



The Realism of Russia's Foreign Policy

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THE EMERGENCE OF AN INDEPENDENT RUSSIAN FEDERATION amidst the disintegration of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 has constrained Russia and Russian policy elites to fashion novel forms of statehood and national identity at home as well as new conceptions of the Russian national interest in its foreign relations.¹ Most striking, perhaps, has been the Russian effort to maintain the appearance of great power status abroad while most of the sinews of Russian power have withered into evanescence at home. How successful has the Russian government been in projecting international influence from an increasingly fragile domestic foundation? How has it managed the delicate balance between asserting Russian prerogatives and maintaining Russia's relations with the G-7 powers, on whom it is financially dependent² and without whom, most Russian foreign policy elites agree, Russia's most vital national interests cannot be secured?³ What does the answer to this question imply for both the evolution of Russian foreign policy and, more broadly, the nature of the nascent post-Cold War international political system?

The scholarly literature on post-Soviet Russian foreign policy has tended to settle on a number of propositions concerning its domestic and international context. These include, most importantly, the following points:

1. The Russian state that has emerged since the collapse of the Soviet Union faces a profound crisis of political and national identity,⁴ one that impels Russian foreign policy in unilateralist and nationalist directions. Moreover, the process of 'democratisation' itself often provides incentives to excluded and/or ambitious political elites to urge unilateralist foreign policies that are quite different from those presumed by the literature on the 'liberal democratic peace'.⁵
2. That state has experienced an unprecedented disintegration of the classical sinews of international power, i.e. a decade-long depression in the industrial economy and the virtual decomposition of the armed forces as a coherent combat organisation, and an external debt which cannot be serviced without further indefinite infusions of foreign credit, rescheduling and forgiveness, *de facto* or *de jure*.⁶
3. Decision making in the foreign and security policy area is highly amorphous, unstructured and frequently incoherent, as various agencies of state frequently pursue their institutional and even personal as distinct from Russian state interests in foreign as in domestic policy.⁷
4. Since 1993, in response to the frustration of early Russian aspirations to join the Western (i.e. G-7) economic, political and security communities, Russian diplomacy has moved in a decidedly unilateralist and frequently anti-Western (often

- anti-US) direction, reflecting the priority of establishing Russia as the integrating power in central Eurasia as opposed to integrating Russia within the broader G-7 world.⁸
5. To the extent that the Russian government has nevertheless been able to preserve a balanced policy in relationship to the G-7 states, it has had more to do with the specific interests of the political and economic elites that dominated Russian politics during the El'tsin era than it has with the constraints imposed by Russia's external environment. Russian foreign policy, in short, can be explained better by unit-level than system-level factors.⁹

In brief, the problems that Russian foreign policy has presented to the outside world reflect in substantial measure the problems that beset the fledgling Russian state at home, and can be expressed in three terse questions: What is Russian? What is foreign? What is policy? That is: what is the political content of Russian-ness in the wake of the disintegration of the imperial state that, in Soviet as in Tsarist times, undergirded Russian power at home and abroad? What is foreign when, amid the debris of that lost empire, about one-sixth of the Russian nation resides outside the borders of the Russian state? And finally, what is policy when the state lacks the resources, institutions and coherence to perform many of the minimal functions of governance, including the levying of collectable taxes, control of the armed forces, suppression of internal rebellion, macroeconomic regulation of the economy and satisfaction of external financial obligations?

Many of these premises are in fact sound enough when taken individually. Together, they do underscore part of the dramatic crisis of statehood that the Russian Federation has been experiencing since independence at the end of 1991. Yet, as a detailed analysis of the course of Russian foreign policy since then demonstrates, Russian diplomacy has proved to be far from the picture of a unilateralist, anti-Western and generally ineffective statecraft that some of the scholarly literature, much of the journalistic analysis, and the Russian government's domestic opponents, have suggested. Nor has Russia's foreign policy been driven predominantly by internal political considerations, as Michael McFaul has argued.¹⁰ Rather, a close reading of Russian foreign policy since 1991 indicates instead a diplomacy that has proved relatively successful in maintaining two important policy objectives that are in potential tension with each other: establishing Russian diplomatic and security hegemony throughout the territory of the former Soviet Union as well as Russia's 'great power' status in international councils while at the same time avoiding a rupture with the G-7 states, in the first place the United States, whose cooperation remains essential to Russia's internal as well as external prospects. In this article it is argued that the prevalent view of contemporary Russian foreign policy as relatively incoherent and ineffective¹¹ and, where coherent, unilateralist and anti-Western—and withal driven by internal (unit-level) rather than external (system-level) influences—has to date often proved far from being the case. Moreover, the reasons behind the relative effectiveness of Russian diplomacy shed instructive light on the emerging structure of the international political system as a whole since the end of the Cold War.

How has post-Soviet Russia been able to perform this delicate balancing act,

especially from a position of unprecedented collapse in the classical sources of the state's external power? What does the explanation imply for our understanding of the course and prospects of Russian foreign policy as well as for the structure and evolution of the post-Cold War international political system? In order to address these questions, this article will examine a series of cases of Russia's post-Soviet diplomacy in several different regional and functional settings. These include Russia's involvement in civil conflicts and local wars along the southern periphery of the former Soviet Union, as expressed in the civil war in Moldova; Russian diplomacy in the Balkans, as expressed in the wars in Bosnia and Serbia; and Russian diplomacy toward former Soviet allies in East-Central Europe in respect of the extension of NATO membership eastwards to include Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. First, as background, what sort of diplomacy did the first post-communist Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, bequeath to his successors?

Primakov versus Kozyrev?

The replacement of Andrei Kozyrev by Evgenii Primakov as Foreign Minister in January 1996 was widely hailed as signalling a shift in Russian diplomacy from a Western-oriented to a Eurasian-oriented foreign policy. Kozyrev's liberal internationalism, clearly expressed in an article on human rights published in the *Slavic Review* in summer 1992,¹² appeared to be discredited in light of the improbability of Russia's early integration into the broader liberal-democratic international community. The prospect of the entry of erstwhile Soviet satellite states Poland, Hungary and (after the splitting of the Czechoslovak federation in 1993) the Czech Republic into NATO appeared to underscore—or so argued most Russians concerned about the issue—the centrality of classical geopolitical as distinct from liberal criteria in post-Cold War international relations.¹³ Primakov, with deep roots in the Soviet foreign policy and intelligence bureaucracies, and having just served as head of a KGB successor unit, the Federal Intelligence Service, presaged a refocusing on securing for Russia the status of global power within Eurasia and further afield that Kozyrev, a vociferous advocate of the proposition that Russia's national interests flowed from its liberal-democratic aspirations, had seemed to neglect. Indeed, contrary to this liberal school, Primakov had on several occasions declared that Russia should pay the economic price for reintegrating the old empire, directly or indirectly; great power status did not come cheaply and was worth the cost.¹⁴ Consequently, many anticipated that Primakov's appointment would see a marked anti-Western turn in Russian diplomacy, as the establishment of Russian primacy in central Eurasia had apparently become a higher priority than relations with the G-7 world.

Such interpretations, which reflected a broad anti-Kozyrev consensus within the Russian parliament and throughout much of the government itself, discounted the fact that Kozyrev had presided over a Russian diplomacy that was far more complex and balanced than his critics were prepared to accept.¹⁵ After an early disillusionment about the likelihood of Russia's integration into the G-7 community (prompting an extraordinary mock hostile speech to the foreign ministers of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in Stockholm in December 1992),¹⁶ Kozyrev helped to steer a weak Russian state through a series of diplomatic

engagements in which Russia proved able to assert its interest in primacy within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the trappings of great power status further afield, and advancing its material interests in the face of US protests without in the process undermining its relationships with the United States and its most powerful allies. Throughout the southern CIS, ranging from civil conflicts within Moldova, Georgia and Tajikistan to war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, Russia had succeeded between 1992 and 1995 in asserting its claim to be the *interlocuteur privilégié* between these states and the world beyond the old Soviet frontiers.¹⁷ Russian military power, such as it was, and the will of the Russian state to employ it, underwrote the state's claim that Russia's security borders were those of the defunct Soviet Union.¹⁸ Kozyrev himself came to embrace this shift in Russian policy,¹⁹ stating during a visit to the Russian Northern Fleet in February 1995 that 'the fleet continues to be a major strategic force of Russian global presence. It has a secure future because it plays a diplomatic role in furthering cooperation between Russia and NATO'.²⁰ In the Balkans, Russia vetoed the US proposal to lift the arms embargo on former Yugoslavia in respect of Bosnia in the UN Security Council in summer 1993 and succeeded within the year—after a unilateral demarche to NATO to send Russian peacekeeping units to Sarajevo as a guarantee of Serb good conduct—in negotiating membership of the five-power Contact Group, a kind of regional adaptation of the Security Council that excludes the one permanent member with no specific interest in the Balkans (China) and includes one major power with such interests that is not a permanent member (Germany). Russian membership in the Contact Group provides a clear example of the complexity of Russian diplomacy under Kozyrev: Russian inclusion testifies to Russia's balancing of a frequently pro-Serbian orientation with functional relations with the West, and the United States in particular; moreover, the central purpose of the Contact Group has been to ensure that the potentially conflicting interests of Russia, France, Great Britain, Germany and the United States on Balkan issues do not undermine the relations of these powers with each other. In this respect, the Contact Group testifies both to Russia's desire to pursue potentially conflicting policy lines, i.e. the assertion of great power status together with cultivation of close ties with the United States and its allies, as well as its ability to do so.

That Russia has not very often been compelled to choose between these two lines of policy certainly reflects the more permissive international environment that has emerged since the end of the Cold War. West European and North American powers have generally been reluctant to press Russia forcefully to observe important international legal and political norms, whether it concerns the use of the Russian Army to underwrite the *de facto* secession of trans-Dniestr from Moldova (or of Abkhazia from Georgia), the observance of OSCE rules on troop movements on the eve of both invasions of Chechnya (as well as the conduct of the Russian Army during each Chechen war), reckless statements by Russian officials, including the President (who declared in September 1995 that NATO expansion would mean the return of 'the flames of war' to Europe), or even where Russian commercial interests conflict with long-standing US (as well as previous US-*Soviet*) non-proliferation policy, as in the sale of \$800 million worth of nuclear reactors by the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy to Iran.²¹ The fact remains that Russian diplomacy under

Kozyrev's tenure proved able to identify the margin of manoeuvre potentially available to Russia and very frequently, much more than Russia's gravely weakened economy, military and state—and Russian critics—would imply, advanced its twin interests in predominance within the CIS and good relations with the G-7 states.

