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The 1980s Soviet War Scare: New Evidence from East German Documents

BENJAMIN B. FISCHER

With the collapse of détente and the onset of the ‘second’ Cold War in the early 1980s the Soviet leadership concluded that the chances of a nuclear war with the United States had increased significantly.¹ Some in the Kremlin even believed that the US might be preparing to launch a surprise nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. That at least is what they told their military and intelligence services, their Warsaw Pact allies, and the Soviet people.² In late 1983 a public war frenzy, stimulated by Soviet propaganda, erupted and threatened to get out of hand before calmer heads prevailed.³

The Soviet war scare is one of the most intriguing mysteries of the late Cold War.⁴ Former American and Soviet insiders have given authoritative accounts from their respective perspectives, but much remains unknown.⁵ When a Russian defense correspondent attempted to uncover details he found it still ‘wrapped in a fog of propaganda’.⁶ While former Soviet officials are reluctant to talk about the war scare, some of their Western counterparts are reluctant to believe it was genuine. Doubting Thomases dismissed the war scare as a scare tactic Soviet disinformation specialists had used to intimidate NATO governments, stimulate the anti-nuclear movement in the US and Europe, and bolster a domestic ‘discipline’ campaign at home.⁷

Skepticism persisted even after former KGB officer (and British agent) Oleg Gordievsky had revealed details in intelligence briefings and later in published accounts following his 1985 escape from Moscow. In 1991 he and Christopher Andrew published previously classified KGB cables that documented Kremlin obsession with the threat of a surprise nuclear attack.⁸ Four years later former Soviet ambassador to the US Anatoly Dobrynin confirmed Gordievsky’s account, adding that his discussions in Moscow had convinced him that the leadership, and especially General Secretary Yuriy Andropov, considered the threat of a US attack more serious than at any time in the post-Stalin era.⁹ Then in his 1997 autobiography ex-East German spymaster Markus Wolf discussed the war scare and the central role his service (the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung or HVA) had played in it.¹⁰ Reviewers by and large have ignored Wolf’s book as a source of Cold War history, focusing more on the author than the content. But his account is important. Wolf is the highest-ranking former communist intelligence official to have written about the war scare; he had the benefit of discussions with Soviet leaders and intelligence officials; and he had a ‘headquarters’ perspective that Gordievsky, a field officer, lacked.

Gordievsky dates the war scare from May 1981, when General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and then KGB chairman Yuriy Andropov ordered an unprecedented intelligence alert called RYAN (the Russian acronym for nuclear missile attack) that was supposed to search for indications of US war-planning and give advance warning...
to the Soviet General Staff. RYAN, he concluded was a 'potentially lethal combination of Reaganite rhetoric and Soviet paranoia'. Yet Wolf indicates that the war scare was rooted in the downturn in US-Soviet relations that began in 1979-80, that is, it predated the Reagan administration and was a response to Soviet perception of trends in US policy that transcended parties and personalities in the White House. During a February 1980 visit to Moscow Wolf and Andropov discussed the state of US-Soviet relations. 'I had never before seen Andropov so sombre and dejected', Wolf wrote. 'He described a gloomy scenario in which a nuclear war might be a real threat.' US statements, the Soviet leader said, indicated that 'under certain circumstances a nuclear first-strike against the Soviet Union and its allies would be justified'.

According to Wolf, the Soviets drew all the Warsaw Pact intelligence services into RYAN, but the HVA seems to have shouldered most of the burden. On Soviet orders, East German intelligence created a complex early-warning system (Frühwarnsystem). It included a headquarters staff dedicated to servicing RYAN requirements; military intelligence training and alert drills; a round-the-clock situation center (Lagezentrum) that monitored a 'catalogue' of potential indications of US/NATO war preparations; and a special communications link to KGB headquarters in Moscow.

The East Germans, and presumably the other Warsaw Pact allies, emulated the Soviets by coordinating civilian and military intelligence operations. Except for a short-lived experiment with a centralized intelligence directorate early in the Cold War (the Committee for Information), this was unprecedented in peacetime. The East German Ministry for State Security (Ministerium für Staatssicherheit or MfS), for example, signed a formal memorandum of understanding (dated 28 May 1983) with the Ministry for National Defence's intelligence directorate that called for joint cooperation in the military intelligence field. Military intelligence chief General Alfred Krause visited MfS headquarters so frequently for discussions with Minister of State Security Erich Mielke and Wolf that he was given his own security pass. One result was a coordinated effort to recruit agents and establish safehouses and emergency communications plans in West Germany for wartime use. Krause's service targeted members of the West German armed forces who could report on troop strengths, mobilization plans, and alert procedures. (West German counterintelligence recorded some 1,500 recruitment attempts from 1983 to 1989.) The HVA focused on West German civilians and US military and civilian personnel.

