

Problematic Potential: The Human Rights Consequences of Peacekeeping Interventions in Civil Wars

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ABSTRACT

Does peacekeeping intervention improve the human rights situation in states with a history of civil war? While this question has received a myriad of attention and debate within the human rights community, there have been relatively few studies that attempt to answer this question. Examining the characteristics of peacekeeping following civil war from 1980 to 2004, this article finds that peacekeeping can both encourage and undermine respect for human rights. Specifically, the mission and activities of peacekeepers matter. These findings support the human rights community's stance that peacekeeping can be problematic but holds promise for human rights in post-conflict states.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Does peacekeeping intervention improve the human rights situation in states with a history of civil war?¹ This question has received a myriad of attention and debate within the human rights practitioner community, especially among human rights NGOs operating in states with ongoing or recurring civil conflicts.² Given the well-established link between civil war and negative human rights practices, many in the human rights community argue that efforts to intervene after civil conflicts and to halt potential human rights atrocities should be encouraged.³ Others within the human rights community, however, have argued that advocating for any outside intervention is problematic and can cause more harm than good for future human rights practices within a state.⁴

Surprisingly, despite attention and debate within the human rights practitioner community, the influence of peacekeeping interventions on human rights conditions has received only limited theoretical attention from human rights scholars studying either intrastate conflict intervention and management or human rights. Further, as pointed out by human rights practitioners, there are no empirical studies on the effects of third party interventions, either during or after civil wars, on human rights practices.⁵ Compared to states

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1. A peacekeeping intervention is minimally defined as any intervention by an outside state or international organization into the internal affairs of a state with the goal of preventing a resumption of military hostilities or to provide an environment where negotiations can occur. See Paul F. Diehl, Daniel Druckman & James Wall, *International Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution: A Taxonomic Analysis with Implications*, 42 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 33 (1998); Nicholas Sambanis, *Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of the Theoretical Literature*, 52 WORLD POL. 437 (2000); ROLAND PARIS, *AT WAR'S END: BUILDING PEACE AFTER CIVIL CONFLICT* (2004); Mark J. Mullenbach, *Deciding to Keep Peace: An Analysis of International Influences on the Establishment of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions*, 49 INT'L STUD. Q. 529 (2005). In line with the definitions of the Armed Conflict/Uppsala Conflict Data Program, a civil war is any internal armed conflict or internationalized internal armed conflict with at least 1000 battle-related deaths. Nils Petter Gleditch, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg & Havard Strand, *Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset*, 39 J. PEACE RES. 615, 619 (2002).
 2. See, e.g., Kenneth L. Cain, *The Rape of Dinah: Human Rights, Civil War in Liberia, and Evil Triumphant*, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 265 (1999); Liam Mahony, *Military Interventions in Human Rights Crises: Responses and Dilemmas for the Human Rights Movement* (Int'l Council of Human Rights Policy (ICHRP), Working Paper, 2001); Hugo Slim, *Military Intervention to Protect Human Rights: The Humanitarian Agency Perspective* (ICHRP, Working Paper, 2001); ICHRP, *HUMAN RIGHTS CRISES: NGO RESPONSES TO MILITARY INTERVENTIONS* (2002); Ken Roth, *War in Iraq: Not a Humanitarian Intervention*, in *HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2004: HUMAN RIGHTS AND ARMED CONFLICT* 13 (2004).
 3. See Mahony, *supra* note 2; Slim, *supra* note 2; ICHRP, *supra* note 2.
 4. See Cain, *supra* note 2; Mahony, *supra* note 2.
 5. A notable exception to the paucity of research on the impact of military interventions on human rights is James D. Meernik, Steven C. Poe & Erum Shaikh, *The Use of Military Force To Promote Human Rights*, in *CONFLICT PREVENTION AND PEACE BUILDING IN POST-WAR*

without peacekeepers, how is the human rights performance of conflict-prone states affected by peacekeeping interventions? Moreover, within states with peacekeepers, what actions or conditions help human rights performance after intrastate war? Existing scholarship fails to address these questions and thus offers little guidance to human rights practitioners interested in any potential human rights payoff from peacekeeping interventions.

This article seeks to fill these gaps in the literature and offers tentative answers for the human rights community. It argues that the mere presence of peacekeepers in a state with a history of civil war will not lead to improvements in human rights practices. However, certain actions by peacekeepers can influence human rights performance. First, the purpose of the intervention matters. If the intervention has a strong humanitarian purpose, we argue that human rights performance, particularly physical integrity rights, such as freedom from torture, political imprisonment, disappearance, and extrajudicial killing, will improve. Second, peacekeeping interventions that facilitate mediation improve human rights performance by encouraging the transmission of information between belligerents through means other than torture or political terror. Finally, the human rights performance of the lead peacekeeping state should, if peacekeepers act abroad as they do at home, affect the human rights performance of the conflict-prone state.

These propositions are tested quantitatively and offer widespread support for our arguments and suggest many avenues for future research. Somewhat surprisingly, however, greater domestic respect by the lead peacekeeping state for human rights does not affect the human rights performance in the state where the intervention occurred. This finding could indicate that peacekeepers do not carry their home values abroad, in contrast to the ideological continua literature. Additionally, though powerful at improving physical integrity rights, some actions by peacekeepers can have negative externalities with respect to empowerment rights, such as freedom of speech. This is not surprising given the nature of peacekeeping missions and the causal mechanisms through which peacekeepers try to enforce peace, including enforcing restrictions on movement.⁶

This research thus provides evidence of both the potential and the problems of peacekeeping interventions from a human rights perspective. The findings add to human rights scholarship, which has not previously examined how attempts to mediate or manage conflict can affect future human rights

SOCIETIES: SUSTAINING THE PEACE 160 (James D. Meernik & T. David Mason eds., 2006). Unlike our focus on peacekeeping interventions, their article focuses on all uses of force by the United States. See also MARI KATAYANAGI, HUMAN RIGHTS FUNCTIONS OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (2002), for a fascinating inquiry into human rights aspects of UN peacekeeping.

6. VIRGINIA PAGE FORTNA, DOES PEACEKEEPING WORK? SHAPING BELLIGERENTS' CHOICES AFTER CIVIL WAR (2008).

practices. By examining an additional consequence of third party interventions, these findings also add to present scholarship on intrastate conflicts.⁷ In all, the results are in line with Amnesty International's position on third party interventions in civil conflicts: "We do not call for military action, nor do we oppose it, but we do campaign on how such interventions should be conducted."⁸

This article first discusses the relevant literature and central arguments. Next, this article lays out the research design and empirical methodology. The model results and substantive significance of these results follow. Finally, the article concludes by outlining the implications of these findings for theory and examining how this research could inform future inquiries concerning both civil wars and human rights.

II. BACKGROUND AND THEORY

To develop the argument, this article draws on two largely distinct theoretical literatures: (1) peacekeeping interventions after civil conflict; and (2) human rights practices. This article first outlines previous theories of the effects of peacekeeping and then incorporates them into the human rights framework. After this, the article presents the testable implications of the argument.

