Introduction

The process of disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration (DDRR) of former combatants plays a critical role in transitions from war to peace. The success or failure of this endeavour directly affects the long-term peacebuilding prospects for any post-conflict society. The exploration of the closely interwoven relationship between peacebuilding and the DDRR process also provides a theoretical framework for this article, which aims to present an assessment of various disarmament, demobilization and reinsertion (DDR) programmes planned or implemented in a number of countries over the last two decades. The assessment is conducted by focusing on three specific DDR issues: disarmament as a social contract; demobilization without cantonment; and the relevance of financial reinsertion assistance. The majority of these initiatives adopted a 'guns–camps–cash' approach that seems to provide only a limited perspective for dealing with a wide range of complex issues related to the DDR process. Therefore, the article questions whether there is a need for a more comprehensive consideration of disarmament by acknowledging and responding to its social, economic and political implications. In conjunction with the above-mentioned consideration, disarmament in terms of a social contract is proposed as an alternative to the current military-centred approach. Experience also indicates a tendency towards the inclusion of cantonment in the demobilization phase, regardless of whether it actually can have some negative impacts on the DDRR process in general. Subsequently, the article questions such implications and possible approaches to demobilization without cantonment. Finally, the article focuses on the effectiveness of cash payments during reinsertion as an easier alternative to the provision of other material assistance, since this tends to be the most controversial aspect of the reinsertion phase.

Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace*

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The process of disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration (DDRR) of former combatants is part of the overall long-term peacebuilding process, a task in which success depends on the holistic and integrated implementation of various postwar recovery programmes. The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) (1999) defines disarmament as the collection, control and disposal of small arms and light weapons and the development of responsible arms management programmes in a post-conflict context. Meanwhile, demobilization is defined as a
planned process by which the armed force of the government and/or opposition or factional forces either downsize or completely disband. Having been demobilized and transported to their community of choice, the former combatants and their families must establish themselves in a civilian environment, and reinsertion assistance, which is intended to ameliorate the process, often includes post-discharge orientation, food assistance, health and education support and a cash allowance. Finally, reintegration is the process whereby former combatants and their families are integrated into the social, economic and political life of (civilian) communities.

Two types of DDRR programmes can be identified as demilitarization and those taking place in war-to-peace transition (Colletta, Kostner & Wiederhofer, 1996a). The former involves a reduction in the number of military personnel following a decisive victory, attempting to reduce military expenditure in order to take advantage of the peace dividend.\(^1\) Large-scale downsizing as part of peacetime demobilization initiatives can also be considered under this heading. However, in the second scenario, no clear victor emerges and DDRR is undertaken as part of a peace settlement.\(^2\) Within this scenario, the outcome of any DDRR programme depends predominantly upon the political context in which it is carried out, and the political will among the belligerent parties will remain the chief criterion for determining success. It should also be noted that demobilization occurs spontaneously in some post-conflict contexts, as was the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example. The scope of this article excludes such cases, however, as our discussions will be based on planned DDRR experiences in peace-to-war transitions.

Experience also indicates that the ways in which disarmament, demobilization and reinsertion (DDR) programmes are planned and implemented have significant implications for the reintegration of former combatants and peacebuilding processes (Berdal, 1996; Colletta, Kostner & Wiederhofer, 1996a; DPKO, 1999; UN Security Council, 2000; Kingma, 2002; World Bank, 2002). Therefore, it is important to explore various DDR programmes in order to gain from those experiences a clear understanding of what has worked and what has not. Subsequently, the aim of this article is to conduct an assessment of DDR programmes planned or implemented throughout the 1980s and 1990s in a number of African, Asian, Central American and European countries, in order to explore their principal characteristics.\(^3\) First, the majority of these DDR initiatives adopted the ‘one-gun-per-person-demobilization’ approach, which seems to provide only a limited perspective for dealing with a wide range of complex issues related to disarmament. Hence, the article questions whether there is a need for a more comprehensive consideration of disarmament by acknowledging and responding to its social, economic and political implications. Disarmament as a social contract is proposed as an alternative to the current military-centred

\(^1\) The context of demilitarization implies that the government retains administrative control over the state’s territories and there exists no viable armed opposition.

\(^2\) The context of this scenario differs from demilitarization in that armed opposition to the government retains territorial control and possesses the ability to engage in warfighting, if the peace agreement breaks down owing to non-compliance.

\(^3\) The review will mainly draw upon the experiences of the United Nations in peacekeeping operations and the World Bank. The UN peacekeeping operations are often mandated to undertake, or oversee, disarmament of belligerent factions. Hence, the UN perspective is focused upon the initial phases of DDR programmes, namely disarmament. The World Bank’s perspective is coloured by the organization’s involvement in the latter phases of DDR programmes, demobilization and reintegration. However, the DDR experiences of a number of other international organizations such as the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the International Labour Office (ILO) will also inform discussions.
approach. Second, experience also indicates a tendency towards the inclusion of cantonment in the demobilization phase, regardless of whether this might actually have some negative impact on the DDRR process in general. Subsequently, the article questions the implications of cantonment on the successful implementation of the whole DDRR process and explores possible approaches to demobilization without cantonment. Finally, the article focuses on the effectiveness of cash payments during reinsertion as an easier alternative to the provision of other material assistance, as this tends to be the most controversial aspect of the reinsertion phase. Although the focus of this article will be the DDR phases, before carrying out this review, we will first explore the relationship between DDRR and peacebuilding in order to provide an overall theoretical framework.

