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The Soviet–American War Scare of the 1980s

As his limousine pulled into the U.S. State Department’s subterranean garage late on a February afternoon in 1983, Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin had no idea that his scheduled meeting on the seventh floor had been cancelled—or that he was about to sneak into the White House for a hush-hush chat with the President of the United States. The surprised Soviet envoy learned that Ronald Reagan wanted to speak with him “in person” and “right away.” After entering the presidential compound through a little-used entrance, Dobrynin and Secretary of State George Shultz made their way, unseen and unescorted, to the President’s second-floor private apartment for a meeting that was “shrouded in the utmost secrecy.” This was the first private session between the dean of the Washington diplomatic corps and the American President, and Mr. Reagan’s first substantive conversation with a senior Soviet official. It also may have marked the first small step toward ending the Cold War.1

After more than two years in office, the President was still displaying little interest in diplomatic contacts with Moscow, but his opening question revealed a sense of urgency. Did Soviet leaders really believe that the United States might attack them by launching a nuclear war? If so, he wanted to assure the Kremlin that “I don’t want a war between us, because I know it would bring countless disasters.”2 The question puzzled

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Dobrynin. What the President knew—and what Dobrynin learned only later—was that Moscow was in the midst of a war scare.

Reports from British intelligence claimed that the Kremlin had put its intelligence services on alert to search for indications of a possible U.S. attack. In fact, just two days after the Reagan-Dobrynin meeting, KGB headquarters sent an “eyes only” cable to select rezidenturas (field stations) proclaiming that the alert, codenamed RYaN, had acquired “an especial degree of urgency” and “particularly grave importance.” The cable instructed recipients to form a “continual watch” using their entire operational staff to provide warning at a “very early stage” and “without delay” of “any preparations by the adversary for a nuclear missile attack (RYaN) on the USSR.”

MUTUAL VULNERABILITY AND THE DECAPITATION OPTION

President Reagan’s question still intrigues Cold War scholars. Except for a few Doubting Thomases, most believe that a war scare of some sort did occur, but its origins are obscure. A Russian investigative journalist who attempted to plot the story found it still “caught in a fog of propaganda.” But he learned enough to describe it as “this war of nerves, political passions, and military technologies” that raged “from 1981 through 1985, when the Soviet Union and the United States of America were preparing for nuclear war.”

The journalist’s description reads like hyperbole, but he was close to the mark. Most accounts of the Soviet war scare attribute it to “paranoid mistrust” based on “alarmist assumptions” about “non-existent U.S. war plans.” The reality was more complex. The Soviet war scare was genuine, but recent revelations show there also was an American war scare. “In the early Reagan years,” according to author James Mann, “the U.S. government gave more serious consideration to the possibility of a nuclear war with the Soviet Union than at any time since the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.”

The two war scares paralleled and fed off each other. Both sides seized on the threat of a “decapitating” surprise attack against their respective national capitals and national command authorities, and both generated “doomsday” plans, which, they hoped, would deter an attack if possible, but also enable them to launch a post-attack retaliatory strike if worse came to worse. The Soviet version—a “dead hand” that could launch missiles even after the supreme leadership had been incapacitated or killed—was the more bizarre of the two, but was by no means unique.

Persistent fear of surprise attack punched a big hole in the prevailing theory of MAD (mutual assured destruction) that had emerged in the 1960s and 1970s when the Soviet Union achieved parity in strategic forces.
with the United States. Indeed, in view of the war scare, it seems more like wishful thinking than a description of strategic reality. According to MAD, both superpowers were mutually deterred, or “self-deterred,” from attacking the other but, if deterrence failed, each side was supposed to have the patience and invulnerability to absorb a surprise attack and then retaliate. “Well, that was a crock,” as one American expert put it in nonscientific terms. Both sides had a strong incentive to consider a preemptive strike if war appeared imminent and to fully commit all their strategic forces in the event of war.

The dirty little secret of the “second” or “late” Cold War was that the two antagonists remained vulnerable to a decapitation strike aimed at destroying their command structures, that is, the organizational and communications networks that would provide coherent direction of strategic forces in wartime. Although it received little attention in public discussions, command vulnerability was “the most significant problem of modern strategic forces.” Missiles hitting political capitals and command posts were only part of the problem. American tests revealed that intense electromagnetic pulses released by nuclear explosions would disrupt communications and avionic systems to such an extent that controlling retaliatory forces would have been extremely difficult to impossible. MAD may have been the strategic cant of the seventies, but mutual assured vulnerability was the reality of the 1980s.

To reduce the threat of decapitation, both sides adopted—without openly acknowledging it—a strategic posture of launch-on-warning (LOW), that is, initiation of a counterstrike once an enemy missile attack had begun, but before incoming warheads had reached their targets (missile launch sites, missile-armed submarines, bombers, and command centers). But LOW is predicated on early and reliable warning—something that was always questionable at best. As a former Strategic Air Command (SAC) commander put it, “When people talk about firing on warning or launch on warning, they’re in a very risky area. It’s dangerous, in my opinion—very dangerous.” Both sides poured vast sums of money into improving their command arrangements and missile-attack early-warning systems, but the Soviet Union, hampered by technical backwardness and growing social and economic problems, was always a day late and a ruble short.

Both superpowers played to the other side’s vulnerability in their strategic planning. According to Mann, one of the “core elements of the Reagan administration’s strategy for fighting a nuclear war was to decapitate the Soviet leadership by striking at top political and military officials and their communications lines.” The administration wanted to ensure that the Soviet Union could not do what Pentagon war planners intended to do to the Soviet Union. Soviet war planners, for their part, thought along similar
lines. Aware of U.S. vulnerability, they signaled an appreciation of command vulnerability and its importance both in their military writings on strategy and in extensive investments to protect their own command facilities and early-warning system.\textsuperscript{14} Added to the strategic and technical considerations that exacerbated fear of decapitation was the added weight of historical experience. The United States and the Soviet Union both entered World War II as victims of surprise attacks—a memory that was subliminal on the American side but always on the surface of Soviet military planning.

The Soviet war scare erupted during President Reagan’s first term and—as the result of several incidents in Soviet–American relations—peaked during 1983, often described as “the year of living dangerously” or “the most dangerous year.”\textsuperscript{15} Again, the reality was more complex. The stage was set during the previous administration, and many of the props were already in place. President Jimmy Carter ordered the first major post-Vietnam augmentation of the U.S. defense budget, and devised a new war-fighting strategy that placed greater emphasis on targeting the Soviet political and military leadership and the Soviet national command authority. Under his Republican successor, the Pentagon adopted the same strategy and made a decapitation strike an even stronger option. Carter, not Reagan, began spending hundreds of millions of dollars on overhauling and upgrading the U.S. command-and-control system, as well as on a major expansion of the U.S. early-warning network of radars and satellites. And it was Carter’s Pentagon, not Reagan’s, that initiated development of new, high-tech conventional weapons that, in the Soviet view, posed the threat of nonnuclear decapitation of Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces based on World War II–era armaments. No wonder, then, that the Kremlin was feeling pressured by a resurgent American defense effort even before the 1980 elections. Former East German spymaster Markus Wolf recounted the following 1980 exchange with Yuri Andropov, who, as head of the KGB, had ordered the RYaN alert:

We began discussing the East-West conflict. I had never before seen Andropov so somber and dejected. He described a gloomy scenario in which a nuclear war might be a real threat. His sober analysis came to the conclusion that the US government was striving by all available means to establish nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. He cited statements of President Carter, his adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, and of Pentagon spokesmen, all of which included the assertion that under certain circumstances a nuclear first-strike against the Soviet Union and its allies would be justified.\textsuperscript{16}

Wolf added that when the Carter administration announced a record defense budget to pay for MX and Trident missiles, cruise missiles, more
nuclear submarines, and an eleven-thousand-man reserve force, the “reaction in Moscow was one of barely controlled panic.”

AN ALARMED KREMLIN

The Soviet war scare consisted of four separate but related episodes, each of which was part of a larger picture that requires its own explanation.

(1) Operation RYaN

In May 1981, Communist Party General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, with KGB chairman Yuri Andropov at his side, ordered the KGB and the GRU (military intelligence) to organize a joint clandestine operation to collect what, in Western intelligence jargon, would be called indications-and-warning-of-war. RYaN was predicated on the hypothesis that the United States and its NATO allies might be planning a surprise attack on the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies.

The alert’s origins are obscure. Some observers attributed RYaN to “Kremlin paranoia” and “Reaganite rhetoric,” but it almost certainly had a more concrete basis. RYaN was probably a response to a series of U.S. psychological warfare operations (known as PSYOPS in military jargon) that began in early 1981. In the first phase, the United States sent fighter-bombers on probing missions along the USSR’s European and Asian peripheries. The probes were conducted at irregular intervals in different places at different times to spook the Soviets and keep them off balance while flexing U.S. military muscle. A specific purpose was to dissuade Moscow from sending Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces to Poland, where the Solidarity protest movement was challenging the Communist regime. Because of the risk involved, and the need to disavow the PSYOPS in case of an accidental intrusion into Soviet airspace (or worse, the loss of an aircraft to Soviet air defenses), only a few top officials were informed, and there were no written orders from the White House or the Pentagon, and hence no paper trail.

