The new defence minister, Shoigu, reshuffled his ministry, shifting responsibilities among the deputy ministers and increasing their number from eight to ten. He also replaced those officials most closely associated with Serdyukov. Makarov was replaced as Chief of General Staff by General Valeriy Gerasimov, though Makarov was appointed to an advisory role in early 2013.

Shoigu did embark on a review of the reforms initiated by his predecessor, tackling some particularly contentious issues, such as real-estate consolidation and sale, reductions in basing, proposed cuts to central administration and mergers of military academies. Personnel cuts at defence ministry headquarters were scaled back, amid concerns from some in the armed forces that the size of the reductions had damaged command-and-control at the strategic level.

Serdyukov had planned to merge military academies into ten Joint Training Centres, but this was shelved and the academies are, after a three-year break, once again taking cadets.

Shoigu also re-established the Main Directorate of Combat Training. Following its closure in 2010, unit combat training had become the responsibility of the individual services, while inter-service and operational-level training was under the authority of the General Staff. First Deputy Defence Minister General Arkady Bakhin justified the reinstatement by citing the need to improve coordination and combat effectiveness, and said this would, as Tass news agency reported, ‘primarily improve combat capability of the multi-service force groupings and improve the existing regulatory framework regulating the organisation of combat training’. This is consistent with the Russian push to develop skills in joint operations, as demonstrated by major exercises during 2013.

Analysts have noted that while rearmament and related financial issues were key for Serdyukov, Shoigu is more concerned with the organisation of training and regular activities of the forces. Therefore, many of the most important decisions of the Serdyukov–Makarov era remain untouched. Despite Serdyukov’s sacking, the goal continues of restructuring the armed forces away from the mass-mobilisation model intended for large-scale conflict,
to professionalised armed forces at a higher state of readiness. Instead of relatively low-strength units, to be filled with mobilised personnel in time of crisis, Russia’s ground forces are now mostly in mobile brigade-sized formations, more aligned with the combat requirements of low- and medium-intensity local and regional warfare. The perception of increased readiness has been reinforced by the reintroduction of surprise operational-readiness inspections at the military-district, combined-arms-unit and single-service levels, which were last carried out in the Soviet era. The presentation of a new, classified State Defence Plan early in Shoigu’s tenure is evidence of continuity, since this document must have been drawn up under Shoigu and Gerasimov’s predecessors.

The State Defence Plan was complemented by the publication of an Activity Plan 2013–20, which identifies intended levels of increased combat readiness, new or upgraded equipment, and increases in personnel costs for the remainder of the decade. The plan sets highly ambitious targets for manpower and the proportion of ‘modern’ (this term remains vague) weapons systems in service, tied in with the State Armaments Programme (see Defence Economics, p. 163). Interestingly, the plan constitutes the first official admission that the armed forces were at only 80% of planned strength in 2013, contrasting with repeated official claims that Russia has one million troops under arms. As noted in previous editions of *The Military Balance*, recruitment and staffing have been key areas of concern for some years, with ongoing challenges in securing adequate numbers of conscripts and in recruiting enough of the contract personnel expected to fill so many roles within the future armed forces.

**Armed forces**

Two elite army divisions, the 4th Tamanskaya and the 5th Kantemirovskaya divisions, were re-established in May 2013 having previously been ‘reformed’ into brigades. However, there was little indication during 2013 of any increase in personnel or equipment holdings to reflect this change in status, indicating that the defence ministry is not reconsidering the move to brigade-based structures more generally.

Considerable work remains to be done in establishing brigade structures within ground forces. Moves to create light, medium and heavy brigades remain at an experimental level. Nonetheless, the ministry is persisting with the plan, as analysis of combat-training exercises with these formations apparently shows that while they are far from ideal, they are better that the current ‘New Look’ motorised and tank brigades. The division structure is to be retained within the Airborne Forces and Strategic Missile Forces.

**Air force** reform and development is following three themes: improving command-and-control, modernising the combat aircraft fleet, and increasing

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**Personnel issues**

Manpower remains a key issue for Russian military planners. Conscript targets are hard to meet, and plans for recruiting professional (‘contract’) servicemen to serve as NCOs and in posts requiring advanced training are falling short of targets. It has long been clear that the armed forces as a whole are understaffed. Senior Russian officers, when persuaded to admit the problem, downplay it, saying that where necessary the ‘rolling deficit’ (tekushchy nekomplekt) can be covered by calling up reservists.

The target is still for a total of 425,000 contract servicemen by 2017 (up from a claimed 241,400 in 2013). It appears that, as with previous failed programmes to recruit contractors, Russian leaders would prefer at present to maintain the narrative that this is achievable, rather than adjust the target or institute major change to reach it. As in all discussions of Russian military manpower, information is unclear and the challenge is understated; for example, Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov said in June 2013 that the target would be met by recruiting 60,000 contractors annually — without mentioning that many more than this must be recruited to allow for those leaving the service after their contract term expires.

Stopgap measures have been put in place to keep the junior command structure functioning while these targets remain unmet. Officers continue to serve in posts that are notionally intended for NCOs under the new structure. The post of praporshchik, normally translated as ‘warrant officer’, referred to a class of long-serving specialists, usually in roles demanding technical or administrative skills. Abolished entirely under Defence Minister Serdyukov, praporshchiki have been reinstated under his successor Shoigu, with plans to recruit (or re-enlist) up to 50,000. However, it remains unclear how the target of achieving 100% staffing by 2014, outlined in the defence ministry’s Activity Plan 2013–20, can be achieved without revising the targets radically downwards.
the types and number of air-launched precision-guided weaponry. Deliveries of fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft have increased in the past few years, allowing units to be re-equipped fully with new or upgraded platforms.

One of the most significant revisions to the Serdyukov reforms so far concerns air-force structure. Air Force Commander-in-Chief Lieutenant General Viktor Bondarev initiated a shift away from the ‘air base’ (aviabaza) approach, which often involved hosting multiple types of aircraft at single airfields, towards a ‘one airfield, one regiment’ formula. This will in effect reinstate a division and regiment structure. The Serdyukov reforms eliminated air armies, divisions and regiments, replacing these with the aviaibaza as the basic unit of air-force formations. These were divided into first- and second-class categories. First-class air bases comprised 5–8 wings, while second class-bases had 1–2 wings. Each wing consisted on average of three squadrons, each with different aircraft types. Before the reforms, an air regiment consisted of not more than two squadrons, each equipped with one aircraft type.

The navy is in the midst of recapitalising its infrastructure, while also bringing into service more modern designs to replace ageing Soviet-era platforms due to be decommissioned. Refurbishment work is also under way at most main bases, with infrastructure upgrade and construction a key objective for shore facilities, as well as for ancillary vessels such as tugs and auxiliaries.

Mediterranean deployments also attracted attention. During the Soviet era, the navy’s Fifth Squadron operated in the area and although naval vessels returned to the Mediterranean in 2012, the deployment of a Mediterranean Task Force in June 2013 was seen as a key event. Ships are to be rotated through the task force deployment, and the squadron consists of vessels from the Black Sea, Baltic Sea, Northern and, in some cases, Pacific fleets.

Russian Airborne Forces are due to be bolstered by the end of 2013 with three air-assault brigades from the Eastern and Southern Military Districts (under Decree 776, signed by Putin on 11 October 2013). The brigades will become the Supreme Commander-in-Chief’s reserve. This shift reflects the armed forces’ desire, discussed and approved by the defence ministry in May, to be able to provide rapid-deployment forces as a core capability, with airborne units used as a crisis-reaction force. Along with airborne units, rapid-deployment forces are also scheduled to include special taskforce brigades, marine units and special operations personnel.

Meanwhile, a Special Operations Command (SOC) was established in 2013, in an attempt to unify special forces capabilities at the command level. The SOC is viewed as part of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief’s reserve, alongside airborne units.

Sustaining and renewing Russia’s nuclear forces remains a near-term priority. Lieutenant-General Sergey Karakayev, the Strategic Rocket Forces commander, claims that Russia has two new ICBM designs capable of penetrating missile-defence systems: one a solid-propellant missile, the other a long-discussed, liquid-fuelled model. Some media reports indicate that the liquid-fuelled design may be intended to replace the R36M (SS-18 Satan). The intent is that by 2021 almost all strategic missiles should be of new or recent design. There is also renewed interest in a rail-mobile system to succeed the Molodets, which was withdrawn from service in 2007. However, missile programmes continue to suffer development problems. A test firing of the Bulava (SS-NX-32) SLBM failed again in September 2013, prompting further concern over the project.

The Aerospace Defence Forces and associated air- and missile-defence systems are due to be fully integrated into the command-and-control system between 2016 and 2020. A key programme is the S-500 (Triumf-M) SAM system. Introduction into service of the S-500 is now promised for the beginning of 2018, but this date remains open to doubt, as the facilities for building the system are still under construction. The A-135 Amur ballistic-missile defence system for Moscow is also to be replaced with the A-235 Samolyet-M. As of the end of 2013 it appeared that the A-235 would use an improved variant of the 53T6 missile used in the A-135. The interceptor is intended to be capable of a kinetic kill, while also retaining the capacity to carry a nuclear warhead.

DEFENCE ECONOMICS

State Armaments Programme

The country’s political and military leadership have shown considerable continued commitment to the ambitious State Armaments Programme to 2020, notwithstanding faltering economic performance. Spending on the programme is now nearly half of all expenditure under the ‘National Defence’ budget chapter, compared with less than one-third in 2005. The optimistic economic forecasts on which the
programme was originally based – average annual GDP growth of at least 6% – have not been achieved. Instead, economic growth has slowed, from 4.3% in 2011 (the first year of the programme’s implementation) to barely 2% in 2013. Consequently, the government has had little choice but to alter its budgetary priorities to permit a steadily growing share of defence spending as a proportion of GDP. This is now projected to rise from 2.72% of GDP in 2011 to 3.15% in 2013 (see Table 4). The draft three-year budget for 2014–16, sent to the Duma at the end of September 2013, envisaged that this share would eventually rise to 3.9% of GDP by 2016, with a significant ramping up of real defence spending over the 2012–15 period. To fund the programme, the authorities have resorted increasingly to state-guaranteed credits. This is, in effect, a non-budgetary means of increasing spending, although the finance ministry has indicated that there will be no new credits after 2015.

Defence industry restructuring
Since December 2011, the government’s Military-Industrial Commission has been headed by the deputy prime minister, Dmitry Rogozin. Under his leadership, it has been transformed into a more interventionist coordinating agency, while Rogozin himself has played a prominent role in attempting to resolve issues arising from the implementation of the annual state defence order, the instrument with which the State Armaments Programme is put into effect. He has also promoted organisational restructuring, particularly through the consolidation of Russia’s sprawling defence industries into large corporate structures. In addition, he has sought to boost private business involvement in the defence sector, including the use of small companies to fulfil defence contracts, though with only limited success so far.

As a result of these reforms, the defence sector is now dominated by a small number of large, predominantly state-owned corporations. The largest of these is Rostec (formerly Russian Technologies), established in 2007, which now has some 660 enterprises, both defence and civilian, employing 900,000 people. Under CEO Sergey Chemezov, there has been a concerted effort to establish an effective corporate structure, with factories grouped into a dozen or so holding companies, some playing a major role in defence work. (This development has parallels with post-war Italy, where state-owned Finmeccanica consolidated the defence and engineering assets of state holding company IRI, but eventually became a commercial business, albeit with a sizeable state shareholding.) Corporations within Rostec include: the state arms export company Rosoboronexport; Oboronprom, which includes Russian Helicopters, employing 40,000, and gas-turbine manufacturer the United Engine Corporation, employing 70,000; Radio-Electronic Technologies, comprising more than 50 enterprises employing 67,000, concerned with electronic warfare and aviation electronics, among others; Russian Electronics, responsible for most of Russia’s electronics component base for military purposes; Shvabe, making military and civil optoelectronic equipment; avionics concern Aircraft Engineering; and high-precision tactical weapons firm Vysokotochnye Kompleksy.