**DDRR of Former Combatants in a Peacebuilding Context**

Peacebuilding encompasses programmes ranging from micro-level changes in the opinions and behaviour of conflicting communities to macro-level institutional changes that address the structural causes of conflict (Lily, 2002). *An Agenda for Peace* defines ‘peacebuilding’ as ‘an action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict’ (Boutros-Ghali, 1992: 11). It is a holistic but distinct process, with numerous stages that require multi-sector efforts in order to achieve sustainable results. Potentially, the DDRR of former combatants constitutes one such activity, and within the context of the war-to-peace transition, it can have a number of important effects upon the wider transitional process. The efficient implementation of the DDRR programme can reassure belligerent parties of the possibility of a permanent cessation of hostilities, as they are often the most visible element of the peace agreement. Moreover, a well-planned and flexible reintegration process can also promote the viability of long-term peace locally, nationally and internationally (Berdal, 1996).

Experience indicates that there is a symbiotic relationship between peacebuilding and the DDRR process. Berdal (1996: 73) refers to this relationship as ‘an interplay’ and ‘a subtle interaction’. Although a sustainable recovery after war cannot be achieved without a successful DDRR process, conversely, without a successful peacebuilding process the viability of a DDRR process would, in general, be questionable (Özerdem, 2002). Supporting this view, Colletta, Kostner & Wiederhofer (1996a: 18) highlight the relationship between economic reintegration of former combatants and the sustainability of the peace process:

Successful long-term reintegration can make a major contribution to national conflict resolution and to the restoration of social capital. Conversely, failure to achieve reintegration can lead to considerable insecurity at the societal and individual levels, including rent-seeking behaviour through the barrel of a gun.

Poorly conceived and executed DDRR programmes can themselves also become a factor in the creation of future conflicts. The incomplete disarmament in Mozambique contributed to the proliferation of weapons not only throughout that country, but also in neighbouring countries such as South Africa, Zambia and Malawi. By 1998, Mozambique constituted the single largest source of small arms to the South African domestic market (UNIDIR, 1999). Based on their experience in the Horn of Africa, Kingma & Grebreshov (1998: 12) identify a number of situations in which the reintegration of displaced populations and former combatants may have an impact on the recurrence or development of conflicts. These include the absence of a functioning
state and legal system, lack of economic opportunities, competition for natural resources, political marginalization and the absence of appropriate conflict management systems, and the availability of light weapons. In other words, war-torn countries with demobilized combatants also run the risk of returning to conflict, if they are not provided with a comprehensive reintegration strategy.

Collier’s (1994) micro- and macro-insecurity framework for possible threats presented by former combatants asserts that if demobilized combatants are not placed into employment or provided with skills-training opportunities, the lack of an income source increases their propensity to commit crimes. Kingma (1999) cites the examples of Mozambique and South Africa, where some demobilized combatants turned to banditry. Similarly, in countries such as El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique and Nicaragua, former combatants were disposed to make their living through banditry after demobilization (Weiss-Fagen, 1995). This is a particular concern when DDRR processes fail. For example, the reports of increased levels of crime in Angola in the late 1990s were linked to the failure of the DDRR programme either to remove weapons from society or to reintegrate former combatants in a manner conducive to establishing income activities (UNIDIR, 1999).

In conjunction with the macro-insecurity framework, if the grievances and frustrations of demobilized combatants are not addressed through a reintegration strategy, former combatants can be remobilized easily and pose security risks at a regional level, as happened in 1998 following the border clashes between Eritrea and Ethiopia. According to Özerdem (2002), some former combatants of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) are believed to have been involved in the 2001 Macedonian conflict between Albanian guerrilla groups and security forces.

One of the primary conditions for ensuring an effective relationship between peacebuilding and a DDRR process is the coordination of activities. Experience shows that a wide range of programmes are carried out by a variety of agents, preferably, but not necessarily, coordinated by a single vision for the future. Reflecting on the issue of coordination, the UNDP (2001) explains that in 2001, there were a number of different DDRR activities taking place in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) such as the UN Mission to the DRC (MONUC), which was mandated to carry out DDRR activities applicable to the foreign armed groups only. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), UNDP and other organizations were conducting various DDRR and development activities in eastern DRC. Meanwhile, the Bureau National de Mobilisation et Reinsertion (BUNADER), which is a DRC government initiative, began implementing a pilot project targeting vulnerable groups. In addition to these, the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) was providing additional support to the demobilization of child soldiers. Unfortunately, it is stated that all of these activities were taking place independently of each other.4

In the framework of the peacebuilding–DDRR relationship, there are also a number of issues related to social and cultural norms and psychological impact that should be borne in mind. First, social reintegration involves the re-establishment of family and community ties that play a significant role in the success of reintegration programmes. According to Kingma (2000), in a number of cross-cultural experiences, there is a pattern of more successful

4 The UNDP programme in the Great Lakes region included the following countries: Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo.
reintegration in rural than in urban areas. This is put down to the likelihood of having stronger supporting societal networks in rural than in urban areas. For example, in the rural areas of Ethiopia, a key factor for successful social reintegration was the acceptance and support by the community as well as their extended families (Ayalew & Dercon, 2000).