Wolf was skeptical of Kremlin paranoia, but orders from above - and from Moscow - had to be obeyed. His political bosses apparently took the war scare more seriously. The East German Politburo ordered the construction of five dispersed underground bunkers that would have been used as command centers in the event of a nuclear war.

Most accounts conclude that the war scare peaked in November 1983, when some Soviet forces went on alert in response to a Nato nuclear-release exercise codenamed 'Able Archer' and then began to subside thereafter. Mikhail Gorbachev's ascension to power in 1985, the introduction of 'new thinking' in Soviet foreign policy and military doctrine, and the convening of the first US-Soviet summit since 1979 contributed to the impression that Kremlin concerns had diminished, if not disappeared. But this interpretation is probably wrong. RYAN, we now know, was not formally canceled until November 1991.

Two documents found in the central archive of the former MfS and reprinted below show that KWA (Kernwaffenangriff) - the German acronym for RYAN - not only remained in effect but even reached a higher level of urgency in 1985. The first document, a Ministerial Order (Ministerbefehl) Nr. 1/85 dated 5 February 1985 and
signed by Mielke, decreed that the alert was now an 'absolute priority' for the entire Ministry, namely, for the internal security service as well as the HVA. All MfS 'operational and operational-technical units' in a position to collect information against KWA requirements were tasked to do so, using agents, 'skimming off' operations' (Abschöpfung or elicitation from non-agent sources), and surveillance. The main objective was to glean indications of US and NATO 'aggressive intentions', especially planning for a 'surprise nuclear attack,' by penetrating 'enemy decisionmaking centers'.

The 1985 order gave the HVA overall authority for planning, implementation, and coordination. It was responsible for processing and evaluating all incoming intelligence, issuing situation reports, and disseminating both raw information and finished intelligence. The foreign intelligence directorate was charged with supporting, tasking, and assessing information from agents under nominal MfS control as well as those handled by independent HVA departments that were targeted against KWA requirements. All information from agent and technical sources was to be reported immediately (word underscored) to HVA Department VII, where the situation centre was located. The order instructed all MfS units with agents who were reporting on KWA or could be redirected to do so to guarantee that they were in immediate contact (Sofortverbindung) with their sources. Department VII in turn was to pass reports and analysis to Mielke, his appointed deputy (Wolf), the chief of military intelligence (Krause), and the KGB. Mielke directed Wolf to prepare an implementing order (Durchführungsbestimmung) defining intelligence requirements, reporting channels, and other matters related to evaluating and disseminating incoming information.

Wolf issued his order on 5 June 1985. Mielke countersigned it, giving Wolf authority to task pertinent MfS units and receive their intelligence reports. The second document was in effect an operational plan using all the Ministry’s capabilities to expand and intensify KWA. The MfS was ordered to search for indications intelligence in the ‘Operations Area’ (Stasi jargon for West Germany), ‘on the territory of the GDR’, and ‘in the ether’. Ether apparently referred to the MfS’s substantial signals intelligence (Sigint) collection capabilities targeted on West Germany. The main mission, as noted in the original order, was early recognition (Früherkennung) of indicators of a US/NATO decision to launch a surprise nuclear-missile attack. Wolf’s plan did not specify any organizational or personnel changes or additions to the earlywarning system already in place, although it did elaborate on the various lines of authority for making sure that information from MfS units at headquarters and in East Germany’s 15 regional offices reached Wolf and his designated staff.

The implementation order specified five separate areas and related requirements that the operational components were supposed to target. They included US and Nato political and military leadership circles, intelligence services, civil defence organs, and various economic sectors. Wolf was in effect casting a finely-meshed net over Western political, military, and economic targets in the expectation that the MfS could ‘operationally penetrate’ centers of power where a decision for war would be made or at least detect the actions that would flow from such a decision.