Other major structures include the United Aviation Corporation, responsible for almost all development and production of fixed-wing aircraft, military and civil, and now employing almost 100,000; the United Shipbuilding Corporation, responsible for approximately 90% of shipbuilding, including all naval work; Almaz-Antey, responsible for almost all development and manufacture of air-defence equipment,

<table>
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<th>Year</th>
<th>GDP (R bn)</th>
<th>Real GDP Change (%)</th>
<th>National Defence Expenditure (R bn)</th>
<th>% change in Real Defence Expenditure</th>
<th>National Defence as a % of GDP</th>
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Sources: Rosstat, Ministry of Finance, Kremlin Annual Budget Laws, Ministry of Economic Development and 2014–16 draft budget. National defence expenditure figures for 2010–12 reflect actual expenditure; figures for 2013 reflect the law on the budget; and figures for 2014–16 reflect the draft national budget as of September 2013. Spending in real terms calculated using the annual GDP deflator.
with more than 60 enterprises employing almost 95,000; and the Tactical Missiles Corporation, uniting 25 enterprises and design organisations concerned with air-, land- and sea-based tactical missile systems. In late 2013 plans to reorganise the space-missile industry were announced, transforming the Federal Space Agency (Roskosmos) into a more effective, business-orientated, structure: the United Rocket and Space Corporation. These corporations are mostly state-owned, but the intention is to form joint-stock companies with the involvement of private capital. This is with the exception of the nuclear weapons industry, which will remain in state hands under the Rosatom state corporation.

**Remaining defence-industrial challenges**

The R20tr (US$610bn) State Armaments Programme to 2020 poses a major challenge for Russia’s defence industry. Until its adoption, Russia’s defence industry was largely dependent on foreign orders. Defence exports assisted in the recovery of the industry after the collapse of output during the 1990s. However, exports did not equally benefit all sectors. Enterprises obliged to focus on domestic orders because of the nature of their work – for example, strategic missile manufacturers – were unable to rely on foreign orders to sustain their activities, and consequently lacked investment resources and had difficulty in retaining workers because of low pay rates. As a result, industrial capabilities now vary considerably across Russia’s defence sectors. Some companies face capacity constraints, and find it difficult to meet both export demand and the increased domestic orders required by the State Armament Programme. This applies in particular to Almaz-Antey, which now has to build new factories to manufacture its air-defence systems. The same applies, albeit to a lesser degree, to the construction of conventionally powered submarines and other naval systems.

In parallel with the armaments programme there is another programme focused on development of the defence industry (to 2020), with a R2–3tr (approximately US$65–98bn) budget for investment in new capacity and the refurbishment of existing production facilities. However, the rate of renewal of productive assets remains low, and many enterprises forced to use Soviet-era equipment have found it difficult to meet modern quality standards. Official
policy favours the installation of new Russian-built machinery, rather than imported equipment, but overall the volume of domestic production is inadequate.

The Russian defence industry now employs more than 1.3m people, including 440,000 in R&D. However, it is experiencing labour problems, above all difficulty in recruiting younger technical and R&D personnel and skilled shopfloor workers. The workforce is ageing, with a large cohort of personnel near or above the official retirement age (60) and relatively few under the age of 30. The average age of employees is reported to be 46 years at industrial enterprises and 48 in R&D. Relatively low pay is a major factor in the inability to recruit and retain. However, increased orders in recent years have enabled some companies to offer pay increases, which may be a way to reverse the negative trends of the past 20 years.

Defence companies are also experiencing difficulties in obtaining high-quality domestically produced components and systems. A feature of the Soviet defence industry was the low level of subcontracting. Many Soviet-era defence enterprises not only conducted final assembly in-house, but also manufactured a wide range of components – often using costly low-volume production methods – that in market economies are normally obtained from specialist suppliers, often small- or medium-sized companies. While this meant higher costs for in-house components, Soviet arms producers were able to minimise the supply disruptions that plagued many other sectors of the state-run economy. Today, most end-product producers are still state-owned, but specialist component suppliers, where they exist, are now often private businesses, and will only undertake defence work if it is profitable. In reality, defence contracts are often loss-making or yield only modest profits. In these circumstances, there is little incentive for new companies to enter the field and some established suppliers have switched to more profitable civilian work. Soviet-style internal component production remains widespread, in part because of this lack of specialist firms, but costs remain high and achieving the quality required for defence products is a problem.

These difficulties now threaten the armaments programme. In some sectors, the scheduled increase in output is so large that it is difficult to see how it can be realised. For example, according to the Ministry of Economic Development, the state defence order will see the value of contracts for Russia’s aviation industry increase by seven times between 2012 and 2016, while this will rise by a factor of six for shipbuilding. It is likely that some contracts will have to be fulfilled in the next armaments programme (2016–25). This will probably apply to such systems as naval vessels, transport aircraft, armoured vehicles and air-defence equipment.

**Foreign weapons procurement**

Given the defence industry’s problems, there has been interest in acquiring overseas military hardware. Importing arms and components from CIS countries, especially from Belarus, has been acceptable, but strains have developed with Ukraine, notwithstanding its significant role in the manufacture of transport aircraft, power units for ships and some types of missiles for aircraft. Serdyukov took the initiative in securing foreign supply, most prominently by buying two Mistral-class LPDs from France, with the option of building two more at a Russian shipyard. The two vessels are now being built at Saint-Nazaire, with the delivery of the first, the Vladivostok for the Pacific Fleet, scheduled for late 2014 and the second, the Sevastopol, at the end of 2015. However, it now seems unlikely that two more will be built in Russia. While there have been some foreign technology acquisitions, such as optical equipment from France, there have been only two other significant imports of end-product weapons: Iveco armoured vehicles from Italy and UAVs from Israel. In the latter case, some Israeli UAVs are now being assembled at a factory in Yekaterinburg.

Since Shoigu replaced Serdyukov there has been a policy change, in which Rogozin played a role. It is being stressed that Russia will no longer import...
assembled weapons. However, cooperation with international partners will still be welcome, provided that Russia is an equal partner with direct access to the relevant technology. For instance, UralVagonZavod is now working jointly with France’s Sagem and Renault Trucks Defense on a new combat vehicle, which may be built in Russia. Foreign systems can be manufactured in Russia but only with a high degree of local sourcing; simple assembly of imported components will no longer be permitted.

Russia is now dependent on imported microelectronic components, with Belarus a major supplier. In principle, all components of foreign origin have to undergo rigorous testing before they can be accepted for use in Russian armaments. In practice, this time-consuming and costly procedure is often bypassed, leading to the use of components of inadequate quality for military purposes. This is a matter of considerable policy concern, with efforts under way to increase the domestic supply of crucial components and systems.

Russia is also committed to achieving a significant modernisation of its armed forces’ armaments, with the headline goal that by 2020 at least 70% of Russian inventories will be modern equipment. However, the current armaments programme is ambitious, and does not take adequate account of the development and production constraints facing the country’s defence industry. While defence-industrial renewal is gradually beginning, it is taking longer than Russia’s political and military leadership would wish.

Russian security policy in Central Asia demonstrates further the collapse of the US–Russia ‘reset’ in relations. Moscow is primarily concerned with promoting or exploiting the perception of declining Western/NATO influence in light of the 2014 withdrawal. To this end, it is using both the CSTO and SCO as instruments to present local governments with alternatives to pursuing closer relations with NATO; pushing joint air-defence policies; and offering arms to the weaker Central Asian states as a means of boosting political influence and reducing these countries’ appetite for cooperating with NATO. It also wants to further develop the CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Forces (KSOR), in case of a possible deterioration of the post-2014 security situation in Central Asia.

Security policy and the Afghan drawdown
Since the ISAF drawdown was announced, both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have issued new military doctrines. Kazakhstan’s 2011 Military Doctrine confirmed that Astana’s security policy has not prioritised Afghanistan, and its force structure and armed forces modernisation suggest that Kazakhstan expects no deterioration in post-2014 security environment in Central Asia.

Kyrgyzstan’s new doctrine, signed into law on 5 July 2013, sets out possible threats to the state, and notes plans to reform the armed forces. The security environment is described as unpredictable, with a risk of sudden conflict; the text then refers to the Middle East and Afghanistan. The doctrine identifies potential threats to Kyrgyz security, including international terrorism and interference in its domestic affairs, only afterwards adding possible recurrences of the ethnic violence that the country experienced in June 2010. There is no evidence in the references to military reform (section III, 31) that Bishkek is no closer to devising the force structure, doctrine, training and procurement policies that would support state security priorities.
The smaller Central Asian states, such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, are preoccupied with internal stability and limited militant activity, with less focus on the post-2014 implications of the ISAF drawdown. Tajik security forces have intermittent problems coping with armed gangs linked to drug trafficking. Given the overall weaknesses of the Tajik armed and security forces – which suffer from inadequate special forces training and personnel issues revolving around high numbers of conscripts and low planning capacity – it is likely that low-level militant activity linked to drug trafficking will continue to challenge the armed forces.

The larger and more prosperous states are more or less indifferent to the possible effects of the Afghan drawdown. Priorities for Kazakhstan include protecting the capital during EXPO 2017, deploying peace-support elements abroad in support of future UN missions, and boosting its naval forces in the Caspian Sea. Having declared neutrality in 1999 and enshrined this in its 2009 Military Doctrine, Turkmenistan is mainly focused on its naval build-up in the Caspian. President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov plans to strengthen the country’s naval forces by 2015, and the navy has already procured coastal assets, including fast patrol boats. A low level of training for officers and enlisted personnel, lack of spare parts and insufficient numbers of trained pilots, combined with the lack of contact with foreign armed forces, limit capability.

The one exception is Uzbekistan. Although security documents are classified as a state secret in Uzbekistan, statements by senior government officials imply that this is the sole Central Asian state to now consider Afghanistan the main potential security threat (although past security issues requiring state action have mainly stemmed from domestic issues). Tashkent’s focus on Afghanistan-linked contingencies means that border security, mobility and small-scale operations are central to security thinking. The Uzbek government has lobbied Washington heavily to materially benefit from the drawdown. ISAF members have dampened this appetite among Central Asian states by insisting that any hardware transfers, based on what individual countries choose to leave behind, must be collected and transported by the recipient country.

In general, Central Asian states show little sign of preparing for any negative impact on their security arising from the 2014 ISAF drawdown. This reflects a mixture of political confidence in some capitals, coupled with weak defence capacity in others. The smaller states refer to the potential threat increase post-2014 in order to extract a better security assistance package from NATO members; those states less focused on Afghanistan present requests more suited to varied security applications.

Consistent with its 2011 Military Doctrine, Kazakhstan continues to develop its peace support operation (PSO) capabilities in order to participate in UN peacekeeping operations (PKO). Legislation has been drafted that would give the defence ministry the power to send forces abroad. Kazakhstan’s peacekeeping battalion (KAZBAT) functions as part of the emerging KAZBRIG peacekeeping brigade. Since 2003, this battalion has participated in annual Steppe Eagle exercises with US and UK forces. Other countries have recently joined the exercise, including small contingents from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Steppe Eagle 2013, held in southern Kazakhstan in August, included an assessment under NATO Partnership for Peace arrangements of KAZBAT/KAZBRIG PSO capabilities, partly to help deployment preparations for UN PKOs. However, supporting security forces in responding to future domestic crises remains a core focus, as does enhancing forces assigned to the CSTO and developing CIS joint air-defence, mainly with Russia.

In the South Caucasus, Russian security policy remains focused on preventing tensions flaring between Georgia and the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Moscow has relaxed trade sanctions imposed on Tbilisi after the August 2008 war, though renewing diplomatic relations is proving more difficult.

Policy is more nuanced regarding Armenia and Azerbaijan. Moscow wants to avoid any renewal of territorial conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, yet arms sales proceed to both sides. Despite alarmist reporting on the defence policies of both Armenia and Azerbaijan, neither side appears closer to renewed conflict, with modernisation and defence reform plans progressing moderately.

**Defence economics**

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan struggle to maintain defence spending at levels high enough to support structural reforms. The larger states in the region, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, have greater defence-spending capacity, although precise levels are impossible to establish in Uzbekistan, because of state secrecy. Defence spending in
Turkmenistan reached 1.6% of GDP in 2012 (around US$538.9m) and in 2013 stabilised at around this figure.