Second, armed conflicts also affect cultural norms and reciprocal relationships in a society. For example, women as both fighters and war-affected civilians acquire new roles during the war. However, they are usually expected to return to their traditional roles after the war. Kingma (2002) makes linkages between this attitude and the high divorce rate in Eritrea, where about one-third of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) were women. The analysis of socio-economic and demographic data on former combatants in Guinea-Bissau and Eritrea has also shown that female former combatants were more vulnerable than their male counterparts (de Watteville, 2002). Consequently, Tegegn (1992) emphasizes the importance of providing female former combatants with special assistance to enable them to participate fully and equally in social, economic and political life.

Finally, the trauma of war can have a profound psychological impact on the population, particularly on children, both as soldiers and civilians, affecting their social and emotional development (El Nagar, 1992). The World Bank (2002) argues that the reintegration of child soldiers should emphasize three key components: family reunification, psychological support and education, and economic opportunity. This is illustrated by the example of Sierra Leone, where the whole DDRR process was seriously disrupted by the outbreak of renewed fighting, and many child soldiers whose distinctive needs had been neglected by the process returned to the conflict in April 2000.

**Guns: UN Understanding of Disarmament – and Its Limits**

As the Brahimi Report (2000) on the reform of UN peacekeeping operations recommends, disarmament programmes are considered as the first phase of an operation aimed at facilitating the rapid disassembly of fighting factions and reducing the likelihood of a resumption of conflicts. It is usually understood as a linear process for completely eliminating the military capabilities of warring factions. However, disarmament in war-to-peace transition situations seldom ensures a total collection and disposal of weapons. As an assessment of the disarmament of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unit (URNG) in 1997, it is stated that it ‘would be naïve to assume that the 1,824 firearms were handed over by the URNG represented a significant portion of the military weapons in circulation in Guatemala’ (Laurance & Godnick, 2001: 43). However, more significantly, this disarmament process indicated the commitment of the UNR to the peace process. Supporting this view, the UN Security Council (2000: 1) stated the importance of disarmament at a symbolic level as follows:

> Even if full disarmament and demilitarisation prove unachievable, a credible programme of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration may nonetheless make a key contribution to strengthening of confidence between former factions and enhancing the momentum toward stability.

It should be pointed out that the preceding argument is not intended to undermine the significance of disarmament, but to emphasize its real importance at a symbolic level. It is argued that in some circumstances the DDRR process may need to consider ways of initiating the demobilization phase

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5 The DPKO’s (1999: 16) linear sequence of the three phases is as follows: ‘Where disarmament terminates, demobilization begins and where demobilization ends, reintegration commences.’
without a full disarmament process, which would defy conventional strategies. For example, Sedra (2002: 37) considers the stated goal of the Afghanistan National Disarmament Commission (NDC) of a million weapons and pieces of military equipment as a ‘lofty’ objective because of ‘the innate resistance to disarmament displayed by Afghans throughout the country’. Nevertheless, it was explained that the timeliness of initiating disarmament in the context of Afghanistan is a crucial issue, as trust-building measures and improvement of the overall security environment will be essential ‘for convincing various armed factions to consider giving up their arms’ (Özerdem, 2002: 966).

Nevertheless, an early initiation of disarmament is an important factor for the successful implementation of DDRR processes, and it is directly linked with the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces. Cox’s (1996: 132) examination of the UN peacekeeping missions in the five contexts of Central America, Cambodia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Somalia concludes that ‘the prospects for successful disarmament diminish the greater the delay in the deployment of the force’. Prompt deployment of peacekeeping forces following peace agreements often coincides with a general support for the ceasefire and the presence of the peacekeepers. As time passes, if the disarmament mandate has not been translated into tangible developments on the ground, ‘both the parties and the peacekeepers begin to turn away from the commitment, and the resulting erosion of the mandate starts an irreversible process’ (Cox, 1996: 132).6

Having reviewed lessons learned from its peacekeeping operations, the DPKO (1999) recommended the establishment of an integrated technical mission early on, during the peace negotiations. The rapid deployment of such a team can aim at the establishment of communications with partner organizations within the DDRR process, which would facilitate early development of coordination mechanisms, and the establishment of a survey team, gathering from combatants socio-economic information, intended location of settlement and their expectations concerning the DDRR process. The early deployment of a DDRR team under UN auspices, either before or shortly after the peace agreement, would fill the expectation gap prior to the full deployment of peacekeeping contingents, facilitate the development of the programme and demonstrate an early commitment to the process.

Approaches to Disarmament: Consensual, Coercive, Compellence

Tanner (1996) suggests that there are three categories of UN disarmament mission, based on principles of consensus, coercion and compellence, undertaken within the wider context of the mandate of the peacekeeping mission.7 In regard to the UN disarmament missions in the 1980s and early 1990s, the revealing aspect of debates within the UN, as it affected

6 The causes for delayed deployments are considered to rest with member-states of the United Nations and UN organizational deficiencies, the consideration of which is beyond the scope of this article.