Even on the issue of NATO expansion, where to be sure Russian diplomacy failed in obtaining its declared objectives, Russian protests helped to delay the timing of expansion and to obtain in compensation (under Primakov's tenure as Foreign Minister) NATO commitments not to station nuclear or conventional forces of existing NATO states to new members in East-Central Europe, as well as Russian membership in a permanent joint NATO-Russian council.²² From early 1993 on, Kozyrev consistently maintained that any eventual extension of the NATO alliance eastward had to be rooted in a broader concept and framework of European security, taking Russia's special status as a nuclear power into account.²³ That such a framework was codified under Primakov should not obscure the strong lines of continuity between these putatively 'liberal' and 'realist' foreign ministers, as the following case studies will illustrate.

In this context, McFaul's argument that Russia's (relatively) liberal foreign policy has been sustained mainly by (relatively) liberal Russian political and economic elites is suggestive but not conclusive.²⁴ Russia's diplomatic pattern from as early as mid-1993 has not been consistently liberal internationalist but rather has been one of attempting to balance potentially competing objectives of primacy within the CIS area and the trappings of great power status further afield versus the cultivation of Russia's ties with the G-7 states, collectively as well as individually. Moreover, and again in qualification of McFaul's thesis, this shift took place whilst the Russian government was still in 'liberal' hands (Kozyrev as Foreign Minister and Anatolii Chubais in charge of privatisation policy), although clearly in response to nationalist pressures emanating from the Russian parliament. Further, this more complex policy has been sustained despite shifting elite patterns: the neutralisation of the anti-liberal opposition in October 1993; its resurgence in the parliamentary elections of December 1993 and December 1995 (though without significant power under Russia's 1993 presidentialist constitution); the replacement of the liberal Kozyrev by the un-liberal ('anti-Western pragmatist', in Margot Light's phrase) Primakov as Foreign Minister in early 1996; and the rise and fall of Primakov as Prime Minister (1998–99) and the replacement of the erstwhile liberal El'tsin by the career intelligence official Vladimir Putin as President to begin 2000. (One of Putin's first acts as Acting President was to restore a memorial bust to the notoriously anti-liberal Yurii Andropov, head of the KGB between 1967 and 1982, to the infamous Lubyanka building.²⁵) Elite-level explanations of Russian foreign policy, it would appear, would have to be situated in a broader environmental context, one that might help explain why Russian political elites, divided on domestic programmatic grounds, are nevertheless united on a core pragmatic nationalist consensus that Russia is in a rapid internal decline that must be reversed, that primary foreign policy focus must be in the CIS region and that Russia's nuclear superpower status must be maintained.²⁶

How, then, have Russian policy elites reacted, in several geopolitical settings, to the challenges of defining Russia's external interests in the post-Soviet, post-Cold War and allegedly liberal international environment? The cases that follow trace Russian

policy within the ex-Soviet area (Moldova), the ex-Warsaw Pact area (in relation to NATO expansion) and the Balkans in order to ascertain the nature of Russian policy and its relative consistency, and thereby to gauge the extent to which extant theories focusing on unilateralism, incoherence, ineffectiveness, anti-Westernism and elite-level explanations hold.²⁷

Case 1: Moldova

The *de facto* secession of trans-Dniestr from Moldova²⁸ in the course of 1992—and Western acquiescence in this fact—represents the first instance of the Russian military acting essentially on its own to create political and military *faits accomplis* to which an ambivalent Russian government subsequently accommodated itself. Indeed, the events in Moldova served as a critically important and to date little known test case of the liberal-democratic premises of Kozyrev's early foreign policy. Unwittingly, the United States and its European allies, by not pressing Russia on the behaviour of its 14th Army based in Moldova, seriously undermined the position of Kozyrev, who had been arguing that Russia could not afford to engage in such unilateral interventions beyond its borders because of the price that would have to be paid in relations with the Western world. In the process, the Russian government learned that, within the confines of the CIS, Russia possessed considerable latitude of action without running the risk of jeopardising its Western options.²⁹

The Russian military saw itself in Moldova as the protector of a number of Russian geopolitical and geostrategic objectives. These included 'preventing the reunification of Moldova with Romania; keeping Moldova within Russia's sphere of influence as a strategic crossroads between the Black Sea and the Balkans; and maintaining the considerable infrastructure of military bases, arms and ammunition stores, and communications facilities in Moldova's trans-Dniestr region'.³⁰ Furthermore, both the Russian government and the 14th Russian Army based in Moldova had strong material interests in keeping the army based in Moldova. Russia lacked adequate military housing for any relocation to Russia, while more than half of the 14th Army itself was of local provenance and did not wish to be withdrawn for entirely personal reasons. While elements of freelancing activity by local units of the Russian army occurred, these on the whole involved the selling of arms for cash by individual or small groups of officers to the highest bidder. Where important political-military and geopolitical interests have been concerned, the Russian military has acted as a relatively coherent entity, in the process confirming itself as an effective institutional actor and the embodiment of a certain conception of Russia's historical and international interests.³¹ (This pattern would be repeated in Georgia and Armenia.)

Even before the disintegration of the Soviet Union, an alliance between Soviet reactionaries and the military based in Moldova had been formed, at first in an effort to thwart Moldova's move toward sovereignty and then independence from the USSR. In April 1991 Soviet Politburo member Anatolii Lukyanov had begun to conspire with trans-Dniestr groups to establish trans-Dniestr as a base from which to halt Moldova's slide from the Soviet orbit. The legislative key to such efforts was a clause in the draft Treaty of Union which stated 'that in the event that any republic refuses to sign the Union Treaty, and autonomous republics and regions, as well as

territories with compactly settled national groups express themselves against such a refusal, they then have the right to enter the USSR as independent subjects of the federation, with an appropriate state status ...'.³² Gorbachev himself had embraced such an approach in a futile effort to check El'tsin's rise as President of Russia. Lukyanov's efforts, however, were to yield fruit, as the trans-Dniestr region declared its secession from Moldova in September 1991, in protest against government proposals for unification with Romania. With the encouragement of the 14th Army based in Moldova and elements in the Defence Ministry in Moscow, Cossack forces from Russia began to arrive in Moldova to enforce the secessionists' claims.³³ Indeed, the 14th Army had become so implicated in this conflict between the Moldovan state and those claiming to speak for the Russian minority that the Russian Defence Ministry itself feared it was losing control over the unit. Defence Minister Grachev had to admit in June 1992 that the 14th Army was no longer obeying orders from Moscow. The majority of the Russian Army in Moldova refused to obey the order to retreat and had gone over to the trans-Dniestrian side. The danger of 'warlordism' genuinely alarmed the Defence Ministry, which responded by replacing 14th Army commander General Netkachev with General Aleksandr Lebed, with the express order to bring the 14th Army under control. Lebed largely succeeded in this task, and was able to disarm the paramilitary units that had formed from the corps of the 14th Army and itinerant Cossack units.³⁴

The re-establishment of discipline in the 14th Army, however, went hand in hand with that Army now assuming an openly partisan stance on the secession issue. Lebed publicly declared that Russia supported the trans-Dniestr independence movement, and would continue to do so, by force if necessary. In interviews in the media Lebed attacked what he called the 'fascist' Moldovan government.³⁵ By late summer 1992 the Russian government had begun to integrate its policy toward Moldova on the basis of Lebed's political-military accomplishment and negotiated a cease-fire which has had the effect of enshrining the status quo in trans-Dniestr.

The re-establishment of military discipline was thus not accompanied by the establishment of civilian control over the military, or indeed of political control over foreign policy. With the appointment of Lebed, the Russian Defence Minister assumed direct responsibility for the conduct of the 14th Army in Moldova, as a number of Russian sources now confirm. The official Russian newspaper *Rossiiskie Vesti* on 2 February 1994 confirmed the admission of presidential adviser Sergei Stankevich that General Lebed had not acted on his own in directing the 14th Army against Moldova. 'Only now', the paper wrote, 'summing up all the facts, have we come to understand: every step of that Army's commander was authorised by the hierarchy of Russia's Ministry of Defence'. Foreign Minister Kozyrev strongly condemned the behaviour of the Russian military in Moldova in late June 1992, arguing that the military were transgressing on political decisions.³⁶ Indeed, Moldova was the first case in the post-Soviet era of the Russian military conducting its own foreign policy, the aim of which was the 'pacification' of regional conflicts and the 'protection' of the Russian population, together with the re-establishment of a unified security space throughout the ex-USSR.

With Moldova begins the process by which Russia embarked on the way to re-establishing a hegemonic position in what Russian strategists called Russia's

'geopolitical space', and to a significant extent with the tacit acquiescence of the Western powers, including the United States. Interestingly, as Andranik Migranyan, a foreign policy adviser to El'tsin, admitted, Western failure to challenge Russian intervention in Moldova in mid-1992—when Russian policy was in considerable disarray—was a turning point in Russia's foreign policy, as it disproved the liberal Russian argument that Russia would pay a price for violating accepted principles of good conduct. The conflict in Moldova 'played a great role in changing the Russian establishment's understanding of Russia's role in the post-Soviet space', Migranyan has written. The Russian Foreign Ministry and liberal democratic circles were concerned that adverse international reactions would follow the aggressive Russian behaviour in Moldova. 'The West, however, feared that any strong response to Russia over the 14th Army's actions ... might overburden the ruling democrats, and therefore refrained from any serious demarches against Russia; whereupon the Russian Foreign Ministry's position shifted toward the unconditional defence of the Dniestr republic ...'. From that point on, Migranyan notes, 'practically all political forces in Russia shared similar positions toward Moldova'.³⁷ This lack of Western reaction also sent a powerful signal to the Moldovan leadership, and that government ultimately bowed to Russian pressure and agreed to join the Commonwealth of Independent States, as would, under similar circumstances, Georgia the following year.³⁸ (For his service to the Russian state, General Lebed received promotion directly from El'tsin in October 1993; more than 200 of his officers and soldiers received commendations for their activities in Moldova.)