A. The Effect of Peacekeeping Interventions

Much research on the effects of peacekeeping following World War II has focused on how peacekeepers influence the length of peace following conflict.⁹ According to this literature, peacekeeping in states with a history of civil conflict is generally effective.¹⁰ Focusing only on UN peacekeeping forces, Michael Doyle and Nicolas Sambanis contend that interventions can be successful at keeping peace and encouraging democratization if implemented in the first few years after civil conflict.¹¹ Likewise, focusing both on UN and non-UN peacekeeping missions after the Cold War, Virginia Page

7. See MICHAEL W. DOYLE & NICHOLAS SAMBANIS, *MAKING WAR AND BUILDING PEACE: UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS* (2006); Patrick M. Regan, *The Short Term Effects of Military Interventions in Civil Conflict*, 7 INT'L NEGOT. 363 (2002).

8. Pierre Sané, *Foreword* to AMNESTY INT'L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2000 (2000).

9. See FORTNA, *DOES PEACEKEEPING WORK?*, *supra* note 6; DOYLE & SAMBANIS, *MAKING WAR AND BUILDING PEACE*, *supra* note 7.

10. Seminal pieces on peacekeeping after civil war include: Caroline Hartzell, Matthew Hoddie & Donald Rothchild, *Stabilizing the Peace After Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variables*, 55 INT'L ORG. 183 (2001); Mullenbach, *supra* note 1; FORTNA, *DOES PEACEKEEPING WORK?*, *supra* note 6.

11. DOYLE & SAMBANIS, *MAKING WAR AND BUILDING PEACE*, *supra* note 7.

Fortna illustrates that peacekeeping forces increase the duration of peace.¹² By changing the incentives of belligerents and providing credible information about each party's intentions, peacekeepers lessen the need for each side to return to violence.

Despite these widespread findings on the effectiveness of peacekeeping, some extant research has found that the effect of peacekeeping can be limited.¹³ Moreover, when peacekeeping does occur, not all interventions are equal.¹⁴ The effects of peacekeeping interventions can differ because of the peacekeeping mission's purpose and objectives, leadership, or activities on the ground. While some peacekeeping operations have minimal objectives, others have multifaceted purposes including providing security during elections or delivering humanitarian assistance. Also, the current generation of UN peacekeeping missions often includes objectives concerning democratization and infrastructure development.¹⁵ When belligerents cooperate, multidimensional interventions are more successful than interventions with limited objectives aimed at increasing the duration of peace and encouraging democratization.¹⁶ Overall, Fortna finds that traditional peacekeeping operations are more successful at reducing the risk of recurring war.¹⁷

Existing research also finds that the effects of peacekeeping are somewhat dependent on operational leadership. Fortna, for example, observes that while non-UN led interventions could be more successful at reducing the risk of war recurrence, UN missions are often sent to the more difficult situations.¹⁸ Alan James also highlights the differences between peacekeeping missions established by the UN, regional organizations, and ad-hoc groups of states, especially in terms of military muscle.¹⁹ Additionally, both scholarly and

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12. FORTNA, DOES PEACEKEEPING WORK?, *supra* note 6. Although these studies bode well for peacekeeping interventions, others have recently questioned some of the methodological underpinnings for these conclusions. See, e.g., Gary King & Langche Zeng, *When Can History Be Our Guide? The Pitfalls of Counterfactual Inference*, 51 INT'L STUD. Q. 183 (2007). In line with these critiques, Michael J. Gilligan and Ernest J. Sergenti re-estimated many of the classic peacekeeping models and found similar results to those listed above. Michael J. Gilligan & Ernest J. Sergenti, *Do UN Interventions Cause Peace? Using Matching To Improve Causal Inference*, 3 Q. J. POL. SCI. 89 (2008).
 13. Amitabh Dubey, *Domestic Institutions and the Duration of Civil War Settlements*, Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association (2002).
 14. See FORTNA, DOES PEACEKEEPING WORK?, *supra* note 6; Sambanis, *supra* note 1.
 15. See FORTNA, DOES PEACEKEEPING WORK?, *supra* note 6; DOYLE & SAMBANIS, MAKING WAR AND BUILDING PEACE, *supra* note 7.
 16. Michael Doyle & Nicholas Sambanis, *International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis*, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 779 (2000).
 17. Virginia Page Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War*, 48 INT'L STUD. Q. 269 (2004).
 18. *Id.*
 19. ALAN JAMES, PEACEKEEPING IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1990); Alan James, *Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era*, 50 INT'L J. 241 (1995).

journalistic accounts of peacekeeping missions stress how individual states differ in their approach to peacekeeping, which could affect the long-term impacts of peacekeeping operations.²⁰

In addition to the influence of mission objectives and leadership differences, the activities and actions taken within the peacekeeping mission also influence the conflict-prone state. For example, a growing number of post-civil war peacekeeping operations include mediation attempts by peacekeepers.²¹ Though most of the literature on mediation focuses on interstate wars, the activity appears to hold much promise for conflict resolution in general.²² Generally, mediation and communication can lead to quicker war settlements and less escalation, and early mediation can lower the duration of future disputes.²³ Mediation also encourages the exchange of information on the characteristics of belligerents that are not readily observable, such as resolve, power, and costs of war.²⁴ To note, the informational role of mediation attempts is similar to the causal mechanism Fortna highlights as critical to peacekeeping success.²⁵

In short, previous research on peacekeeping interventions emphasizes the role peacekeeping plays in increasing the duration of peace following conflict cessation and, in certain instances, encouraging democratization. Despite this generally favorable view within the scholarly literature, peacekeeping is not always seen as a positive force within the human rights community. In fact, many human rights reports bring attention to the number of human rights atrocities committed by peacekeepers.²⁶ Likewise, many human rights NGOs have highlighted the limited attention paid to human rights by peacekeeping missions.²⁷ Moreover, because the intervention's