7 Daniel (1996) traces the development of peacekeeping mandates from traditional peacekeeping to the multi-dimensional operations of the 1990s. Referring to the varying options for the use of military force in UN operations, Daniels states that there are three options: peacekeeping, enforcement and the hybrid case ‘peace enforcement’, which is option 3 or probably more appropriately, ‘option 1.5’. The variations of options include peacekeeping (option 1) as the traditional role of UN peacekeeping missions, lightly armed troops monitoring peace agreements in a consensual environment, mandated under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Enforcement (option 2) is war-fighting by coalition forces operating within a Security Council mandate in order to enforce compliance with Security Council resolutions; the enforcement mandate is an interpretation of Chapter VII, Article 42 of the UN Charter. Meanwhile, the peace enforcement (option 3 or 1.5) suggests that the peacekeeping mission is likely to operate in an environment of ambiguous consent, or what Tanner (1996) refers to as ‘decaying consent’.
the DDRR process as whole, was often the conspicuous lack of consideration of any inducements or persuasions to disarm, operating in tandem with coercion or compellence. Inducements, as understood by the UN peacekeeping missions, involved methods of bargaining for, or trading in, weapons. Inevitably, such an understanding led to the establishment of weapons-for-cash programmes. UN disarmament operations that have attempted weapons-for-cash programmes include El Salvador, Haiti, Liberia, Mozambique, Nicaragua and Somalia (Tanner, 1996; World Bank, 1993). Cash as an incentive was also used in Eastern Slavonia, Croatia. The United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) collected 10,000 rifles, 7,000 anti-tank rocket launchers, 15,000 grenades and 2 million rounds of ammunition between October 1996 and August 1997 (Boothby, 2001).

There are some issues that require particular attention in using cash as an incentive in disarmament programmes, such as the cash amount offered for a weapon. According to Faltas (2001), the price does not need to be the full market price, but should be enough to make it worthwhile for people to travel and bring in the weapon. However, it is noted that the money received for old weapons can be used for buying newer and more dangerous ones. The process in Croatia also tried to avoid the creation of a market attracting weapons from outside the region. Although it was not proved conclusively, there were concerns that weapons were smuggled across the border with Serbia. Instead of cash, the incentives used during the Phase II weapons collection programme in El Salvador were vouchers for supermarkets, pharmacies and shoe stores (Laurance & Godnick, 2001).

Overall, experience shows that weapons-for-cash programmes have a negligible effect on security, attract old and unserviceable weapons, and often stimulate the creation of illegal arms markets, resulting in an influx of weapons into the society. Berdal (1996: 34) explains further that buy-back programmes have limited medium-term impact in reducing the number of weapons in countries which have ‘(1) porous borders with countries with active weapons markets; (2) lack of capacity to enforce regulations on the open carrying and criminal use of weapons; (3) a political, economic or security climate which enhances the security and economic value of owning and using a weapon’. In some countries, the culture of the gun, which is often associated with masculinity, may also be another difficult barrier to overcome; Afghanistan is illustrative of such an environment (Özdem, 2002; Sedra, 2002). It should be noted that although ‘weapons-for-cash’ is the most widely used method, it is far from being the only approach to disarmament. There is a wide spectrum of methods ranging from a ‘weapons in exchange for development’ approach, to the strengthening of cultural norms against the use of weapons (Faltas & Di Chiaro, 2001). Nevertheless, the most effective inducement and persuasion for combatants to disarm is a credible DDRR programme that offers opportunities for new, nonviolent livelihoods. This can only be effective if all elements of the DDRR programme are coordinated and mutually supportive and if disarmament is considered from a social contract perspective.

Disarmament as a Social Contract

Disarmament, as understood and practised by United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations, is defined and constricted by their mandates, taken from the relevant Security Council resolutions. In other words, for UN peacekeeping operations, disarmament is closely associated with demobilization, which is understood to refer to the disarmament and dissolution of force
structures and the transition of combatants to civilian status (Tanner, 1996). However, as this understanding of disarmament emphasizes compliance with requirements stipulated within peace agreements, the imperative remains at the strategic and political level. Consequently, there is little or no consideration of the social and economic implications for the former combatants and their dependants as a consequence of disarming.

Furthermore, Tanner’s transformation from combatant to civilian following the handing-over of a weapon takes no account of what Berdal (1996) refers to as ‘war as social order’, the economic value to the combatants of their weapons. It is stated that when ‘combatants are asked to give up their arms, they face a “point of no return”: they, and their leaders, must have faith in a future where the advantages of peace outweigh those of war’ (ECHA, 2000: 1). Last (1999) presents a number of justifications for preferential treatment of former combatants, which resonate with the argument for considering disarmament as a social contract. For example, if former combatants cannot see a role for themselves in the postwar order, they may turn to banditry. It is particularly important that former combatants should not be seen returning to their communities empty-handed. Furthermore, targeted programmes may also be seen as a political payback for leaders who risked a great deal to bring their constituents into the peace process. However, disarmament as practised by UN peacekeeping operations appears to show little understanding of this implied contract between the individual combatants and the state.