Case 2: Balkan diplomacy and the establishment of the Contact Group

In perhaps the most striking assertion of Russian diplomacy³⁹ since 1992 (and in anticipation of the unilateral dispatch of 200 Russian paratroopers to Pristina airport in Kosovo in June 1999), the Russian government in February 1994 unilaterally countered a NATO ultimatum to Serbia, to withdraw heavy artillery units from around Sarajevo or face heavy bombing, with a guarantee to be enforced by Russian peacekeeping units on the spot. The Russian demarche achieved its desired effect of forestalling NATO air raids, in the process both inspiring and alarming the Russian foreign policy leadership. Russia had now openly asserted itself as a peer of the West in matters Yugoslav, and thus underscored its claim to be taken seriously as a great power in European affairs. No decisions of importance, it seemed, could henceforth be taken without active Russian involvement beforehand.⁴⁰ At the same time, the visible dismay of the Western allies, and above all the United States, at what was widely seen as Russia's sleight of diplomatic hand, gave cause for concern in Moscow that great power harmony might not tolerate many more such inspired initiatives.⁴¹ Kozyrev framed the issue squarely in an interview with Western journalists in mid-June 1994:

We are on the threshold of recreating in the Balkans ... a type of client–patron relationship that used to characterise the Cold War period ... Russian public opinion tends to believe that we have to be the protectors of the Serbs, and in the United States there seems to be a kind of obsession with portraying the Muslim and Croat side as almost the innocent victim of

so-called Serbian aggression ... That is the danger: that Washington starts to behave as protector of the Muslim side and unilaterally lifts the arms embargo. The Russian parliament has already prepared a resolution. They are ready to respond immediately to countries lifting the arms embargo by unilaterally lifting sanctions against Serbia ... This will be a total break with international legality.⁴²

Whatever the Russian stake in the Balkans,⁴³ for the El'tsin-Kozyrev government it was always subordinate to the need to maintain at least the appearance, if not the substance, of partnership with the West. The trick was to craft Russian policy in such a way that Russia need not have to choose between its parallel claims to strategic partnership with the West, on the one hand, and to the say and weight appropriate to a 'great power', on the other. So long as the NATO powers were themselves divided or undecided on how to proceed, the Russian government could maintain this delicate balancing act. NATO unity to act against Serb transgressions of UN Security Council resolutions in Bosnia, on the other hand, would test Russia's claims to diplomatic peerage to the breaking point.

In this light, movement to form the Contact Group, i.e. a framework for more systematic diplomatic coordination among Russia, the United States, France, Britain and Germany, began almost immediately after the Russian success at Sarajevo,⁴⁴ although the decisive impulse came after the Serbian humiliation of Russia during the bombardment of Gorazde in April 1994.⁴⁵ The Contact Group, formally established in late April 1994, was to give institutional expression to the conviction, shared among the five powers (later six, when Italy was included as focus shifted to Kosovo), that avoidance of mutual misunderstanding and the preservation of cooperative relations were superior to the specific issues involved in ex-Yugoslavia and the manner by which they might eventually be resolved.⁴⁶ Moreover, Russian inclusion in the group would tend to ensure that NATO states could not interpret how to implement UN mandates (as over Sarajevo in February 1994) without prior Russian agreement. As Vitalii Churkin, the Russian diplomat at the time responsible for handling Yugoslav diplomacy, put it in March 1994, 'We cannot accept a situation in which the right to interpret Security Council decisions is given to some other organisation [i.e. NATO]'.⁴⁷ Closer cooperation among the five just before and after the establishment of the Contact Group did in fact lead to a series of significant initiatives, including mediation leading to a cease-fire among Serbs and Croats in Krajina in March 1994, relief of Tuzla airport, also in March 1994,⁴⁸ and—after a bitter deception by the Bosnian Serbs over the shelling of Gorazde in April 1994—a determined Russian effort, coordinated now with the Western powers, to separate the Bosnian Serbs diplomatically from Serbia proper, and in the process isolate the Bosnian Serb party (and thereby appease domestic Russian political pressures). Russian observers immediately noticed a closer calibration of Russian and Western diplomacy. 'Moscow is no longer talking about the categorical impermissibility of air strikes and, moreover, now acknowledges their advisability when the civilian population is threatened', an *Izvestiya* journalist noted in late April 1994. 'Washington, for its part, has agreed that the primary orientation must be toward diplomatic methods of influencing the participants in the conflict ...'.⁴⁹ From April 1994 Foreign Minister Kozyrev would speak increasingly of 'negative sanctions' to inflict on the Bosnian

Serbs, including the raising of the arms embargo, in the event of non-compliance with the Contact Group's offer to divide Bosnia on a 51–49 basis.⁵⁰ In early July 1994 Kozyrev declared in Geneva that, 'if the Serbs do not agree to the borders on the new map, a lifting of the arms embargo against the Muslims will be inevitable'.⁵¹ It thus seemed that cooperation within the Contact Group would enable Russia to preserve relations with the West *and* cultivate a special relationship with Serbia, as Russia now pressed to lift the economic embargo on Serbia as the political counterpart to threatening greater sanctions on the Bosnian Serbs.⁵²

In mid-December 1994 Russian foreign ministry officials affirmed their understanding of the consensus view within the Contact Group 'that emphasise[s] political and diplomatic solutions to the Bosnian crisis'.⁵³ Such an approach seemed at the time likely to succeed, in that it could preserve superficially amicable relations not only between Russia and the West but also between Britain and France, on the one hand, and Germany and the United States, on the other. An excellent example is the symbolic bombing by NATO of a Serb airfield in Croatia in late November 1994, at the time of the escalation of fighting around Bihac: Russia did not formally protest, and NATO took care to see that no Serb combat planes were actually destroyed.⁵⁴ More robust NATO actions, such as those which came in late August–September 1995 with the bombing of Serb targets through Bosnia, would test the limits of Russian influence to breaking point.⁵⁵

That bombing campaign, and the US-led peace negotiations that followed it, 'laid bare the internal contradictions of the El'tsin administration's policy toward the conflict in the former Yugoslavia'.⁵⁶ Assertive NATO diplomacy, backed with military power, undermined the ability of El'tsin and Kozyrev to appease their domestic critics by adopting a profile on Bosnia that, while distinct from the West's, nevertheless always stopped short of outright confrontation with the NATO states. In practice, while official Russian rhetoric reached heights seldom achieved even during the Cold War—at one point El'tsin connected the NATO bombings to the issue of NATO extension and ignition of 'the flames of war in Europe'⁵⁷—Russia had been removed as an agent of international policy on Bosnia. Moreover, the El'tsin government simply could not outbid the nationalist forces of the opposition in the Duma, who would have liked nothing better than the rupture of relations with a West that it saw as responsible for the international humiliation of the Russian state. This El'tsin was not prepared to countenance. In consequence, the El'tsin government was compelled by circumstances tacitly to concede what should have been apparent all along: that Russia was no longer a great power in a region of declared Russian historical interest.

Up until the Serb conquest of Srebrenica and Zepa in mid-July 1995 Russia was able to present itself at home as the champion of the Serbs' rights in the Balkans and abroad as a responsible, if critical, negotiating partner. Indeed, at the 21 July session of the Contact Group, 'Russia again opposed making any threats against the Bosnian Serbs and insisted that only "political means" be used to solve the conflict'.⁵⁸ Within weeks, however, the stunning military successes of the Croatian army in Krajina, in conjunction with joint Croatian-Bosnian government operations in Bosnia itself, had, by expelling Serb military forces from Krajina and parts of western Bosnia, transformed the balance of power in the region. Russia was no longer needed as a

'privileged' interlocutor to deliver the Krajina Serbs, who were no longer a factor to be taken into account. Likewise, the Bosnian Serbs now had much more pressing military considerations to deal with than distant and implausible Russian entreaties. Croatian president Franjo Tudjman's rejection of El'tsin's invitation for a Moscow conference scheduled for 10 August with Russia, Serbia and Croatia underscored the dramatic loss of Russian prestige in the preceding weeks.

The commencement of the NATO bombing campaign on 30 August, following another Serb attack on a Sarajevo marketplace, saw Russia effectively marginalised as a diplomatic and military factor. Russia's protests against NATO's attacks were politely ignored as the bombing campaign continued. The Russian role, as Scott Parrish notes, 'was now restricted to criticising the United States and NATO from the sidelines'.⁵⁹ Since the end of the bombing campaign in mid-September 1995 Russian diplomacy on Bosnia has closely adhered to the efforts of the Contact Group, and in particular of the United States, to devise a framework for a ceasefire and eventual settlement in Bosnia that essentially reflect the military facts on the ground. In this sense, at least, Russian efforts have not been entirely in vain. Primakov had been following a similar pattern within the Contact Group in connection with the civil conflict in Kosovo until NATO began actual bombing of Serbia on 24 March 1999.⁶⁰

Case 3: calculations on NATO expansion

A meeting convened by Primakov as Prime Minister with the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy on 13 February 1999 (to discuss *domestic* politics) underscored the close links between this advisory group and Russian foreign policy considerations under Primakov.⁶¹ Headed by Sergei Karaganov, deputy director of the Institute of Europe and one of the most provocative of Gorbachev's 'new thinkers' in the late 1980s,⁶² the Council on Foreign and Defence Policy has played an important role in conceptualising the external policy of a Russian state that is seen as weak but in need of negotiating a fine line between establishing Russian primacy within the CIS area and maintaining good relations with the G-7 world.⁶³ This complex perspective is perhaps best reflected in the Council's views of Russian policy toward NATO expansion, the focus of Russia's Western policy in the mid-1990s.

As soon as the issue of NATO expansion was formally raised by the Polish leadership in a controversial summit meeting between Lech Walesa and Boris El'tsin in August 1993 the prospective inclusion of erstwhile East European satellites of the Soviet Union in NATO became intertwined with Russian domestic politics. In spite of the fact that most Russian foreign and security officials and analysts understood that NATO presented no threat to specific Russian security interests, a broad domestic consensus in Russia on the unacceptability of NATO expansion tended to preclude any substantive Russian negotiation with NATO on the terms of such expansion. NATO was thus to be both opposed and appeased: told time and again that expansion of the alliance was unacceptable, yet taking every precaution so that the political and diplomatic fallout from expansion—which was soon seen as inevitable—did not undermine Russia's necessary diplomatic, economic and even strategic cooperation with the Western world. The expansion of NATO threatens not so much Russia's material interests as Russia's fragile post-Soviet international

identity, according to which Russia remains a great power worthy of the mantle of the USSR or Imperial Russia. And because the question is primarily one of identity, it has been that much more intractable to discuss.