Next, the United States launched the first in a series of unilateral and joint allied naval exercises near Soviet maritime approaches as part of a new forward deployment strategy. The first exercise was a combined US/NATO operation involving a full battle group led by two aircraft carriers, the USS Eisenhower, which served as the command ship, and the HMS Invincible. The assembled armada of more than 80 vessels used active and passive deception measures, as well as evasive maneuvers, to elude detection by the USSR’s massive oceanic surveillance system. The stealth fleet managed to transit the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap, unseen and unheard, while remaining below the radar, literally and figuratively. The GIUK Gap was a sensitive area. In wartime, NATO
would have used it as chokepoint to keep the Soviet Northern Fleet from leaving its only access to the north Atlantic.

As part of the same exercise, a U.S. Navy cruiser and three escort vessels slipped away from the main group and sailed north through the Norwegian Sea, and then east around Cape North and into the Barents Sea for the first time in twenty years. Soviet long-range aircraft on routine patrol stumbled onto the four ships almost by accident and then lost them. The Soviets quickly launched two satellites, one a nuclear-powered, low-orbit surveillance spacecraft and the other an ELINT (electronic signals) collector. The first “bird” malfunctioned, and the second failed to achieve orbit for more than a week; neither satellite was able to locate and track the four ships. Sailing “on top of the world,” the U.S. ships remained off the coast of the Kola Peninsula and the city of Murmansk, home port to the Northern Fleet and a major military-industrial center, for nine days without being detected.

The U.S./NATO exercise was a complete success for new and still not fully tested electronic warfare measures. It demonstrated that a NATO battle group could sail up to the Soviet Union’s backdoor without getting caught and nullified the advantage the Soviets had derived from a long-running spy operation (the Walker spy ring) that gave them access to “secure” U.S. Navy communications. For the Soviets, it was the first of several dismal failures of an inadequate surveillance and early-warning system that would animate the war scare.

(2) Able Archer 83

On the night of 8–9 November 1983, during a NATO command-post nuclear-release exercise codenamed Able Archer-83, the Soviet Union placed some nuclear-capable fighter-interceptors in Poland and East Germany on strip alert and rattled a few sabers at military bases in the western USSR. Some observers argue that this was potentially the most serious episode of the Cold War—equal to or even greater than the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.

Subsequently, however, U.S. intelligence surveyed the incident and concluded that “Although the Soviet reaction was somewhat greater than usual, by confining heightened readiness to selected air units Moscow clearly revealed that it did not in fact think there was a possibility of a NATO attack.” The fact that the Soviets waited until the end of the exercise to respond, and then did not push the panic button, suggests that they were engaging in “signaling,” the bizarre body language that developed during the Cold War, rather than something riskier. The White House, moreover, had learned of the RYaN alert and scaled back Able Archer-83 to make it less challenging to Moscow—in other words, more
body language. Rather than a "brush with Armageddon," this episode probably signified that both sides had learned to live with the war scare.  

(3) War Panic in the USSR

Beginning in mid-1981, some Soviet political leaders and senior military officers began to speak openly about the increased danger of nuclear war. This was unprecedented since Stalin's time. War propaganda assumed new prominence in late 1982. By late 1983, the entire country found itself in a frenzy stimulated by peace rallies, civil defense drills, and classified briefings for the party aktīv on the war danger. (Photographs from this period show people practicing air-raid and gas-mask drills.) A diplomatic interpreter returning to Moscow from abroad in November 1983 described the atmosphere as "prewar."  

The public war scare was brief but intense, and its origins and termination are veiled in mystery. It most likely began as a drive to prepare the Soviet people for greater sacrifices and a postponement of promised increases in living standards in the name of national security. In early 1984, the Politburo cancelled plans for a six-day workweek and a voluntary national defense fund, saying that international tensions had subsided to the point at which they were no longer necessary. 

(4) East German Early-Warning System

This is the least known, but in some ways the most intriguing, episode. The conventional wisdom holds that RYaN wound down after the Able Archer 83 incident, even though it was not cancelled until late 1991. Beginning in mid-1985, however, the East German Ministry of State Security, the counterpart to the KGB, began organizing a massive early-warning system (Frühwarnsystem) that was modeled on, but far exceeded, the parallel Soviet effort. The East German government decree that implemented the alert, codenamed KWA (Kernwaffenangriff, or nuclear weapons attack, the German translation of RYaN), declared that it was an "absolute priority" for the entire Ministry, that is, the internal security apparatus (the Stasi), as well as the foreign intelligence service, the HV A (Hauptverwaltung A, Main Directorate A). The East German early-warning system included:

- Reporting requirements keyed to a KGB/RYaN "catalogue of indicators" of US/NATO war preparations
- A "gigantic" situation center (Lagezentrum) with a "special communications link" to the KGB Center (headquarters) that monitored U.S. and NATO military operations and exercises
• A headquarters staff dedicated to analyzing the intelligence flow from the KWA collection effort
• Alert drills and military training for HV A officers, and annual exercises that simulated a surprise attack\textsuperscript{29}

The East German phase of the war scare almost certainly was a response to the impending completion of NATO’s deployment of new U.S. intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), including 108 Pershing II (P-II) ballistic and 464 BGM-109 G Gryphon ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs), which began in late 1983. The former were of special concern, since Moscow, probably incorrectly, considered the P IIs, which were deployed solely in West Germany, a first-strike weapon that could “decapitate” their political and military leadership—“a cocked pistol aimed at Moscow’s head,” in the words of Soviet general responsible for detecting the missiles.\textsuperscript{30}

The East German role was critical. The HV A had human and technical assets in West Germany and inside NATO that the KGB could only envy. One top agent, codenamed Topaz (Rainer Rupp), a West German national assigned to NATO Headquarters near Brussels, supplied the HV A (and KGB) with more than a thousand Top Secret Cosmic documents, the highest level of classification. But there were dozens of lesser but still important sources. As the war scare progressed, the HV A began recruiting new agents and establishing communication plans and locating safe houses that could be used in a crisis or in wartime. The agent-recruiting drive was massive. West German counterintelligence documented some 1,500 attempts between 1983 and 1989 to recruit West German servicemen with access to information on weapons developments, troop strengths, mobilization plans, and alert procedures.\textsuperscript{31} The HV A also set its sights on American civilians, and the military intelligence service targeted U.S. service personnel living in West Berlin and West Germany.\textsuperscript{32}

The Ministry for State Security had ears as well as eyes in West Germany and surrounding NATO countries. It operated a massive and highly effective SIGINT (signals intelligence) collection network just next door that remained virtually undetected by Western intelligence during the Cold War and was held in high esteem by the KGB.\textsuperscript{33}

THE OTHER WAR SCARE

Project 908, also known as the continuity-in-government (COG) program, was the U.S. version of the war scare. Soon after entering office, President Reagan signed a secret executive order that inaugurated a “highly classified program” in response to the threat of a Soviet decapitation strike.\textsuperscript{34} It involved measures to protect the President and maintain
command-and-control of U.S. strategic forces in the event of war, but also created a shadow War Cabinet that could assume power if the President were killed, incapacitated, or otherwise prevented from executing his duties as command-in-chief. Besides political and administrative arrangements, fallout-proof command posts, and space-age communications systems were the order of the day. The COG underscored the sense of urgency surrounding command vulnerability, as well as the new hi-tech nature of warfare. As one defense expert put it, "Computers, satellites and radars share priority status with missiles, bombers and submarines."^{35}

Dubbed the "Doomsday Project" by one journalist, the Reagan plan paid special attention to presidential succession. Seventeen U.S. officials who, according to the Constitution and the Presidential Succession Act of 1947, would be in line to succeed the President were tracked by a computer database, and at least one of the seventeen was supposed to remain outside the Washington, D.C. area at all times. The National Security Council organized 50 former and serving officials and 250 personnel, mostly Pentagon officials and disaster specialists, into three teams, which were color-coded (red, white, and blue, of course). Each team included a serving Cabinet member (who would act as President), and representatives from the major national security departments (State, Defense, and Central Intelligence Agency), as well as staff from domestic policy agencies. In the event of a war alert, the teams would be evacuated to secure bunkers and command posts along with war plans and nuclear codes.

A continuity-in-government office had its own headquarters (Defense Mobilization Planning System Agency), headed by a two-star general, and a budget of hundreds of millions of dollars per year, most of which was for sophisticated communications equipment linking the teams to military commanders. Total expenditures were estimated at three billion dollars. (The Reagan plan bore some similarity to, and may have been inspired by, a recently disclosed plan inaugurated by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in the 1950s when a Soviet surprise attack was seen as the preeminent threat to U.S. national security.)^{36}

Planners divided the continental United States into ten zones and constructed some 50 bunkers that could serve as wartime command posts. The COG teams held regular exercises in which they repaired to different clandestine sites.^{37} It was assumed that the two major presidential relocation sites, one located on Mount Weather in rural Virginia, and the other, Raven Rock, near the presidential retreat at Camp David on the Maryland–Pennsylvania border, were high on the Soviet target list. With the addition of more sites, the Soviets would be forced into a shell game of guessing where the President or his successor had relocated. The exercises involved elaborate deception efforts, including real and decoy truck convoys that either carried communications equipment or were empty. The
teams moved at night to avoid detection by Soviet satellites and shifted from site to site for each exercise.

In addition to underground bunkers, the COG also included airborne command posts. A helicopter command center, designated “Crown Helo,” stood ready to whisk the President from the White House to nearby Andrews Air Force Base, where a specially equipped Boeing 747, with a conference room and communications equipment, that could take off quickly and remain in the air for an extended period while being refueled in flight, stood ready. (In one exercise, a command-post aircraft remained airborne for three days.) SAC maintained additional airborne command posts (codenamed “Looking Glass”)—four-engine jets, each capable of carrying a crew of 28. At least one aircraft was in flight at all times.