**Kazakhstan**’s cumulative 2013–15 defence budget of 1.01tr tenge (around US$6.74bn) was approved in the Law on the Republic’s Budget. In 2013 it reached 348.4bn tenge (US$2.32bn, 0.95% of GDP), reflecting overall growth in the country’s GDP. Progress in improving capacity in the domestic defence industry through the joint-stock company Kazakhstan Engineering is proceeding slowly. The number of joint ventures stands at four (Exocet, Eurocopter, Cessna and Otokar) with plans to increase this in the near future. President Nursultan Nazarbayev has set a target for 70% of the armed forces’ modern weapons to be manufactured domestically by 2015. Joint ventures and in-country assembly will likely be central to this aim, as part of the country’s ‘multi-vector’ defence policy (see *The Military Balance 2013*, p. 212). Kazakhstan is diversifying its foreign military cooperation with NATO and non-NATO members, while still serving as Russia’s main partner within Central Asia. Its security policy, however, limits the level of potential cooperation with NATO, which will mostly centre on small-scale activities to boost peacekeeping capabilities. In January 2013, Astana took delivery of two Airbus C-295s, with the option of a further six. The contract also envisages a service package for spare parts and ground support. Kazakhstan’s defence ministry is also discussing the possible procurement of A400M. Nonetheless, these procurement developments do not signal any move away from close defence cooperation with Russia.

**South Caucasus**

Defence spending in the South Caucasus continues to be dominated by **Azerbaijan’s** disbursements. According to President Ilham Aliyev, the country’s defence budget increased from US$3bn in 2012 to US$3.7bn in 2013. This funding will enable the replacement of ageing equipment and weapons systems. Military procurement falls into three areas: diversification of Baku’s foreign military cooperation; equipment purchases; and efforts to boost domestic production. Azerbaijan buys equipment from a range of suppliers, developing forms of defence cooperation with a variety of states. Ukraine was the main source of foreign equipment until a substantial 2012 deal with Russia, which will sell Baku US$4bn-worth of equipment and weapons over three years. Azerbaijan is also reportedly interested in military equipment from South Korea, although details remain unclear. Also important is a related initiative to boost domestic defence production capacity. In 2012, the volume of such production increased by 12% on 2011, and there are now some 700 defence items produced domestically. It is likely, however, that Baku will rely on foreign procurement for high-tech requirements.

**Armenia’s** 2013 defence budget was US$447m. Although the country’s fledgling domestic defence industry has developed in recent years, it is unlikely to become profitable before 2015 at the earliest, leaving Armenia’s armed forces heavily reliant on a strategic partnership with Russia for upgrades, modernisation and maintenance of its predominantly Russian-manufactured inventory. Small joint ventures with Greece and Poland to modernise T-72 MBTs will mean the country is not completely reliant upon Russia, though contacts with Moscow will likely continue in relation to advanced systems, such as Armenia’s S-300PM air-defence system. Yerevan is interested in enhancing its artillery capabilities, most recently demonstrated by an agreement to procure the Chinese A100 300mm MRL. (A military parade in 2006 showcased an earlier version of this MRL, which appears to have entered service in the 1990s.) Military-technical cooperation with China is unlikely to weaken Moscow’s grip on this market, particularly given Yerevan’s membership of the CSTO and its decision in September 2013 to enter the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia.
Armenian Dram d 2012 2013 2014

GDP

US$ 10.1bn 10.3bn

per capita

US$ 2,991 3,037

Growth

% 7.18 4.30

Inflation

% 2.51 4.20

Def bdgt

US$ 402m 447m

FMA (US)

US$ 2.7m 2.7m 2.7m

US$1=d

395.54 419.66

Population

2,974,184

Age 0 – 14 15 – 19 20 – 24 25 – 29 30 – 64 65 plus

Male 9.2% 3.8% 5.2% 5.0% 20.2% 3.6%

Female 8.0% 3.5% 5.1% 5.1% 24.9% 6.2%

Capabilities

Armenia’s armed forces focus on territorial defence, given continuing tensions with neighbouring Azerbaijan. While overall military doctrine remains influenced strongly by Russian thinking, Armenia’s overseas deployments, which include support to ISAF in Afghanistan, enable the troops serving in the Pul-e Khumri PRT to learn lessons from their NATO counterparts. The ISAF contribution increased in 2011. In November 2011, Armenia signed a new Individual Partnership Action Plan with NATO. While conscription continues, there is a growing cohort of professional officers. The country’s armed forces are generally held to be at least competent and well-motivated. Serviceability and maintenance have been a problem for the air force, and Russia provides national air defence from a leased base. The army exercises regularly, and aims to be able to deploy and sustain a battalion-sized contingent by 2015 as part of a multinational mission. To inform these developments, Armenia completed a Strategic Defense Review in May 2011.

ACTIVE 44,800 (Army 41,850 Air/AD Aviation Forces (Joint) 1,100 other Air Defence Forces 1,850) Paramilitary 4,300

Conscript liability 24 months.

RESERVES some mob reported, possibly 210,000 with military service within 15 years.

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 22,900; 18,950 conscripts (total 41,850)

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF regt

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

1 (1st) corps (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 2 MR regt, 1 maint bn)
1 (2nd) corps (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 2 MR regt, 1 lt inf regt, 1 arty bn)

1 (3rd) corps (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 4 MR regt, 1 lt inf regt, 1 arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 maint bn)
1 (4th) corps (4 MR regt; 1 SP arty bn; 1 sigs bn)
1 (5th) corps (with 2 fortified areas) (1 MR regt)

Other

1 indep MR trg bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bde
1 MRL bde
1 AT regt
1 AD bde
2 AD regt
1 (radiotech) AD regt
1 engr regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT 109: 3 T-54; 5 T-55; 101 T-72
AIFV 98: 75 BMP-1; 6 BMP-1K; 5 BMP-2; 12 BRM-1K
APC (W) 130: 8 BTR-60; 100 look-a-like; 18 BTR-70; 4 BTR-80
ARTY 232
SP 38: 122mm 10 2S1; 152mm 28 2S3
TOWED 131: 122mm 69 D-30; 152mm 62: 26 2A36; 2 D-1; 34 D-20
MRL 51: 122mm 47 BM-21; 273mm 4 WM-80
MOR 120mm 12 M120

AD

SAM

SP 38: 122mm 10 2S1; 152mm 28 2S3
TOWED 131: 122mm 69 D-30; 152mm 62: 26 2A36; 2 D-1; 34 D-20

MRL 51: 122mm 47 BM-21; 273mm 4 WM-80

MOR 120mm 12 M120

AT • MSL 22

SP 22: 9 9P148 Konkurs; 13 9P149 MT-LB Spiral

GUNS

SP 15 23mm 2ZU-23-4
TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2

UAV Light 15 Krunk

RADAR • LAND 6 SNAR-10

MSL • TACTICAL • SSM 12: 8 9K72 Elbrus (SS-1C Scud B); 4 9K79 Tochka (SS-21 Scarab)

AEV MT-LB

ARD BREhM-D; BREM-1

Air and Air Defence Aviation Forces 1,100

1 Air & AD Joint Command

FORCES BY ROLE

GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with Su-25/Su-25UBK Frogfoot

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 15 combat capable

ATK 15: 13 Su-25 Frogfoot; 2 Su-25UBK Frogfoot

TPT 3 Heavy 2 Il-76 Candid; PAX 1 A319CJ

TRG 14: 4 L-39 Albatros; 10 Yak-52

HELICOPTERS

ATK 8 Mi-24P Hind

ISR 4: 2 Mi-24K Hind; 2 Mi-24R Hind (cbt spt)

MRH 10 Mi-8MT (cbt spt)

C2 2 Mi-9 Hip G (cbt spt)
Russia and Eurasia

TPT • Light 7 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite
SAM • SP S-300/S-300PM (SA-10 Gromble)

Paramilitary 4,300

Ministry of Internal Affairs

FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Other
4 paramilitary bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIFV 55: 5 BMD-1; 44 BMP-1; 1 BMP-1K; 5 BRM-1K
APC (W) 24 BTR-60/BTR-70/BTR-152

Border Troops
Ministry of National Security

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIFV 43: 5 BMD-1; 35 BMP-1; 3 BRM-1K
APC (W) 23: 5 BTR-60; 18 BTR-70

DEPLOYMENT
Legal provisions for foreign deployment:
Specific legislation: ‘Law on Defence of the Republic of Armenia’
Decision on deployment of troops abroad: by the president, in accordance with ‘Law on Defence of the Republic of Armenia’ (Article 5 (2) (1)). Also, under Art. 55 (13) of constitution, president can call for use of armed forces (and National Assembly shall be convened). (Also Art. 81 (3) of constitution.)

AFGHANISTAN
NATO • ISAF 131

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
OSCE • Bosnia and Herzeogovina 2

LEBANON
UN • UNIFIL 1

SERBIA
NATO • KFOR 36

FOREIGN FORCES
OSCE figures represent total Minsk Conference mission personnel in both Armenia and Azerbaijan
Bulgaria OSCE 1
Czech Republic OSCE 1
Poland OSCE 1
Russia 3,303: 1 MR bde; 74 MBT; 201 AIFV; 84 arty; (12 MRL, 72 SP/towed); 1 frigate with 18 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 2 SAM bty with S-300V (SA-12 Gladiator/Giant); 1 SAM bty with 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful)
Sweden OSCE 1
Ukraine OSCE 1
United Kingdom OSCE 1

Azerbaijan AZE

GDP
per capita
Growth
Inflation
Def bdgt *
FMA (US)
US$m=

* Official budget

Population 9,590,159

Age 0 – 14 15 – 19 20 – 24 25 – 29 30 – 64 65 plus
Male 12.1% 4.2% 5.2% 4.8% 20.7% 2.4%
Female 10.5% 3.9% 5.0% 4.6% 22.7% 3.9%

Capabilities

While the armed forces have yet to successfully transition from a Soviet-era model, increasing defence expenditure has provided the opportunity to acquire some more capable military equipment. Rising oil revenues have provided the financial headroom for acquisitions, including the S-300 SAM system, but it is unclear whether the potential benefits brought by these modern systems have been felt in terms of operational capability. The armed forces still rely on conscription, and readiness within the services varies considerably between units. Peacekeeping deployments have included a small number of personnel in Afghanistan. Azerbaijan maintains defence relationships with NATO through an IPAP, and has a close relationship with Turkey. With NATO support, the Internal Troops are developing a police support unit to be available for NATO-led operations. US military assistance has included support to maritime-security operations in the Caspian Sea. The air force suffers from training and maintenance problems. The armed forces cannot organically support external deployments.

ACTIVE 66,950 (Army 56,850 Navy 2,200 Air 7,900)

Paramilitary 15,000

Conscript liability 17 months, but can be extended for ground forces.

RESERVE 300,000

Some mobilisation reported, 300,000 with military service within 15 years

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 56,850

FORCES BY ROLE
COMMAND
5 corps HQ
MANOEUVRE
Mechanised
4 MR bde
Light
19 MR bde
Other
1 sy bde

COMBAT SUPPORT
1 arty bde
1 arty trg bde
1 MRL bde
1 AT bde
1 engr bde
1 sigs bde

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 log bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MBT 433: 95 T-55; 244 T-72; 94 T-90S
AIFV 211: 20 BMD-1; 43 BMP-1; 33 BMP-2; 100 BMP-3; 15 BRM-1
APC 575
APC (T) 336 MT-LB
APC (W) 149: 10 BTR-60; 132 BTR-70; 7 BTR-80A
PPV 90: 45 Marauder; 45 Matador
ARTY 542
SP 87: 122mm 46 2S1; 152mm 24: 6 2S3; 18 2S19 Msta-S; 155mm 5 ATOMS-2000; 203mm 12 2S7
TOWED 207: 122mm 129 D-30; 130mm 36 M-46; 152mm 42: 18 2A36; 24 D-20
GUN/MOR 120mm 36: 18 2S9 NONA; 18 2S31 Vena
MRL 100+: 122mm 52+; 43 BM-21; 9+ IMI Lynx; 128mm 12 RAK-12; 220mm 6 TOS-1A; 300mm 30 9A52 Smerch
MOR 120mm 112: 5 CARDOM; 107 PM-38
AT • MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn); Spike-LR
AD • SAM • SP 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher); 2K11 Krug (SA-4 Ganef); 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko)
MANPAD 9K32 Strela (SA-7 Grail); 9K34 Strela-3; (SA-14 Grenmlin); 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet); 9K338 Igla-S (SA-24 Grinch)
MSL • SSM €4 9M79 Tochka (SS-21 Scarab)
RADAR • LAND SNAR-1 Long Trough/SNAR-2/6 Pork Trough (arty); Small Fred/Small Yawn/SNAR-10 Big Fred (veh, arty); GS-13 Long Eye (veh)
UAV • ISR • Medium 3 Aerostar
AEV MT-LB
MW Boxena