The remainder of the seven-page document assigned specific tasking to HVA and MfS components and outlined reporting procedures. The effort was comprehensive, involving the HVA, its branches in all 15 East German regional administrative districts, and nine MfS main directorates plus their counterparts at the regional level. The latter included Main Directorates I (military counterintelligence), II (counterintelligence), III and independent Department 26 (Sigint, telephone
monitoring, and audio surveillance), VI (border control), VII (security within the Interior Ministry); VIII (security of transit routes); IX (MfS internal security); XVIII (security of the economy); XIX (security of traffic and communications); XX (security of party, state, and social organisations); and XXII (counter-terrorism). The regional MfS offices in Rostock, East Berlin, Potsdam, and others located in areas bordering West Germany and West Berlin received additional tasking commensurate with their opportunities for observing Western actions.

Some of the tasking was deliberately vague, apparently for security reasons. Main Directorate III, for example, was simply instructed to continue co-operating with HVA Department VII under a pre-existing arrangement. Main Directorate IX was instructed to report KWA-related information that derived from ‘investigative activities’, that is, security vetting of MfS officers. Main Directorates XVIII, XIX, and XX were tasked with reporting observations made by so-called traveling cadre (Reisekader), namely, East German citizens recruited to visit West Germany and other Western countries on operational assignments. (HVA staff officers, as a rule, were desk-bound. The MfS recruited private citizens who had legitimate reasons for traveling to the West to perform duties normally handled by staff officers in Western intelligence services. This was a legacy of East Germany’s diplomatic isolation in the 1950s and 1960s, when the HVA did not have official installations to provide legal cover for its field stations. The practice continued after East Berlin expanded its official overseas presence in the mid-1970s because of the protection it provided against Western counterintelligence.)

The regulation stipulated that all KWA-related information was to be reported ‘by the shortest route and without delay’ with the indicator ‘Befehl 1/85’ to the situation centre in HVA Department VII/C during business hours or to the duty officer during non-business hours. Cables from the field with urgent information were to be sent by highest precedence. All reports and analysis had to indicate who had seen the information before it passed up the chain of command.

Clearly, the alert did not just fade away after the ‘Able Archer’ crisis of late 1983. In fact, a KGB cable circulated in July 1984 notified field stations that RYAN remained in effect and that the codeword ‘kostyor 1’ (bonfire) would be used to signify the approach of war and a shift to ‘combat alert’ status. A German journalist who examined HVA files noted that during 1983–84, when Kremlin anxiety was supposedly ebbing, the Soviets were pressing the East Germans ‘with special emphasis’ to devote more resources to RYAN.23 The two documents cited above almost certainly were the result of that pressure.

Unfortunately, neither the KGB cable nor the 1985 MfS order reveals the threat perception behind the heightened sense of urgency. This makes the mystery of the war scare even more mysterious. At best, we can only speculate on the reason for the decision to devote considerable East German resources to the alert and divert them from other missions at home and abroad. The original impetus behind RYAN – the deployment of new US intermediate-range ground-launched and ballistic nuclear missiles in Europe beginning in 1983 – suggests a clue. The Soviets considered the Pershing II ballistic missile, which was deployed exclusively in West Germany, the main threat. With its extended range, increased accuracy, and deep-earth penetration capability, the modified Pershing was like a ‘cocked pistol held at Moscow’s temple’ in the words of the Soviet commander of anti-ballistic missile defence forces, because it could potentially threaten Soviet and Warsaw Pact command centres in a first-strike scenario.24

The Soviets could not defend against it and even had trouble extending the search sector of the single radar system they had targeted on West Germany to the southern
part of the country where 27 Pershings-IIIs were deployed. Under NATO plans, full deployment was scheduled for completion by 1985. Even though the Soviets had begun reassessing US intentions (part of Gorbachev's 'new thinking'), they still had to deal with remaining uncertainty about those intentions and with what they, rightly or wrongly, regarded as the missile's first-strike capability. Even while unveiling his new approach to East–West relations at the 27th Communist Party Congress in 1985, Gorbachev noted that 'scenarios for a nuclear strike against us do exist'. The general secretary may have considered it militarily prudent or politically necessary – or both – to expand the alert during a period of increasing vulnerability and risky departures in foreign policy.

NOTES

The views expressed in this article are the author's alone and do not reflect the views of the Central Intelligence Agency or the US Government. The Central Intelligence Agency reviewed this article in draft and determined that it does not contain classified information.