Author James Mann notes that the capstone of the wartime plan was the Boeing 747 National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP or “kneecap”). He errs, however, by identifying NEACP solely with the Reagan administration. The first aircraft was built and deployed during the Carter presidency. The Reagan Pentagon added three more planes, and “hardened” them to guard against various threats, including the effect of electromagnetic pulses generated by nuclear weapons. 38

White House concern over the vulnerability of U.S. command-and-control facilities began in the late 1970s. President Carter signed a series of presidential directives calling for measures to strengthen presidential control over strategic forces in the event of a Soviet attack, to harden command posts (to protect them against nuclear attack), to upgrade warning systems (radars and satellites), and to safeguard communications networks by making them more resilient though a combination of hardening and redundancy. The Carter program was the fastest growing part of the Pentagon’s budget. 39

Fear of a Soviet decapitation strike was one of the first thoughts to cross the minds of Cabinet members when a deranged gunman shot and wounded President Reagan in May 1981. 40 Discussions in the White House Situation Room addressed the possibility that the Soviets had plotted the assault as a prelude to a surprise attack, or that a series of unintended consequences might lead the Kremlin to launch an attack, either out of panic or in an attempt to take advantage of the ensuing chaos. Unbeknown to other officials, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger had placed U.S. strategic forces on alert—DEFCON (Defense Condition) 2, the second highest alert level—and ordered SAC bombers on strip alert. He did so in response to the attack on Mr. Reagan, as well as to reports of Soviet missile-carrying submarines (SSBNs) being stationed closer than usual off the eastern coast of the United States.

Soviet intelligence almost certainly caught wind of continuity-in-government plans formulated under both the Carter and the Reagan
administrations, despite the secrecy and concealment and deceptions measures used to conceal them. If so, then the COG project may have fueled the Soviet war scare. U.S. plans and preparations for evacuating senior government officials and their staffs to clandestine relocation sites and command posts were high on the list of warning-of-war indicators for both RYaN and its East German variant.

TECHNOWAR, DECAPITATION, AND THE WINNING EDGE

The “war of military technologies” was at the center of the Soviet war scare. The United States had crossed the digital divide and was on its way to becoming a hyperpower. The Soviet Union, still mired somewhere in the second industrial revolution, was on the verge of collapse, although this was not evident at the time. As Norman Friedman noted, “Few if any in the West seem to have realized just how quickly the balance of military power was tipping” in America’s favor as the world entered in the 1980s. The key factor was computers and micro-electronic engineering.

The advent of “smart bombs”—munitions that can be guided to their targets by cameras or laser beams—and “brilliant bombs” that can be loosed over a battlefield and strike targets of their own “computing volition” was part of the story. At the tactical level, the revolution in computerized warfare enabled commanders to organize, display, and transmit information in real time. Such advances “had provided a potentially winning edge that the Soviets found they could not match.”

Ironically, few observers in the West grasped the revolutionary nature of the changes taking place. But their implications were not lost on the Soviets. In a series of publications, Marshal of the Soviet Union Nikolai Ogarkov, chief of the General Staff, first deputy defense minister, and the USSR’s highest-ranking military officer, coined the term Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) to refer to new hi-tech forms of warfare, a term Pentagon strategists adopted and still use with respectful acknowledgement.

Most accounts of the end of the Cold War make the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, generally dubbed “Star Wars” by the media) the focus of Soviet angst. SDI, they claim, more than any other factor, convinced the Soviet Union that it could not compete in a new technological arms race with the United States. Andropov attacked the concept as a “bid to disarm the Soviet Union” and as part of a plan “to unleash a nuclear war in the best way, with the hope of winning it.” But SDI was more of a concept than a reality, and many U.S. military officers and scientists, as well as their Soviet counterparts, doubted that it would be technically feasible to build a ground- and space-based, laser-armed, antiballistic missile system that would provide a near-impenetrable defensive shield.
SDI lay in the future, but Soviet intelligence, aided by East Germany’s Markus Wolf, stumbled on more immediate plans in the here and now to develop hardware and software that would enable the United States to plan a decapitating strike. One of Wolf’s agents inside the U.S. Air Force, for example, reported on a U.S. capability to pinpoint and destroy dozens of Warsaw Pact targets during the first few minutes of conflict. The same agent explained how American intelligence had penetrated the communications system of the Soviet ground station at an air base near East Berlin and, in the event of war, would have transmitted false orders to Soviet pilots. To Wolf, this sounded like science fiction, but technical experts confirmed that it was technically feasible. 45

These were not the only alarming reports reaching Moscow by way of East Berlin. A former Soviet diplomat recalled seeing a top secret/eyes only KGB report in 1983 “stating that the US had ‘prepared everything for a first-strike,’ might resort to a ‘surgical strike against command centers in the Soviet Union,’ and had the ‘capability to destroy the...by incapacitating the command center.’” 46 Two former East German intelligence officers suggest that their service was the source of the report, which was based on a classified NATO briefing. 47 Later, the HV A obtained, and passed to the KGB, additional details of a U.S. capability that would neutralize the Soviet Union’s command-and-control HF (high frequency) communications and thereby short circuit the high command’s ability to direct Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces (which would have come under direct Soviet command in wartime). 48

Kremlin concern led to a reorientation of intelligence collection requirements away from advanced Western technology applicable to the ailing Soviet economy, and to new U.S. weapon systems and military technologies. The number one priority for the science and technology directorate of the KGB’s First Chief Directorate (foreign intelligence), as outlined in its 1984 annual work plan, included:

military technology measures taken by the Main Adversary to build up first-strike weapons: the quantitative increase in nuclear munitions and means of delivery (MX missile complexes, Trident, Pershing-2, cruise missiles, strategic bombers); replacement of one generation of nuclear missiles by another (Minuteman, Trident-2), the development of qualitatively new types of weapons (space devices for multiple use for military purposes, laser and pencil beam weapons, non-acoustic antisubmarine defense weapons, electronic warfare weapons, etc.) 49

No wonder that an East German intelligence officer, who had been briefed on such collection priorities, worried that the new U.S. weapons and electronic warfare capabilities threatened to make the Warsaw Pact armed forces “deaf, dumb, and blind.” 50
In a remarkably candid conversation with a U.S. arms expert, Marshal Ogarkov summed up the USSR’s position and its implications for the Cold War. He acknowledged that the Soviet Union lagged behind the United States in modern military technology by a generation or two. Modern military power, he noted, is based on computer technology, an area in which the USSR was deficient. “And for reasons you know well, we cannot make computers widely available in our society.” To catch up would require an economic revolution, but the larger question was whether that was possible without a political revolution. That in a nutshell was the Soviet dilemma—reform or fall further behind. Eventually, Mikhail Gorbachev would try, and fail, to find a way out with perestroika and glasnost, but it was too little and too late to stave off the final collapse.

TECHNOWAR AND DECAPITATION: NEW STRATEGY, TACTICS, AND WEAPONS

The U.S. defense modernization program that began during the Carter administration and accelerated after the Republicans regained the White House in 1980 surprised Moscow, not only because it signified a rapid recovery from America’s post-Vietnam malaise, but also because it created the prospect of undermining the gains—political and strategic—the USSR had made during the 1970s. According to Pavel Podvig, the renewed defense effort “caused serious concern among the Soviet leadership, in part because it could undermine Soviet efforts to achieve parity with the United States and provide the United States with the capability of launching a disarming strike.” The massive and unconstrained Soviet buildup, especially the deployment of a third generation of new, more powerful, and more accurate intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), had created an American backlash after a decade of relative American quiescence. At the turn of the decade, the eruption of superpower tensions over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and NATO’s 1979 INF decision only made matters worse, as a new arms race in which the Soviets were not competitive loomed on the horizon. Soon, it became clear that the American challenge would be an across-the-board effort with regard to strategic, theater-nuclear, and conventional weapons, as well as new strategies and tactics governing the use of such weapons.

Strategic Programs

The United States began developing higher-yield warheads for the Minute III ICBM—the main weapon in its strategic arsenal—in 1979, as well as the new more accurate MX (Peacekeeper) ICBM, both of which had the capability to target Soviet hardened missile sites, the backbone of the USSR’s deterrent
force. Another concern was the development of the Trident II (D-5) sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), with accuracy comparable to the MX. This new Trident missile was especially troublesome, since Moscow lacked an adequate early-warning capability against submarine-launched missiles. This had not been a pressing problem, so long as such missiles had second-strike but not counterforce capability. The U.S. decision to deploy sea-based cruise missiles, which posed another detection challenge, pointed in the same direction.

Presidential Directive 59

Much has been made of the “battle of the Euromissiles” during the second Cold War and Soviet concern over U.S. Pershing II missiles, in particular. But Presidential Directive 59 (PD-59), rather than the P-II, set off the first real alarms in the Kremlin. Unveiled in August 1980, PD-59 altered U.S. strategy for large-scale nuclear war in two key ways: first, it mandated targeting U.S. missiles at Soviet “political-military assets” rather than “economic recovery targets,” Pentagon jargon for cities and factories.

The new targets included 700 underground bunkers; 2,000 strategic targets, such as ICBM silos, command-and-control posts, nuclear storage sites, and air and naval facilities; 3,000 additional targets, including 500 airfields, plus military units, supply depots, and critical transportation hubs, and so on; and 200–400 defense-industrial factories. Second, President Carter’s PD-59 required the development of strategic forces and concomitant command, control, communications, and intelligence assets to fight a protracted nuclear war that might last months instead of days or hours. The Reagan administration adopted PD-59, making a decapitation strike a stronger option, and describing its version as a “prevailing” rather than “countervailing” strategy, as its predecessor had.