Navy 2,200

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 8
CORVETTES • FS 1 Petya II with 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2, 2 twin 76mm gun
PSO 1 Luga (Woodnik 2 Class) (FSU Project 888; additional trg role)
PCC 3: 2 Petrushka (FSU UK-3; additional trg role); 1 Shelom (FSU Project 1388M)
PB 3: 1 Bryza (FSU Project 722); 1 Yark (TUR AB 25); 1 Pobrat (FSU Project 368)
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4
MHC 4: 2 Yezgenya (FSU Project 1258); 2 Yakhont (FSU Sonya)

AMPHIBIOUS 6
LSM 3: 1 Polnochny A (FSU Project 770) (capacity 6 MBT; 180 troops); 2 Polnochny B (FSU Project 771) (capacity 6 MBT; 180 troops)
LCU 1 Vydrat (FSU) (capacity either 3 AMX-30 MBT or 200 troops)
LCM 2 T-4 (FSU)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 5
AGS 1 (FSU Project 10470)
ARS 1 Isa (FSU Vikhr)
YTB 2
YTD 1

Air Force and Air Defence 7,900

FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER
1 sqn with MiG-29 Fulcrum
FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
1 regt with MiG-21 Fishbed; Su-17 Fitter; Su-24 Fencer; Su-25 Frogfoot; Su-25UB Frogfoot B
TRANSPORT
1 sqn with An-12 Cub; Yak-40 Codling
ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 regt with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-24 Hind; Mi-35M Hind; PZL Mi-2 Hoplite

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 44 combat capable
FTR 14 MiG-29 Fulcrum
FGA 11: 4 MiG-21 Fishbed (1 more in store); 4 Su-17 Fitter; 1 Su-17U Fitter; 2 Su-24 Fencer
ATK 19: 16 Su-25 Frogfoot; 3 Su-25UB Frogfoot B
TPT 4: Medium 1 An-12 Cub; Light 3 Yak-40 Codling
TRG 40: 28 L-29 Delfin; 12 L-39 Albatros

HELICOPTERS
ATK 42: 26 Mi-24 Hind; 16 Mi-35M Hind
MRH 20+ Mi-17-IV Hip
TPT 20: Medium 13 Mi-8 Hip; Light 7 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite
UAV • ISR • Medium 4 Aerostar
AD • SAM S-75 Divina (SA-2 Guideline); S-125 Neva (SA-3 Goa); S-200 Vega (SA-5 Gammon) static; S-300PM/PMU2 (SA-10 Grumble/SA-20 Gargoyle)
MSL • AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer)
IR/SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo)

Paramilitary £15,000

Border Guard £5,000
Ministry of Internal Affairs
AIFV 168 BMP-1/2
APC (W) 19 BTR-60/70/80

Coast Guard
The Coast Guard was established in 2005 as part of the State Border Service.

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10
PBF 6: 1 Osu II (FSU Project 205); 2 Silver Ships 48ft; 3 Stenka
PB 4: 2 Baltic 150; 1 Point (US); 1 Grif (FSU Zhuk)
Belarus  BLR

Belarusian Ruble  

\[
\begin{array}{lcccc}
\text{Belarusian Ruble} & \text{2012} & \text{2013} & \text{2014} \\
\hline
\text{GDP} & \text{r} & 527\text{tr} & 698\text{tr} \\
\text{per capita} & \text{US$} & 63.3\text{bn} & 72.9\text{bn} \\
\text{Growth} & \% & 1.50 & 2.11 \\
\text{Inflation} & \% & 59.22 & 20.50 \\
\text{Def bdgt} & \text{r} & 4.61\text{tr} & \\
\text{US$} & & 552\text{m} & \\
\text{US\$1=r} & & 8336.92 & 9573.73 \\
\end{array}
\]

Population  

\[
\begin{array}{l}
\text{9,625,888} \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

Capabilities

The primary role of the armed forces is to protect territorial integrity. Much of Belarus’s military inventory consists of ageing Soviet-era equipment. High inflation during 2011 is believed to have adversely affected morale within the conscript-based armed forces; these have reduced in size. As of late-2013 the fate of the air force’s Su-27 Flankers remained unclear. This threatened to leave the MiG-29 Fulcrum as the country’s only fighter aircraft. Air combat capabilities could be bolstered by the creation of a Russian air base in Belarus. Moscow is Minsk’s main ally. Early 2013 saw a second Tor-M2 battery enter service, with an additional S-300 (SA-10/20) battery now expected in 2014. Belarusian forces exercise with their Russian counterparts regularly and could support notionally a regional joint operation with Moscow, though the actual combat capacity of its ground forces is limited. Alongside its close bilateral defence and security ties to Russia, through the CSTO and the Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia Customs Union, Belarus is also developing a relationship with China, and has defence-industrial ties with Ukraine. Belarus hosted in September 2013 the CSTO’s Rapid Reaction Forces Zapad-13 exercise, to which it contributes an air assault brigade.

ACTIVE 48,000  (Army 22,500 Air 15,000 Joint 10,500) Paramilitary 110,000

RESERVE 289,500  (Joint 289,500 with mil service within last 5 years)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Joint 10,500  (Centrally controlled units and MoD staff)

Army 22,500

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND

2 comd HQ (West & North West)
SPECIAL FORCES
1 SF bde

MANOEUVRE
Mechanised
1 (mobile) armd inf bde
1 (mobile) mech bde
4 mech bde

COMBAT SUPPORT
2 arty bde
1 arty gp
1 MRL bde
2 MRL regt
2 SSM bde
2 AD bde
2 engr bde
2 engr regt
1 EW unit
1 NBC regt
1 ptn bridging regt
2 sigs bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT
515: 446 T-72; 69 T-80

AIFV
1,111: 100 BMD-1; 875 BMP-2; 136 BRM-1

APC
264
APC (T)
72: 22 BTR-D; 50 MT-LB
APC (W)
192: 39 BTR-70; 153 BTR-80

ARTY
1,005
SP
434: 122mm 198 2S1; 152mm 236: 108 2S3; 116 2S5; 12 2S19 Farm
TOWED
228: 122mm 48 D-30; 152mm 180: 48 2A36; 132 2A65

GUN/MOR
120mm
61 2S12

AT • MSL
SP 236: 126 9P148 Konkurs; 110 9P149 Shturm
MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 9K114 Shturm (AT-6 Spiral); 9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn)

AD • SAM • SP
350 9K37 Buk (SA-11 Gadfly); S-300V (SA-12A Gladiator/SA-12B Giant); 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher); 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko) (700–2,100 eff.); Tor-M2E (SA-15 Gauntlet)

RADAR • LAND
GS-13 Long Eye/SNAR-1 Long Trough/ SNAR-2/-4 Pork Trough (arty); some Small Fred/Small Yawn/ SNAR-10 Big Fred (veh, arty)

MSL • TACTICAL • SSM
96: 36 FROG/SS-21 Scarab (Tochka); 60 Scud
AEV MT-LB
VLB MTU

Air Force and Air Defence Forces
15,000

Flying hours 15 hrs/year

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER
2 sqn with MiG-29S/UB Fulcrum

GROUND ATTACK
2 sqn with Su-25K/UBK Frogfoot A/B

TRANSPORT
1 base with An-12 Cub; An-24 Coke; An-26 Curl; II-76 Candid; Tu-134 Crusty

TRAINING
Some sqn with L-39 Albatros

ATTACK HELICOPTER
Some sqn with Mi-24 Hind

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
Some (cbt spt) sqn with Mi-6 Hook; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-24K Hind G2; Mi-24R Hind G1; Mi-26 Halo

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT
72 combat capable
FTR 38 MiG-29S/UB Fulcrum
FGA (21 Su-27P/UB Flanker B/C poss. non-operational)
ATK 34 Su-25K/UBK Frogfoot A/B
TPT 13: Heavy 2 II-76 Candid (+9 civ II-76 available for mil use); Medium 3 An-12 Cub; Light 8: 1 An-24 Coke; 6 An-26 Curl; 1 Tu-134 Crusty
TRG Some L-39 Albatros

HELICOPTERS
ATK 49 Mi-24 Hind
ISR 20: 8 Mi-24K Hind G2; 12 Mi-24R Hind G1
TPT 168: Heavy 43: 29 Mi-6 Hook; 14 Mi-26 Halo; Medium 125 Mi-8 Hip

MSL
ASM Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen); Kh-29 (AS-14 Kedge)
ARM Kh-58 (AS-11 Kilter)
AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer)
SARH R-27R (AA-10 Alamo A)

Air Defence

AD data from Uzal Baranovichi EW radar

FORCES BY ROLE

AIR DEFENCE
1 bde (2 AD bn)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AD • SAM S-300PS (SA-10B Grumble); S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa); S-200 (SA-5 Gammon)

Paramilitary

Border Guards 12,000
Ministry of Interior

Militia 87,000
Ministry of Interior

Ministry of Interior Troops 11,000

DEPLOYMENT

LEBANON
UN • UNIFIL 5

SOUTH SUDAN
UN • UNMISS 4 obs

FOREIGN FORCES

Russia: Military Air Forces: 4 SAM units with S-300 (SA-10 Grumble (quad))
Georgia’s armed forces continue to make efforts to address lessons from the conflict with Russia in 2008, while tensions with Moscow remain. The brief war revealed significant shortcomings in key areas, including anti-armour and air-defence capabilities, though performance in air defence was better. It has also acquired the Israeli Spyder short-range air-defence system. A substantial number of Georgia’s T-72 MBTs were destroyed during the short conflict. Current plans call for the small air force – comprising Soviet-era ground-attack aircraft and combat-support helicopters as well as transport and utility helicopters – to merge with the army. Georgia currently deploys personnel to ISAF in Afghanistan, and has aspirations for NATO membership. Training activity involves international forces, including the US. Moves are under way to generate a pool of four-year contract servicemen to boost professionalisation.

ACTIVE 20,650 (Army 17,750 Air 1,300 National Guard 1,600) Paramilitary 11,700
Conscript liability 18 months

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 14,000; 3,750 conscript (total 17,750)

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES
1 SF bde

MANOEUVRE

Light
5 inf bde

Amphibious
2 mne bn (1 cadre)

COMBAT SUPPORT
2 arty bde
1 engr bde
1 sigs bn
1 SIGINT bn
1 MP bn

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 med bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT 123: 23 T-55; 100 T-72

RECE 4+ Didgori-2

AIFV 72: 25 BMP-1; 46 BMP-2; 1 BRM-1K

APC 199+

AIFV (T) 69+: 3 Lazika; 66 MT-LB

AIFV (W) 120+: 25 BTR-70; 19 BTR-80; 8+ Didgori-1; 3+ Didgori-3; 65 Ejder

PPV 10 Cougar

ARTY 240

SP 67 152mm 66: 32 DANA; 20 2S1; 13 2S3; 1 2S19; 203mm 1 2S7

TOWED 71: 122mm 58 D-30; 152mm 13: 3 2A36; 10 2A65

MRL 122mm 37: 13 BM-21; 6 GRAD-LAR; 18 RM-70

MOR 120mm 65: 12 2S12; 33 M-75; 18 M120

AT e50

MSL e10

GUNS e40

AD • SAM • SP 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher); Spyder

MANPAD Grom; 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail); 9K36 Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin); 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet)

Air Force 1,300 (incl 300 conscript)

1 avn base, 1 hel air base

AIRCRAFT 12 combat capable

ATK 12: 3 Su-25 Frogfoot; 7 Su-25K Frogfoot A; 2 Su-25UB Frogfoot B

TPT • Light 9: 6 An-2 Colt; 1 Tu-134A Crusty (VIP); 2 Yak-40 Colling

TRG 9 L-29 Delfin

HELICOPTERS

ATK 6 Mi-24 Hind

TPT 29 Medium 17 Mi-8T Hip; Light 12 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois)

UAV • ISR • Medium 1+ Hermes 450

AD • SAM 1–2 bn 9K37 Buk-M1 (SA-11 Gadfly), 8 9K33 Osa-AK (SA-8B Gecko) (two bty), 6–10 9K33 Osa-AKM updated SAM systems.

National Guard 1,600 active reservists opcon

Army

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Light
1 inf bde

Paramilitary 11,700

Border Guard 5,400

Coast Guard

HQ at Poti. The Navy was merged with the Coast Guard in 2009 under the auspices of the Georgian Border Guard, within the Ministry of the Interior.