At the same time, a document published in July 1995 by the Russian Council on Foreign and Defence Policy well reflects the distinction between the analysis of NATO intentions made in the councils of the Kremlin and Moscow's policy on NATO expansion.⁶⁴ The analysis shares the broad Russian consensus against NATO extension but warns against 'a Soviet-style rhetoric of confrontation that will endanger Russia's national interests in all senses'. The authors, who included members of El'tsin's Presidential Council, interpreted the motives of NATO states in extending NATO membership to ex-Warsaw Pact states as based on a threefold desire to preserve the viability of NATO in a post-Soviet international setting, build the basis for a common (West) European defence and security policy, and keep the United States committed to Europe's security, thereby constraining the scope of future German strategic influence on the continent. In other words, they understood that NATO expansion was not directed against Russia. Moreover, these Russian analysts saw these concerns as quite legitimate ones for the NATO states.

What are Russia's interests *vis-à-vis* NATO, in this light? Russia, the authors stated, desires continued good relations with the West. Indeed, Russia's primary fear about the consequences of NATO expansion is that Russia will be strategically isolated from a Europe, East and West, that is committed to a course of comprehensive economic, political and strategic integration.⁶⁵ It is this concern about the unknown political and diplomatic effects of isolation, and not a belief that NATO constitutes any definite threat to Russia, that has driven Russian resistance to the inclusion of Poland, Hungary and others into the North Atlantic alliance. What Russia prefers, the authors declared, is a band of neutral, weakly armed states in East-Central Europe, an interest that is obviously incompatible with an increase in NATO membership eastward.

How should Russia protect its core foreign policy and security interests in the face of NATO's prospective extension? The Russian advisers argued that Russian leaders should in no way take NATO expansion for granted. In particular, they advised against any talk of Russia receiving compensation from the West in exchange for the adhesion of ex-Warsaw Pact states to the alliance. Russia, they noted, would receive such compensation anyway from a West that was desperately concerned not to alienate a Russia formally committed to market and democratic reforms. Russian leaders should thus distinguish between the specific problem of NATO expansion and the broader, more fundamental issue of Russia's overall relationship with the states of the North Atlantic alliance. Russia, in this view, should concentrate on developing an intense set of bilateral relationships that would form a distinct framework to protect Russia's interests even in the event of NATO expansion. Moreover, given the lack of consensus among key NATO states on the nature and timing of NATO expansion, Russia might be able to exert considerable influence through its respective bilateral ties. Russia, unlike the USSR, is able to cooperate with ruling elites in a number of key NATO states.

In the end, the Russian government, with Primakov as Foreign Minister, acquiesced in the inevitability of NATO expansion. In exchange, Russia and NATO worked out

a parallel relationship involving a permanent joint Russia-NATO Council that for the first time allows Russia a voice in the internal deliberations of NATO. Very quickly thereafter the question of NATO expansion was largely defused in the domestic politics of Russian foreign policy, while Russia continued to cooperate with NATO and NATO states on a range of issues, including Russian peacekeeping troops under NATO command in Bosnia.⁶⁶

Case 4: NATO's war against Serbia, March–June 1999

NATO's war against Serbia in the spring of 1999 provoked the loudest, most intemperate and sustained Russian protests against the West since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Terms such as 'aggression', 'barbaric', 'diktat', 'undisguised genocide', 'criminal', 'Natocolonialism' etc. were regularly employed by Foreign Minister Ivanov in his prepared remarks at press conferences, while comparisons were often made with the destruction rained on Yugoslavia in World War II, evoking strong emotions of pro-Serb (and anti-NATO) sympathy in Russian society.⁶⁷ While Russian officials took pains always to refer to Yugoslav 'President' Milosevic, Russian President El'tsin spoke rudely of just 'Clinton' twice in his first televised address to the Russian people on the war.⁶⁸ The Russian government broke off its participation in the joint Russia-NATO Council, while, perhaps for the first time, broad elements in Russian society became deeply affected by a foreign policy issue, evidently seeing Russia's own past (and future?) in the plight of a Belgrade once again, as in 1941, under aerial bombardment.⁶⁹

In fact, NATO's Balkan war *was* a traumatic event for the Russian government in ways that previous Western actions in Bosnia were not, if only because of the timing of the war, just weeks after the admission of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic into the North Atlantic alliance. Russian policy elites appeared to understand at once (in the manner of US elites after the invasion of South Korea in June 1950) that NATO's war in Serbia had a much broader significance than the future of Kosovo: this was to be the first case study of the world after NATO expansion, in which NATO states, led by the United States, determined, without reference to the UN Security Council (where the Russians have a veto) or even to the letter of NATO's charter (concerning the nature of NATO actions—defensive, and the area of NATO operations—confined to existing NATO states), when, where and how force might be employed to affect political behaviour, perhaps extending to the border regions of Russia itself.⁷⁰ Given that NATO would give no undertaking as to when the alliance might cease admitting new members or who might be ineligible (e.g. the Baltic states or Ukraine), NATO's decision for war exposed the legal fiction of the Russia-NATO treaty: Russia's relationship with NATO was of symbolic, not substantive, significance. NATO's war thus underscored in undeniable ways the weakness of Russian power and the extent to which Russia's influence depends upon fissures in its external political environment. This was clearly too much for many Russian politicians to bear.

Yet, in the final analysis, the pattern that we have described in this article—one in which Russia seeks to balance its great power pretensions while preserving its lines to the West—prevailed. From the very outset of the war, Russian officials dis-

tinguished their attitude toward NATO's war and NATO itself from their interests with respect to the states constituting NATO. While Russia withdrew from the NATO-Russia Council, it stayed part of the Contact Group, continued contacts with the G-7 and stressed its ongoing bilateral interests in good relations with NATO states, including the United States. Russian histrionics notwithstanding, and despite symbolic gestures such as sending a Russian intelligence ship into the Adriatic Sea, the Russian government made it clear that it would not be drawn militarily into the NATO-Serbian war. After weeks of attempted mediation between Milosevic and NATO, Russia, faced with the choice of Milosevic or NATO (or simple withdrawal from the fray), accepted the role of postman for the North Atlantic alliance, with Russian special envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin in effect helping to deliver NATO's terms to Milosevic in early June 1999.⁷¹ Russian domestic observers were not deceived; most, and most importantly the Russian military leadership, saw Chernomyrdin's role for what it was: an attempt to disguise Russia's isolation and impotence (and abandonment of Milosevic) by being present at the armistice.⁷² Once again, when pressed to the choice, the Russian government chose to tend its bridges to the West rather than make its Western policy hostage to the particulars of disagreements over the Balkans.

At the same time, something changed with NATO's war against Serbia. The fact of the war and of the way in which it was presented in Russia has had the effect of crystallising a progressively stronger scepticism toward the West that had been building in Russian society. Through its efforts to shape the specific contours of the Russian political economy, the United States had already, before the war, helped to make it 'virtually impossible to conceive of a pro-reform Russian nationalist'.⁷³ The domestic backlash in Russia against what are seen as US-inspired 'reform' programmes, which has made untenable an explicitly pro-American platform in Russian politics (by contrast to the early 1990s), has been compounded by Russia's increasing international isolation. The Russian decision to hurriedly send 200 troops to Pristina airport in Kosovo in June 1999—made by the General Staff leadership without the involvement of either the Defence or Foreign Ministers⁷⁴—reflects a general Russian sentiment that Russia still counts for something in world affairs.⁷⁵ Russia is very different from the rest of Eastern Europe in this respect. As the Romanian political scientist Silviu Brucan has observed, '... while the mechanisms of the world economic system compel the [smaller] East European nations to play by the rules of the world market, the referee being the IMF, the dynamics of power politics generate in a great power like Russia the will to resist, and gradually oppose, the tendency of the Western powers to assert their supremacy'.⁷⁶ If, according to this feeling, Russia is not included by the West, Russia can still create facts on the ground to compel Western attention. The general shift in Russian politics away from pro-Western positions that is part of Russia's experience with Western-aided economic 'reform' has rendered such interventions non-controversial among Russian elites. The burden of proof in Russian politics is now squarely on those arguing that the West, including the United States, should be given the benefit of the doubt. The Russian-Western, and especially the Russian-American, relationship has thus lost almost all of the sentimental glue that bound the two countries together in a common anti-communist, pro-reform consensus in the early 1990s.

This is not to say that Russia, in the aftermath of NATO's war in Serbia, is committed to a confrontation with the West. Far from it: this is neither within Russia's power nor within the imagination of the pragmatic nationalist consensus that prevails in Moscow. As Kubicek has noted, 'the mainstream Russian foreign policy of the pragmatic nationalists envisions a realistic partnership with the West and is not overtly anti-Western'.⁷⁷ Thus, after the melodramatic dash of the Russian paratroopers to Pristina—many more Russian troops were blocked by aggressive US diplomacy to close East European airspace to Russian transports⁷⁸—Russian peacekeepers assumed the roles that NATO had assigned to them, without their own sector and reporting to a NATO commander. Rather, the cost of NATO's war will be calculated in terms of the greater difficulty of obtaining Russian cooperation in areas such as the collaborative managing of Russia's nuclear archipelago, civilian as well as military, that are as much in the Western as in the Russian interest but which have been and may continue to be held political hostage in the Russian Duma (as in the case of the START II treaty).

The consistency of Russian diplomacy

The cases examined in this article illustrate in particular what has become a general and consistent pattern in post-Soviet Russian foreign policy. Having come to power amidst an apparently decisive break with the past, the external policy of the new Russian state reflected the ambitious and ideologically influenced assumption that Russia's interests abroad corresponded to its effort to construct a liberal democratic order at home, and, related to this, that Russia's external interests could be subsumed within its liberal aspirations to become integrated as broadly and as rapidly as possible in the G-7 community of states. Very soon, however, it became clear that those aspirations were wildly exaggerated and that Russia would to a large extent be left to its own devices in facing the range of foreign policy issues that confronted it in the aftermath of Soviet collapse. In response, Russian foreign policy adopted a much less ideological stance,⁷⁹ one predicated upon a more nationalist and unilateralist tone, while being careful not to take steps that could jeopardise its ties with the wealthy and powerful G-7 states on whose cooperation Russia continued to depend. (Early Soviet Russia of course went through a comparable stage of breaking with the past, frustration of early ideological expectations of integration with the advanced West—on Soviet terms—and the corresponding need to adapt to the more traditional practices of diplomacy and the international political system in general. At the same time, the Soviet Union did not relinquish its revolutionary option or institutions abroad and by the mid-1920s was able to obtain recognition from most European states without dismantling its revolutionary mission.⁸⁰) A very weak Russian state (as in the 1920s) has been able to have its cake and even to eat some of it at the same time.