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20. See Joel J. Sokolsky, *Great Ideals and Uneasy Compromises: The United States Approach to Peacekeeping*, 50 INT'L J. 266 (1995); George Klay Kieh, *International Organizations and Peacekeeping in Africa*, in PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA: ECOMOG IN LIBERIA 12 (Karl P. Magyar & Earl Conteh-Morgan eds., 1998); Terry Mays, *Nigerian Foreign Policy and Its Participation in ECOMOG*, in PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA, *supra*, at 106.
 21. Mediation attempts are typically defined as nonviolent, non-binding, and consent based communication interventions by third parties. For a thorough discussion of this, see William J. Dixon, *Third-Party Techniques for Preventing Conflict Escalation and Promoting Peaceful Settlement*, 50 INT'L ORG. 653 (1996); Andrew Kydd, *Which Side Are You On? Bias, Credibility, and Mediation*, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 597 (2003).
 22. See Dixon, *supra* note 21; Kydd, *supra* note 21.
 23. See Dixon, *supra* note 21; Patrick M. Regan & Allan C. Stam, *In the Nick of Time: Conflict Management, Mediation Timing, and the Duration of Interstate Disputes*, 44 INT'L STUD. Q. 239 (2000).
 24. Kydd, *supra* note 21.
 25. FORTNA, DOES PEACEKEEPING WORK?, *supra* note 6.
 26. See SHERENE RAZACK, DARK THREATS AND WHITE KNIGHTS: THE SOMALIA AFFAIR, PEACEKEEPING, AND THE NEW IMPERIALISM (2004); Letter from Kenneth Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch & Steve Crawshaw, UN Advocacy Director, Human Rights Watch, to Ban Ki-moon, Secretary-General, United Nations (30 Apr. 2008), available at <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/04/30/un-tackle-wrongdoing-peacekeepers-0>.
 27. ICHRP, *supra* note 2; Roth & Crawshaw, *supra* note 26; AMENSY INT'L, 15 POINT PROGRAM FOR IMPLEMENTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (2008), available at http://www.genderandpeacekeeping.org/resources/5_Amnesty_International.pdf.

focus is on preventing a reoccurrence of conflict, human rights violations by the government may be ignored by peacekeepers. For example, in a recent interview with the Lawyer's Committee for Human Rights, a UN peacekeeping officer in El Salvador stated that the mission chose not to focus on human rights violations by the government because "highlighting their violations would do more harm than good, and put weapons in the hands of the anti-accords folks."²⁸ Therefore, despite the role of peacekeeping in reducing the risk of future war, as outlined above, its influence on human rights is theoretically unclear.

B. Human Rights Practices

Before outlining how peacekeeping interventions can be incorporated into a human rights framework, we must first provide some background on the human rights literature within international relations. To begin, it is important to note that the focus in this article is on de facto human rights practices, not de jure human rights protection. As such, the focus is not on human rights treaty ratification; instead, the focus is on whether human rights practices within a state are consistent with the rights granted all individuals under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Much recent research has concluded that the signing or ratification of human rights treaties has little influence on actual human rights practices within a state.²⁹ It has been posited that human rights treaty ratification is a result of preexisting respect for human rights, not a cause of any future improvements.³⁰

Therefore, as to de facto human rights practices, previous research has shown a wide variety of factors that influence human rights performance. Specifically, per capita income levels and democracy have been repeatedly found to be correlated with better human rights practices within a state.³¹

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28. LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, *IMPROVISING HISTORY: A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER MISSION IN EL SALVADOR* 37 (1995).
 29. Oona Hathaway, *Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?*, 111 *YALE L.J.* 1935 (2002); TODD LANDMAN, *PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY* (2005); Emilie Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, *Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty Promises*, 110 *AM. J. SOC.* 1373 (2005); Eric Neumayer, *Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?*, 49 *J. CONFLICT RESOL.* 925 (2005).
 30. See BETH SIMMONS, *MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS* (2009); Hathaway, *supra* note 29.
 31. See Neil J. Mitchell & James M. McCormick, *Economic and Political Explanations of Human Rights Violations*, 40 *WORLD POL.* 476 (1988); Conway W. Henderson, *Conditions Affecting the Use of Political Repression*, 35 *J. CONFLICT RESOL.* 120 (1991); Steven C. Poe & C. Neal Tate, *Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis*, 88 *AM. POL. SCI. REV.* 853 (1994); Steven C. Poe, C. Neal Tate & Linda Camp Keith, *Repression of the Human Right to Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years 1976-1993*, 43 *INT'L STUD. Q.* 291 (1999); David L. Cingranelli & David L. Richards, *Respect for Human Rights After the End of the Cold War*, 36 *J. PEACE RES.* 511 (1999); David L. Richards, Ronald D. Gellenny & David H. Sacko, *Money with a Mean Streak? Foreign Economic Penetration and Government Respect for Human Rights in Developing Countries*, 45 *INT'L STUD. Q.* 219 (2001).

Conversely, large population size and the presence of violent conflict are associated with fewer human rights practices within a state.³²

First, economic resources and development have been found to increase respect for human rights within a state.³³ When economic benefits are distributed throughout a state, individuals have greater resources with which to work against repressive regimes.³⁴ Likewise, individuals are less likely to revolt due to scarcity, eliminating some possible opportunities for repression by elites.³⁵

Next, there are many studies linking consolidated democracy to increases in human rights realization.³⁶ Researchers have argued that increased political freedoms, better civil-military relations, and a pro-human rights norm form the basis behind this link. Democracy gives individuals a voice to articulate human rights concerns and a mechanism with which to punish human rights abusers.³⁷

As stated above, larger population sizes have been associated with increases in human rights violations.³⁸ Population increases can lead to scarcity, leading to more opportunities for repression and, perhaps, more reasons for individuals to revolt. Moreover, a large population simply gives more opportunities for repression by the state and a larger base with which the state can diffuse or hide violations.

Most pertinent to this discussion, previous human rights research has found strong correlations between international and civil conflict and decreases in human rights performance.³⁹ This is not surprising given recent conflicts: Kosovo, Bosnia, and the Iraq situation, for example, all show the devastation that civil or international conflict can have on human rights conditions within a state. Intrastate or interstate war can threaten the existing regime, leading state leaders to severely repress citizens in order to try to

32. Conway W. Henderson, *Population Pressures and Political Repression*, 74 Soc. Sci. Q. 322 (1993); Poe & Tate, *supra* note 31; Poe, Tate & Keith, *supra* note 31; Richards, Gelleny & Sacko, *supra* note 31.

33. Mitchell & McCormick, *supra* note 31; Poe & Tate, *supra* note 31; Poe, Tate & Keith, *supra* note 31; Cingranelli & Richards, *Respect for Human Rights After the End of the Cold War*, *supra* note 31; Richards, Gelleny & Sacko, *supra* note 31.

34. Poe & Tate, *supra* note 31; Richards, Gelleny & Sacko, *supra* note 31.

35. Poe & Tate, *supra* note 31.

36. For a thorough discussion of democracy and repression, see CHRISTIAN DAVENPORT, *STATE REPRESSION AND THE DOMESTIC DEMOCRATIC PEACE* (2007).

37. On the other hand, there are also studies linking democratic transitions to negative human rights practices. See Helen Fein, *More Murder in the Middle: Life-Integrity Violations and Democracy in the World, 1987*, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 170 (1995). The arguments for this are very similar to the arguments linking civil war to democratic transitions. See Edward D. Mansfield & Jack Snyder, *Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength, and War*, 56 INT'L ORG. 297 (2002).

38. Henderson, *supra* note 32; Poe & Tate, *supra* note 31; Poe, Tate & Keith, *supra* note 31; Richards, Gelleny & Sacko, *supra* note 31.