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 16

PBF 2: 1 Kaam 33; 1 Kaam 20
PB 14: 7 Zhuk (3 ex-UKR); 2 Point; 2 Dauntless; 2 Dilos (ex-GRC); 1 Akhmeta (up to 20 patrol launches also in service)

AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCU 1 Vydra (ex-BUL)
LOGISTIC AND SUPPORT • YTL 1

Ministry of Interior Troops 6,300

DEPLOYMENT
Legal provisions for foreign deployment of armed forces:
Decision on deployment of troops abroad: By the presidency upon parliamentary approval (Art. 100)

AFGHANISTAN
NATO • ISAF 1,561; 2 inf bn

SERBIA
OSCE • Kosovo 4

TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL
Following the August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia, the areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia declared themselves independent. Data presented here represents the de facto situation and does not imply international recognition as sovereign states.

FOREIGN FORCES
Russia Army 7,000; 1 MR bde at Gudauta (Abkhazia); 1 MR bde at Djava/Tskhinvali (S. Ossetia)

Kazakhstan KAZ

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<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
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<td>32.2t</td>
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<td>per capita</td>
<td>US$</td>
<td>196bn</td>
<td>214bn</td>
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<td>US$</td>
<td>11,773</td>
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<td>Growth</td>
<td>%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>5.12</td>
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<td>Def bdgt</td>
<td>t</td>
<td>340bn</td>
<td>348bn</td>
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<tr>
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<td>150.28</td>
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</table>

Population 17,736,896
Ethnic groups: Kazakh 51%; Russian 32%; Ukrainian 5%; German 2%; Tatar 2%; Uzbek 13%

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<th>Age</th>
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<th>15–19</th>
<th>20–24</th>
<th>25–29</th>
<th>30–64</th>
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<td>Male</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
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<td>4.7%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>19.9%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>22.3%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
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</table>

Capabilities
The Soviet origins of Kazakhstan’s conscript-based armed forces remain. The 2011 Military Doctrine identified both internal and external security concerns, and risks from regional instability. There were few force structure changes in that document, with much focus on the development of Kazakhstan’s indigenous defence industry. Kazakhstan is a member of the CSTO and also participates in Shanghai Cooperation Organisation military exercises. Moscow and Astana signed an agreement on the creation of a joint regional air-defence system at the beginning of 2013. As of mid-2013, it appeared that delivery of the S-300PMU-1, under discussion since 2010, had not yet begun. The services are at varying levels of preparedness. In the army, air mobile units are held at the highest level of readiness, with other units at considerably lower levels. There are ongoing efforts to improve the navy and the air force, with modest procurement projects underway. Rotary- and fixed-wing transport is being improved, while some combat aircraft have also been upgraded. The air force reportedly struggles to keep its aircraft airworthy, although air-defence fighters fare better than strike aircraft. Tactical airlift is being bolstered with the purchase of the C-295; deliveries began in 2013. Ukraine is also emerging as a defence-industrial partner, with collaboration on armoured vehicle production.

ACTIVE 39,000 (Army 20,000 Navy 3,000 Air 12,000 MoD 4,000) Paramilitary 31,500
Conscript liability 12 months

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 20,000
4 regional comd: Astana, East, West and Southern

FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Armoured
1 tk bde
Mechanised
4 mech bde
Air Manoeuvre
4 air aslt bde

COMBAT SUPPORT
3 arty bde
1 SSM unit
3 cbt engr bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MBT 300 T-72
RECCE 100: 40 BRDM; 60 BRM
AIFV 652: 500 BMP-2; 107 BTR-80A; 43 BTR-82A; 2 BTR-3E
APC 357
APC (T) 150 MT-LB
APC (W) 207: 190 BTR-80; 17 Cobra
ARTY 602
SP 246: 122mm 126: 120 2S3; 6 Sener; 152mm 120 2S3
TOWED 150; 122mm 100 D-30; 152mm 50 2A65;
(122mm up to 300 D-30 in store)
AIRCRAFT EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIR DEFENCE

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

ATTACK HELICOPTER

TRAINING

TRANSPORT

GROUND ATTACK

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

FIGHTER

FORCES BY ROLE

Air Force

12,000 (incl Air Defence)

Zhaik AND SUPPORT

AGS

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AGS 1 Zhaik

Coastal Defence

MANOEUVRE

Other

1 coastal defence bde

Air Force 12,000 (incl Air Defence)

Flying hours 100 hrs/year

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

1 sqn with MiG-29/MiG-29UB Fulcrum
2 sqn with MiG-31/MiG-31BM Foxhound

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

2 sqn with MiG-27 Flogger D; MiG-23UB Flogger C
2 sqn with Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker

GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with Su-25 Frogfoot

TRANSPORT

1 unit with Tu-134 Crusty; Tu-154 Careless,
1 sqn with An-12 Cub, An-26 Curl, An-30 Clank, An-72 Coaler

TRAINING

1 sqn with L-39 Albatros

ATTACK HELICOPTER

5 sqn with Mi-24V Hind

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

Some sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H); EC145; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17V-5 Hip; Mi-26 Halo

AIR DEFENCE

Some regt with S-75M Volkhov (SA-2 Guideline); S-125 Neva (SA-3 Goa); S-300 (SA-10 Grumble); 2K11 Krug (SA-4 Ganef); S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon); static; S-300 (SA-10 Grumble)

TOwed 100 S-75M Volkhov (SA-2 Guideline); S-125 Neva (SA-3 Goa)

AD • SAM 147+

SP 47+: 20 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful); 27+ 2K11 Krug (SA-4 Ganef)/S-200 Angara; static; S-300; 50+ Mi-26 (UH-1H); 6 EC145

HELICOPTERS

ATHK 40+ Mi-24V Hind (first 9 upgraded)

MRH 20 Mi-17V-5 Hip

TPT 64 Heavy 2 Mi-26 Halo; Medium 50 Mi-8 Hip; Light 12: 6 Bell-205 (UH-1H); 6 EC145

AD • SAM 147+

SP 47+: 20 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful); 27+ 2K11 Krug (SA-4 Ganef)/S-200 Angara; static; S-300 (SA-10 Grumble)

Towed 100 S-75M Volkhov (SA-2 Guideline); S-125 Neva (SA-3 Goa)

MIL

ASM Kh-23 (AS-7 Kyle); Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen); Kh-29 (AS-14 Kedge)

ARM Kh-28 (AS-9 Kyle); Kh-27 (AS-12 Kegler); Kh-58 (AS-11 Killer)

AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer) IR/

SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo) SARH R-33 (AA-9 Amos)

ARH R-77 (AA-12 Adder – on MiG-31BM)

Paramilitary 31,500

Government Guard 500

Internal Security Troops £20,000

Ministry of Interior

Presidential Guard 2,000

State Border Protection Forces £9,000

Ministry of Interior

HEL • TPT • Medium 1 Mi-171

Kyrgyzstan KGZ

Kyrgyzstani Som s 2012 2013 2014

GDP s 304bn 348bn

US$ 6.47bn 7.23bn

per capita

US$ 1.158 1.282

Growth % -0.90 7.37

Inflation % 2.77 8.61

Def bdg * s 4.95bn 4.91bn 4.87bn

US$ 105m 102m

FMA (US) US$ 1.5m 1.5m 1.5m

US$1=s 47.02 48.11

* Expenses on Ministry of Defence & Ministry of Interior.

Population 5,548,042

Ethnic groups: Kyrgyz 56%; Russian 17%; Uzbek 13%; Ukrainian 3%

GUN/MOR 120mm 25 259 Anona

MRL 118: 122mm 100 BM-21 Grad; 300mm 18 Lynx
(with 50 msl); (122mm 100 BM-21 Grad; 220mm 180 9P140 Uranag all in store)

MOR 63 SP 120mm 18 CARDOM 120mm 45 2B11/M120 AT

MSL

SP 3 BMP-T

MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115 Metis (AT-6 Spiral)

GUNS 100mm 68 MT-12/T-12

MSL • SSM 12 9K79 Tochka (SS-21 Scarab)

AEV MT-LB

Navy 3,000

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 17

PCG 1 Kazakhstan with 2 quad lnchr with 3424 Uran

(SS-N-25 Switchblade) AShM, 1 Ghibka lnchr with SA-N-10 Gimlet SAM

PB 5: 3 Sea Dolphin; 2 Saygak;

PB 15: 4 Almaty; 1 Dauntless; 1 Turk (AB25); 2 Zhuk (of which 1 may be operational); 4 Sardar; 3 Archangel;

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AGS 1 Zhaik

Coastal Defence

MANOEUVRE

Other

1 coastal defence bde

ECONOMICS

Budget:

GDP 4.1% 4.2% 4.1%

GDP/Per Capita 4.95bn 4.91bn 4.87bn

Personal Consumption 54.6% 54.6% 53.7%

GDP at Market Prices 4.95bn 4.91bn 4.87bn

GDP at Factor Cost 3.37bn 3.37bn 3.38bn

Population 5,548,042

Ethnic groups: Kyrgyz 56%; Russian 17%; Uzbek 13%; Ukrainian 3%
Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male 15.2% 4.7% 5.2% 4.8% 17.3% 1.9%
Female 14.5% 4.5% 5.1% 4.7% 19.1% 3.0%

Capabilities

A new military doctrine was enacted in July 2013, setting out possible threats to the state and plans to reform the armed forces. The security environment is characterised as being marked by unpredictability and the sudden emergence of conflict. The reform plans promise, among other things, a modern military with enhanced C2, effective military logistics and a modern air-defence system, adding the term ‘mobilisation readiness’. In general, combat readiness remains low with large numbers of poorly trained conscripts within the armed forces and, according to analysts, Bishkek is no closer to devising the force structure, doctrine, training and procurement policies that would support state security priorities. Kyrgyzstan is a member of the CSTO and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. In mid-2013 the army conducted an anti-terrorist exercise with Russian air force units from Kant air base. The US and Russia have a base each in the country, though the agreement allowing the US to use Manas expires in 2014.

ACTIVE 10,900 (Army 8,500 Air 2,400) Paramilitary 9,500
Conscript liability 18 months

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 8,500

FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES
1 SF bde
MANOEUVRE
Mechanised
2 MR bde
1 (mtl) MR bde
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 arty bde
1 AD bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MBT 150 T-72
RECCE 30 BRDM-2
AIFV 320: 230 BMP-1; 90 BMP-2
APC (W) 35: 25 BTR-70; 10 BTR-80
ARTY 246
SP 122mm 18 2S1
TOWED 141: 100mm 18 M-1944; 122mm 107: 72 D-30; 35 M-30 (M-1938); 152mm 16 D-1
GUN/MOR 120mm 12 2S9 Anona
MRL 21: 122mm 15 BM-21; 220mm 6 9P140 Uragan
MOR 120mm 54: 6 2S12; 48 M-120
AT • MSL • MANPATS 9K11 (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 (AT-4 Spigot); 9K113 (AT-5 Spandrel)
RCL 73mm SPG-9
GUNS 100mm 18 MT-12/T-12

AD • SAM • MANPAD 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)‡
GUNS 48
SP 23mm 24 ZSU-23-4
TOWED 57mm 24 S-60

Air Force 2,400

FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER
1 regt with L-39 Albatros*†
FIGHTER/TRANSPORT
1 (comp avn) regt with MiG-21 Fishbed; An-2 Colt; An-26 Curl
ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 regt with Mi-24 Hind; Mi-8 Hip
AIR DEFENCE
Some regt with S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa); S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 33 combat capable
FGA 29 MiG-21 Fishbed
TPT • Light 6: 4 An-2 Colt; 2 An-26 Curl
TRG 4 L-39 Albatros*

HELICOPTERS
ATK 2 Mi-24 Hind
TPT • Medium 8 Mi-8 Hip

AD • SAM
SP 2K11 Krug (SA-4 Ganef)
TOWED S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline); S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa)

Paramilitary 9,500

Border Guards 5,000 (KGZ conscript, RUS officers)

Interior Troops 3,500

National Guard 1,000

DEPLOYMENT

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
OSCE • Bosnia and Herzegovina 1

LIBERIA
UN • UNMIL 3 obs

SOUTH SUDAN
UN • UNMISS 2 obs

SUDAN
UN • UNAMID 2 obs

FOREIGN FORCES

Russia ε500 Military Air Forces: 5 Su-25 Frogfoot; 2 Mi-8 Hip
Russia and Eurasia

Moldova MDA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Moldovan Leu L</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>L</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US$</td>
<td>7.25bn</td>
<td>7.89bn</td>
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<tr>
<td>per capita</td>
<td>US$</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td>2,037</td>
<td>2,218</td>
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<tr>
<td>Growth</td>
<td>%</td>
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<td>4.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inflation</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>4.66</td>
<td>4.64</td>
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<tr>
<td>Def bdgt *</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>270m</td>
<td>292m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US$</td>
<td>22m</td>
<td>24m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMA (US)</td>
<td>US$</td>
<td>1.25m</td>
<td>1.25m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.25m</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>US$1=L</td>
<td>12.11</td>
<td>12.29</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* Includes military pensions

Population 3,619,925

Age 0 – 14 15 – 19 20 – 24 25 – 29 30 – 64 65 plus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Male</th>
<th>9.1%</th>
<th>3.4%</th>
<th>4.3%</th>
<th>4.7%</th>
<th>23.0%</th>
<th>4.0%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Capabilities

Moldova is a neutral state with limited military capability. Its conscript-based army’s primary focus is on the disputed territory of Transdniestr, though the country is also looking to develop further the capacity to contribute to peacekeeping and crisis management missions in a multinational context. Political upheaval during the first half of 2013 may have delayed its ambitions to sign an association agreement with the European Union, though this could be initialled at November’s Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius. Russia continues to support an army garrison as well as a peacekeeping contingent in Transdniestr. Moldova’s air capability is limited to a small fixed- and rotary-wing transport fleet. Implementing the recommendations of the Strategic Defence Review, carried out with UK support in 2011, is a priority, though funding problems mean this could prove a challenge. Moldovan forces are deployed in small numbers on UN operations.