Why then was Kozyrev sacked in favour of Primakov? Already before 1993 was out, Kozyrev was becoming a growing liability for President El'tsin in terms of the domestic politics of Russian foreign policy. In many respects a political anomaly in El'tsin's cabinet after 1992, Kozyrev was identified by the communist-nationalist majority established in the parliament by the December 1993 elections (and increased

by the December 1995 elections) with the liberal government of Egor Gaidar that had been forced to resign in December 1992 in favour of the senior energy official Viktor Chernomyrdin. Much of this criticism was about tone, since Kozyrev had in fact quickly tacked to the more nationalist wind that picked up steam as Russians of all political stripes began to awaken to the many unexpected foreign policy consequences of Soviet disintegration, especially the difficulties of organising relations with Russia's newly independent neighbours in the 'near abroad'.⁸¹ Still, Kozyrev's evident unpopularity within the Russian political class (there is not much evidence that the population at large was at all interested in the foreign policy issues under contention⁸²) meant that El'tsin had to weigh the cost of that unpopularity against the credibility that Kozyrev as foreign minister lent El'tsin in dealings with Western leaders and lenders. Kozyrev, who had no real political base apart from his relationship to El'tsin, proved unable to quiet the domestic controversies surrounding Balkan diplomacy and especially NATO expansion.⁸³ By early 1996, following a crushing defeat for the government in the December 1995 parliamentary elections, and in anticipation of the presidential election in the coming summer, El'tsin agreed to remove Kozyrev in favour of Primakov.

A close reading of Russian foreign policy indicates that the decision was not taken because of a re-evaluation of the main lines of Russian diplomacy. In all central respects Primakov continued Kozyrev's balancing act. Moreover, the more senior Primakov had for many years before the Soviet break-up been associated with a school of foreign policy analysts arguing for a more deideologised, pragmatic foreign policy, one that proved compatible with Gorbachev's foreign policy philosophy (if not all of its fruits, such as the unification of Germany within NATO).⁸⁴ The Russian political scientist Aleksei Bogaturov has observed in this respect that in the course of the 1970s and early 1980s there appeared inside the Soviet communist elite 'a kind of "revisionist" or "proto-liberal" core' consisting of key foreign policy think tank directors Georgii Arbatov (Institute of USA and Canada), Nikolai Inozemtsev (Institute of World Economy and International Relations), as well as Primakov (Institute of Oriental Studies).⁸⁵ Moreover, there is much evidence to suggest that since at least late 1993 Primakov was already exerting considerable influence on Russian diplomacy through his direct channel to President El'tsin as Director of the Federal Intelligence Service.⁸⁶ What Primakov brought to the Foreign Ministry was a different tone, one that focused explicitly on Russia's state interests as distinct from those flowing from its nominal liberal democratic aspirations. This more pragmatic, state-centric discourse did a great deal to insulate the foreign ministry from criticism from the communist-nationalist majority in the parliament as well as the many nostalgic for Soviet Russia's superpower status throughout the government. Primakov also proved an able administrator and, just as he had preserved a degree of cohesion within the Federal Intelligence Service amidst the general chaos of the Russian government, so was able to establish a team of trusted subordinates and insulate the formulation of Russian foreign policy from most of the more extreme challenges that had emanated from the institutions of an imperfectly 'democratising' state.⁸⁷

In all of the areas mentioned above Primakov maintained the post-1993 Kozyrev line in Russian foreign and security policy. Russian troops continued to define the parameters of Georgian sovereignty in Georgia's conflict with its Abkhaz minority;

Russian arms transfers bolstered Armenia's position in its war against Azerbaijan while underscoring its dependence on Russia; a Russian division continued to monitor civil conflict in Tajikistan as well as patrol the old external Soviet border there with Afghanistan; in the Balkans, even after the onset of NATO's war in Serbia, Russia continued to work collaboratively within the Contact Group, balancing its privileged relationship with Serbia against its partnership with France, Britain, Germany and the United States; while concerning NATO, Primakov secured for Russia membership in a joint NATO-Russia council, in the process defusing for the time being the issue of NATO expansion in Russian politics. Elsewhere, Primakov propelled Russian nuclear energy contracts with Iran (again, a process that had begun under Kozyrev, though at the initiative of the Ministry of Atomic Energy) while on Iraq Primakov's policy has been to accelerate the lifting of the UN embargo, much to the anxiety of the United States. Yet even on this last issue strong points of continuity between Kozyrev's and Primakov's diplomacy are present: just as, under Kozyrev, Russia worked with a sympathetic Britain and France in opposing the US on lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia in mid-1993,⁸⁸ so was Russia under Primakov careful to align itself with significant allies when opposing the United States.⁸⁹ France in particular has provided useful cover and leverage for Russia on policy toward Iraq. Perhaps most important of all, Russia continues to respect the independence and territorial integrity of Ukraine;⁹⁰ it was in fact under Primakov—in the face of widespread scepticism by the parliamentary critics who never accepted Kozyrev—that the key bilateral Russian-Ukrainian treaty was signed in late May 1997, providing for post-Soviet Russia's recognition of the inviolability of Ukraine's borders.⁹¹ (That the Russian decision to sign the treaty was motivated in part by a calculation that such assurances could dissuade Ukraine from an undesirable rapprochement with NATO illustrates a subtlety to Primakov's diplomacy that is often overlooked.)⁹²

Conclusions

The widely held thesis of a fundamental break between Russian foreign policy under Kozyrev and that under Primakov, as well as the notion of an anti-Western turn in Russian diplomacy since 1993, is thus untenable. There *was* a decided shift in Russian policy in the course of 1993, away from the premises of liberal internationalism toward a more realist, and frankly, more realistic, assessment of Russian interests and capabilities. This shift occurred early in the Kozyrev administration and, while it was certainly not Kozyrev's preference, the Foreign Minister helped Russian policy adapt to the frustration of its more utopian initial expectations about integration into the broader liberal world without jeopardising Russia's links with that same world. 'Liberal' Russia discovered very early, as had the ill fated Provisional Government of 1917 and the Bolsheviks by 1921, that the structure of the international political system tended to undermine the transformative claims of ideology, whether it be liberal or communist. A Russia that would not (could not?) be integrated into a wealthier, more powerful international community was a Russia that would (as in the 1920s) be forced to rely mainly on its own resources, such as they were, in crafting its external policy and relationships. It fell first to Kozyrev and then to Primakov to make the adaptations required to reconcile post-Soviet Russia to a subordinate

position in the international system in a domestic setting wherein most Russian elites persisted in assuming Russia's great power status.⁹³ Under both foreign policy administrations Russian diplomacy avoided the twin traps of outright defiance and abject dependency: a state with far fewer power resources than it desired nevertheless managed to assert its interests in primacy within the CIS, diplomatic peerage (within limits, to be sure) with NATO in the Balkans, rejection (in the end unsuccessful) of NATO expansion, as well as defiance of US policy in Iraq and Iran without undermining its multiple ties with the immensely more powerful Western world.

How was Russia able to accomplish this feat in light of the collapse of basic indicators of national power, such as the industrial economy, the armed forces, the fiscal base of the state, not to mention the loss of Russia's historical imperial territories that have underwritten its great power status?⁹⁴ Influence, of course, is a relational concept, and as such Russia's prospects for exercising external influence hinge upon developments in other states. Three points bear noting in this respect.

First, within the CIS, especially in the broad southern periphery stretching from Moldova to Tajikistan, Russia's ex-Soviet neighbours face challenges at least as daunting as those besetting Russia itself. Poor and fragile states riven by civil or international wars remain vulnerable to Russian power, as much as that power has fallen in absolute terms. Ironically, only within the Russian Federation itself—in Chechnya—has Russian power exceeded its grasp; in Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Tajikistan Russian intervention in ongoing conflicts has confirmed Russia's status as *Ordnungsmacht* within the southern CIS.⁹⁵

Second, the capacity to exercise influence depends not only on how one's power resources compare with others' but on the intensity of the stake that given powers claim in a given conflict.⁹⁶ As the US and Western non-reaction to Russian military intervention in the Moldovan civil conflict in trans-Dniestr demonstrates, superior capacity to apply power must be qualified by the political will to use that power in a particular situation. By the end of 1993 it had become clear to Russian leaders that, in the southern CIS at least, neither the United States nor any of its NATO powers were prepared either to intervene to challenge Russia's claim to be the regional policeman or to inflict an economic or diplomatic price on Russia for such interventions as it deemed in its interests. (By contrast, where the United States and key West European states have made clear that unilateral and interventionist conduct by Russia would jeopardise its relations with the G-7 world—as over the Baltic states—Russian conduct has been much more solicitous of the sovereignty of the states concerned.) Western inaction had the additional effect of removing the negative sanction from the argument of Russian liberals that the G-7 states would not tolerate unilateral Russian interventions in neighbouring states, thereby helping to discredit the liberal democratic argument in Russian policy circles. Relatedly, Russia's margin for manoeuvre has depended on the capacity of Western states to allow the El'tsin government considerable slack on the argument that too much pressure from the West might undermine El'tsin at home and with him a policy that Western governments recognised was quite compatible with core Western interests.⁹⁷ The collapse of the material infrastructure of Russian power is thus but one, if an extreme, consequence of the end of the cold war and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The nature of the Western stake in international order has also been transformed. Consequently, just

as the scope of actual Western influence is much more restricted than one might deduce from a projection of the indices of the superiority of Western power, so the scope of Russian influence is often greater than one might deduce from a simple projection of the indices of the inferiority of Russian power.⁹⁸

Third, one cannot overlook both the professionalism with which Russian diplomacy has been conducted on key issues under both Kozyrev and Primakov and the extent to which Primakov especially was able to insulate the foreign policy-making process from the broader turbulences of Russian politics.⁹⁹ Primakov proved more successful than Kozyrev in containing the isolationist and xenophobic voices that became more prominent with the pluralisation of Russian politics. The impact of talented diplomats such as Churkin on Balkan and NATO issues, as well as of Primakov himself and the team of loyal professionals serving under him at the Foreign Ministry, has to be taken into account in assessing the ability of an otherwise unsteady Russian state to negotiate multiple and potentially conflicting objectives in several spheres of external policy.¹⁰⁰ In particular, Russia has been careful to choose when to act alone and when to oppose the United States in collaboration with others, especially US allies like France. Two mutually reinforcing factors are thus at work here: the analytical and diplomatic professionalism of much of the Russian foreign policy community, i.e. the Foreign Ministry and the several research institutes, as well as the administrative, political and diplomatic skills of Primakov himself (as evidenced by his appointment as Prime Minister in September 1998). In many respects, the conversion of Russian foreign policy elites to what we might call a tempered realist outlook was well under way even before the advent of Gorbachev, especially among the younger generations. Since then, the professional foreign policy community in Russia has shed Soviet habits and premises to a far greater extent than has been the case among Russian political-economic elites more generally. Primakov too emerged from this alternative Soviet-era voice. Yet his major contribution to Russian statecraft was to insulate the foreign policy process from the often wild gyrations of the larger Russian political scene, an accomplishment that has been maintained under his successor as Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov.