By disarming, the combatants are forging a new social contract with the government and the international community, which act as impartial mediators; the combatants surrender the security and economic surety that their weapons provide, in exchange for opportunities and assistance in finding new peaceful livelihoods. If the UN’s activities during disarmament cause the combatants to question the organization’s effectiveness, their belief that the peace agreement will be impartially implemented is likely to be undermined. However, it seems that impartiality is sometimes sacrificed for other political priorities. For example, the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) is mandated with the demobilization of militias, including the pro-independence Falintil. However, it is reported that the UN-authorized International Forces in East Timor (INTERFET) were ‘much more concerned with disarming the pro-Indonesian militias’ than Falintil. In fact, the Falintil militia was allowed to keep its weapons within a cantonment in the town of Aileu (Kingma, 2001: 29).

The emphasis on weapons and military forces instead of social contract aspects can be directly linked to the mandates under which the peacekeeping missions operate, but it is also a consequence of the involvement of military individuals, and units, as the main implementers of disarmament activities. The influence of the UN peacekeeping missions, by virtue of the fact that they physically represent the will of the international community and are the first of the implementing organizations to come into contact with the combatants, cannot be underestimated. The stance adopted by the UN peacekeeping mission is important, as it affects the success or failure of the DDRR process. For example, the UN peacekeepers’ strategic and tactical stance can influence and dictate the belligerents’ maintenance of consent. Furthermore, the perceptions of the peacekeepers regarding the DDRR process can affect the development of institutional attitudes towards the process that either prevents or encourages compartmentalization of the phases involved. A holistic understanding of the process can facilitate
implementing structures that are organizationally vertically and horizontally aware. Finally, the combatants must have faith in the ability of the UN to implement not only the disarmament, but also the particulars of the peace agreement. If the DDRR process is inefficient and poorly implemented, and if it fails to perceive disarmament from a social contract point of view, doubts will be cast on the outcome of the wider peace process, resulting in an undermining of the peace agreement.

Camps: Demobilization with or without Cantonment

Demobilization is the second stage of the DDRR process, following disarmament; its form and functions vary according to context. In addition to removing the symbols of a combatant’s military life, such as their weapon, uniform and rank, demobilization activities include a survey of combatants’ needs and aspirations, medical examinations, counselling, initial reintegration packages and transportation to the community of choice. Like Berdal (1996), Colletta, Kostner & Wiederhofer (1996a) and the DPKO (1999) include cantonment (sometimes termed ‘assembly’ or ‘quartering’) as an essential element within demobilization.

It seems that the basic rationale for the cantonment of former combatants is threefold. First, it provides a number of operational opportunities such as the registration and gathering of information and profiling of former combatants, their health screening for infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, and identification of vulnerable groups such as those with disabilities, child soldiers and female combatants. Second, it allows for pre-discharge orientation sessions, which are intended to prepare former combatants and their families for the changed circumstances of civilian life and to furnish them with information on the DDR programme, including benefits and opportunities available. Third, it may also have a political objective, particularly during the war-to-peace transition, of demonstrating factions’ willingness to demobilize forces while retaining the forces in concentrated areas, where they could be remobilized if the peace agreement is not implemented. Within this understanding, cantonment represents a halfway house between a mobilized state and the dissolution of forces.

The DPKO (1999: 36) presents cantonment as a vital requirement for the DDR process, particularly in circumstances in which former combatants ‘have to wait for extended periods before they can be transported to their homes for resettlement’. The cantonment can also be considered as a necessity when the caseload of former combatants is too large, which would require a phased-out demobilization, allowing local communities the time to absorb each group of demobilized combatants before the arrival of the next cohort. It is also likely that some former combatants will not have a community to return to, if they were abducted from their families when they were children, or if they have committed atrocities against their own communities. Subsequently, they would need time before they could adopt a community for themselves. Nevertheless, more importantly, child soldiers must be separated from military authority and protected through the establishment of special reception centres during demobilization, as long as their stay prior to being reunited with their families and communities is as short as possible (Verhey, 2002).

Furthermore, a comprehensive process of information gathering on former combatants during cantonment will greatly enhance the effectiveness of reintegration programmes. Colletta, Kostner & Wiederhofer (1996a) consider the targeting of reintegration programmes to be central for their successful implementation. Targeting encompasses...
beneficiaries who have to be identified on the basis of specific criteria, needs and opportunities which have to be ascertained and the development of an effective targeting mechanism. For example, the medical care, child care and education needs of female former combatants will be different from those of male former combatants and child soldiers (de Watteville, 2002). It is clear that the inclusion of cantonment as part of demobilization can provide opportunities for a thorough assessment of the capacities and needs of former combatants and the implementation of an effective targeting mechanism. Therefore, it would be unrealistic not to consider the possible advantages of cantonment as part of the demobilization process. However, a number of commentators on DDRR highlight the problems encountered during cantonment (World Bank, 1993; Colletta, Kostner & Wiederhofer, 1996b; Berdal, 1996; Kingma, 1997) concerning the living conditions experienced by former combatants, the effect that cantonning thousands of former combatants has on security and the negative impact this can have on the peace process.

In his study, Kingma (1997: 161) reiterates the requirement for an extensive logistics operation to support the cantonment of former combatants. He points out that if adequate facilities are not provided, ‘violent activities and rebellion could undermine the demobilization and reintegration process, as well as the total peace process’. Furthermore, the cost of such logistics operations can prove to be disproportionate to the resources available for subsequent reintegration activities; the support for Ethiopian cantonment sites provided by the US Department of Defence alone is estimated to have cost $20 million (Colletta, Kostner & Wiederhofer, 1996b).