ACTIVE 5,350 (Army 3,250 Air 800 Logistic Support 1,300) Paramilitary 2,400

RESERVE 58,000 (Joint 58,000)

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 1,300; 1,950 conscript (total 3,250)

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF bn

MANOEUVRE

Light

3 mot inf bde

1 mot inf bn

Other

1 gd bn

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bn

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

RECC 5 BRDM-2

AIFV 44 BMD-1

APC 164

APC (T) 64; 9 BTR-D; 55 MT-LB

APC (W) 100; 11 BTR-80; 89 TAB-71

ARTY 148

TOWED 69: 122mm 17 (M-30) M-1938; 152mm 52: 21 2A36; 31 D-20

GUN/MOR • SP 120mm 9 2S9 Anona

MRL 220mm 11 9P140 Uragan

MOR 59: 82mm 52; 120mm 7 M-120

AT

MSL • MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 9K114 Shturm (AT-6 Spiral)

RCL 73mm SPG-9

GUNS

100mm

36 MT-12

AD

• GUNS • TOWED 39: 23mm 28 ZU-23; 57mm 11 S-60

Radar

• LAND 4: 2 ARK-1; 2 SNAR-10

Air Force 800 (incl 250 conscripts)

FORCES BY ROLE

TRANSPORT

2 sqn with An-2 Colt; An-26 Curl; An-72 Coaler; Mi-8PS Hip; Yak-18

AIR DEFENCE

1 regt with S-125 Nva (SA-3 Goa)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

TPT • Light 6: 2 An-2 Colt; 1 An-26 Curl; 2 An-72 Coaler 1 Yak-18

HELICOPTERS

MRH 4 Mi-17-1V Hip H

TPT • Medium 2 Mi-8PS Hip

AD • SAM 12 S-125 Nva (SA-3 Goa)

Paramilitary 2,400

Ministry of Interior

OPON 900 (riot police)

Ministry of Interior

DEPLOYMENT

Legal provisions for foreign deployment:

Constitution: Codified constitution (1994)

Decision on deployment of troops abroad: By the parliament (Art. 66)

Bosnia-Herzegovina

OSCE • Bosnia and Herzegovina 1

Côte d’Ivoire

UN • UNOCI 3 obs

Liberia

UN • UNMIL 2 obs
FOREIGN FORCES

Czech Republic OSCE 1
Estonia OSCE 2
France OSCE 1
Germany OSCE 1
Poland OSCE 1
Russia ε1,500 (including 350 peacekeepers) Military Air Forces 7 Mi-24 Hind/Mi-8 Hip
Serbia OSCE 1
Spain OSCE 1
Sweden OSCE 1
Switzerland OSCE 1
Ukraine 10 mil obs (Joint Peacekeeping Force)
United Kingdom OSCE 1
United States OSCE 3

Russia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Russian Rouble r</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP r</td>
<td>62.4tr</td>
<td>68.1tr</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US$ 2.02tr</td>
<td>2.21tr</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US$ 2.52tr</td>
<td>2.64tr</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>per capita</td>
<td>14,247</td>
<td>15,650</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth %</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation %</td>
<td>5.07</td>
<td>6.86</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Def bdgt r</td>
<td>1.81tr</td>
<td>2.49tr</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US$ 58.8bn</td>
<td>62.8bn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US$ 73bn</td>
<td>81.4bn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US$1=r</td>
<td>MER 30.84</td>
<td>30.78</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP 24.81</td>
<td>25.81</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* PPP estimate

Population 142,500,482

Ethnic groups: Tatar 4%; Ukrainian 3%; Chuvash 1%; Bashkir 1%; Belarussian 1%; Moldovan 1%; Other 8%

Age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus
Male 8.2% 2.4% 3.5% 4.4% 23.7% 4.0%
Female 7.8% 2.3% 3.3% 4.4% 26.8% 9.1%

Capabilities

Russia remains a significant continental military power, and is in the process of renewing its nuclear arsenal. The first of the Borey-class SSBNs, the Yury Dolgoruky, formally joined the fleet at the beginning of 2013, and is intended as part of a broader recapitalisation of the country’s nuclear capability. The Russian armed forces are undergoing a reform process, begun by Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov in 2008. His replacement by Sergey Shoigu in November 2012 raised questions about the future of the reform process. However, main elements, such as the initiative to transform the army towards a combined arms brigade-based structure, appear to continue. Though pay rates were increased in 2012, the recruitment of contract personnel in adequate numbers remains a challenge, particularly for NCOs and specialist roles; this is also a reflection of demographic issues. The warrant officer rank cut by the Serdyukov reforms – a class of long-serving specialists usually in roles demanding technical or administrative skills – was reinstated and an ambitious 50,000 recruitment target set. Conventional re-equipment continues with all three services taking delivery of modern combat systems, if sometimes in modest numbers. Force restructuring – such as the establishment of the Special Operations Command – is intended to improve capability amid smaller armed forces. The deployment of the Russian Mediterranean Task Force in response to the 2013 Syria crisis and the Western naval presence was a significant show of maritime power. Deployments in Eurasia and on UN missions continue. (See pp. 161–3.)

ACTIVE 845,000 (Army 250,000 Airborne 35,000 Navy 130,000 Air 150,000 Strategic Deterrent Forces 80,000 Command and Support 200,000) Paramilitary 519,000

Conscript liability 12 months conscription.

RESERVE 2,000,000 (all arms)
Some 2,000,000 with service within last 5 years; Reserve obligation to age 50.

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Strategic Deterrent Forces ε80,000 (incl personnel assigned from the Navy and Air Force)

Navy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC • SSBN 11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 Kalmar (Delta III) with 16 RSM-50 (SS-N-18 Stingray) strategic SLBM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Delfin (Delta IV) with 16 R-29RMU Sineva (SS-N-23 Skiff) strategic SLBM (of which 1 vessel in repair following a fire; expected return to service 2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Akula (Typhoon) in reserve with capacity for 20 Bulava (SS-N-X-32) strategic SLBM (trials/testing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Borey with capacity for 16 Bulava (SS-N-X-32) SLBM (missiles not yet operational), (2 additional units completed sea trials with a notional ISD 2014; 2 further units in build)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Strategic Rocket Force Troops

3 Rocket Armies operating silo and mobile launchers organised in 12 divs (reducing to 8). Launcher rp is normally with 10 silos (6 for RS-20/SS-18), or 9 mobile lnchr, and one control centre

MSL • STRATEGIC 356

ICBM 356: 54 RS-20 (SS-18 Satan) (mostly mod 5, 10 MIRV per msl); 160 RS-12M (SS-25 Sickle) (mobile single warhead); 40 RS-18 (SS-19 Stiletto) (mostly mod
FORCES BY ROLE

BOMBER
1 sqn with Tu-160 Blackjack
3 sqn with Tu-95MS Bear

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT
BBR 78: 16 Tu-160 Blackjack each with up to 12 Kh-55 SM (AS-15A/B Kent) nuclear ALCM; 31 Tu-95MS6 (Bear H-6) each with up to 6 Kh-55/SM (AS-15A/B Kent) nuclear ALCM; 31 Tu-95MS16 (Bear H-16) each with up to 16 Kh-55 (AS-15A Kent) nuclear ALCM; (Kt-102 likely now in service on Tu-95MS)

Warning Forces 3rd Space and Missile Defence Army

ICBM/SLBM launch-detection capability: 3 operational satellites
RADAR (9 stations) 1 ABM engagement system located at Sosrofino (Moscow). Russia leases ground-based radar stations in Baranovichi (Belarus); Balkhash (Kazakhstan). It also has radars on its own territory at Lekhtusi, (St Petersburg); Armavir, (southern Russia); Olengorsk (northwest Arctic); Pechora (northwest Urals); Mishelevka (east Siberia).

MISSILE DEFENCE 1,996: 68 53T6 (ABM-3 Gazelle); 1,800 S-300 (SA-10 Grumble); 96 S-400 (SA-21 Growler); (32 51T6 (ABM-4 Gorgon) in store; possibly destroyed)

Space Forces 40,000

Formations and units to detect missile attack on the RF and its allies, to implement BMD, and to be responsible for military/dual-use spacecraft launch and control. May become part of new Air-Space Defence Command.

SATELLITES 63
COMMUNICATIONS 24: 2 Mod Globus (Raduga-1M); 11 Strela; 8 Rodnik (Genets-M); 3 Meridian
NAVIGATION/POSITIONING/TIMING 32 GLONASS
ELINT/SIGINT 4: 1 Kondor; 1 Liana (Lotos-S); 1 Persona; 1 Tselina-2;
EARLY WARNING 3 Oko

Army £205,000 (incl 35,000 AB); £80,000 conscript (total 285,000)

Transformation process continues; previous 6 Military Districts have been consolidated into 4 (West (HQ St Petersburg), Centre (HQ Yekaterinburg), South (HQ Rostov-on-Don) & East (HQ Khabarovsk), each with a unified Joint Strategic Command. Current plans call for the establishment of 28 new bdes (6 MR; 2 air aslt; 1 engr; 1 AD & 18 army avn), and for the restructuring of the existing MR brigades into new light, medium and heavy formations.

FORCES BY ROLE

COMMAND
10 army HQ

SPECIAL FORCES
7 (Spetsnaz) SF bde
1 (AB Recce) SF regt

MANOEUVRE

Reconnaissance
1 recce bde

Armoured
1 (4th) tk div (1 armd recce bn; 3 tk bn; 1 MR bn; 1 arty bn; 1 MRL bn; 2 AD bn; 1 engr bn; 1 EW coy; 1 NBC coy)
3 tk bde (1 armd recce bn; 3 tk bn; 1 MR bn; 1 arty bn; 1 MRL bn; 2 AD bn; 1 engr bn; 1 EW coy; 1 NBC coy)

Mechanised
1 (5th) MR div (1 recce bn; 1 tk bn; 3 MR bn; 2 arty bn; 1 MRL bn; 1 AT bn; 2 AD bn; 1 engr bn; 1 EW coy; 1 NBC coy)
1 (201st) MR div
30 MR bde (1 recce bn; 1 tk bn; 3 MR bn; 2 arty bn; 1 MRL bn; 1 AT bn; 2 AD bn; 1 engr bn; 1 EW coy; 1 NBC coy)
2 MR bde (4—5 MR bn; 1 arty bn; 1 AD bn; 1 engr bn)
3 (lt/mtn) MR bde (1 recce bn; 2 MR bn; 1 arty bn)
1 (18th) MGA div (2 MGA regt; 1 arty regt; 1 tk bn; 2 AD bn)

Air Manoeuvre
4 AB div (2 para/air aslt regt; 1 arty regt; 1 AD regt)
1 indep AB bde
3 air aslt bde

COMBAT SUPPORT
8 arty bde
4 MRL bde
2 MRL regt
2 SSM bde with Iskander-M (SS-26 Stone)
7 SSM bde with Tochka (SS-21 Scarab) — to be replaced by Iskander-M)
10 AD bde
4 engr bde
1 MP bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT 2,550: 1,400 T-72B/BA; 150 T-72B3; 650 T-80BV/U; 350 T-90/T-90A; (18,000 in store: 2,800 T-55; 2,500 T-62; 2,000 T-64A/B; 7,500 T-72/T-72A/B; 3,000 T-80BV/U; 200 T-90)
RECECE 1,200+: 100+ Dozor, 100+ Tigr, 1,000 BRDM-2/2A; (1,000+ BRDM-2 in store)