In sum, Russian influence has proved greatest where the Western stake is least intense and weakest where the Western stake is the most intense.¹⁰¹ Where most successful, Russia has nevertheless not been able to exclude the West from projecting its interests (e.g. Western assertion of energy interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia);¹⁰² where least successful, Russia has nevertheless managed, as we have seen, to elicit from the West commitments to institutionalised consultation (e.g. in the Balkans and in relations with NATO); these commitments, in turn, have provided significant external incentives for Russian policy to remain broadly within a framework of diplomatic engagement with states whose specific interests did not always coincide with those of the Russian government.¹⁰³

This is not to gainsay the very real limits on Russia's external influence, whatever the political colour of Russia's government. Russia will lack most of the trappings of significant international power for the foreseeable future. It is a large power rather than a great power. Even the question of how to deal with Russia's nuclear weapons—how to insulate them from domestic instability and disorder—now flows from the debility rather than from the strength of the Russian state. Moreover, the

relative indifference with which the Western world has observed Russia's attempts to come to grips with disorder along its southern periphery has arguably contributed to an overextension of Russian power that, as the wars in Chechnya suggest, is sapping what remains of Russia's capacity to shape its external as well as internal environment. Finally, it is far from clear that the relatively balanced foreign policy that has been conducted under Kozyrev and Primakov has deep institutional roots within the Russian political and administrative order. Much evidently depended upon Primakov's capacity to manage the diplomatic process and insulate it from the vicissitudes that emanated daily from the Russian political scene, not least the often erratic interventions of the Russian president himself.¹⁰⁴ Indeed, it is unlikely that a more 'representative' foreign policy would be able to maintain the delicate balances amongst unilateralism, partnership and Russia's severely limited resources that has to date been the case.¹⁰⁵ One is left to wonder how comparable the current situation may be to that in Imperial Germany in the late Bismarck period, when Bismarck's virtuoso management of an overly complex and restrained policy masked the fact that his balanced policy had few roots in the German system beyond his own presence.¹⁰⁶ That Russian diplomacy has been more effective, coherent and balanced than is often assumed is not to say that this Russian foreign policy has been effectively institutionalised. It is therefore an open question how much longer the relative coherence of the external policy of a very fragile state can be maintained. In this sense, the early Putin years should provide another test of the hypothesis that it has been internal political factors rather than the very narrow external margin of Russian manoeuvre that account for the main contours of Russian foreign policy.

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¹ Ted Hopf (ed.), *Understandings of Russian Foreign Policy* (University Park, Penn State University Press, 1999).

² Russia's 1998 external debt amounted to approximately \$140 billion, with more than \$18 billion due in interest and principal; by contrast, the sum total of the Russian federal budget amounted to about \$25 billion (with \$10 billion—or just 55% of the total due—formally allocated to debt servicing; for the rest, Russia must have debt relief from G-7 country creditors, public and private, or face default). For the year 2000, external debt amounts to \$155 billion as against a Russian federal budget of \$33 billion. Iurii Proshin, 'Russia's Foreign Debts Will Be Paid', *International Affairs* (Moscow), 45, 1, 1999, pp. 7–12; *The New York Times*, 9 January 2000, p. 8.

³ On the importance of relations with the West in securing Russia's interests see President El'tsin's 4 July 1999 message to President Clinton in the immediate aftermath of NATO's war in Serbia, as summarised in *S. Sh. A. i Kanada*, 1999, 10, p. 126, and the sober and constructive official discussion of cooperation with NATO before the war in Serbia by contrast to Russian histrionics during the war itself (although here too Russian officials took pains to distinguish their views toward NATO from those toward the separate states constituting NATO, as well as the Contact Group that included five NATO states as well as Russia): compare *Diplomatscheskii vestnik*, 1999, 1, pp. 15–16, 21–22, 98 with 1999, 4, pp. 9–46; 'Balkanskiy krizis i Rossiisko-Amerikanskie otnosheniya (situatsionnyi analiz)', *S. Sh. A. i Kanada*, 1999, 10, pp. 41–54; and A.M. Salmin, 'Rossiya, Evropa i novyi mirovoi poryadok', *Polis*, 1999, 2, pp. 26–30.

⁴ James Richter, 'Russian Foreign Policy and the Politics of National Identity', in Celeste Wallander (ed.), *The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy After the Cold War* (Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1996), pp. 69–73.

⁵ Edward Mansfield & Jack Snyder, 'Democratization and War', *International Security*, 20, 1, Summer 1995, pp. 5–38.

⁶ Moshe Lewin, 'La Russie en mal d'Etat', *Le Monde Diplomatique*, November 1998, pp. 1, 18–19;

Cynthia Roberts & Thomas Sherlock, 'Bringing the Russian State Back In: Explanations of the Derailed Transition to Market Democracy' (Review Article), *Comparative Politics*, 31, 4, July 1999, pp. 477–498.

⁷ F. Stephen Larrabee & Theodore W. Karasik, *Foreign and Security Policy Decisionmaking Under Yeltsin* (Santa Monica, RAND, 1997); Claudia Schmedt, *Russische Aussenpolitik unter Jelzin. Internationale und innerstaatliche Einflussfaktoren aussenpolitischen Wandels* (Frankfurt am Main, Peter Lang, 1997), pp. 51–139; Scott Parrish, 'Chaos in Foreign-Policy Decision-Making', *Transition* (Prague), 17 May 1996, p. 30; and Suzanne Crow, *The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia under Yeltsin* (Munich, RFE/RL Research Institute, 1993).

⁸ Mette Skak, *From Empire to Anarchy. Postcommunist Foreign Policy and International Relations* (London, Hurst & Co., 1996), pp. 137–191; Leon Aron, 'The Foreign Policy Doctrine of Postcommunist Russia and its Domestic Context', in Michael Mandelbaum (ed.), *The New Russian Foreign Policy* (New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), pp. 23–63; and Jeffrey Checkel, 'Structure, Institutions, and Process: Russia's Changing Foreign Policy', in Aadeed Dawisha & Karen Dawisha (eds), *The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia* (Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 1995), pp. 49–56.

⁹ Michael McFaul, 'A Precarious Peace: Domestic Politics in the Making of Russian Foreign Policy', *International Security*, 22, 3, Winter 1997, pp. 5–36 and Michael McFaul, 'Russia's Many Foreign Policies', *Demokratizatsiya*, 7, 4, Summer 1999, pp. 393–412.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Checkel, pp. 42–65. For Russian views in substantial agreement see Sergei Rogov, 'Rossiya i Zapad', *S. Sh. A.*, 1995, 3, pp. 3–14 and Sergei Karaganov, 'Rudderless and Without Sails', *Moscow News*, 25 December 1994–1 January 1995, p. 7. Rogov is the director of the Institute for USA and Canada Studies, Karaganov deputy director of the Institute of Europe and also chairman of the politically influential Council on Foreign and Defence Policy.

¹² Andrei Kozyrev, 'Russia and Human Rights', *Slavic Review*, 51, 2, Summer 1992, pp. 287–293; see also Kozyrev's liberal-internationalist speech before the United Nations General Assembly in September 1992, 'Vystuplenie ministra inostrannykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsii A.V. Kozyreva na 47-i sessii General'noi Assamblei OON', *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1992, 19–20, pp. 18–20.

¹³ For a documented analysis see David Kerr, 'The New Eurasianism: The Rise of Geopolitics in Russia's Foreign Policy', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 47, 6, September 1995, pp. 977–988; for a discussion of extremist Russian views see Aleksandr Yanov, *Posle El'tsina* (Moscow, KRUK, 1995), pp. 26–111; for one such work see Aleksandr Dugin, *Osnovy Geopolitiki. Geopoliticheskoe budushchee Rossii* (Moscow, Arktogetya, 1997). For a more balanced Russian analysis see V.L. Tsymbursky, 'Geopolitika kak mirovidenie i rod zanyatii', *Polis*, 1999, 4, pp. 7–28.

¹⁴ The case under discussion concerned union with Belarus, which Russian liberals such as Chubais opposed because of the economic costs and the feared drag on Russia's liberal prospects in general. Sherman W. Garnett, 'Europe's Crossroads: Russia and the West in the New Borderlands', in Mandelbaum (ed.), p. 75. See also the report submitted by Primakov's Federal Intelligence Service as published in *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 21 September 1994.

¹⁵ Neil Malcom, Alex Pravda, Roy Allison & Margot Light, *Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 289–290.

¹⁶ For excerpts of Kozyrev's astounding speech, in which he affected the stance of a Zhirinovskiy-like rabid nationalist, see *The New York Times*, 15 December 1992, p. A 16. One indication of the domestic political damage that Kozyrev inflicted on himself with the speech, akin to Khrushchev's banging the shoe at the General Assembly in 1960, is seen in the fact that the Foreign Ministry did not include this speech in its official documentary collection on Russian foreign policy between 1990 and 1992. His previous speeches at CSCE meetings were published. See Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiiskoi Federatsii, *Vneshnyaya politika Rossii. Sbornik dokumentov 1990–1992* (Moscow, Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya, 1996). For earlier CSCE speeches by Kozyrev, see pp. 197–199, 326–328.

¹⁷ For analysis and a wealth of primary sources see Rajan Menon, 'After Empire: Russia and the Southern "Near Abroad"', in Mandelbaum (ed.), pp. 100–166; in addition see Jean Radvanyi, 'Transports et strategie au sud de la Russie', *Le Monde Diplomatique*, June 1998, pp. 18–19.

¹⁸ Allen Lynch, 'Der Einfluss des Militärs auf die Aussenpolitik Russlands', *Europa Archiv*, 49, 15, 10 August 1994, pp. 437–446.

¹⁹ Malcolm *et al.*, pp. 81, 136.