39. Poe & Tate, *supra* note 31; Poe, Tate & Keith, *supra* note 31.

limit any perceived domestic threats to their tenure.⁴⁰ Limits on human rights are even justified or condoned in war situations due to security or scarcity concerns. Because of the more direct threat from the domestic population, the impact of civil war is typically greater on human rights practices than is the impact of international war.⁴¹

In short, most research on human rights practices have highlighted the positive effect that high income levels and democracy have on human rights while also showing the negative effect that a large population size and conflict have on human rights.

C. Hypotheses

As mentioned, many in the human rights practitioner community are concerned with limiting the human rights consequences of civil war. As such, the community has debated the influence that third party interventions in states with a history of civil war could have on human rights practices.⁴² Given the current literatures on human rights practices and peacekeeping, outlined above, this article argues that human rights are indeed impacted by peacekeeping after civil wars, although the consequences of these interventions are not one-dimensional. Below, is an outline of the central arguments and testable implications.

Underlying the central argument of this article is the contention that the existing conflict management literature needs to focus on the effects of peacekeeping on human rights. By focusing on human rights, the definition of a successful intervention expands.⁴³ Although preventing future hostilities may be the primary goal of a peacekeeping intervention, it is consistent with existing conflict management literature to examine whether human rights performance is an alternative or secondary effect of the intervention.⁴⁴ Likewise, because low human rights performance can lead to future civil wars, the influence of interventions on this cycle of repression and response is both theoretically interesting and politically important.⁴⁵

40. Ted Robert Gurr, *The Political Origins of State Violence and Terror: A Theoretical Analysis*, in GOVERNMENT VIOLENCE AND REPRESSION: AN AGENDA FOR RESEARCH 45 (Michael Stohl & George A. Lopez eds., 1986); Poe & Tate, *supra* note 31.

41. Poe, Tate & Keith, *supra* note 31.

42. Cain, *supra* note 2; Mahony, *supra* note 2; ICHRP, *supra* note 2; Roth, *supra* note 2.

43. See Barbara F. Walter, *Designing Transitions from Civil War: Demobilization, Democratization, and Commitments to Peace*, 24 INT'L SECURITY 127 (1999); Regan, *supra* note 7.

44. Regan, *supra* note 7; DOYLE & SAMBANIS, MAKING WAR AND BUILDING PEACE, *supra* note 7.

45. Oskar Thoms & James Ron, *Do Human Rights Violations Cause Internal Conflict?*, 29 HUM. RTS. Q. 674 (2007).

First, it is a rather straightforward concept that peacekeeping interventions will not be a general human rights solution. At the most basic level, as stressed by human rights NGOs, peacekeeping interventions are often “political . . . with a human rights coating so people . . . accept it more.”⁴⁶ As mentioned above, the overarching focus on preventing future hostilities might allow human rights abuses by governments to continue despite the presence of a peacekeeping intervention. Likewise, peacekeepers themselves may cause additional human rights violations.

Moreover, the causal mechanisms through which peacekeeping interventions create durable peace, as outlined by Fortna, imply divergent effects on human rights performance within the conflict-prone state.⁴⁷ Peacekeepers often play an important role in providing information which could lessen the need for torture or physical integrity abuses to gain information from potential combatants. By trying to change the incentives of potential rebel groups to resort to violence, however, peacekeeping could actually lead to increases in threatening actions from the government to potential rebels. Thus, though peacekeeping may work to prevent the recurrence of conflict, the human rights payoff to this work is potentially slight. Therefore, it is expected that:

HYPOTHESIS 1: Among all states experiencing civil wars, the mere presence of a peacekeeping intervention will not lead to improvements in human rights.

When peacekeeping interventions do occur, as outlined above, the existing literature indicates that they are not equally effective.⁴⁸ From this literature, therefore, several dynamics are expected to occur with respect to human rights. First, consistent with actions taken by human rights INGOs, peacekeeping operations that include a humanitarian objective should have more of an effect on human rights performance. Just like Michael Doyle’s and Nicholas Sambanis’s finding that interventions with a democracy-building objective have a greater influence on democratization, having an objective relating specifically to the conditions of citizens in the conflict-prone state should increase the intervention’s influence on human rights.⁴⁹ Thus, it is expected that:

HYPOTHESIS 2: Among all civil-war prone states with a peacekeeping intervention, a formal humanitarian purpose in the peacekeeping mission will lead to a better human rights outcome.

46. LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, *supra* note 28, at 18.

47. FORTNA, DOES PEACEKEEPING WORK?, *supra* note 6.

48. *Id.*; DOYLE & SAMBANIS, MAKING WAR AND BUILDING PEACE, *supra* note 7.

49. Doyle & Sambanis, *International Peacebuilding*, *supra* note 16.

Likewise, peacekeeping missions that concentrate on information transmission between former belligerents are expected to increase human rights performance, especially with regards to physical integrity rights, by lessening the need for torture or political imprisonment as a way to get information. Hence, it is implied that:

HYPOTHESIS 3: Among all civil-war prone states with a peacekeeping intervention, a mediation attempt during the peacekeeping intervention will lead to a better human rights outcome, especially with regards to physical integrity rights.

Finally, respect for human rights at home matters for encouraging human rights abroad. This is consistent with literature on ideological continua.⁵⁰ As Brian Rathbun pointed out, “individuals project their values from home abroad.”⁵¹ For our purposes, this projection of human rights values abroad could be found either in individual soldiers involved in the intervention or in the political elites electing to intervene. Regardless, the following is expected:

HYPOTHESIS 4: Among all civil-war prone states with a peacekeeping intervention, interventions led by a state with high human rights practices domestically are more likely to improve human rights in the civil war prone state.

Despite the literature on ideological continua, however, there are many accounts of human rights abuses by peacekeepers from countries with a high domestic respect for human rights.⁵² For example, Canadian peacekeepers in Somalia in 1993 tortured a teenager to death and forced others to be videotaped while sodomized.⁵³ These actions, if widespread, could indicate that the domestic conditions of states that contribute peacekeepers are of little consequence to the human rights influence of peacekeeping interventions in war-prone states. Moreover, the leading contributors of forces to peacekeeping missions are often non-democracies with little domestic respect for human rights. This rationale implies that Hypothesis 4 might receive little empirical support.

50. See SHOON KATHLEEN MURRAY, *ANCHORS AGAINST CHANGE* (1996); Jeffrey Pickering & Mark Peceny, *Forging Democracy at Gunpoint*, 50 *INT'L STUD. Q.* 539 (2006); Brian C. Rathbun, *Hierarchy and Community at Home and Abroad: Evidence of a Common Structure of Domestic and Foreign Policy Beliefs in American Elites*, 51 *J. CONFLICT RESOL.* 379 (2007).

