalled the ‘universalizing’ of the fear of terrorist attacks against urban areas and their critical infrastructures (Beck, 2008).
3. Anderson (2007: 159), for example, has noted how ‘fear, dread and anxiety accompany the emergence of anticipatory logics of governance’ and how ‘heightened concerns about a range of risks, now in almost every conceivable sphere of thought and life, are argued to have generated a culture of fear’.
4. This was particularly the case in the wake of the attacks in Madrid in 2004 and those in London on 7 July 2005.
5. One reason for hostage-taking is to draw out attacks – often to generate more media coverage.
6. As the Guardian newspaper reported in 2006, ‘at the time it was the world’s worst terrorist attack. Planned by the Muslim gangs in the city as payback to the Hindus who went on months of rampage from late 1992, demolishing mosques and killing indiscriminately, the bombings permanently scarred India’ (cited in Wills and Moore, 2009).
7. In many ways, they bore more resemblance to the type of terror attack that periodically occurred during the 1970s.
8. The Australian cricket team, for example, cancelled a planned tour of Pakistan in 2008 as a result of security concerns following a series of suicide bombings. Additionally, the 2008 Champions Trophy cricket competition was postponed in August 2008 after complaints by a number of participating teams that the security situation in Pakistan had not improved. At the time of writing, in August 2009, the English Badminton team withdrew from the World Badminton Championships due to take place in Hyderabad, India, due to a specific, but undisclosed, terrorist threat.

9. These temporary ‘states of exception’ (Agamben, 2005), where fixed duration militarization and draconian legal procedures dominate urban spaces, are becoming increasingly normalized characteristics of major sporting spectacles.

10. Others expressed surprise that more common league sporting fixtures had not been targeted as yet. Arsene Wenger, the manager of English Premiership football side Arsenal, noted that ‘football has not been attacked but you wonder why not. Sport is good for attracting attention’ (News of the World, 2009).

11. This bombing occurred on 20 September 2008, killing at least 50 people and injuring over 250.

12. For example, in the UK security and intelligence agencies immediately began their own study of the implications of this attack. Subsequent security documents released indicate how this had taken effect (HM Government, 2009).


References


**Jon Coaffee** is a Professor of Spatial Planning in the Centre for Urban and Regional Studies, University of Birmingham, UK. He has published widely on the social and economic future of cities, especially the impact of security and terrorism on the functioning of urban areas. He currently holds a number of UK research council grants related to national security policy and at present is undertaking work on models and impact of Olympic security. [email: j.coaffee@bham.ac.uk]