²⁰ Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report. Russian National Affairs*, FBIS-SOV-95-037, 24 February 1995, p. 25.

²¹ For a detailed analysis of this general point as applied to the Russian-Chechen war see Gail W. Lapidus, 'Contested Sovereignty: The Tragedy of Chechnya', *International Security*, 23, 1, Summer 1998, esp. pp. 7–8, 28–41.

²² The English-language text of the 'Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation' may be found at www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/fndact-a.htm.

²³ Andrei Kozyrev, 'The New Russia and the Atlantic Alliance', *NATO Review*, February 1993, pp. 3–6; Suzanne Crow, 'Russia Asserts its Strategic Agenda', *RFE-RL Research Report*, 2, 50, 17 December 1993, pp. 1–8.

²⁴ McFaul, 'Russia's Many Foreign Policies'.

²⁵ John Lloyd, 'The Logic of Vladimir Putin', *The New York Times Magazine*, 19 March 2000, p. 65.

²⁶ McFaul, 'Russia's Many Foreign Policies', p. 397.

²⁷ For Russian experts' views on Kozyrev and Primakov see 'Balkanskii krizis i rossiisko-amerikanskisye otnosheniya', pp. 45, 49, 51.

²⁸ For background on the Moldovan civil war see *Final Report on the Conflict in the Left Bank Dniestr Areas of the Republic of Moldova by the Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office of the CSCE Council Adam Daniel Rotfeld (Poland) Director of SIPRI (Prague, 31 January 1993)* as well as Adam Daniel Rotfeld, 'In Search of a Political Settlement. The Case of the Conflict in Moldova', in *The Challenge of Preventive Diplomacy. The Experience of the CSCE (Stockholm, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1994)*, pp. 100–137, and Schmedt, *Russische Aussenpolitik unter Jelzin*, pp. 122–127.

²⁹ Malcolm *et al.*, p. 148.

³⁰ Fiona Hill & P. Jewett, '*Back in the USSR*'. *Russian Intervention in the Internal Affairs of the Former Soviet Republics and the Implications for United States Policy Toward Russia* (Cambridge, JFK School of Government, January 1994), p. 61.

³¹ Vladimir Socor, 'Russia's Fourteenth Army and Insurgency in Eastern Moldova', *RFE-RL Research Report* 1, 36, 11 September 1992, pp. 41–48.

³² Pavel Anokhin, 'Istochnik voyny v Pridnestrov' e no iskat' v Moskve', *Moskovskii Komsomolets*, 5 April 1994, p. 2.

³³ Stuart J. Kaufman, 'Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses and Moscow in Moldova's Civil War', *International Security*, 21, 2, Fall 1996, pp. 108–139.

³⁴ Hans-Henning Schroder, *Eine Armee in der Krise, Die russischen Streitkräfte 1992–93: Risikofaktor oder Garant politischer Stabilität?* (Cologne, Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ost-wissenschaftliche und internationaler Studien, 45, 1993).

³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 35–36.

³⁶ Andrei Kozyrev, 'Partiya voyny nastupaet: i v Moldove, i v Gruzii, i v Rossii', *Izvestiya*, 30 June 1992. See also Kozyrev's joint declaration with the Moldovan foreign minister as well as a CIS communiqué on Moldova from that period in *Vneshnyaya politika Rossii. Sbornik Dokumentov, 1990–1992*, pp. 323–325, 414.

³⁷ Andranik Migranyan, 'Rossiya i Blizhnee Zarubezh' e', *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 18 January 1994, pp. 4–5, 8.

³⁸ Malcolm *et al.*, p. 300.

³⁹ For background see Schmedt, *Russische Aussenpolitik unter Jelzin*, pp. 84–93, and Paul Kubicek, 'Russian Foreign Policy and the West', *Political Science Quarterly*, 114, 4, Winter 1999–2000, pp. 550–554.

⁴⁰ For an official Russian analysis see Oleg Levitin, 'Konflikt na Balkanakh: Diplomaticeskisye Aspekty', in *God Planety 1995 (Moscow, Respublika, 1995)*, pp. 399–403.

⁴¹ For a supporting Russian analysis see Gennadii Sysoev, 'Uroki bombovykh udarov', *Novoe vremya*, 1994, 16, pp. 26–27.

⁴² Therese Raphael, Claudia Rosett & Suzanne Crow, 'An Interview with Andrei Kozyrev', *Draft Research Paper*, RFE/RL Research Institute, 5 July 1994, pp. 1–2.

⁴³ For Russian experts' differing views on the nature of Russian interests in the Balkans and in particular with respect to Kosovo see 'Balkanskii krizis i rossiisko-amerikanskisye otnosheniya', pp. 42–43.

⁴⁴ In late February 1994 President El'tsin called for a summit meeting among the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany and Russia to discuss the management of the Yugoslav crisis. Initially greeted with considerable reserve by the Western powers, by April El'tsin's idea would be institutionalised in the form of the standing Contact Group. Tanjug (Belgrade), in English, 24 February 1994, as reprinted in 'Reactions to Yeltsin's Proposals Viewed', *FBIS-EEU-94-038*, 25 February 1994, p. 58.

⁴⁵ *Izvestiya*, 30 April 1994, p. 3. Russian mediator Vitalii Churkin said at the time: 'The Bosnian Serbs must understand that in Russia they are dealing with a great power, not a banana republic. Russia must decide whether a group of extremists can be allowed to use a great country's policy to achieve its own aims. Our unequivocal answer is: "never". If the Bosnian Serbs fire so much as one more volley at Gorazde, a tremendous crisis will erupt that will plunge the Serbian people into disaster'. *Izvestiya*,

20 April 1994, p. 1, as translated in *The Current Digest of the post-Soviet Press*, XLVI, 16, 1994, p. 1.

⁴⁶ Igor Ivanov, the current Russian Foreign Minister, previously Primakov's deputy and long involved in Russia's Balkan diplomacy, has stated in this respect: 'Our goal is to prevent differences in approach to specific problems from degenerating into a general confrontation because, in the final analysis, that would go against our own interests ...'. Igor Ivanov, 'La Russie et l'Asie-Pacifique', *Politique Etrangere*, 1999, 2, p. 310.

⁴⁷ Interview with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vitalii Churkin, *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 16 March 1994, p. 14, as translated in *The Current Digest of the post-Soviet Press*, XLVI, 10, 1994, pp. 29–30.

⁴⁸ For a convincing Russian analysis that stresses both Western military pressure and Russian diplomatic flexibility as essential in moving the Belgrade and Bosnian Serbs in opening Tuzla airport, see *Izvestiya*, 3 March 1994, p. 2, as translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report. Central Eurasia*, FBIS-SOV-94-042, 3 March 1994, pp. 11–12.

⁴⁹ *Izvestiya*, 30 April 1994, p. 3, as translated in *The Current Digest of the post-Soviet Press*, XLVI, 17, 1994, p. 22.

⁵⁰ See Patrick Moore, 'Bosnian Partition Plan Rejected', *RFE/RL Research Report*, 3, 33, 26 August 1994, pp. 1–5.

⁵¹ As cited in *Pravda*, 7 July 1994, p. 3, translated in *The Current Digest of the post-Soviet Press*, XLVI, 27, 1994, p. 21. See also *Segodnya* 29 July 1994, p. 1.

⁵² *Politika* (Belgrade), 5 January 1995, p. 1, as translated in 'FRY, Russia Exchange Most-Favored Nation Status', *FBIS-EEU-95-007*, p. 42; Tanjug (Belgrade), in English, 14 September 1994, as reprinted in 'FRY, Russia sign contracts worth \$1.8 billion', *FBIS-EEU-94-180*, 16 September 1994, p. 40; Michael Mihalka & Stan Markotich, 'Kozyrev: UN and Contact Group ha[ve] Failed to Meet Commitments to Belgrade', *Open Media Research Institute Daily Digest* (Prague), pt. I, no. 43, 1 March 1995, p. 3.

⁵³ *Segodnya*, 16 December 1994, p. 3, as translated in 'Russian foreign ministry condemns drawing of Croatia into Bosnian conflict', *The Current Digest of the post-Soviet Press*, XLVI, 50, 1994, p. 27.

⁵⁴ *Segodnya*, 22 November 1994, p. 1, as translated in 'NATO Hits Serb Base; Reactions in Moscow Vary', *The Current Digest of the post-Soviet Press*, XLVI, 47, 1994, p. 6.

⁵⁵ For a selection of translated Russian documents and commentary on the diplomacy of the war in Bosnia see *Russia's Evolving Foreign Policy, 1992–1994* (Columbus, OH, Current Digest of the post-Soviet Press, 1994), pp. 53–68.

⁵⁶ Scott Parrish, 'Twisting in the Wind: Russia and the Yugoslav Conflict', *Transitions* (Prague), 3 November 1995, p. 28.

⁵⁷ David Hoffmann, 'Attack on Bosnia Shows Russia's Drift From West', *The Washington Post*, 16 September 1995, p. A20.

⁵⁸ ITAR-TASS news agency, 22 July 1995, as cited in Parrish, 'Twisting in the Wind', p. 29.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁶⁰ Jane Perlez, 'Kosovo Peace Plan Takes Shape as Russia Prods Serbs on Troops', *The New York Times*, 16 February 1999, pp. A1, A3.

⁶¹ For background, see Kubicek, 'Russian Foreign Policy ...', pp. 554–556.

⁶² See S. Karaganov *et al.*, 'Vyzovy bezopasnosti—starye i novaya', *Kommunist*, 1988, 1, pp. 42–50. On the other hand, antiquarians might consult the seldom cited S. Karaganov *et al.*, *S. Sh. A. Diktatr NATO* (Moscow, 1985).

⁶³ Schmedt, *Russische Aussenpolitik unter Jelzin*, pp. 70–72.

⁶⁴ The document as published in *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 21 July 1995. See also 'Strategiya dlya Rossii (2)', *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 27 May 1994, pp. 4–5, and 'Politika natsional'noi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii (1996–2000)', *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, 23 May 1996, monthly supplement, pp. 1–3. For a direct statement of Karaganov's views see 'Russian Foreign Policy Amidst the Economic Crisis', *International Affairs* (Moscow), 45, 1, 1999, pp. 57–80, esp. 59–60, 69, 74.