Soviet debate over the implications of PD-59 pitted civilian defense analysts against the military establishment in the pages of Kommunist, the USSR’s leading policy journal, which suggests that it became an issue of high-level concern. On the civilian side, a prominent Soviet analyst, A. Arbatov, conceded that U.S. forces being developed under PD-59 could be used for a “pre-preemptive missile attack,” but he argued that Soviet strategic forces and the threat of a “massive retaliatory response” were sufficient to deter the U.S. The purpose of PD-59, however, was “not to formulate plans for a real war.” Rather, it was prompted by “political considerations.” The U.S. wanted to be in a position to “pressure the other side politically” in crisis situations and “economically exhaust” the Soviet Union. “It is therefore clear,” Arbatov concluded, that “Directive No. 59 represents serious and long-term political plans of US imperialism” but not an immediate strategic threat.54
Alarmists in the Kremlin’s high command took a different view. Three months later, Marshal Ogarkov offered his counterpoint. PD-59, he argued, aimed at nothing less than keeping the world “on the brink of war,” and violated the 1973 Soviet–American agreement on preventing nuclear war. He charged that the Reagan administration was seeking “strategic superiority” to “change in its favor the approximate military balance,” which would pose a clear and present danger.

But the civilian analysts got it right. PD-59 was the culmination of a longstanding Pentagon concern that the USSR did not accept MAD, and therefore might not be deterred under the prevailing conditions of strategic parity or, some feared, an impending shift in the balance of strategic power in Soviet favor. U.S. war planners had concluded that Soviet leaders might have a much broader definition of “unacceptable damage” than Western leaders and a different risk-gain calculus, in which they might be willing to sacrifice cities and populations in large numbers if they could protect themselves and the military-industrial complex during a nuclear war. Thus, the deterrent effect of U.S. strategic forces would be “maximized” and deterrent would be “extended” if Soviet leaders realized that their hold on power, and perhaps their very existence, were put at nuclear risk.

**Pershing II**

The number one Soviet foreign policy priority during the early 1980s was to prevent the deployment new U.S. INF missiles, and the Pershing IIs in particular. “Soviet military experts believed the Pershing II to be a greater danger than American ICBMs deployed in the United States,” according to former Soviet arms control officials. The Soviets erroneously, but apparently honestly, overstated its range, flight time, and, ultimately, its main purpose by applying worst-case analysis. The new missile’s range was estimated at 2,500 kilometers, while the actual figure was 1,600. Its flight time was estimated at 10–12 minutes or even as little as 4–6 minutes, according to one RYaN cable. (The actual flight, which was classified, almost certainly was longer.) The Soviets also may have overestimated its accuracy, but not the fact that it had a deep-earth penetration capability of 70–100 meters, that is, it could pierce a target to that depth before exploding. In the Soviet view, “It was completely obvious that this was a very serious threat and a real possibility of surprise destruction of hardened command and control facilities of the state and Armed Forces.”

The view from Washington was quite different. The decision to deploy the new missiles was apparently based more on political than on military considerations. The White House saw the new missiles as a symbol of U.S. commitment to NATO defense that was intended to prevent the Soviet
Union from “decoupling” NATO’s transatlantic partners as the military threat to Western Europe increased with the USSR’s deployment of new SS-20 intermediate-range missiles. That was not the perception in Moscow, however, with its concern over an unauthorized launch and the possibility that a decision to use the Pershing IIs might be easier to take, as the Soviet side viewed it, because the missiles would not be launched from American territory. In fact, the P-IIs were under strict U.S. control, and were not part of U.S. strategic-force planning. Yet, the dilemma the Soviets created for themselves was real in their own minds and, according to author Steven J. Zaloga, “symptomatic of the extremism of Soviet military thinking in the early 1980s.” When deployment began in November 1983, Soviet delegations walked out of the INF negotiations in Geneva, as well as arms control talks on strategic and conventional weapons. The public war scare erupted soon thereafter.

In 1982, Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov convened a meeting of the Soviet high command to brainstorm possible countermeasures. The final plan, attributed to Marshal Ogarkov, called for deploying two brigades of medium-range SS-23 missiles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, and for increasing the number of Soviet SSBNs on combat patrol off the east coast of the United States and moving closer to American shores, where their missiles could reach selected targets in ten minutes. The countermeasures were announced in May 1984, presumably after they had been implemented. In the words of a Soviet general who attended the conference, Washington’s “risky plan to take cover beyond the ocean in the event a nuclear war was unleashed in Europe fell through.”

New Weapons and Tactics on the Central Front

The Pershing II was just one element in the evolving balance on the NATO–Warsaw Pact front. The real focus of the RMA—and the one Ogarkov feared most—was the advent of new hi-tech, precision-guided conventional weapons. The guru of technowar was William J. Perry, Undersecretary of Defense in the Carter administration for research and engineering (and later Secretary of Defense under President Bill Clinton). Perry advocated development of an entirely new kind of warfare, which had made its appearance during the Vietnam conflict, based on computers, precision munitions, and stealth technology. He argued that it was possible to “change the face of battle” by exploiting American technological superiority to offset Warsaw Pact preponderance in conventional weaponry.

New weapons led NATO to formulate new tactics. Western intelligence knew that Soviet operational plans were offensive and were based on a sudden-attack scenario in which in-place forces stationed in Eastern
Europe—which NATO designated as the first strategic echelon—would drive as rapidly as possible toward Western Europe. If the first wave encountered resistance, then a reserve force, the “second strategic echelon” based in the Soviet Union, would move up to restore the momentum of the attack. The first strategic echelon was large; it included Soviet forces stationed in Eastern Europe, plus allied armed forces. Poland alone accounted for 600,000 dedicated troops. But the second strategic echelon was a huge ground force that included 50 Soviet divisions, two million soldiers, and a million armored vehicles and rockets. At one time, NATO would have had to use nuclear weapons to counter the second-wave Soviet attack. Poland would have borne the brunt of a devastating attack, since it was the primary route to the west and because NATO wanted to avoid striking Soviet territory in hopes of being able to negotiate an end to hostilities. In the 1980s, however, the U.S. Army developed a new doctrine to counter Soviet plans: AirLand Battle. AirLand Battle employed a new generation of weapons to make “deep battle” attacks against the second strategic echelon, while NATO forces conducted defensive operations against the first wave of Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces.

NATO never accepted AirLand Battle in its entirety because of its offensive connotations and a fear of Soviet diplomatic and propaganda pressure, but did adopt a related theater-level warfare doctrine, the Follow-On Forces Attack (FOFA), in November 1984. FOFA, which was also known as the “Rogers Plan,” after Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, Gen. Bernard Rogers, envisioned using the alliance’s air superiority and new hi-tech weapons to offset Warsaw Pact numerical superiority in conventional forces. NATO was in a position to use conventional weapons to locate, attack, and destroy “follow-on” forces before they were committed to battle. By striking deep inside the opposing side’s territory without invading it—a new kind of standoff warfare—the FOFA concept aimed at fighting, if necessary, a conventional war without resort to nuclear weapons.

The new tactical warfare doctrine and tactics did not add up to a new offensive posture—NATO strategy on the Central Front was still defensive—or signify that NATO had abandoned deterrence for war fighting. But the Soviets took a different view and denounced AirLand Battle and FOFA as a “Pentagon-NATO attempt to create and make use of the potential for a disarming [conventional] strike and concluding the war under conditions favorable to the West.”

Soviet military experts quickly grasped the implications of the new warfare, concluding that highly precise conventional weapons mated with new battlefield information processing methods were becoming an integral part of U.S. and NATO combat plans and operations, and were replacing firepower as the key measure of military power.
their allies, Marshal Ogarkov and Marshal Viktor Kulikov, the Warsaw Pact commander-in-chief, expressed grave concern over conventional weapons that were approaching the level of weapons of mass destruction, not only because they could be used to strike single targets or lay down a field of fire against advancing forces, but also because they could destroy Soviet strategic nuclear forces without crossing the nuclear threshold.67

The Soviet marshals were not just reacting to the theoretical implications of the new warfare. British operations against Argentina to recover the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, and Israeli operations against Syria in Lebanon’s Bekka Valley in 1982, provided a practical demonstration. The latter was especially discomfiting because it pitted Soviet aircraft and air-defense systems against U.S.-supplied weapons. Israeli forces, using American F-15 and F-16 fighters, handily destroyed Soviet MiG-21 and MiG-23 aircraft, T-72 tanks and SAM (surface-to-air) missiles while suffering almost minimal losses. The key to the Israeli victory was the U.S. computer-driven Air Battle Management System, which provided Israeli commanders with a complete and current picture of air and ground activity in the Bekka Valley—the same system that was deployed in Europe against the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet Union was a silent partner in the Syrian defeat, and its military prestige and morale plummeted.

The Soviets and their allies envisioned a new political as well as military threat inherent in the U.S.–NATO doctrines. As Heinz Busch, the former East German analyst in charge of analysis during the war scare put it, the advent of AirLand Battle, FOFA, and decapitation revived the West’s plans of the 1950s to “roll back” Soviet power and “liberate” Eastern Europe from Soviet control. “The destruction of the enemy need not require the occupation of his territory; strategically cautious destruction of the life’s blood of the enemy state could suffice to create the prerequisites for effecting changes in the political system without having to bear the burden of an occupation army.”68 Throughout the Cold War, the West had avoided interfering in Eastern Europe for fear of provoking war with the Soviet Union. Now, however, the shoe was on the other foot; the Soviet Union could not risk war for fear of losing its empire and alliance.