Examples of longer than planned cantonment periods suggest that, as they evolve on the ground, DDRR programmes invariably encounter delays during cantonment. In Mozambique, the demobilization was scheduled for 6 months, but in reality it took over 16 months, which led to insecurity in and around the cantonment sites (Berdal, 1996). The lack of trust between the parties was the main factor delaying the process, as neither party wanted to give a strategic advantage to their adversary, causing disputes over selection and location (Coelho & Vines, 1994). In Somaliland, lack of resources and funding meant that combatants were kept in camps for eight months and in the end might have simply left the cantonment areas (Berdal, 1996).

Cantonment might also attract communities of former combatants’ families and develop into politically awkward semi-permanent settlements (Last, 1999). In the Angolan demobilization process starting from April 2002, plans were originally made for around 50,000 former National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) combatants. However, more than 85,000 UNITA combatants were registered in 35 cantonment areas while approximately 280,000 family members were gathered in family reception areas. These higher than expected numbers of former combatants and their family members, as well as delays in international response to the challenge, have resulted in the process facing a dire humanitarian situation (Porto & Parsons, 2003). The possibility of further delays with the demobilization of former combatants in Angola could easily pose serious setbacks to the peace process after a 27-year-long civil war.

Overall, the concept of assembly and the development of the concept into development poles present a central dilemma to the DDRR process. Ironically, the cantonment of combatants reinforces the command structures that the process is intended to dissolve, and in the case of development areas, the former combatants are concentrated and
isolated from the community when the objective is, in fact, to dissipate and integrate them within the community. Mozambique and Nicaragua represent DDRR programmes that were agreed by all parties during peace negotiations, were fully supported by the international community and were well funded (Colletta, Kostner & Wiederhofer, 1996a,b; Berdal, 1996; Kingma, 1997; Spencer, 1997). However, the cantonment of former combatants encountered the same problems, delays, inadequate facilities and an undermining of the peace process. Consequently, the next section will seek to address these concerns by exploring the possibility of demobilization without cantonment.

Demobilization without Cantonment

The cantonment of former combatants is often endorsed as a key activity within the demobilization phase. However, as preceding discussions show, cantonment can prove detrimental to the effectiveness of the DDRR programme by absorbing scarce resources and causing delays that undermine overall confidence in the process. Therefore, it is important to explore possible alternatives to cantonment of former combatants before deciding whether it constitutes an absolute necessity as part of demobilization.

An alternative to cantonment would be the establishment of demobilization centres, to which former combatants simply report, before returning to their communities. Following their registration, they would report periodically to the discharge centre for documentation, screening or benefits. The primary advantage of such a system would be the achievement of a shorter demobilization period without the need for setting up camps for cantonment. Such operations are bound to be less expensive to run and logistically easier to implement. They are particularly useful for vulnerable groups whose members might be reluctant to enter camps where they would be subject to attack. On the other hand, such an alternative method means a much looser control over demobilizing forces, which could in turn result in both political and security risks (Last, 1999).

Past experience of demobilization programmes highlights occasions when alternatives to cantonment have been implemented. The Transitional Government of Ethiopia did not require female former combatants to report to cantonment sites. Rather, they were required to report to their communities and register, thereby ensuring their entitlement to the same benefits as male former combatants (Colletta, Kostner & Wiederhofer, 1996b). Within the same programme, 70,162 former combatants who had served fewer than 18 months were transported to their communities immediately after registration. The programme in Cambodia, planned by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), intended that more than 200,000 militia were required to disarm without going through the cantonment process (Cox, 1996). These examples represent the exception rather than the rule; they do, however, suggest that demobilization can be achieved without cantonment of the combatants.

On the other hand, as pointed out earlier, the cantonment of former combatants may have a political objective, particularly during the war-to-peace transition, of demonstrating the willingness of factions to demobilize, while retaining the requisite forces in concentrated areas where they could be remobilized if the peace agreement is not implemented. In such circumstances, the deficiencies of cantonment in relation to the objective of demobilization, reinforcing and concentrating force structures, represent a political objective of belligerent factions during the cantonment phase. Cantonment allows the belligerent factions to demonstrate...
a ‘willingness’ to disarm without actually doing so. Forces are concentrated, and in some cases disarmed, but remain effectively under the control of the force command structures and can therefore be remobilized rapidly if the peace process is not successful. It is therefore possible that the political requirements of the belligerent factions might prevent the implementation of demobilization without cantonment. In such circumstances, it remains the responsibility of the international community and donor bodies to articulate their preferences and so decide the method to be adopted.

Cash: Financial Reinsertion Assistance

Reinsertion of former combatants following demobilization and prior to participation within a reintegration programme constitutes a crucial stage within the overall DDRR process. Kostner (2001: 1) states the importance of reinsertion assistance as follows:

Upon discharge, an ex-combatant loses his/her source of (formal or informal) income. Immediately thereafter, s/he is normally in a critical financial situation until s/he can generate income through self-employment. During this period (the ‘reinsertion’ phase), an ex-combatant is in need of special assistance (‘transitional safety net’) to cover the basic material needs of him/herself and his/her family.