⁶⁵ For related fears of a kind of political-economic 'ghettoisation' of Russia see Yu. V. Golik & V.I. Karasev, 'Pochemu dazhe "demokraticeskaya" Rossiya ne ustraivaet "svobodnyi" zapad?', *Svobodnaya mysl'*, 1999, 3, pp. 159–160; Yurii Granin, 'Chto Vpered? Mirovaya globalizatsiya i Rossiya', *Svobodnaya mysl'*, 1999, 9, pp. 46–49; Aleksei Makushkin, 'Finansovaya globalizatsiya', *Svobodnaya mysl'*, 1999, 11, pp. 32–35.

⁶⁶ Yurii P. Davydov, 'Rossiya i NATO. "Posle Bala"', *S. Sh. A.*, 1998, 1, pp. 3–18, and Jeremy Bransten, 'Russia: Ivanov Says Ties with NATO Have Improved Significantly', *RFE/RL* (Prague), 9 December 1998, at www.rferl.org/nca/features/1998/12/F.RU.98120918264_9.html.

⁶⁷ *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1999, 4, 5 and 6, *passim*.

⁶⁸ *Diplomaticheskii vestnik*, 1999, 4, p. 10.

⁶⁹ For a detailed sampling of Russian official and societal views on the war see the translated items

in Gordon Livermore (ed.), *Russian Foreign Policy, 1994–1998* (Columbus, OH, Current Digest of the post-Soviet Press, 1999), pp. 116–142. This is a special supplement covering the period March–July 1999.

⁷⁰ ‘Balkanskii krizis i rossiisko-amerikanskii otnosheniya’, pp. 41, 50–51; Ted Hopf, ‘How NATO’s War in Yugoslavia is Making Foreign Policy in Moscow’, *Policy Memo Series, 81* (Cambridge, MA, Program on New Approaches to Russian Security, October 1999); B. Kazantsev, ‘Serious Concern Over New NATO Strategy’, *International Affairs* (Moscow), 45, 2, 1999, pp. 23–28. Kazantsev is deputy director of the Department of European Cooperation in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See also Stanislav Chernyavsky, ‘Zakavkaz’e v planakh Vashingtona’, *Svobodnaya mysl’*, 1999, 7, pp. 56–61.

⁷¹ André Fontaine, ‘1979–1999: De Kaboul au Kosovo’, *Politique Etrangere*, 1999, 3, p. 502. For the Russian texts of the peace agreement and the enabling UN Security Council Resolution (No. 1244) see *Diplomaticeskii vestnik*, 1999, 7, pp. 6–12.

⁷² Livermore (ed.), pp. 136–137.

⁷³ Janine Wedel, *Collision and Collusion* (New York, St Martin’s Press, 1998), p. 138.

⁷⁴ According to an interview by the reputable Giulietto Chiesa with a ‘high-ranking officer in the Russian Armed Forces’, *La Stampa* (Turin), 13 June 1999, as translated in *Johnson’s List*, No. 3342, item 7, 15 June 1999.

⁷⁵ For one Russian general’s view on this see ‘Balkanskii krizis i rossiisko-amerikanskii otnosheniya’, p. 47.

⁷⁶ Silviu Brucan, *Social Change in Russia and Eastern Europe. From Party Hacks to Nouveaux Riches* (Westport, CT, Praeger, 1998), p. 102.

⁷⁷ Kubicek, p. 568; also Malcolm *et al.*, pp. 87–88.

⁷⁸ Robert G. Kaiser & David Hoffman, ‘Russia Had Bigger Plan in Kosovo’, *The Washington Post*, 25 June 1999, p. A1.

⁷⁹ Assen Ignatow, *Ideologie, Rhetorik und Realpolitik. Die ideologische Komponent der russischen Aussenpolitik* (Cologne, Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, Bericht 20, 17 May 1999).

⁸⁰ The classic history of E.H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution. Volume III* (London, Penguin, 1953) should now be supplemented by Jon Jacobson, *When the Soviet Union Entered World Politics* (University of California Press, 1994).

⁸¹ Schmedt, *Russische Aussenpolitik unter Jelzin*, pp. 51–139, and Skak, *From Empire to Anarchy*. For a survey of translated Russian documents and commentaries tracing the criticism of Kozyrev and his adjustment see *Russia’s Evolving Foreign Policy, 1992–1994*, pp. 1–12.

⁸² Crow, ‘Russia Asserts its Strategic Agenda’, p. 7.

⁸³ Checkel, pp. 52–54.

⁸⁴ See Evgenii M. Primakov, ‘XXVII s’ezd KPSS i issledovanie problem mirovoi ekonomiki i mezhdunarodnykh otnoshenii’, *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, 1986, 6, p. 14 and *passim*; Evgenii M. Primakov & Vitalii V. Churkin, *Mezhdunarodnye konflikty* (Moscow, Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya, 1972).

⁸⁵ Aleksei Bogaturov, ‘International Relations Theory in Late Communist and Early Post-Communist Russia (1985–1994)’, unpublished manuscript (1995), pp. 5–6. For detailed accounts, including bibliographies, see Margot Light, *Soviet Theory of International Relations* (Wheatshaf Books, 1988).

⁸⁶ Schmedt, *Russische Aussenpolitik unter Jelzin*, pp. 69–70, and Larrabee & Karasik, *Foreign and Security Policy Decisionmaking*, pp. 27–28.

⁸⁷ Larrabee & Karasik, pp. 7–11.

⁸⁸ For the text of a leaked British Foreign Office memorandum underscoring the importance of the British–French–Russian axis against the United States in the UN Security Council on the arms embargo issue see Mark Almond, *Europe’s Backyard War. The War in the Balkans* (London, Macmillan, 1994), p. 406, endnote 38.

⁸⁹ For Russian views on how Russia must develop coalitions of convenience in order to advance its interests see Sergei Rogov, ‘Russia and the United States at the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century’, *Russian Politics and Law*, 36, 2, March–April 1998, pp. 5–27 (a translation from *Svobodnaya mysl’*, 1997, 4, pp. 29–45); Salmin, ‘Rossiya, Evropa i novyi mirovoi poryadok’, pp. 42, 52–53; ‘Russian Foreign Policy Amidst the Economic Crisis’, *International Affairs* (Moscow), 45, 1, 1999, pp. 59–60, 74; *Diplomaticeskii vestnik*, 1999, 8, p. 62; Vladimir Baranovsky, ‘Russia’s Interests are too Important’, *International Affairs* (Moscow), 45, 3, 1999, pp. 6, 12–13; A. Fedorov, ‘New Pragmatism of Russia’s Foreign Policy’, *International Affairs* (Moscow), 45, 5, 1999, pp. 48–52.

⁹⁰ For a sophisticated Russian analysis of the logic and limits of Russian–Ukrainian rapprochement see Anatolii Usov, ‘Na puti k slavyanskomu triedinstvu’, *Svobodnaya mysl’*, 1999, 10, pp. 71–77.

⁹¹ For an analysis see Margarita M. Balmaceda, ‘Ukraine, Russia and European Security: Thinking Beyond NATO Expansion’, *Problems of post-Communism*, January/February 1998, pp. 21–29.

⁹² For a somewhat contrary interpretation see Kubicek, pp. 556–561.

⁹³ Many professional foreign policy analysts hold this to be untenable. Thus Sergei Rogov: 'The view that Russia is "destined" to be a great power is a dangerous myth', or Andrei Fedorov, Director of Political Programmes at the Foreign and Defence Policy Council: 'Can we remain a figure of world importance ... or should we limit ourselves to the responsibility zone directly connected with our national interests and security? ... The objective political and economic situation in Russia is pushing us toward the latter'. Rogov, p. 15; A. Fedorov, 'New Pragmatism of Russia's Foreign Policy', *International Affairs* (Moscow), 45, 5, 1999, p. 48; Salmin, p. 10.

⁹⁴ For an impressive tally of the scope of this decline see Rogov, pp. 7–12, 15; Salmin, p. 26.

⁹⁵ As demonstrated by Menon, 'After Empire ...'.

⁹⁶ Richard Betts, 'Must War Find a Way?', *International Security*, 24, 2, Fall 1999, p. 191; Barry Blechman & Tamara Cofman Wittes, 'Defining Moment: The Threat and Use of Force in American Foreign Policy', *Political Science Quarterly*, 114, 1, Spring 1999.

⁹⁷ Dmitrii Trenin, 'Predotvrashchenie, upravlenie i uregulirovanie konfliktov na territorii byvshego SSSR: naskol'ko raskhodyatsya interesy Rossii i Zapada?', in B. Koppiters *et al.* (eds), *Eticheskie i regional'nye konflikty v Evrazii*, Vol. 3 (Moscow, Ves' Mir, 1997), pp. 118–138.

⁹⁸ For a sophisticated Russian analysis see Oleg Bykov, 'S. Sh. A.: Konets Sverkhderzhavnosti', in *God Planety 1994* (Moscow, Respublika, 1994), pp. 269–275, and Salmin, pp. 23–25.

⁹⁹ Larrabee & Karasik, *Foreign and Security Policy Decisionmaking*, pp. 5–11.

¹⁰⁰ 'Russian Foreign Policy: Amidst the Economic Crisis', pp. 59, 74.

¹⁰¹ This conclusion is broadly consonant with that of Kubicek.

¹⁰² Uwe Halbach, *Moskau's Südpolitik. Russland und der West im Kaspischen Raum* (Cologne, Bundesinstitut für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, Bericht 30, 23 August 1999); Ariel Cohen, 'The New Great Game: Pipeline Politics in Eurasia', *Eurasia Studies*, 3, 1, Spring 1996, pp. 2–15.

¹⁰³ For a systematic analysis with respect to Russian-German relations in the 1990s see Celeste Wallander, *Mortal Friends, Best Enemies. German-Russian Cooperation After the Cold War* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1999).

¹⁰⁴ While Russian diplomats were working intensively within the Contact Group to craft a diplomatic settlement to the Kosovo crisis, El'tsin declared—without apparent foundation—that he had just spoken to President Clinton to declare: 'We will not allow Kosovo to be touched'. David Hoffmann, 'Yeltsin Vows to Disallow Force in Kosovo', *The Washington Post*, 19 February 1999, p. A19.

¹⁰⁵ William Zimmerman concludes from his study of Russian opinion and foreign policy that 'a more authoritarian and less market-oriented Russia would be more prone to view the United States as threatening, would be more isolationist, and would be less inclined to reduce military spending'. William Zimmerman, 'Markets, Democracy and Russian Foreign Policy', *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 10, 2, April–June 1994, p. 124; see also Yanov, *Posle El'tsina*, for specific foreign policy views of various communist and nationalist politicians.

¹⁰⁶ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1994), pp. 118–136.