51. Rathbun, *supra* note 50, at 381.

52. RAZACK, *supra* note 26; KATAYANGI, *supra* note 5.

53. RAZACK, *supra* note 26.

III. RESEARCH DESIGN

In order to examine the validity of the four hypotheses listed above, we constructed a panel dataset of one row per year (t) per country (i) of all countries with at least one civil war in the past ten years during the time period 1980 to 2004. This time period was chosen because of the use of the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset (CIRI), which is available on a sample of 159 countries from 1981 to 2005, and the Political Terror Scale, which is available on a sample of 147 countries from 1980 to 2005. When these datasets were combined with available datasets on peacekeeping interventions, this yielded a sample of roughly 550 observations for statistical models concerning all states that have experienced a civil war and roughly 130 observations for statistical models concerning states with peacekeeping interventions.

A. Model Specification

To examine each of the hypotheses, we constructed different statistical models, each with a slightly different key independent variable and sample.

To examine Hypotheses 1, Model 1 examines the effect of peacekeeping interventions on human rights performance in cases of civil wars. We used a dichotomous indicator of the presence or absence of an intervention, *Peacekeeping Intervention*, as the key independent variable. This data is from the Mullenbach and Dixon TPI-Intrastate Disputes Project.⁵⁴

As a test of Hypothesis 2, Model 2 examines the effect of having a stated humanitarian purpose in peacekeeping missions. For this model, the focus is only on cases where there was a peacekeeping intervention. *Humanitarian Purpose*, the key independent variable, is again from the Mullenbach and Dixon TPI-Intrastate Disputes Project and is coded as 1 if any of the purposes of the mission include a humanitarian focus. Of the roughly 130 observations within the sample, twenty included a peacekeeping mission with a humanitarian purpose.

Next, for Hypothesis 3, which examines the effect of a mediation attempt within peacekeeping interventions on human rights performance, Model 3's key independent variable is *Mediation*, a dichotomous indicator from the Mullenbach and Dixon TPI-Intrastate Disputes Project dataset, representing any attempted mediation by third parties during the peacekeeping intervention. Similar to Model 2, in Model 3 the focus is only on

54. Mark J. Mullenbach & William Dixon, *Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions: 1946–2006, Version 2.1. Codebook* (2007), available at http://faculty.uca.edu/~markm/tpi_peacekeeping_codebook.htm.

cases of peacekeeping intervention in the civil war. Of the roughly 130 observations within the sample, 100 included a mediation attempt during the peacekeeping mission.

Finally, in order to test Hypothesis 4, whether the domestic human rights records of peacekeeping interveners matter for their influence on human rights in the state of intervention, we constructed a dataset, used in Model 4, with the various human rights scores of the lead peacekeeping intervener in each state. The name of the lead intervening state came from the Mullenbach and Dixon TPI-Intrastate Disputes Project. Data on human rights scores came from CIRI Human Rights Data Project and the Political Terror Scales (PTS).⁵⁵ Therefore, corresponding to each of the operationalizations of the dependent variable, discussed below, we created four separate key independent variables: *Lead Peacekeeping Intervener CIRI-Empowerment Score*, *Lead Peacekeeping Intervener CIRI-Physical Integrity*, *Lead Peacekeeping Intervener PTS-Amnesty*, and *Lead Peacekeeping Intervener PTS-State Department*.

B. Dependent Variable

The dependent variables in each of the models are different human rights index scores for the states with civil wars. As mentioned, we use the *CIRI-Empowerment Score*, *CIRI-Physical Integrity Rights*, the *PTS-Amnesty*, and the *PTS-State Department*.

The PTS are ordinal measures from 1 to 5 (1 = fully protected, 5 = widespread terror) that have been widely utilized in research on human rights practices. The PTS-Amnesty measure is based on country reports from Amnesty International.⁵⁶ The PTS-State Department measure is based on country reports from the US State Department. Following conventional practice, these scales were reversed so that they match the direction of the CIRI scales; for this research, higher scores thus equal more human rights protection.⁵⁷

A common critique of the PTS, however, is their focus on mainly personal integrity rights and their insensitivity in distinguishing between the practices of extreme states.⁵⁸ Therefore, we also use the CIRI aggregated

55. Mark Gibney & Matthew Dalton, *The Political Terror Scale*, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 73 (David Cingranelli ed., 1996); David Cingranelli & David L. Richards, The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Data Project Coding Manual, Version 7.30.08. (2008), available at http://ciri.binghamton.edu/documentation/ciri_coding_guide.pdf.

56. See Gibney & Dalton, *supra* note 55; Poe & Tate, *supra* note 31; Poe, Tate & Keith, *supra* note 31.

57. LANDMAN, *supra* note 29.

58. *Id.*; David L. Cingranelli & David L. Richards, *Measuring the Impact of Human Rights Organizations*, in NGOs AND HUMAN RIGHTS: PROMISES AND PERFORMANCE 225 (Claude E. Welch, Jr. ed., 2001).

indices. The physical integrity rights index is an index of human rights performance concerning “torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance.”⁵⁹ The scores of this index range from 0 to 8, with 0 indicating no governmental respect of physical integrity and 8 indicating full governmental respect for these rights.⁶⁰ The empowerment rights index score is a compilation of scores relating to “freedom of movement, freedom of speech, worker’s rights, political participation, and freedom of religion indicators.”⁶¹ Values of the CIRI empowerment index range from 0 to 10, with 0 indicating no governmental respect for empowerment rights and 10 indicating full governmental respect for these rights.⁶² The CIRI Human Rights Data Project codes are based on the yearly reports of governmental human rights practices from the US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and, for personal integrity rights only, Amnesty International’s Annual Reports for each country.⁶³

In order to determine whether there are possible delays that may affect an intervention’s impact on human rights all models are run two ways. First, the models are run traditionally, with the dependent variable and independent variables all measured in the same year, t . Second, all models are re-run with the independent variables lagged three years, $t-3$.⁶⁴ Therefore, this is a model of the effects of peacekeeping intervention on *future* human rights performance. This is consistent with existing human rights research.⁶⁵

C. Controls

As mentioned in the literature review on human rights practices, there are many potential control variables that need to be accounted for in this research. All control variables are operationalized consistent with previous research. As to economic development, the natural logarithm of *GDP Per Capita* (in constant US dollars) is used.⁶⁶ For population size, the natural logarithm of *Total National Population* is included in the models.⁶⁷ Data on

59. *Id.* at 228.

60. *Id.* at 229.

61. David Cingranelli & David L. Richards, Short Variable Descriptions for Indicators in the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset, Version 12.07.08 (2008), available at http://ciri.binghamton.edu/documentation/ciri_variables_short_descriptions.pdf

62. Cingranelli & Richards, CIRI Human Rights Data Project Coding Manual, *supra* note 55.

63. *Id.* at 3.

64. As a robustness check, all models were ran with the independent variables lagged five years, $t-5$. Results are similar in substance and significance.