AIFV 7,360+: 700 BMD-1; 600 BMD-2; 100 BMD-3; 60+ BMD-4; 1,000 BMP-1; 3,500 BMP-2; 500+ BMP-3; 700 BRM-1K; 200+ BTR-80A/82A; (8,500 in store: 7,000 BMP-1; 1,500 BMP-2)

APC 9,700+
APC (T) 5,700+: some BMO-T; 700 BTR-D; 5,000 MT-LB; (2,000 MT-LB in store)
APC (W) 4,000+ BTR-60/70/80; (4,000 BTR-60/70 in store)

ARTY 5,436+
SP 1,820: 122mm 400 251; 152mm 1,400: 800 253; 150 255; 450 2519; 203mm 20 257; (4,050 in store: 122mm 1,800 251; 152mm 1,950: 1,000 253; 800 255; 150 25319; 203mm 300 257)
TOWED 550: 122mm 400 D-30; 152mm 150 2A65; (12,215 in store: 122mm 7,950; 4,200 D-30; 3,750 M-30-M1938; 130mm 650 M-46; 152mm 3,575: 1,100 2A36; 600 2A65; 1,075 D-20; 700 D-1 M-1943; 100 ML-20 M-1937; 203mm 40 B-4M)
GUN/MOR 970+  
SP 120mm 870+: 790 259 NONA-S; 30 2S23 NONA-SVK; 50+ 2S34  
TOWED 120mm 100 2B16 NONA-K  
MRL 1,106+ 122mm 800 BM-21; 220mm 200 9P140  
Uragan; some TOS-1A; 300mm 106 9A52 Smerch; (2,920 in store:  
122mm 2,120; 1,700 BM-21; 420 9P138; 132mm  
100 BM-13; 220mm 700 9P140 Uragan)  
MOR 990  
SP 240mm 20 2S4; (410 2S4 in store)  
TOWED 970+ 120mm 970: 50+ 2B23; 920 2S12; (2,100 in store:  
120mm 1,800; 900 2S12; 900 PM-38; 160mm 300 M-160)  

AT  
MSL  
SP BMP-T with 9K120 Ataka (AT-9 Spiral 2); 9P149  
with 9K114 Shturm (AT-6 Spiral); 9P157-2 with 9K123  
Khrisantema (AT-15 Springer)  
MANPATS 9K11/9K14 Malyatka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111  
Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K112 Kobra (AT-8 Songster); 9K113  
Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 9K114 Shturm (AT-6 Spiral);  
9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn); 9K115-1 Metis-M (AT- 
13 Saxhorn 2); 9K116 Bastion/Basnaya (AT-10 Stabber);  
9K119 Reflex/Soir (AT-11 Sniper); 9K135 Kornet (AT-14  
Spriggan)  
RCL 73mm SPG-9  
RL 105mm RPG-29  
GUNS 562+  
SP: 125mm 36+ 2S25  
TOWED 100mm 526 MT-12; (100mm 2,000 T-12/  
MT-12 in store)  
AD • SAM 1,570+  
SP 1,320+: 350+ 9K37/9K317 Buk (SA-11 Gadfly); 400  
9K33M3 Osa-AKM (SA-8 Gecko)  
400 9K35M3 Strela-10  
(SA-13 Gopher); 120+ 9K330/9K311 Tor (SA-15 Gauntlet)  
SPAAAM 250+ 2K22 Tunguska (SA-19 Grison)  
MANKAD Igl-1 (SA-16 Gimlet); 9K38 Igl-S (SA-18  
Grouse); 9K338 Igl-S (SA-24 Grinch); 9K34 Strela-3 (SA- 
14 Gremlin)  

GUNS  
SP 23mm ZSU-23-4  
TOWED 23mm ZU-23-2; 57mm S-60  
UAV • Heavy Tu-143 Reys; Tu-243 Reys/Tu-243 Reys D; Tu- 
300 Korshue Light BLA-07; Pchela-1; Pchela-2  
MSL • SSM 200+: 200 Tochka (SS-21 Scarab); some  
Islander-M (SS-26 Stone); (some FROG in store; some Scud  
in store)  
AEV BAT-2; IMR; IRM; MT-LB  
ARV BMP-1; BREM-1/64/D/K/L; BREhM-D; BTR-50PK(B);  
M1977; MTP-LB; RM-G; T-54/55; VT-72A  
VLB KMM; MT-55A; MTU; MTU-20; MTU-72; PMM-2  
MW BM-3M; GMX-3; MVC-2 (reported); MTK; MTK-2  

Reserves  
Cadre formations, on mobilisation form  
MANOEUVRE  
Armoured  
1 tk bde  
Mechanised  
13 MR bde  

Navy £130,000  
4 major fleet organisations (Northern Fleet, Pacific Fleet,  
Baltic Fleet, Black Sea) and Caspian Sea Flotilla  

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE  

SUBMARINES 64  

STRATEGIC • SSBN 11:  
3 Kalmar (Delta III) with 16 R-29R Volna (SS-N-18  
Stingray) strategic SLBM  
6 Delfin (Delta IV) with 16 R-29RMU Sineva (SS-N-23  
Skiff) strategic SLBM (of which 1 vessel in repair  
following a fire; expected return to service 2014)  
1 Akula (Typhoon) in reserve for training with  
capacity for 20 Bulava (SS-N-X-32) strategic SLBM  
(trials/testing - 2 more awaiting decommissioning)  
1 Borey with capacity for 16 Bulava (SS-N-X-32)  
SLBM (missiles not yet operational), (2 additional  
units completed sea trials with expected ISD 2014;  
2 further units in build)  

TACTICAL 45  

SSGN 8:  
8 Antey (Oscar II) (of which 3 in reserve) with 2  
single 650mm TT each with T-65 HWT, 4 single  
553mm TT with 3M45 Granit (SS-N-19 Shipwave)  
AShM  

SSN 7:  
2 Schuka-B (Akula II) with 4 single 533mm TT each  
with 3M10 Granat (SS-N-21 Sampson) SLCM, 4  
single 650mm TT with T-65 HWT (one further  
boat leased to India for 10 years from 2012)  
8 Schuka-B (Akula I) (of which 2 in reserve) with 4  
single 533mm TT with 3M10 Granat (SS-N-21  
Sampson) SLCM, 4 single 650mm TT with T-65  
HWT  
2 Kondor (Sierra II) with 4 single 533mm TT each  
with 3M10 Granat (SS-N-21 Sampson) SLCM, 4  
single 650mm TT with T-65 HWT  
1 Barracuda (Sierra I) with 4 single 533mm TT with  
3M10 (SS-N-21 Sampson) SLCM, RPK-2 (SS-N-15  
Starfish) and T-33 HWT, 4 single 650mm TT with  
RPK-7 (SS-N-16 Stallion) AShM and T-65 HWT  
4 Schuka (Victor III) (of which 1 in reserve) with 4  
single 533mm TT each with 3M10 Granat (SS-N- 
21 Sampson) SLCM, 2 single 650mm TT with T-65  
HWT  

(1 Yasen (Graney) in sea trials; expected ISD 2014; 2  
more units in build)  

SSK 20:  
15 Paltus (Kilo) with 6 single 533mm TT with T-53  
HWT  
4 Varshavyanka (Kilo) with 6 single 533mm TT (3  
additional vessels under construction)  
1 Lada with 6 single 533mm TT (2 additional vessels  
in build)  

SUPPORT 8  

SSAN 7: 1 Orenburg (Delta III Stretch); 1 Losharik (one  
further vessel under construction); 2 Project 1851  
(Paltus); 3 Kashalot (Uiform)  
SSA 1 Sarov
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CV 1 Orel (Kuznetsov) with
1 12-cell VLS with 3M45 Granit (SS-N-19 Shipwreck)
ASHM, 4 sextuple VLS with 3K95 Kindzhal (SA-N-9 Gauntlet) SAM, 2 RBU 12000 Udav 1, 8 CADS-N-1 Kashtan CIWS with 9M311 (SA-N-11 Grison) SAM, 6 AK630 CIWS, (capacity 18-24 Su-33 Flanker D FGA ac; 4 Su-25UTG Frogfoot ac, 15 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel, 2 Ka-31R Helix AEW hel)

CRUISERS 5

CGHMN 1:
1 Orlan (Kirov) with 10 twin VLS with 3M45 Granit (SS-N-19 Shipwreck) ASHM, 2 twin lnchr with Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 12 single VLS with Fort/Fort M (SA-N-6 Grumble/SA-N-20 Gargoyle) SAM, 2 octuple VLS with 3K95 Kindzhal (SA-N-9 Gauntlet) SAM, 10 single 533mm ASTT, 1 RBU 12000 Udav 1, 2 RBU 1000 Smerch 3, 6 CADS-N-1 Kashtan CIWS with 9M311 (SA-N-11 Grison) SAM, 1 twin 130mm gun, (capacity 3 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel) (2nd Orlan undergoing extensive refit currently non-operational; expected return to service in 2017)

CGHM 4:
1 Berkut-B (Kara)† (scheduled to be decommissioned), with 2 quad lnchr with Rastrub (SS-N-14 Silex) ASHM/ASW, 2 twin lnchr with 4K60 Shstorm (SS-N-3 Golet) SAM, 2 twin lnchr with Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 quintuple 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000, 2 twin 76mm gun, (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel)
3 Atlant (Slava) with 8 twin lnchr with Vulkan (SS-N-12 mod 2 Sandboa) ASHM, 8 octuple VLS with Fort/Fort M (SA-N-6 Grumble/SA-N-20 Gargoyle) SAM, 2 single lnchr with Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 quintuple 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2, 6 AK650 CIWS, 1 twin 130mm gun, (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel) (one Atlant entered repairs in June 2011, currently non-operational; expected return to service in 2014)

DESTROYERS 18

DDGGM 17:
8 Sarpych (Sovremenny) (of which 3 in reserve) with 2 quad lnchr with 3M80 Moskit (SS-N-22 Sunburn) ASHM, 2 twin lnchr with 3K90 Uranag/9K37 Yezh (SA-N-7 Gadfly/SA-N-12 Grizzly) SAM, 2 twin 533mm TT, 2 RBU 1000 Smerch 3, 4 AK630 CIWS, 2 twin 130mm gun, (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel)
8 Fregat (Udaloy I) each with 2 quad lnchr with Rastrub (SS-N-14 Silex) ASHM/ASW, 8 octuple VLS with 3K95 Kindzhal (SA-N-9 Gauntlet) SAM, 2 quad 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2, 4 AK630 CIWS, 2 100mm gun, (capacity 2 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel)

DDGM 1:
1 Komsonolets Ukrainy (Kashin mod) with 2 quad lnchr with 3M24 Uran (SS-N-25 Switchblade) ASHM, 2 twin lnchr with Volyga (SA-N-1 Goa) SAM, 5 single 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2, 1 twin 76mm gun

FRIGATES 9

FFGGM 5:
2 Jastreb (Neustrashimy) with 2 quad lnchr with 3M24 Uran (SS-N-25 Switchblade) ASHM, 4 octuple VLS with 3K95 Kindzhal (SA-N-9 Gauntlet) SAM, 4 single 533mm ASTT, 1 RBU 12000, 2 CADS-N-1 Kashtan CIWS with 9M311 (SA-N-11 Grison) SAM, 1 100mm gun, (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix ASW) (3rd vessel launched, but production halted in 1997; unclear status)
1 Steregushchiy with 2 quad lnchr with 3M24 Uran (SS-N-25 Switchblade) ASHM, 2 quad 324mm ASTT, 1 CADS-N-1 Kashtan CIWS with 9M311 (SA-N-11 Grison) SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun
2 Steregushchiy with 2 quad lnchr with 3M24 Uran (SS-N-25 Switchblade) ASHM, 1 12-cell VLS with 9M96 Redut SAM, 2 quad 324mm ASTT, 1 CADS-N-1 Kashtan CIWS with 9M311 (SA-N-11 Grison) SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (5 additional vessels in build, of which two are improved Steregushchiy II)