SOVIET COMMAND-AND-CONTROL

Because the Soviets had discounted the probability of a surprise attack prior to the war scare, they had paid little urgent attention to technical requirements for ordering a retaliatory response in the event of war. On the assumption that war would grow out of crisis rather than start as a bolt from the blue, they believed that the political–military leadership would have time enough to repair to underground bunkers in Moscow and its environs or disperse to command posts elsewhere in the USSR. During
1979–1984, however, the Soviets accelerated development, testing, and deployment of a new command system. The main objective was to increase warning time, while reducing the time required to assess incoming information and order a retaliatory strike. The heightened sense of threat was a reaction to NATO’s impending deployment of Pershing II ballistic missiles and a longstanding concern over U.S. SSBNs stationed in the North Sea. Given their proximity to the USSR, sea-based missiles could strike within thirteen minutes—less than the optimal time required to order a counterattack.69

The key effort was aimed at providing the Soviet leadership with a rapid response capability comparable to the American “nuclear football”—the portable communications device containing nuclear-release codes the President would use to launch a retaliatory strike. The Soviet equivalent was the Cheget system, also known as the “nuclear briefcase,” because it was mounted in a Swiss-made metal briefcase selected from a mail-order catalogue.

Most of Cheget’s operational details were and remain classified (as are those of its American counterpart).70 This encrypted teleconferencing system linked the General Secretary, the Defense Minister, and the chief of the General Staff. Cheget could sanction a retaliatory strike; unlike the American “nuclear football,” however, it did not contain the codes required to “unlock” strategic missiles and launch them. The American system was designed to ensure civilian control of nuclear forces and prevention of an unauthorized launch by accident or design. Cheget was built around a troika of coequals, in which the high command really had the upper hand. According to Russian analyst Aleksey Arbatov, “The monopoly of the military on working out the control system and operational plans (for a counter-strike, above all) has materialized in a concept which guards not against an accidental strike due to a mistake, a nervous breakdown, or a technical problem, but against a failure to respond to an attack promptly and on a massive scale.” As such, “the control system mirrored the totalitarian and highly militarized nature of the political regime.”71

Cheget was in essence an insurance policy against surprise attack. One of its designers confirmed that it was “developed in the early eighties toward the end of the ‘Cold War’ when the Soviet leadership feared a surprise US nuclear strike.”72 Another added that “This was a time of great confrontation in the Cold War, Pershings in Western Europe [sic], submarines in the North Sea and Mediterranean…”73 Work began on a high priority basis while Leonid Brezhnev was still alive, and the designers were ordered to take the ailing leader’s diminished physical and mental condition in mind. Due to technical problems, however, Cheget was not field tested until 1984 and was not actually put into service until 1985.74
The Politburo may have had some second thoughts about the General Staff’s finger on the nuclear trigger after the armed forces unilaterally decided to destroy Korean Air Lines flight 007. The issue emerged in an oblique way during Marshal Ogarkov’s 8 September 1983 press conference as he defended a regional air-defense commander’s decision to shoot down the civilian airliner. Ogarkov vehemently denied that, under similar circumstances, a military commander could deliberately or inadvertently start World War III. Since none of the journalists present had raised the issue, Ogarkov was apparently addressing a concern that had arisen behind closed doors. He paid lip service to military subordination to the Communist Party, but made it clear that, in view of the threat of a U.S. decapitation strike, the armed forces had to be able to react quickly, and presumably without waiting for political approval in a crisis situation. That this was a touchy issue in higher political circles was suggested the day before the press conference when Krasnaya zvezda ran a lengthy article that made a case for more, not less, authority for the General Staff to act in the event of an attack warning, given the speed and complexity of modern weapons systems. The author was none other than Ogarkov’s first deputy on the General Staff.

Perimitr
Doubts about the reliability of their command system and early-warning network, as well as concern over a decapitation strike, led the Soviets to develop a plan for launching a retaliatory attack even if the entire political and military leadership were killed or incapacitated. Codenamed Perimitr, and referred to in Soviet military circles as the Dead Hand, the post-mortem launch system seems more like science fiction than fact. Perimitr was authorized in August 1974 as a response to the surprise attack threat posed by U.S. SSBNs stationed in the North Sea. Development proceeded during 1979–1984, and it went into operation in 1985. According to Soviet sources, work on Perimitr “increased considerably in the early 1980s due to worsening superpower relations.”

Perimitr was designed to allow the General Staff to launch strategic weapons by issuing an emergency command to special radio nodes located far from Moscow. It was built around a combination of sensors, command posts, and communications systems “netted” into the existing command-and-control system. Sensors would detect evidence of a nuclear attack, then report through a computer network that would determine, by means of an algorithm that required specific events to happen, that is, a certain number of strikes against designated targets, whether war had broken out. Another criterion was interruption of command links to the leadership. Once all the criteria were met, the central command system would activate...
a buried low-frequency radio antenna net that triggered the Perimitr launch system. The signal would launch special command rockets that would take off and then transmit a launch order and authorization codes for 20–50 missiles while in flight over missile silos. (Details are scarce, but the command rockets may have been designed to issue orders to SLBMs and bombers as well.) The system would have been activated upon warning of a missile attack and, presumably, could be deactivated if the warning proved to be a false alarm. By relying on a remote launch capability, Perimitr guaranteed that a counterstrike would occur even if the command system were destroyed or incapacitated, as well as compensate for the possibility that electromagnetic pulses created by nuclear explosions would disrupt communications.

The Soviet doomsday machine was intended to calm the leadership’s nerves in the event of a reported missile attack, give it time to consider whether the attack were the real thing or a false alarm, and avoid panic under a severe time constraint. It was also presumably intended to extend the deterrent value of Soviet strategic forces by obviating U.S. plans for a decapitation attack. If so, it fell on deaf ears. The Dead Hand was so macabre that U.S. intelligence refused to believe initial unconfirmed reports of its existence.79

SOVIET BALLISTIC MISSILE EARLY WARNING

During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union built huge arsenals of offensive nuclear weapons, but neither side was able to develop an adequate defense against the other. Instead, they built massive missile-attack early-warning systems that relied on a combination of radar stations—electronic “fortresses” erected around national and even international borders—and satellites—electro-optical “eyes” that could “see” missiles launched by the opposing side. In theory, timely detection of a missile attack would make possible a determination of the scale of an attack and its origins, estimate potential damage, and choose an appropriate response. According to Pavel Podvig, an early-warning system “is absolutely necessary for implementation of a launch-on-warning posture, which assumes that a retaliatory strike would be launched before attacking missiles reach their target.”80 The short time available for detecting an attack and deciding on a response calls for tight integration of the early-warning and command-and-control systems. It also means that procedures for assessing warning information and decisionmaking must be practically automatic, requiring, asserts Podvig, “an unprecedented reliability of the early-warning system, since if it generates a false alarm, there might be little or no time to recognize, not to mention, correct, an error.”81
Deficiencies in Soviet early-warning capabilities—deficiencies that were revealed only after the Cold War—almost certainly exacerbated the war scare. At the dawn of the 1980s, the Soviet Union was engaged in a major radar construction program that had begun a decade earlier and been delayed by a host of technical, logistical, and bureaucratic problems. The Soviet satellite early–warning program was still in its infancy, lagged almost twenty years behind its American counterpart, and generated a serious incident that came close to starting World War III.

**Radar**

The Soviet Union never had a comprehensive or complete early-warning system that would have enabled it to detect all possible missile launches from U.S. territory or U.S. submarines. Technical difficulties, especially computer hardware and software problems, were the main reason. But the longstanding assumption that a U.S. surprise attack was a low-probability event also played a role. 82

From 1968 to 1972, Soviet scientists formulated a plan for a comprehensive early-warning system based on a triad of above-the-horizon and over-the-horizon radars and satellites. Once implemented, it would include a network of dedicated radars covering the western, southwestern, and southern approaches to Soviet territory, as well as integrate exiting radar stations with those of their anti-ballistic missile and space-monitoring radars and early-warning satellites. The work that began in 1972 involved more than 100,000 military and civilian construction workers and billions of rubles. (In addition to building barracks, mess halls, workshops, and depots during construction, the Soviets also built housing, schools, stores, and other facilities for the military personnel and their families who would staff the radar stations, which were self-contained areas off-limits to civilians as a security precaution.) This became the USSR’s principal national security program.83

"We will handcuff American imperialism," the chief designer of the early-warning system boasted, but, as the commander of Soviet missile defense noted years later, that goal “did not fully come true.”84 The first stage of the ambitious program—integration of early-warning, anti-ballistic missile, and space-monitoring radars—was completed only after considerable delay and with costly overruns. Designers faced serious interface problems and had to rework combat algorithms and computer programs so that the various components could exchange data.85

Despite years of costly research and development, the over-the-horizon radar program was scrapped after the armed forces refused to commission it. An inability to compensate for ionospheric disturbances over polar regions over which U.S. missiles would pass rendered the experimental
radars "virtually useless." Tests showed that the radars could detect massive launches but could not meet the armed forces’ requirement for detecting single missile or isolated launches.

Other components of the radar program encountered problems as well. Even though the program was a top priority, and the early-warning corps was an elite service, neither was immune to serious problems encountered elsewhere in Soviet society. Glasnost-era investigations conducted by the military and the press uncovered a program rife with corruption, fraud, and theft, as well as poor quality equipment, much-delayed delivery of construction materials, bureaucratic rivalries, and clashing egos. Most of the military construction workers were draftees with little education, and many were national minorities with poor knowledge of Russian. The commander of the antimissile defense forces, who boasted that the missile-attack early-warning system was "a guarantee against delivery of a surprise, unpunished, unanswered nuclear missile strike against our country" had to admit that "Yes, there was and is dedovshchina [hazing and mistreatment of army draftees] there and crime."