65. LANDMAN, *supra* note 29; Meernik, Poe & Shaikh, *supra* note 5.

66. World Development Indicators 2008 (World Bank Publications CD ROM, June 2008).

67. *Id.*

the level of *Democracy* came from POLITY IV and is a dichotomous indicator of whether a state is democratic, representing a score of 6 or higher on the Polity scale.⁶⁸

Additionally, it is necessary to control for factors of civil war that could influence the degree of difficulty for peacekeepers. Thus, the models also include a natural log of civil war *Battle Deaths*, taken from the updated Fearon and Laitin civil war dataset.⁶⁹ Along the same lines, we also included *Conflict Duration*, representing the number of years of the civil war, as a control variable.⁷⁰

D. Statistical Method

Conventional tests for panel autocorrelation indicated that serial autocorrelation was an issue in all models.⁷¹ Therefore, we utilize Newey-West standard errors with a lag length of 1.⁷²

IV. ANALYSES AND RESULTS

The hypotheses are supported in a number of the analyses, as shown in Tables 1 through 4. Additionally, the models all fit the minimum standard of accuracy, meeting a minimum goodness of fit to the population (Prob > F is less than 0.05). As a whole, the analyses show: (a) the mere presence of peacekeeping interveners does not help current or future human rights among states with civil wars; (b) a humanitarian purpose helps future physical integrity rights among states with peacekeeping; (c) a mediation attempt helps both current and future physical integrity rights among states with peacekeepers; and (d) the lead intervener's domestic human rights performance does not help the current or future human rights of the state where the peacekeeping intervention take places. Additionally, the analyses show that humanitarian purposes and mediation attempts, though helpful at improving physical integrity rights and lessening political terror, may have negative externalities with respect to empowerment rights. Below is an outline of these results and a discussion of the substantive impacts.

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68. MONTY MARSHALL & KEITH JAGGERS, POLITY IV PROJECT: POLITICAL REGIME CHARACTERISTICS AND TRANSITIONS, 1800–2008 (2009), available at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>.
 69. Bethany Lacina & Nils Petter Gleditsch, *Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths*, 21 EUR. J. POPULATION 145, 146, 153 (2005).
 70. *Id.*
 71. See David M. Drukker, *Testing for Serial Correlation in Linear Panel-Data Models*, 3 STATA J. 168 (2003).
 72. See DAMODAR N. GUJARATI, BASIC ECONOMETRICS 484 (2003).

A. Model 1: The Effect of Peacekeeping Interventions

To start, Table 1 shows the limited influence that the presence of a peacekeeping intervention has on human rights performance, either present or future. Thus, peacekeeping interventions are not an automatic solution to human rights abuses in civil wars. In fact, in line with existing human rights reports on peacekeepers, peacekeeping interventions actually have a negative effect on current human rights performance, as measured by the *PTS-State Department* variable.

Additionally, all statistically significant human rights performance control variables are in the expected direction. It is worth noting that the *Conflict Duration* control is statistically significant and positive, indicating that wars of longer duration have greater impact on current and future human rights performance. This is consistent with the Bargaining Model of War in International Relations, which implies that wars of greater length lead to greater convergence of beliefs concerning the outcome of future conflict, thus lessening claims for renegotiations or unstable post-war situations.⁷³ Similarly, when beliefs are in convergence as to future conflict, the need for human rights abuses diminishes. This is an interesting human rights result that has not been previously examined.

Given the results of Model 1, Hypothesis 1 is supported: the mere presence of a peacekeeping intervention does not lead to improvements in human rights. Indeed it can negatively influence physical integrity rights.

B. Model 2: The Effect of a Humanitarian Purpose

The results of Model 2 are provided in Table 2. These results provide moderate support for Hypothesis 2, the effect of a humanitarian purpose by interveners. First, a humanitarian purpose has no influence on current human rights performance in states with peacekeeping interventions, but it does have a substantial positive effect on future physical integrity rights. This makes intuitive sense: a change in human rights performance requires the coordination of many transnational advocacy networks that are necessary to empower local populations and pressure the state from above.⁷⁴ Thus, increased respect for human rights from humanitarian actions by peacekeeping forces would not be immediate but would involve a time lag. The size of the coefficient on this variable, around a whole point, shows the substantial influence that

73. Alastair Smith & Allan C. Stam, *Bargaining and the Nature of War*, 48 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 783 (2004).

74. MARGARET KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, *ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS* (1998).

Table 1.
Model 1: Does Peacekeeping Intervention Help
Human Rights Performance After Civil War?

<u>Current Performance</u>				
	<u>PTS-Amnesty</u>	<u>PTS-State</u>	<u>CIRI-Physical Integrity</u>	<u>CIRI-Empowerment</u>
Peacekeeping Intervention	-0.008 (0.133)	-0.268* (0.122)	0.008 (0.248)	-0.345 (0.297)
GDP per cap (ln)	0.055 (0.044)	0.138* (0.045)	0.276* (0.084)	0.306* (0.097)
Population (ln)	-0.153* (0.038)	-0.122* (0.036)	-0.397* (0.076)	-0.962* (0.094)
Battle Deaths (ln)	-0.181* (0.031)	-0.229* (0.028)	-0.434* (0.061)	-0.276* (0.072)
Democracy	0.592* (0.111)	0.612* (0.108)	1.287* (0.222)	2.539* (0.234)
Conflict Duration	0.017* (0.008)	0.013 (0.008)	0.033* (0.015)	0.085* (0.017)
Constant	6.025* (0.760)	5.542* (0.703)	11.089* (1.508)	20.183* (1.816)
Observations	612	642	599	599
<u>Future Performance (+3 Years)</u>				
	<u>PTS-Amnesty</u>	<u>PTS-State</u>	<u>CIRI-Physical Integrity</u>	<u>CIRI-Empowerment</u>
Peacekeeping Intervention	0.184 (0.165)	0.060 (0.132)	0.154 (0.295)	0.073 (0.314)
GDP per cap (ln)	0.095 (0.050)	0.194* (0.046)	0.350* (0.093)	0.464* (0.115)
Population (ln)	-0.143* (0.042)	-0.115* (0.039)	-0.425* (0.083)	-0.881* (0.111)
Battle Deaths (ln)	-0.178* (0.032)	-0.231* (0.031)	-0.427* (0.067)	-0.242* (0.082)
Democracy	0.392* (0.131)	0.414* (0.119)	0.968* (0.262)	1.911* (0.288)
Conflict Duration	0.019* (0.009)	0.013 (0.007)	0.033* (0.015)	0.085* (0.018)
Constant	5.618* (0.873)	5.132* (0.796)	11.188* (1.725)	17.748* (2.163)
Observations	551	577	538	539

Newey-West Standard Errors (lag of 1) in Parentheses
* Significant at 5% (two-tailed)
PTS Reversed to Match CIRI (0=low respect, 5=high respect)

Table 2.
Model 2: Among Civil War Prone States with a Peacekeeping Intervention, Does a Humanitarian Purpose Help Human Rights Performance