2. Markus Lesch, 'Wie die Phantasie der SED NATO-Divisionen zuhauf gebar', Die Welt, 2 Feb. 1991, p.3 and Nicholas Hellen, 'Kremlin was poised to launch nuclear strike', The Times (London), 30 Nov. 1997, p.4G.


7. Former KGB officer Oleg Gordievsky recalls meeting a senior US official in Washington who appeared quite knowledgeable about the war scare but dismissed it as 'no more than a deception exercise by the Soviet leadership'. Oleg Gordievsky, Next Stop Execution: The Autobiography of Oleg Gordievsky (NY: Macmillan 1995) p.377. A US diplomatic correspondent notes that such scepticism was rather widespread:
Many senior administration officials scoff now, as they did then, at the suggestion that the Soviet Union was genuinely alarmed by US military moves or public statements, or that Moscow had any justification for feeling vulnerable. The ‘war scare’ in the Soviet Union in 1982–1983 was deliberately engineered for propaganda purposes, these officials maintain – a pretext to create a siege mentality in the Soviet Union, and to frighten the outside world about US intentions.


8. Andrew and Gordievsky, Instructions (note 5) pp.69–90.

17. Ibid.
20. Most authors believe that this was a serious crisis that could have resulted in military conflict. See, for example, John Prados, ‘The War Scare of 1983’, MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History 9/3 (Spring 1996) p.68. Gordievsky claims that the ‘Able Archer’ incident was the most serious international episode since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis and the superpowers came close to war. A US Special National Intelligence Estimate that reviewed the incident concluded that the Soviet reaction was ‘somewhat greater than usual’, but ‘by confining heightened readiness to selected air units Moscow clearly revealed that it did not in fact think there was a possibility of a NATO attack’. See Director of Central Intelligence, ‘Implications of Recent Soviet Military-Political Activities’, SNIE 11-10-84JX, 18 May 1984, p.4 in National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 266 (Records of the CIA).
Tasks of Service Units of the MfS with regard to Early Detection of Acute Threats of Aggression and Surprise Military Activities of the Imperialist States and Alliance, in particular with regard to Prevention of a Surprise Nuclear-Missile Attack on the States of the Socialist Community.

For the effective implementation of the tasks assigned by the Party and State leadership with regard to detection of peace-threatening anti-socialist plans and intentions of the adversary, the operational and operational-technical service units of the MfS are to increase efforts for acquisition of indications and information, which will aid in the timely recognition of acute threats of aggression and surprise military activities of the imperialist states and alliance against the states of the socialist community.

This demands the increased use, further development, and creation of [agent] positions as well as opportunities for elicitation and observation within enemy political, intelligence, and military decisionmaking centers and their communications links from which information can be acquired on relevant enemy plans and intentions.

Absolute priority in the acquisition of information with regard to implementing this task is to be given to early recognition of threats of military aggression, in particular a surprise nuclear-missile attack against the states of the socialist community.

Of especial important is intelligence on the adversary's process of decisionmaking that would precede military actions.

For the effective implementation of this tasking,

I order that:

1. With respect to acquisition of information, above all from non-socialist states and West Berlin, regarding early recognition of plans for military aggression, in particular of a surprise nuclear-missile attack (hereafter KWA) against the states of the socialist community, all capabilities of the operational and operational-technical service units of the MfS, which can obtain relevant information, are to be systematically and expeditiously developed.

2. The HV A will assume responsibility within the MfS for ensuring coordinated and goal-oriented planning and implementation of the measures required for acquiring information. This includes overseeing coordination, ensuring regular situation reports and assessments as well as evaluation and processing of incoming information related to KWA requirements, and central direction of service units as
well as support for operational service units with regard to the handling of relevant IMs [agents].

3. All information related to KWA requirements, which is developed by MfS service units from IMs or by operational-technical means, is to be sent immediately to HV A/Department VII, which also is responsible for collating information of this type and assessing it for me, my designated deputy, the area of the chief of intelligence of the MfNV [Ministry for National Defense] and the KGB.

4. Chiefs of the operational service units of the MfS are to assume personal control over work with IMs who have opportunities for acquiring information on KWA requirements or who can develop appropriate access, and ensure that they are in immediate contact under all conditions.