The one success story was the Daryal large phased-array radar (LPAR), a massive structure that looks like a giant fence. Instead of rotating antennas on conventional radars, LPARs maneuver beams electronically. The Daryal model could detect in the 6,000-kilometer range, with a scanning sector of 100–110 degrees. It was first deployed at two sites in 1984–1985—six years late and at a cost that far exceeded the original budget. The biggest problem came in the one area where the Soviets were weakest, namely computers and algorithm software. The Daryal program was a microcosm of the Soviet system on the eve of its collapse. The USSR could still build mammoth Stalin-era projects (though not well) but could not cope well with microelectronic engineering.

With the deployment of the two Daryal radars, the early-warning system was capable of detecting strikes against USSR territory by ICBMs and SLBMs of the Polaris and Poseidon type from the primary missile-threat sectors. The one remaining gap in radar coverage was in the northeastern approach to Soviet territory. Before the war scare, the Soviets were concerned but not alarmed enough to try close the gap. Then, however, they began to have second thoughts, especially with regard to U.S. SSBNs armed with Trident and the new Trident II missiles stationed off the west coast of the United States, which were capable of reaching entire territory of USSR from the northeastern approach.

To close the gap, Marshal Ogarkov decided to construct a Daryal radar station at Yeniseysk, 270 kilometers north of Krasnoyarsk in Siberia. Studies concluded that the new site should be located in the vicinity of Yakutsk or Norilsk in order to comply with the 1972 U.S.–Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which stipulated that early-warning radars...
must be deployed in the immediate proximity of national borders and face outward. Yeniseysk is located some 3,000 kilometers from the USSR’s maritime border. But Ogarkov ruled out Yakutsk due to a shortage of electric power, and Norilsk due to construction costs in an area that would have to be supplied by sea. When several senior commanders objected that it would be a “flagrant violation,” Defense Minister Ustinov overruled them and threatened to fire anyone who opposed Ogarkov.

When the United States discovered the new site and made a demarche in 1988, Moscow tried to pass it off as a satellite- and space-surveillance center. The matter became a major issue in Soviet–American relations, and in 1991 the USSR agreed to dismantle it as part of new strategic arms agreement. The radar station, which cost a billion rubles, was turned into the world’s most expensive furniture factory.

The Pershing II missiles posed a special problem. The Soviets had only one radar capable of detecting P-II launches, but its search sector covered only the northern half West Germany, not the southern half where 27 of the 108 missiles were deployed. The General Staff mandated a detection time of 2–3 minutes, given the missiles’ proximity and short flight time. After much nail-biting and pursuit of dead-end solutions, a technical quick fix was found by modifying the transmitter and increasing the range of the western search sector.

While the Soviet Union was completing its radar network, the United States was improving and expanding its early-warning system. The Carter and Reagan defense budgets allocated substantial sums for upgrading computers and software at existing sites, replacing older radars with new phased-array systems, and adding two new radars that could detect Soviet SLBMs.  

Oko

In contrast to radar, detectors deployed on satellites can observe missiles almost immediately after launch, and thereby provide the earliest possible warning of a missile attack. The United States deployed its first spaceborne early-warning systems in the early 1960s. The Soviet development program did not begin until a decade later, and was plagued by technical problems and delays due to the unreliability of the spacecraft and in working out an algorithm for its onboard computer. The first generation “birds” were called Oko (eye) or Kosmos-1382. Oko satellites were placed on alert duty at reduced strength in 1978 and at full strength in 1982, four years behind schedule. In theory, they could warn of launches of U.S. ICBMs ten minutes ahead of radars by using thermal imaging to detect rocket motor emissions during a missile’s boost phase, but they could not detect missiles launched from U.S. submarines in the Pacific.

At 12:15 a.m., 26 September 1983, the satellite ground station Serpukhov-15, located south of Moscow, received a report from a single Oko of a launch of
a Minuteman ICBM. A few minutes later, the same “bird” reported a total of five incoming missiles. The watch commander waited fifteen minutes before deciding that this was a false alarm. His decision hinged on two considerations. First, Soviet ground radars could not confirm an attack, and they were more reliable than the satellites. Second, the army officer remembered from his training that the United States would attack with a massive assault, not with a single strike.

A later evaluation determined that the satellite’s onboard computer had malfunctioned as the spacecraft made a drastic shift from an area illuminated by the sun into the shade. The near disaster occurred during the autumn equinox when the sun, the satellite, and U.S. missile fields were in a rare alignment which maximized the sunlight reflected from high-altitude clouds.

The findings of a Soviet Defense Ministry commission empanelled to investigate this incident were not reassuring. The commission determined that the Oko satellite was “extremely unreliable.” Both the computer hardware and the software, which had misread the sun’s reflections as missile plumes, were “far from perfect.” The new satellites had been rushed into service without proper testing. The commission found “many disappointing details” about the radars as well, and was “horrified” at the problems found in both areas.

Fortunately, the watch commander did not transmit the false information to the missile-attack warning system, which could have set in motion a chain of events leading to war, given Soviet launch-on-warning doctrine and the KAL 007 incident that had occurred some three weeks before. If the General Staff had reacted as the regional air-defense commander had on that occasion, the Soviets might have fired off their nuclear arsenal.

Lack of confidence in their early-warning capabilities probably explains why the Soviets inaugurated RYaN, and why they maintained the alert and turned to the East Germans for assistance during the remainder of the decade. In effect, they were substituting human intelligence and superior German technical and human intelligence assets to cover their own inadequate war-warning capabilities.

Another post–Cold War revelation of Soviet concern emerged during the war scare. According to the commander of antimissile and space defense forces, early-warning systems for missile attack, surveillance of space, and space defense, as well as for antimissile defense, were kept on “permanent combat alert status in the highest state of readiness.” Antimissile and antiaircraft missiles deployed to protect radar stations were deployed in double and triple redundancy. One echelon was maintained on “combat alert” at all times, while the second operated in “warmed-up status,” and the third was kept in “cold status.” Forces manning the sites could switch from one echelon to another in a fraction of a second, according to a strict
regimen. Violations were reported immediately to the General Staff, and to
the Defense Minister personally.\textsuperscript{95}

A major upgrade of the U.S. early-warning satellite program began under
the Carter administration and was continued during Reagan’s. It included
new spacecraft, equipped with short-wave infrared sensors capable of
detecting plumes from Soviet ICBMs, as well as nuclear-detection systems
added to Global Positioning System satellites that employed light, X-ray,
and electromagnetic pulse sensors for timely detection of launches of
Soviet SLBMs.\textsuperscript{96}

**DID THE KREMLIN REALLY EXPECT AN AMERICAN ATTACK?**

For most of the Cold War, at least after Josef Stalin’s death in March 1953
and the first steps toward détente, the Soviet Union paid little heed to the
threat of a surprise attack. “Such apprehensions were minor on our side,
because we knew that the existing political and social structure of the
United States was the best guarantee against an unprovoked first strike
against us,” Ambassador Dobrynin noted in his memoirs.\textsuperscript{97} Historical
experience also was factor. U.S. forbearance during the Korean War, when
there was clear unilateral American superiority in nuclear arms, and later,
when the ground war in Vietnam appeared intractable, was not lost on the
Soviets. Despite “anti-imperialist” propaganda, Soviet leaders drew
comfort from the perception that the United States, with its commercial
culture and high living standard, was more interested in peace and
prosperity than war. Then there were what the Soviets called “peace
forces” in the West, which included autonomous pro-peace and antiwar
groups, as well as those that could be controlled or manipulated by overt
and covert Soviet influence. Historical experience dating back to Stalin’s,
and even Lenin’s, time had proved, time and again, that “peace campaigns”
could be very effective in influencing Western governments
and opinion. The 1980s witnessed the largest mass peace movement in the
postwar period. Most important, however, was a conviction that the
United States would not risk war unless its vital national interests were at
stake, and unless it were seriously threatened by the Soviet Union. There
would be no war so long as Moscow did not provoke one.\textsuperscript{98}

The Soviets, then, studied more than just U.S. capabilities; they were also
keen students of the American mentality and intentions, and reached rather
sanguine conclusions with regard to the question of peace and war. In the
1980s, however, according to Andrei Kokoshin, a leading military expert and
former defense official, the increased likelihood of war was “the number one
topic” among military and civilian analysts,” and even “[t]op state and Party
leadership focused on this concern.”\textsuperscript{99} The war scare suggested that
something had changed—or had it? The question is best answered by
examining the views of the two key actors in the war scare drama, Yuri Andropov and Nikolai Ogarkov. As head of the KGB, Andropov ordered the 1980s alert, and later, as the supreme Soviet leader and commander-in-chief, he kept abreast of RYaN through annual and even daily intelligence reports. Ogarkov almost certainly was the driving force behind the war scare; he declared that the United States had “in effect” already declared war.

Andropov

Anatoly Dobrynin claims that, of all Stalin’s successors, Andropov was the only one who took the threat of a U.S. attack seriously. Perhaps, but his private musings reveal more nuance and more sophistication than Dobrynin suggests. Previously classified records based on closed-door sessions with East European leaders and a Politburo meeting reveal that Andropov believed the danger of war had increased, but war was neither imminent nor inevitable. “The USA is preparing for war, but it is not prepared to start war,” he told his East German counterpart, State Security Minister Erich Mielke [emphasis in original]. Washington, he said, wanted to be in a position to “checkmate” the Soviet Union, that is, render it defenseless without destroying all the pieces on the board. “Perhaps I am deceiving myself,” but “they [the United States] did not build their factories and palaces just to destroy them.” Yet, the KGB chief was optimistic that superpower parity, the basis of Soviet deterrence, “will not be destroyed. We will not permit that.”