<i>Current Performance</i>				
	<u>PTS-Amnesty</u>	<u>PTS-State</u>	<u>CIRI-Physical Integrity</u>	<u>CIRI-Empowerment</u>
Humanitarian Purpose	0.498 (0.412)	0.265 (0.320)	0.336 (0.891)	-0.104 (0.704)
GDP per cap (ln)	0.216 (0.110)	0.289* (0.112)	0.570* (0.181)	-0.013 (0.234)
Population (ln)	0.136 (0.197)	-0.020 (0.154)	-0.753* (0.274)	-0.659 (0.525)
Battle Deaths (ln)	-0.056 (0.100)	-0.170 (0.095)	-0.711* (0.236)	0.116 (0.263)
Democracy	0.998* (0.198)	1.135* (0.246)	2.009* (0.432)	1.589* (0.364)
Conflict Duration	-0.012 (0.033)	0.005 (0.027)	0.202* (0.087)	-0.023 (0.108)
Constant	-0.548 (3.070)	2.115 (2.522)	15.732* (4.990)	14.748 (8.727)
Observations	121	131	115	115
<i>Future Performance (+3 Years)</i>				
	<u>PTS-Amnesty</u>	<u>PTS-State</u>	<u>CIRI-Physical Integrity</u>	<u>CIRI-Empowerment</u>
Humanitarian Purpose	1.106* (0.444)	0.753* (0.317)	1.439* (0.700)	-1.031* (0.475)
GDP per cap (ln)	0.248 (0.131)	0.368* (0.090)	0.802* (0.160)	0.167 (0.193)
Population (ln)	-0.093 (0.251)	-0.141 (0.136)	-0.708* (0.302)	-0.047 (0.407)
Battle Deaths (ln)	-0.082 (0.090)	-0.148 (0.080)	-0.371* (0.154)	-0.009 (0.132)
Democracy	1.006* (0.246)	0.987* (0.242)	1.912* (0.459)	1.929* (0.434)
Conflict Duration	0.022 (0.032)	0.011 (0.023)	0.102 (0.066)	0.057 (0.043)
Constant	2.901 (4.040)	3.527 (2.518)	11.439* (5.311)	4.977 (6.781)
Observations	102	110	104	104

Newey-West Standard Errors (lag of 1) in Parentheses
* Significant at 5% (two-tailed)
PTS Reversed to Match CIRI (0=low respect, 5=high respect)

current multidimensional peacekeeping missions could have on increasing respect for physical integrity rights and lessening political terror.

It is extremely interesting, however, that humanitarian purposes by peacekeeping interventions, though a positive force for physical integrity rights, has a negative and statistically significant influence on empowerment rights, as measured by *CIRI-Empowerment*. Though this may seem inconsistent, it must be noted that the other three scales, both of the *PTS* and the *CIRI Physical Integrity* scores, all focus on freedom from torture, imprisonment, brutality, and extrajudicial murders. As mentioned, *CIRI-Empowerment* is an index of freedom of movement, speech, religion, political participation, and women's rights. In the observations used in these models, correlations between *CIRI-Empowerment* and each of the other human rights scales are never over 0.20.

Therefore, these findings imply that humanitarian missions result in a decreased need or ability for the government to use torture or commit other physical integrity rights, perhaps due to the attention humanitarian missions bring to these violations. However, as a way to prevent future war outbreaks and restrict the abilities of former belligerents to congregate and transmit information, governments may place increased restrictions on empowerment rights during humanitarian peacekeeping missions. This negative externality of a largely positive human rights endeavor seems worthy of future theoretical and empirical attention.

Thus, given the results of Model 2, Hypothesis 2's premise is largely supported: humanitarian purposes in states with peacekeeping interventions positively impact future physical integrity rights. However, these results also show that humanitarian missions might have a negative impact on future empowerment rights. Additionally, all statistically significant control variables are in the expected direction.

C. Model 3: The Effect of a Mediation Attempt

Model 3 examines whether a mediation attempt matters for human rights, as outlined in Hypothesis 3. The results, as shown in Table 3, indicate that mediation attempts do improve both current and future physical integrity rights. As expected, the information transmission that is facilitated in mediation lessens the need for a government to abuse physical integrity rights in order to get information. However, at least in the short term, there again appears to be some negative externalities with respect to empowerment rights. When the dependent variable is focusing on future human rights performance, however, the effect of mediation attempts on empowerment rights is not statistically significant. Given the increasing numbers of mediation attempts within peacekeeping, these results bode well for the human

Table 3.
Model 3: Among Civil War Prone States with a Peacekeeping Intervention, Does a Mediation Attempt Help Human Rights Performance?

<i>Current Performance</i>				
	<u>PTS-Amnesty</u>	<u>PTS-State</u>	<u>CIRI-Physical Integrity</u>	<u>CIRI-Empowerment</u>
Mediation Attempt	0.596* (0.260)	0.578* (0.239)	0.663 (0.363)	-0.898 (0.506)
GDP per cap (ln)	0.216+ (0.113)	0.278* (0.106)	0.530* (0.173)	0.010 (0.229)
Population (ln)	0.195 (0.194)	0.074 (0.150)	-0.660* (0.298)	-0.811 (0.497)
Battle Deaths (ln)	0.017 (0.125)	-0.132 (0.101)	-0.625* (0.182)	0.041 (0.227)
Democracy	1.053* (0.206)	1.214* (0.233)	2.058* (0.431)	1.451* (0.367)
Conflict Duration	-0.035 (0.038)	-0.013 (0.029)	0.168* (0.075)	0.014 (0.092)
Constant	-2.351 (3.151)	0.093 (2.702)	13.565* (5.495)	18.058* (8.447)
Observations	121	131	115	115
<i>Future Performance (+3 Years)</i>				
	<u>PTS-Amnesty</u>	<u>PTS-State</u>	<u>CIRI-Physical Integrity</u>	<u>CIRI-Empowerment</u>
Mediation Attempt	1.292* (0.232)	1.006* (0.170)	1.292* (0.397)	-0.777 (0.557)
GDP per cap (ln)	0.242 (0.129)	0.361* (0.084)	0.774* (0.162)	0.190 (0.196)
Population (ln)	0.153 (0.244)	0.077 (0.139)	-0.473 (0.319)	-0.180 (0.445)
Battle Deaths (ln)	0.001 (0.118)	-0.078 (0.086)	-0.236 (0.154)	-0.102 (0.143)
Democracy	1.070* (0.197)	1.097* (0.191)	1.945* (0.394)	1.939* (0.380)
Conflict Duration	-0.011 (0.037)	-0.016 (0.027)	0.062 (0.064)	0.082 (0.045)
Constant	-2.199 (4.002)	-0.899 (2.676)	6.325 (5.832)	7.948 (7.906)
Observations	102	110	104	104

Newey-West Standard Errors (lag of 1) in Parentheses

* Significant at 5% (two-tailed)

PTS Reversed to Match CIRI (0=low respect, 5=high respect)

rights community. Statistically significant controls in this model are all in the expected direction.