5. My deputy and chief of HV A has submitted to me for approval an Implementation Regulation, which deals with special information requirements and reporting duties as well as regulations regarding the dissemination and assessment of information.

6. This Order goes into effect immediately.

MIELKE
General of the Army

Council of Ministers
of the German Democratic Republic
Ministry for State Security
Deputy of the Minister

Berlin, 5.6.1985

Secret Document
GVS-o008
MfS-Nr. 12/85

approved:
MIELKE
General of the Army

1. Implementation Regulation to Order Nr. 1/85 of 15.2.1985,
GVS MfS o008 – 1/85

Comprehensive Use of Capabilities of the Service Units of the MfS for Early and Reliable Acquisition of Evidence of Imminent Enemy Plans, Preparations, and Actions for Aggression.

For implementation of the tasks assigned in Order Nr. 1/85 of the Minister of State Security for early detection of acute threats of aggression and surprise military activities of the imperialist states and alliance, in particular for prevention of a surprise nuclear-missile attack against the states of the socialist community,

I direct that:

1. The operational and operational-technical service units of the Ministry for State Security comprehensively use their specific capabilities and expand within the
framework of their areas of responsibility in a planned and coordinated manner efforts to acquire and report, through goal-oriented operational penetration of enemy decisionmaking centers and through recognition of special features (indicators) in the Operations Area, on the territory of the GDR and in the ether, early and reliable information that indicates imminent plans, preparations, and activities for aggression by the imperialist enemy.

Of top-priority importance in this regard are signs of imminent preparations of a strategic nuclear-missile attack (KWA) and of other surprise military plans of the imperialist states and alliance against the states of the socialist community.

2. For acquisition of information and recognition of indicators within the framework of early detection, the following main tasks in various areas of the adversary are to be accomplished as a matter of priority.

- Area of political leadership
  - Discovery of measures for preparation and adoption of a political decision for a surprise attack, in particular for a surprise nuclear-missile attack (KWA);
  - Discovery of mobilization measures for protecting the functions of the political leadership in conditions of a war/nuclear war;
  - Confirmation of consultations of the NATO countries regarding surprise attack activities/nuclear-weapon strikes;
  - Discovery of measures for maintaining the functioning of governments in conditions of war/nuclear war;
  - Confirmation of orders, by signal, to military command authorities for preparation of nuclear attacks.

- Area of military command
  - Intelligence on measures of direct preparation by US armed forces for surprise attack, in particular for a surprise nuclear-missile attack;
  - Intelligence on measures for direct preparations of the armed forces of the other NATO countries for surprise attack, in particular for a surprise nuclear-missile attack;
  - Confirmation of transmission by orders/signals for preparation of nuclear attacks to nuclear strike forces/troops/transport.

- Enemy intelligence services
  - Confirmation of intelligence measures that would immediately precede a nuclear-missile attack;
  - Confirmation of counterintelligence measures that would immediately precede a nuclear-missile attack.

- Civil Defense
  - Confirmation of measures for increasing the state of readiness of civil defense organs;
  - Confirmation of measures for preparation of secure accommodations for care of the population, for stockpiling of food and water supplies;
  - Confirmation of measures for securing medical care for the population in case of a nuclear attack;
  - Confirmation of preparations for evacuation measures (specialists, population);
  - Confirmation of deviations in the behavior of prominent personalities and other
persons in possession of classified information as well as their family members and persons close to them, which can be viewed as measures for protecting their own security (among other things, sudden moving into specially outfitted secure accommodations, unexpected departure from normal residential areas and from border zones at home and abroad);

- Confirmation of measures for protecting important material assets and cultural assets from the effects of a nuclear counterattack.

- Economic Area
  - Confirmation of mobilization measures for protecting utilities and securing the property of large enterprises and banks;
  - Confirmation of mobilization measures for protection of the activity of key industrial sites under nuclear-war conditions;
  - Confirmation of measures for mobilizing means of transportation for nuclear-war conditions.

3. For implementation of the assigned tasks, the operational and operational-technical service units are to concentrate on the following list of key areas for early recognition of extraordinary activities and occurrences in accordance with Order Nr. 1/85:

Main Department A and Department XV of the regional administrations [BV or Bezirkverwaltungen]:
- Use and goal-oriented expansion of operational capabilities in the Operations Area, with concentration on political decisionmaking centers and military command centers.