Two years later, as General Secretary, Andropov gave his assessment of the new U.S. strategy of limited war before a session of the Warsaw Pact’s Political Consultative Committee. In the past, he noted, the United States had counted on its nuclear weapons “to deter” and “to contain” the Soviet Union; now there was talk of actually fighting and prevailing in a nuclear war. “It is difficult to say where the line between extortion and actual preparation to take a fateful step lies.” There were people in Washington “who are capable of suddenly unleashing nuclear-weapons catastrophe,” he noted, but there were countervailing forces that could prevent it. The most important factors were the anti-U.S. missile campaign in Western Europe, which had become a mass movement “independent of the World Peace Council” (the largest Soviet front organization), and the nuclear-freeze initiative in the United States, which was gaining approval on Capitol Hill, within the Democratic Party, and with the public.

By then, however, Andropov had become pessimistic, both with regard to the Soviet Union’s internal problems and over the prospect of a new technological arms race. Instead of the usual cant about the reasons for the “turnabout” in U.S. policy, which in the past Andropov had attributed to Washington’s disillusionment with détente, its dismay over Soviet gains in the third world,
and “the crisis of capitalism,” he now focused on weaknesses in the Communist countries, including foreign indebtedness, food shortages, technological backwardness, and especially the crisis in Poland. He asserted that the United States was bent on reestablishing strategic superiority over the Soviet Union, especially by relying on new types of weapons systems. The United States was capable of competing in the new hi-tech arms race, the Soviet was not.

On 31 May 1983 Andropov chaired a session of the Politburo that reviewed the USSR’s mounting domestic and foreign problems. The minutes (classified “top secret/eyes only”) are especially revealing with regard to the war scare. NATO heads of state had recently met in the United States and reaffirmed their support for the 1979 INF decision. Without doubt, the missiles would be deployed on schedule, and Soviet diplomatic and propaganda efforts to derail deployment had failed, at least temporarily. Soviet propaganda claimed that the new missiles meant war, yet in private no sense of alarm or panic prevailed in the Kremlin. When Andropov asked whether the United States would use the missiles without being provoked, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko replied negatively: “I think they [American policymakers] wouldn’t dare to use nuclear missiles without sufficient reason.”

Nevertheless, Andropov and his cohorts were no longer confident that they could avoid an expensive arms race. This was evident from the Politburo minutes and from Andropov’s remarks to a gathering of Warsaw Pact principles a month later. There he declared: “We intend to tell the Soviet people directly and straightforwardly” that they would have to sacrifice “in view of the war danger that is a threat to the nation.” The short-lived public war scare, carefully prepared by Soviet propaganda organs, began three months later.

**Ogarkov**

If the war scare had an author, it almost certainly was the chief of the Soviet General Staff. Barely six months after the Reagan administration had entered office, Marshal Ogarkov published a remarkable screed in the pages of Kommunist, in which he alleged that in Washington “direct war preparations are under way on a broad front and the material preparation for a new world war is being carried out.” Appealing to his political superiors, he called for a “timely shift of the armed forces and the entire national economy onto a war footing and of their immediate mobilization deployment.” He also called for the formation of a war cabinet based on Stalin’s wartime State Defense Committee, as well as for the organization of committees in the “frontline zone cities” that would include all “relevant party, soviet, and economic organs in the solution of defense tasks.” Ogarkov went further, brazenly lecturing the Politburo on the
need to inform the Soviet people “in a more profound and better reasoned form, the truth about the existing threat of the danger of war.” This was the duty “not just for the party and soviet organs and political workers of the army and navy but also for the party and soviet organs, all public organizations and for the entire propaganda apparatus.”

Ogarkov did not get his way, at least until the brief public war panic in late 1983. But he continued sounding the tocsin in the Soviet press by comparing the contemporary international situation with the 1930s, and drawing not-so-subtle parallels between American intentions and Nazi Germany’s preparations for a surprise attack on the Soviet Union. Ogarkov never wavered in his belief that the world was on the verge of war. Within weeks of the KAL 007 incident, he reiterated his call for peacetime mobilization and putting the armed forces on combat alert. It appeared in Pravda, Izvestiya, and Krasnaya zvezda, indicating that he had support in high political circles, as well as in the armed forces.

Ogarkov was the first senior Soviet official to compare President Reagan to Hitler and the United States to Nazi Germany. Western commentators wrote this off as nasty propaganda—tit for tat in the “war of political passions.” They were wrong. Records from the East German archives reveal that his public rhetoric matched his private views. Addressing the Warsaw Pact chiefs of staff in September 1982, for example, Ogarkov asserted that U.S.–Soviet relations were reminiscent of the period “shortly before the outbreak of the Second World War.” Reagan’s election signaled a mortal danger equal to Hitler’s 1933 seizure of power. “The USA has in effect already declared war on us, the Soviet Union and the some other states of the Warsaw Treaty Organization.”

According to Ogarkov, the Reagan administration, like the Nazi regime, was dangerous because it was irrational and unpredictable. He alluded to 1941 (a reference to Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union), saying that many had underestimated the threat of war with tragic consequences.

Andropov almost certainly rejected Ogarkov’s alarmist views, and certainly rejected his call to order a full-scale mobilization; privately, he called Ogarkov “a little Napoleon.” But he either could not or would not silence or remove the much-admired marshal. However, in September 1984, after Andropov’s death, Ogarkov was removed from Moscow and transferred to a prestigious field command—but a command that was far from Moscow and even further from the corridors of power.

Ogarkov’s transfer is still enveloped in speculation. One reason may have been that he was in line to succeed the terminally ill Defense Minister Ustinov, a civilian. But there was more to the story. Someone in the Soviet hierarchy made it a point to tell a senior American expert (and ex-CIA official) that Ogarkov was considered “dangerous,” and had championed “adventuristic” countermeasures in response to the INF deployments. A
well-known commentator drew an implicit comparison between the Soviet marshal and the American generals who wanted to attack Cuba during the 1962 missile crisis, and mocked Ogarkov’s comparison of the 1980s with the 1930s. It is possible—but impossible to determine—that Ogarkov had recommended stronger measures than the deployment of new missiles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia and moving Soviet missile-carrying submarines closer to U.S. territory. The “leak” to the American researcher, whether true or not, and the anti-Ogarkov press commentary were apparently meant to convince Washington that the “hawks” had been caged. If so, President Reagan’s tête-à-tête with Dobrynin a year and half earlier and Ogarkov’s transfer were the bookends of the most worrisome period of the war scare. Neither side wanted war, and both had made the adjustments necessary to avoid a serious crisis. As Andropov’s successor, Konstantin Chernenko, noted in a personal letter to President Reagan, “Even under these circumstances,” referring to the impasse over the INF deployments, “we have displayed utmost restraint, in adding that Soviet countermeasures “have not gone beyond the limits necessary to neutralize the threat created for us and our allies.”

DID THE HIGH COMMAND ADVOCATE A PREEMPTIVE ATTACK?  

An intriguing but ultimately unanswerable question is whether the Soviet high command would have demanded a preemptive strike against the United States if RYaN had produced evidence—or perhaps a false alarm—of war preparations. The February 1983 cable that raised the intelligence alert to a new, higher level offers a hint. RYaN “now lies at the core of [Soviet] military strategy,” it noted, adding that the alert was necessary to give Moscow “a period of anticipation essential . . . to take retaliatory measures. Otherwise, reprisal time would be extremely limited.” Surely this was a subterfuge, since it would have made no sense to wait for a fatal decapitating attack. Preemption, not retaliation, would have been the only rational—and undoubtedly the only intended—response.

Anecdotal, but authoritative, evidence indicates that the Soviet high command was thinking along such lines, and may even have considered a preventive war, in view of the USSR’s deteriorating strategic position vis-à-vis the United States. A Soviet foreign affairs expert assigned to the Central Committee recounted his experience after delivering a briefing to a group of marshals and generals:

The respected officers had a glass too many and opened up. One of them began to hold forth loudly about the need to press the nuclear button as soon as possible, before the imperialists could gain superiority over us in every field. The others shouted down my protests and received their comrade’s insane words with great ovation.
Was this the vodka talking or the sober view of the high command? The expert concluded that the officers were deadly serious.

A COLD ENDING TO THE COLD WAR

The last decade of the Cold War was potentially more perilous than it seemed at the time, or than has been acknowledged in most historical accounts. The main reason was a heightened sense of the danger of war. Each side focused on the likelihood of war, and both made extensive military preparations against a possible attack from the other.

Mutual insecurity, based on mutual vulnerability of command systems to a decapitation attack, gave rise to the war scare, but the drive to find technical solutions—"the war of military technologies"—came close to developing a life of its own. In his first major foreign policy speech, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev warned that the arms race was leading to a situation in which war and peace would "no longer depend upon the intelligence or will of political leaders. It may become captive to technology, to technocratic military logic." Plans for doomsday machines and doomsday scenarios show how closely the United States and the Soviet Union approached such a stage in their military preparations.