D. Model 4: The Effect of Human Rights Practices at Home

Model 4 results do not support Hypothesis 4; a higher domestic human rights performance of the lead state intervener never leads to increased human rights performance in the state where the intervention takes place. In fact, higher *PTS-Amnesty* scores by the lead intervening state actually result in diminished current *PTS-Amnesty* scores in the peace kept state, as shown in Table 4. Statistically significant controls remain in the expected direction.

Thus, reflecting much of the recent journalistic accounts of human rights abuses by peacekeepers from states with high domestic respect for human rights, peacekeepers may not “project their values from home abroad.”⁷⁵ For human rights advocates, this result could imply that further attention and accountability for the actions of peacekeepers is necessary.

V. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

What are the effects of peacekeeping interventions on human rights? This article has examined a question that has long been debated in the human rights practitioner community but that has received only minimal attention from either human rights or conflict management researchers to date: Should the human rights community support peacekeeping interventions after civil wars? This research finds that there is no easy answer; peacekeeping interventions are not the magic solution to end human rights abuses in states with a history of civil war. In short, the evidence reveals that:

1. The mere presence of peacekeeping interventions after civil wars does not help human rights.
2. Humanitarian missions in peacekeeping interventions help support future physical integrity rights.
3. Mediation attempts improve both current and future physical integrity rights.

Additionally, there is no support for Hypothesis 4, that the domestic human rights situations of lead interveners influence human rights performance in the states of the intervention. We also found that humanitarian missions and, at least in the short term, mediation attempts can negatively impact empowerment rights.

75. Rathbun, *supra* note 50, at 381.

Table 4.
Model 4: Among Civil War Prone States with a Peacekeeping Intervention, Does the Lead Intervener's Domestic Human Rights Performance Matter?

<u>Current Performance</u>				
	<u>PTS-Amnesty</u>	<u>PTS-State</u>	<u>CIRI-Physical Integrity</u>	<u>CIRI-Empowerment</u>
Lead TPI PTSA	-0.196* (0.090)			
Lead TPI PTSS		-0.011 (0.107)		
Lead TPI CIRI-PHYS			-0.028 (0.111)	
Lead TPI CIRI-EMPX				0.045 (0.075)
GDP per cap (ln)	0.257* (0.124)	0.269* (0.130)	0.568* (0.184)	-0.044 (0.251)
Population (ln)	0.023 (0.232)	0.096 (0.178)	-0.693* (0.319)	-0.688 (0.538)
Battle Deaths (ln)	0.045 (0.122)	-0.135 (0.106)	-0.658* (0.204)	0.066 (0.244)
Democracy	1.002* (0.197)	1.185* (0.249)	1.967* (0.427)	1.656* (0.378)
Conflict Duration	-0.022 (0.041)	-0.011 (0.033)	0.179 (0.098)	-0.024 (0.111)
Constant	0.766 (3.680)	0.366 (2.937)	14.708* (6.132)	15.474 (8.878)
Observations	103	119	110	107
<u>Future Performance (+3 Years)</u>				
	<u>PTS-Amnesty</u>	<u>PTS-State</u>	<u>CIRI-Physical Integrity</u>	<u>CIRI-Empowerment</u>
Lead TPI PTSA	0.003 (0.113)			
Lead TPI PTSS		-0.066 (0.095)		
Lead TPI CIRI-PHYS			-0.039 (0.115)	
Lead TPI CIRI-EMPX				-0.015 (0.072)
GDP per cap (ln)	0.168 (0.133)	0.313* (0.114)	0.854* (0.221)	0.353 (0.249)
Population (ln)	-0.129 (0.311)	-0.059 (0.198)	-0.824 (0.467)	-0.330 (0.568)

Future Performance (+3 Years)

	<u>PTS-Amnesty</u>	<u>PTS-State</u>	<u>CIRI-Physical Integrity</u>	<u>CIRI-Empowerment</u>
Battle Deaths (ln)	0.039 (0.143)	-0.129 (0.098)	-0.199 (0.228)	-0.030 (0.214)
Democracy	1.020* (0.246)	0.982* (0.232)	1.800* (0.404)	2.140* (0.442)
Conflict Duration	-0.020 (0.047)	-0.008 (0.031)	0.035 (0.105)	0.060 (0.084)
Constant	3.337 (5.081)	2.861 (3.420)	12.313 (7.677)	8.244 (7.984)
Observations	87	97	94	92

Newey-West Standard Errors (lag of 1) in Parentheses

* Significant at 5% (two-tailed)

PTS Reversed to Match CIRI (0=low respect, 5=high respect)

These findings are consistent with existing research on multidimensional peacekeeping and consistent with how peacekeepers influence peace duration.⁷⁶ This research also adds to the literature by examining an alternative consequence of interventions. Instead of focusing only on duration of the conflict or peace after conflict, this study also addresses an alternative definition of what it means for an intervention to be successful.⁷⁷ As is evident in policy debates concerning interventions, possible human rights improvement is often used to rationalize military interventions in civil wars.⁷⁸ These findings question whether this argument is truly justified.

The findings also add to the cross-disciplinary human rights literature. Though the large effect of civil wars on human rights performance has been identified for some time, this research adds to the literature by examining a growing phenomenon: peacekeeping intervention in states with a history of civil war. This focus allows human rights scholars more insight into the micro processes connecting civil war to human rights repression and the possible role of information on a state's ability or need to abuse physical integrity rights.

On a whole, though this research might be a necessary first step in developing a large-N study of the effect of third party interventions on human rights performance in civil war situations, it is perhaps nothing more than a baby step. First, it is important to remember that the empirical tests had a

76. FORTNA, DOES PEACEKEEPING WORK?, *supra* note 6; DOYLE & SAMBANIS, MAKING WAR AND BUILDING PEACE, *supra* note 7; Doyle & Sambanis, *International Peacebuilding*, *supra* note 16.

77. Regan, *supra* note 7.

78. Mahony, *supra* note 2; ICHRP, *supra* note 2.

limited time span. Further, when combined with the available datasets, we were left with a moderately small dataset. A larger data collection project seems necessary. Additionally, our focus was on peacekeeping interventions; it would be interesting to expand the project to other types of third party interventions.

In conclusion, given these findings, what should those in the human rights community do in civil war situations to help human rights? Should they advocate for peacekeeping interventions? This article indicates that the human rights community should be hesitant to advocate for general peacekeeping forces, but should seek to influence what actions take place within a peacekeeping mission. All interventions are not equal and interventions in general can be problematic for human rights. Unlike common wisdom, the results indicate that peacekeepers do not project their state's respect for human rights abroad. Though these results show that peacekeeping interventions can be harmful to human rights in states with civil wars, it also highlights the great potential of specific actions within peacekeeping missions. It is on this potential that the human rights community should focus.