Main Department I:
- Area of responsibility for border reconnaissance;
- Enemy activities against the armed forces and national defense installations.

Main Department II and Department II of the regional administrations:
- Activities of enemy intelligence services, especially against military targets on the territory of the GDR;
- Activities and behavior of select foreign representations in the GDR and of the Western military liaison missions and military inspection commissions.

Main Department III and Department III of the regional administrations, Department 26/MfS and Department 26 of the regional administrations:
- Priority tasks in accordance with directives for cooperation with HV A/Department VII/C.

Main Department VI and Department VI of the regional administrations:
- Persons and shipments of goods crossing the border;
- Activities of enemy services and organs against border-crossing points.

Main Department VII and Department VII of the regional administrations:
- Enemy activities against the organs, installations, and forces of the Ministry of the Interior, Civil Defense, and against battle groups;
- Information from resettled agents [illegals], members or former members of Western armed forces.
Main Directorate VIII and Department VIII of the regional administrations:
- Activity and behavior of Western liaison missions and military inspection commissions;
- Military forces of the West Berlin Garrison along GDR transportation routes;
- Anomalies in the situation along the transit routes of the GDR.

Main Department IX and Department IX of the regional administrations:
- Information from investigations.

Main Department XVIII and Department XVIII of the regional administrations:
- Enemy activity against key areas and installations of the national economy important for national defense of the GDR and of economic-technical areas.
- Warnings from traveling cadre.

Main Department XIX and Department XIX of the regional administrations:
- Enemy activity against militarily important areas of the GDR transportation system;
- Preparations for major changes in the schedules of the Bundesbahn [West German Railroad] in the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany];
- Assaults against the operations of the German Reichsbahn [East German Railroad] and of the Main Office of Waterways in West Berlin;
- Warnings from IMs [agents] involved in cross-border activities and from traveling cadre.

Main Department XX and Department XX of the regional administrations:
- Enemy activity against key and selected local state organs;
- Enemy activities against key installations of the post-and-communications systems and science and research [centers].
- Warnings from traveling cadre.

Main Department XXII and Working Group XXII of the regional administrations:
- Relevant information from targeting and control of terrorist and other potential extremists in the Operations Area and use of appropriate foreign contacts.

Central Operations Staff:
- Significant incidents and one-time occurrences.

Regional administration Rostock:
- Conduct of ships from capitalist countries in the ports and on the sovereign waters of the GDR;
- Anomalies in the refitting of GDR ships in the ports of the imperialist states and with passage through foreign sovereign waters;
- Enemy activity against port facilities and off the coasts of the GDR.

Regional administrations Berlin and Potsdam:
- Information related to political, military, and intelligence-related operational cases in West Berlin;
- Anomalies in the political-security situation in the capital city (BV Berlin only).
Regional administrations bordering the FRG and West Berlin:
- Changes in the character of enemy activity against the national borders;
- Buildup of enemy intelligence activities and sabotage preparations in the GDR border areas.

The tasks associated with accomplishing these main tasks are to be summarized in detail and coordinated with Main Directorate A.

4. My deputy and chief of the Staff is responsible for summarizing the results of cooperation between the HV A and the other operational and operational-technical service units of the MfS, which are to fulfill the tasks for accomplishing Order Nr. 1/85 as well as execute them in the spirit of the Order. Confirmation in this regard is the responsibility of the chiefs of the main departments/independent departments. In the regional administrations, the chief of Department XV through the chief of the regional administration is to ensure corresponding cooperation with the departments of the BV and the county-level service units. Support for the work of selected IMs with equipment and facilities of the HV A in accordance with Point 2 of Order Nr. 1/85 is to be verified at the same level.

5. Reporting with regard to Order Nr. 1/85 is to be transmitted by the shortest route and without delay with the indicator ‘Order 1/85’ to the Situation Center (LZ) of Department VII to the HV A (during business hours, to Department VII, telephone WTsoh 3332 [presumably a secure phone] or telephone 28358, after close of business to the ODH [Deputy Officer]). The highest level of urgency is to be used in sending cables. Reports must always indicate who else was informed.

Other non-urgent information and reports with regard to the contents of the Order are to be sent to HV A, Department VII/C.

6. This Implementation Regulation enters into effect immediately.

WOLF
Colonel-General