The basic material needs of former combatants and their dependants can be divided into two groups: household consumption, such as food, clothes, health care and children’s education, and household investment, such as shelter, agricultural tools and kitchen utensils (Kostner, 2001). The transitional safety net is often planned for a period of six months to a year after demobilization and provided through the provision of cash and/or goods. The cash assistance could be provided as a monthly amount or in a lump sum and needs to be tailored to meet the individual needs of the former combatant. Not all former combatants will require the same amount of reinsertion assistance, so criteria for assistance need to be established and implemented in a transparent manner. The following sections will explore the different elements and modalities of reinsertion assistance.

Modalities of Financial Assistance

Cash payments can be used for household consumption and household investment. The advantages of cash as reinsertion assistance, compared to other kinds of material assistance, include the relative ease of distribution, since no transportation or warehousing expenses are incurred. If a banking system is operational, the cash can be paid directly into recipients’ bank accounts, thereby reducing the security risks involved in cash distribution and also strengthening the local banking system. However, it is at this point that the difference between cash payments during the reinsertion and reintegration phases needs to be recognized. As the reinsertion phase serves the purpose of a linkage between demobilization and reintegration, the financial reinsertion might be seen as a reintegration initiative. However, as far as this article is concerned, reinsertion assistance is considered as a transitional safety net. It is accepted that there is in fact ‘no clear correlation between the size of the sum issued and the subsequent employment rate’ during the reintegration phase. It is asserted that ‘cash payments per se do not address the problems of socially integrating ex-combatants into society’ (Berdal, 1996: 47). However, a study carried out by Peppiatt, Mitchell & Holzmann (2001: 19) asserts that cash allowances, as a transitional safety net, provide a cost-effective and beneficiary-friendly method of delivering reinsertion assistance:
The southern Africa safety-net studies indicate that beneficiaries tend to use cash for social and productive investment only after consumption needs have been met, and show how cash can act as a stimulant to the local economy. Evidence of ‘squandering’ – on alcohol and gambling, for example – was not found in any of the case studies that looked at how grants were spent.

Furthermore, the intent of the cash payment for the Ethiopian case was to assist in the establishment of a civilian household. The National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in Sierra Leone (2001: 1) states the objective of the reininsertion support, which also included a cash payment, as being ‘to facilitate the return and initial reintegation of ex-combatants into their home areas, and to help ensure their basic short-term necessities are accommodated without being an undue burden on the receiving household’. In fact, the Sierra Leone example introduces an important element when considering the reinsertion of former combatants, which is the effect upon the host community and household into which they will be reinserted. Former combatants may have to rely on the informal support structures available from family and community. Therefore, the cash allowance will help to ameliorate the additional drain on resources experienced by receiving communities and households.

Overall, five primary issues must be addressed when planning cash reininsertion assistance: the mobilization of funds, differentiating criteria, the amount of the allowance, financial education and the development of a non-corruptible identification system. Alongside the overall challenge for the DDRR process in general, mobilization of the necessary funds for financial reininsertion assistance is obviously the first obstacle to be overcome in this process. For example, although the donor community provided 89% of funds for the DDRR process in Uganda, there was a substantial overlap of activities due to delays in the mobilization of funds, and consequently, some funds had to be loaned from the Ministry of Defence at times (Colletta, Kostner & Wiederhofer, 1996b). The World Bank plans for demobilization in Cambodia in 2000 also faced similar funding problems, as the donors and the government failed in their mobilization. Consequently, the original plan for a severance payment of $1,200 per demobilized Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) soldier was reduced to $240 per veteran. The further demobilization of RCAF soldiers is likely to face problems with the provision of necessary funding (Kingma, 2001).

Experience indicates that criteria for differentiating the amounts paid to particular groups must be clearly and transparently established. This is particularly important in order to avoid discrimination, for example against female former combatants. However, the Ugandan reininsertion process adopted an approach based on egalitarian differentiation. It was the same for all former combatants, irrespective of their rank, age or years of service. In contrast, during the process in Ethiopia, the criteria for differentiating amounts and types of reininsertion assistance included length of service, location of settlement (urban or rural) and level of disability (Colletta, Kostner & Wiederhofer, 1996b). In the Namibian experience, the need for reininsertion assistance was not foreseen at the beginning; however, protests from former combatants and the resulting threat to security meant that retrospective reininsertion was provided. However, the two criteria for differentiating payment – being unemployed and in service at the time the decision was made – proved difficult to establish. Furthermore, the payments were considered as severance pay and were therefore not calculated on the basis of projected needs (Colletta, Kostner & Wiederhofer, 1996b; Preston, 1997).
The amount of the allowance, as a general rule, should broadly correspond to the level of household income of the general population in order that it does not cause resentment within the community in which the former combatant will settle (Kostner, 2001). In other words, establishing the amount of reinsertion assistance must be based upon information gathered from combatants and the prevailing socio-economic environment into which they are to be inserted. Also, the amount should be calculated so as to avoid creating a disincentive to find employment. Criticism of the reinsertion assistance in Mozambique suggests that it was too generous, creating a sense among former combatants that they were special and they could therefore expect and demand more from the government and international community (UNIDIR, 1996).