But the war scare also set the stage for the beginning of the end of the Cold War. President Reagan's realization that the American military challenge might produce the opposite of its intended result, a more belligerent rather than compliant Soviet Union, led him to open a private channel to the Kremlin and ultimately start a Soviet-American dialogue during his second term. On the other side, the war scare contributed in part to the appearance of a Soviet dialogue partner. Prompted by alarmist talk about "pushing the nuclear button," reform-minded officials displayed rare political courage by urging the old guard to chose a "young, dynamic leader, able to find his way in today's world." They did so, selecting Gorbachev. The choice of another hardliner, they believed, "would have sealed the fate of the Soviet Union, and perhaps of the entire world's fate as well."114 The Soviet Union's fate almost certainly was already sealed, but the Cold War could have had a much different ending.

REFERENCES

1 Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents (New York: Times Books/Random House, 1995), pp. 517–520. Nancy Reagan and White House chief of staff Michael Deaver favored the meeting, but the President's other advisers opposed it because they thought it would undermine the administration's hard-line stance.

2 Ibid., p. 517.
3 This information came from Oleg Gordievsky, the number two officer in the KGB’s London rezidentura and a long-time British mole. U.S. intelligence officials were skeptical, but Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher vouched for the KGB man. Dobrynin eventually learned about the alert from the KGB rezident (station chief) in Washington.


11 Ibid., p. 21.


13 James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans, p. 139.

14 John D. Steinbruner, “Nuclear Decapitation,” pp. 18–19. The author noted that “Fewer than 100 judiciously targeted nuclear weapons could so severely damage US communications facilities and command centers that form the military chain of command that actions of individual weapons commanders could no longer be controlled or coordinated” and “even 50 nuclear weapons are probably
sufficient to eliminate the ability to direct US strategic forces to coherent purposes,” p. 18.


18 RYaN is an acronym for the Russian term ракетно-ударное нападение (nuclear-missile attack) or PYH in Cyrillic. Jordan Baev notes that Bulgarian records use the abbreviation VRYaN, in which the “v” stands for the Russian word surprise (внезапное). Jordan Baev, “The Soviet Bloc Intelligence Services’ Collaboration Against the USA and NATO in the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean 1967–1989,” seminar paper, Norwegian Nobel Institute, 28 February 2002, p. 11. The Soviets may have used both terms, but RYaN is the one found in the KGB cables translated in Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *Instructions from the Centre*, especially p. 68, which is a facsimile of an actual KGB cable.


20 Whether intended or not, the air operations may have reminded Moscow of so-called “ferret missions” conducted by the U.S. Army, Air Force, and Navy from 1950 until 1969. In the pre-satellite era, the United States employed aircraft to take the pulse of Soviet air-defense radars, eavesdrop on military communications, and test reaction times for scrambling and vectoring interceptors as a way of collecting target data for war planning. Most flights skirted Soviet borders, but some high-risk operations involved actual penetration of Soviet airspace.

21 Because of the extreme secrecy surrounding the PSYOPS, the U.S. intelligence community was not aware of what was happening. A Special National Intelligence Memorandum on the war scare speculated the “recent US/NATO military exercises and reconnaissance operations” might have been a factor in Soviet behavior, but its drafters lacked information necessary to evaluate that hypothesis, leading them to downplay Soviet statements on the war danger as propaganda. See Director of Central Intelligence, “Implications of Recent Soviet Military-Political Activities,” SNIE 11-10-84JX, 18 May 1984 in National Archives and Records Administration, Archives II, Adelphi, Maryland, Record Group 263 (Records of the Central Intelligence Agency), p. 4.
22 See Pete Earley, “Interview with the Spymaster,” *The Washington Post Magazine*, 23 April 1995, pp. 20–22. According to the KGB rezident who recruited John Walker, his son and brother, and a friend of Walker’s, “For more than 17 years. Walker enabled your enemies to read your most sensitive military secrets. We knew everything! There has never been a breach of this magnitude and length in the history of espionage.”

23 During a strip alert, pilots and crews board their aircraft and wait, with engines running, for further orders.

24 Director of Central Intelligence, “Implications of Recent Soviet Military-Political Activities,” p. 4.


28 The Soviet leadership announced and later cancelled identical plans during the first major war scare of 1927.


34 Details of the war-planning exercises are found in James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans*, pp. 138–149.

35 Steven Emerson, “America’s Doomsday Project,” p. 27.


President Bill Clinton cancelled the COG program in 1994.

Thomas P. Coakley, Command and Control for War and Peace, pp. 58–59.


Norman Friedman, The Fifty-Year War, p. 445.


Markus Wolf, Man Without a Face, p. 297.


Klaus Eichner and Andreas Dobbert, Headquarters Germany: Die USA-Geheimdienste in Deutschland (Berlin: edition ost, 1997), pp. 243, 256n20. Two other ex-East German intelligence officers say that the 1985 upgraded alert was a reaction to the decapitation strategy. See Peter Richter and Klaus Rösler, Wolfs West-Spione, pp. 72, 85.

Markus Wolf, Man Without a Face, p. 296. Because of the highly centralized Warsaw Pact command-and-control system—in wartime all national contingents would have been subordinate to the Soviet General Staff—this would have been tantamount to blocking the eastern alliance’s ability to alert, mobilize, and deploy its armed forces.


56 Dmitriy Tikhanov, “If There is War Tomorrow,” p. 8.
57 Ibid.
58 Aleksandr G. Savel’yev and Nikolay N. Detinov, The Big Five, p. 57.
59 Steven V. Zaloga, The Kremlin’s Nuclear Sword, p. 199.
63 The AirLand Battle was inspired by the Soviet concept of “deep operations” developed in the late 1920s and 1930s. See Andre Kokoshin, Soviet Strategic Thought, 1917–91 (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1998), p. 160.
66 Andrei Kokoshin, Soviet Strategic Thought, 1917–91, p. 139.
69 Steven J. Zaloga, The Kremlin’s Nuclear Shield, pp. 196–197.
70 Cheget presumably remains in service. The description used here refers to what is known about the Soviet-era version.


For details, see Steven J. Zaloga, The Kremlin’s Nuclear Sword, pp. 196–198 and Pavel Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, pp. 65–66, 162, and 176.

Perimitr may in fact have been inspired by the movie Dr. Strangelove, in which a deranged general named Jack Ripper orders a surprise attack on the Soviet Union without realizing that the Soviets have a doomsday device that will unleash nuclear forces in retaliation.

Steven J. Zaloga, The Kremlin’s Nuclear Sword, p. 198.


Ibid., p. 22.

Ibid., pp. 22–23.


Ibid., p. 7.


Pavel Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, p. 438.

Colonel-General Yu. V. Votintsev, “Unknown Troops of the Vanished Superpower,” Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal 8 (1993), p. 11. Dedovshchina, or “grandfather rule” from the Russian word for grandfather, was a serious problem in the Soviet military by the mid-1970s. Older soldiers abused and mistreated recruits; theft, beatings, and even homosexual rape were not uncommon. Brutalization led to poor morale, desertions, and suicide and undermined the authority of NCOs, as well of lieutenants and captains. Dedovshchina did not receive public or official attention until glasnost, when it was publicized and investigated. William E. Odom, The Collapse of the Soviet Military, pp. 288–289.


Pavel Podvig, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, pp. 29–31. Podvig argues that the northwest sector did not pose a serious threat, since the only U.S. missiles that could exploit the gap were C-4 missiles on Trident I submarines, which did not have counterforce capability, and therefore did not pose a threat of a disarming or decapitating strike.

Thomas P. Coakley, Command and Control for War and Peace, p. 60.


Aleksandr Kabakov and Ivan Safronov, “Half an Hour of World War III,” p. 4.

Dmitriy Tikhanov, “‘If There is War Tomorrow,’” p. 6.

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At least since Stalin’s death, Soviet leaders were “unworried about an American attack unless it triggered the attack by its own behavior. Thus the inception of war was in its own hands....” Herbert S. Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union: Nuclear Weapons and the Revolution in Soviet Military and Political Thinking, rev. ed. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. xiii.

Andrei Kokoshin, Soviet Strategic Thought, 1917–91, p. 57.

Michael Ploetz, Wie die Sowjetunion den Kalten Krieg Verlor, p. 95. Andropov’s remarks were taken from a verbatim transcript of his exchange with Mielke found in the East German party archive.
101 Ibid., p. 98. Andropov’s remarks were transcribed and recorded in the archives of the East German Communist Party.

102 Ibid., pp. 98–99. Ploetz notes that Arkady Shevchenko, a high-ranking diplomat who had defected to the West, reported that Andropov placed great store in the peace movement as constraint on Western action. During the Vietnam War, he allegedly opposed aiding and abetting peace negotiations between the United States and North Vietnam because he believed that Washington would be forced by “pressure from the streets” to end the war and withdraw from South Vietnam.


104 Andropov referred to the necessity of preparing the Soviet people for higher defense expenditures during the Politburo meeting cited in reference 30, above, and during a meeting with Warsaw Pact leaders cited in Michael Ploetz, Wie die Sowjetunion den Kalten Krieg Verlor, p. 100.


106 Ibid.

107 Michael Ploetz, Wie die Sowjetunion den Kalten Krieg Verlor, p. 105.

108 The Reagan–Hitler analogy seems far-fetched, more of a propaganda attack than serious political analysis. Yet, a Russian defense expert noted that “for many decades Soviet military and political predictions did not draw a distinction between democratic regimes and radical right-wing regimes of the Nazi type.” He had to wait until 1990 (!) before attempting to correct such skewed perceptions held by military professionals. Andrei Kokoshin, Soviet Strategic Thought, 1917–91, p. 145.


112 Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, Instructions from the Centre, p. 74.


114 Ibid.