In addition to the level of financial assistance, another important issue is whether this should be paid as a lump sum or by instalments. The World Bank (1993) study shows that former combatants tend to have little success in investing lump sum payments for productive purposes, suggesting that cash payments without financial planning sessions are of limited utility. Depending on their context, former combatants may have little or no experience in managing money or operating within a cash economy. In such circumstances, cash payments should be combined with the provision of finance education sessions as an integral component of the reinsertion assistance. Consequently, the preferred approach should entail payment by instalments that decrease over time, thereby reducing dependency and clearly establishing that the assistance is strictly time-limited. For example, the process initiated in Angola in 2002 plans to provide former combatants with one cash payment of $100 in addition to a severance payment in the form of three months’ salary (Porto & Parsons, 2003).

Finally, a non-corruptible identification system must be established during demobilization that will allow former combatants to receive their reinsertion assistance. The establishment of a non-corruptible identification system is imperative in forming and maintaining confidence in the distribution of reinsertion assistance, among both the beneficiaries and the donors contributing towards the DDRR programme. The payment list needs to be complete and accurate, former combatants should be registered and provided with a non-transferable photographic ID and benefits should be tracked via the DDRR programme management information system (Kostner, 2001).

Other Elements of Reinsertion Assistance
Cash allowances should not be considered to be exclusive. For example in Angola, in addition to cash, former combatants will be provided with in-kind kit, including clothes, domestic tools, food and agricultural tools (Porto & Parsons, 2003). Free health services may be included in the reinsertion assistance package, especially if former combatants received free medical care during their period of military service. Any health support provided should be targeted at the family of the former combatant and include children. However, depending upon the social context, it should be recognized that health support may be an element of the reinsertion assistance that potentially causes resentment among the community, especially if medical provision in the community is not freely available. It would therefore be appropriate to channel funds through existing structures that benefit the community as a whole, rather than create specific DDRR programmes (Colletta, Kostner & Wiederhofer, 1996b). An element of the reinsertion assistance that targets children of former combatants may relieve some financial restraints for
a period of one year. Assistance could include school fees, books and uniforms, and such assistance should be delivered, not in cash, but through a system of vouchers that can be redeemed at schools and shops.

Immediately following their return to their community, the most pressing need for former combatants and their dependants is often finding shelter. Assistance can be given either as a cash subsidy or via material inputs such as roofing materials (Colletta, Kostner & Wiederhofer, 1996b). Nevertheless, material assistance, in terms of roofing materials and tools, incurs higher transitional costs; these materials are unlikely to meet the specific needs of individual former combatants and might be sold by former combatants for cash to meet more pressing needs. The special needs of female former combatants should also be borne in mind in this process. For example, in urban areas their housing needs can be covered through the safety net by assisting them with rent fees for a limited period. For those who are in rural areas, cash can be provided for materials for constructing or rehabilitating a house. However, women, particularly those who are single heads of households, can face problems in this process, since they often lack the necessary technical skills. Therefore, the transitional safety net for female former combatants could also include the payment of essential labour for construction of their houses (de Watteville, 2002).

Conclusions

The DDRR of former combatants following an armed conflict is a critical undertaking during the war-to-peace transition. Timely and effective implementation can greatly enhance, or greatly hinder, a society’s transition from a state of war to a state of positive peace and development. The effect of a DDRR programme is evident in post-conflict societies for many years following the cessation of hostilities. The effectiveness of disarmament and demobilization and the subsequent ability of former combatants to support themselves and their families through nonviolent activities directly affect the level of violence prevalent within a post-conflict society and its future rate of development.

The traditional form of DDRR programmes has met with varying degrees of success, as has been illustrated with the examination of the secondary case studies in this article. Experience shows that disarmament, demobilization, reinsertion and reintegration can be outlined in four distinct but interlinked and mutually supporting phases. The process needs to be tailor-made to address the characteristics of its socio-political, economic and physical environment. An integrated and targeted approach requires the advance coordination of a diverse group of actors involved in the process. More importantly, in order to avoid the possibility of creating conflicts between the local community and former combatants, the needs of the wider community should also be considered. Such programmes should be seen as an investment in the productive potential employment of former combatants rather than as a bribe to keep them ‘busy’ and ‘out of trouble’.

The review of secondary case studies underlines the need to consider disarmament as a new social contract between former combatants and their post-conflict environment. In other words, the security-focused concept of disarmament should be expanded so that it encompasses the socio-economic implications of the disarmament process on former combatants and their dependants. Experience with alternatives to cantonment also suggests that in some circumstances demobilization can be achieved without this action. Demobilization without cantonment would create a locale-specific reinsertion orientation, allowing for sessions that are
regionally and culturally specific. Such an approach would avoid the inevitable delays encountered within cantonment sites and the subsequent security concerns that may result in threats to the peace process. It would also serve to concentrate assets on the reinsertion and reintegration activities as opposed to maintaining cantonment sites. The cash component of the orientation assistance might be an effective tool, but it needs to be carefully targeted as part of an overall reinsertion package. However, the reintegration process should avoid the provision of a lump sum payment because of its limited utility for addressing a wide scope of problems in relation to the social and economic reintegration of former combatants.

References


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