FFGM 4:
1 Gepard with 2 quad lnchr with 3M24 Uran (SS-N-25 Switchblade) ASHM, 1 twin lnchr with Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
1 Gepard with 1 8-cell VLS with 3M14 (SS-N-30 Kaliber) LACM, 2 quad lnchr with 3M24 Uran (SS-N-25 Switchblade) ASHM, 1 twin lnchr with Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
1 Burevestnik (Krisav I mod)† with 1 quad lnchr with Rastrub (SS-N-14 Silex) ASHM/ASW, 1 twin lnchr with Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 quad 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2, 2 twin 76mm gun
1 Burevestnik M (Krisav II) each with 1 quad lnchr with RPK-3 Rastrub (SS-N-14 Silex) ASHM/ASW, 2 twin lnchr with 10 Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko SAM), 2 quad 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2, 2 100mm gun

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 82

CORVETTES 46:

FSGM 15:
2 Siwuchi (Dergach) with 2 quad lnchr with 3M80 Moskit (SS-N-22 Sunburn) ASHM, 1 twin lnchr with Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
12 Oxod (Nanuchka III) with 2 triple lnchr with P-120 Malakhit (SS-N-9 Siren) ASHM, 1 twin lnchr with Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko), 1 76mm gun
1 Oxod (Nanuchka IV) with 2 triple lnchr with 3M55 Ovix (SS-N-26) ASHM, 1 twin lnchr with Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko), 1 76mm gun

FSM 31:
3 Albatros (Grisha III) with 1 twin lnchr with Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2, 2 twin 57mm gun
21 Albatros (Grisha V) with 1 twin lnchr with Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT, 1 RBU 6000 Smerch 2, 1 76mm gun
7 Parchim II with 2 quad lnchr with Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun

PCFG 25:
6 Molnya (Tarantul II) with 2 twin lnchr with P-15M Termit (SS-N-2/C D Styx) AShM, 1 quad lnchr (manual aiming) with Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
19 Molnya (Tarantul III) with 2 twin lnchr with 3M80 Moskit (SS-N-22 Sunburn) AShM, 1 quad lnchr (manual aiming) with Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun

PCM 6:
3 Astrakhlan (Buyan) with some 9K310 Igla-1 (SA-16 Gimlet) SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (6 improved Buyan-M vessels on construction)
3 Grachonok with 4 9K38 Igla (SA-18 Groze) SAM (original design was as diving tender)

PHG 4 Vekhr (Matka) with 2 single lnchr with P-15M Termit (SS-N-2/C D Styx) AShM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun

PHT 1 Sokol (Mukha) with 2 quad 406mm TT, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (damaged in 2007 and laid up since; unclear status)

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 53
MHO 2 Rubin (Gorga) with 2 quad lnchr with Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
MSO 11: 10 Akmaren (Natya); 1 Agat (Natya II) (all with 2 quad lnchr (manual aiming) with Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2 RBU1200 Ulragan, 2 twin AK230 CIWS
MSC 25: 23 Yakhont (Sonya) with 4 AK630 CIWS (some with 2 quad lnchr with Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM); 2 Project 1258 (Yevgenya)

MHI 15: 9 Sapfyr (Lida) with 1 AK630 CIWS; 3 Project 696 (Tolga); 3 Malakhit (Olya)

AMPHIBIOUS
LANDING SHIPS • LIST 20:
4 Tapir (Alligator) with 2-3 twi lnchr with Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2 twin 57mm guns, (capacity 20 tanks; 300 troops)
12 Project 775 (Ropucha I) with 2 twin 57mm guns, (capacity either 10 MBT and 190 troops or 24 APC (T) and 170 troops)
3 Project 775M (Ropucha II) with 2 AK630 CIWS, 2 twin 57mm guns, (capacity either 10 MBT and 190 troops or 24 APC (T) and 170 troops)
1 Tapir (Alligator (mod)) with 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun, (capacity 1 Ka-29 Helix B; 13 MBT; 300 troops) (vessel launched in 2012; expected ISD end-2013)

LANDING CRAFT 19
LCU 5:
1 Dugun (4 more in build)
4 Project 11770 (Serna) (capacity 100 troops)

LCM 7 Akula (Ondatra) (capacity 1 MBT)
LCAC 7:
2 Decheryan (Aist) with 2 twin AK630 CIWS (capacity 4 lt tk)
2 Pomornik (Zubr) (capacity 230 troops; either 3 MBT or 10 APC (T)
3 Kalmar (Lebed) (capacity 2 lt tk)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT

ABU 12: 8 Kashtan; 4 Sura
AE 2: 1 Muna; 1 Dvurevok
AEM 3: 2 Amya; 1 Lava
AG 3: 2 Vytrage; 1 Potok
AGB 4 Dobrynja Mikitich
AGE 2: 1 Tuchsoy; 1 Zvezdochka (2 more vessels under construction)
AGI 11: 2 Alpinist; 1 Balzam; 3 Moma; 5 Vishnya
AGM 1 Marshal Nedelin
AGOR 6: 1 Akademik Krylov; 2 Sibiriyakov; 2 Vinograd; 1 Seliger
AGS 21: 3 BKG-797; 6 Kamenka; 9 Omega; 3 Vaygach
AGSH 4: 1 Samara; 3 Vaygach
AGSI 52: 8 Biya; 25 Finik; 7 Moma; 14 Yug
AH 3 Ob +
AK 2 Bira
AOL 13: 2 Dubna; 5 Uda; 6 Altay (mod)
AOR 5 Boris Chilikin
AORL 3: 1 Kaliningradneft; 2 Olekma
AOS 1 Laza
AR 13 Amur
ARC 7: 4 Emba; 3 Klasma
ARS 14: 4 Mikhail Ruditskys; 10 Goryn
AS 1 Project 2020 (Malina)
ASR 2: 1 Nepal; 1 Alegez
ATF 61: 2 Baklan; 7 Katan; 3 Ingul; 2 Neftegaz; 14 Okhtensky; 18 Prometej; 1 Prut; 3 Sliva; 13 Sorum
AWT 2 Manych
AXL 12: 10 Petrushka; 2 Smolny
YDG 15 Berez
YDT 104: 40 Flamingo; 20 Nyryat 2; 28 Yelva; 3 Project 11980; 13 Pelyn
YGS 60 GPB-480
YO 36: 5 Khoji; 30 Toplivoe; 1 Konda
YPB 30 Bolva
YPT 43: 12 Shelon; 31 Poluchat
YTB 46: 11 Stividor; 35 Sidehole
YTR 42: 27 Pozharny; 15 Morok

Naval Aviation £28,000
4 Fleet Air Forces; most combat aircraft previously assigned to Naval Aviation were transferred to Air Force command by end-2011.
Flying hours 60+ hrs/year

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER
2 sqn with Su-33 Flanker D; Su-25UTG Frogfoot

ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE/ISR
2 sqn with Su-24M/MR Fencer

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
2 sqn with IL-20RT Coot A; IL-38 May*
8 sqn with Ka-27/Ka-29 Helix
1 sqn with Mi-14 Haze A
2 sqn with Tu-142M/MR Bear F/J*
1 unit with Ka-31R
MARITIME PATROL/ELECTRONIC WARFARE
1 sqn with An-12 Cub; Be-12 Mail*; Mi-8 Hip

TRANSPORT
3 sqn with An-12 Cub; An-24 Coke; An-26 Curl; Tu-134

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT 104 combat capable
FTR 18 Su-33 Flanker D
FGA 18 Su-24M Fencer
ATK 5 Su-25UTG Frogfoot
ASW 27 Tu-142MR Bear F/J
MP 32: 6 Be-12 Mail*; 26 Il-38 May*
ISR 4 Su-24MR Fencer E*
EW • ELINT 7; 2 Il-20RT Coot A; 5 An-12 Cub
TPT 38 An-12 Cub/An-24 Coke/An-26 Curl/An-140/Tu-134

HELICOPTERS
ASW 90: 70 Ka-27 Helix; 20 Mi-14 Haze A
EW 8 Mi-8 Hip J
AEW 2 Ka-31R Helix
SAR 62: 22 Ka-25PS Hormone C/Ka-27PS Helix D; 40 Mi-14PS Haze C
TPT 50 Heavy 10 Mi-6 Hook; Medium 40: 28 Ka-29 Helix; 12 Mi-8 Hip

MSL
ASM Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen); Kh-59 (AS-13 Kingbolt)
ARM Kh-58 (AS-11 Killer); Kh-25MP (AS-12 Kegler)
AShM Kh-22 (AS-4 Kitchen)
AAM • IR R-27T/ET (AA-10B/D Alamo); R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer); SARH R-27R/ER (AA-10A/C Alamo)

Coastal Missile and Artillery Troops 2,000

Naval Infantry (Marines) £20,000

FORCES BY ROLE
SPECIAL FORCES
1 (fleet) SF bde (1 para bn, 2–3 underwater bn, 1 spt unit)
2 (fleet) SF bde (cadre) (1 para bn, 2–3 underwater bn, 1 spt unit)

MANOEUVRE
Mechanised
2 MR bde
1 MR regt
3 indep naval inf bde
2 indep naval inf regt

COMBAT SUPPORT
1 arty bde
3 SAM regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MBT 200 T-72/T-80
RECCE 60 BRDM-2 each with 9K11 (AT-3 Sagger)
AIFV 300 BMP-2
APC 800
APC (T) 300 MT-LB
APC (W) 500 BTR-80
ARTY 365
SP 263: 122mm 113: 95 2S1; 18 2S19; 152mm 150: 50 2A36; 50 2A65; 50 2S3
GUN/MOR 66
SP 120mm 42: 12 2S23 NONA-SVK; 30 2S9 NONA-S

TOWED 120mm 24 2B16 NONA-K
MRL 122mm 36 BM-21
AT
MSL
SP 9P149 with 9K114 Shturm (AT-6 Spiral)
MANPATS 9K11 (AT-3 Sagger); 9K113 (AT-5 Spandrel)
GUNS 100mm T-12
AD
SAM
SP 70: 20 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko); 50 Strela-1/ Strela-10 (SA-9 Gaskin/SA-13 Gopher)
MANPAD 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-7 Grail)
GUNS 23mm 60 ZSU-23-4

Military Air Forces £150,000 (incl conscripts — reducing to 148,000)

FORCES BY ROLE
BOMBER
4 sqn with Tu-22M3/MR Backfire C
3 sqn with Tu-95MS Bear
1 sqn with Tu-160 Blackjack

FIGHTER
8 sqn with MiG-29 Fulcrum
3 sqn with MiG-29SMT Fulcrum
11 sqn with MiG-31/MiG-31BM Foxhound
10 sqn with Su-27 Flanker
4 sqn with Su-27SM2 Flanker; Su-30M2

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
1 sqn with Su-27SM3 Flanker; Su-30M2

GROUND ATTACK
11 sqn with Su-24M/M2 Fencer
13 sqn with Su-25/Su-25SM Frogfoot
2 sqn with Su-34 Fullback
1 sqn with Su-34 Fullback (forming)

GROUND ATTACK/ISR
1 sqn with Su-24M/MR Fencer*

ELECTRONIC WARFARE
1 sqn with Mi-8PPA Hip

ISR
1 sqn with MIG-25RB Foxbat*
8 sqn with Su-24MR Fencer
1 ft with An-30 Clark

AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL

1 sqn with A-50/A-50U Mainstay

TANKER

1 sqn with Il-78/Il-78M Midas

TRANSPORT

7 (mixed) sqn with An-12 Cub/An-24 Coke/An-26 Curl/ Mi-8 Hip/Tu-134 Crusty/Tu-154 Careless
2 sqn with An-124 Condor
1 ft with An-12BK Cub
1 sqn with An-22 Cock
13 sqn with Il-76MD Candid

ATTACK HELICOPTER

2 sqn with Ka-52A Hokum B
12 sqn with Mi-24 Hind
2 sqn with Mi-28N Havoc B
1 sqn with Mi-28N Havoc B (forming)

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

17 sqn with Mi-8 Hip/Mi-26 Halo

AIR DEFENCE

35 regt with S-300PS (SA-10 Grumble); S-300PM (SA-20 Gargoyle)
6 regt with S-400 (SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 1,389 combat capable

BBR 141: 63 Tu-22M3/MR Backfire C; 31 Tu-95MS6 Bear; 31 Tu-95MS16 Bear; 16 Tu-160 Blackjack
FTR 580: 150 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 40 MiG-29UB Fulcrum; 120 MiG-31B/31BS Foxhound; 40 MiG-31B/31BS Foxhound; 200 Su-27 Flanker; 30 Su-27UB Flanker
FGA 343: 28 MiG-29SMT Fulcrum; 6 MiG-29UBT Fulcrum; 150 Su-24M Fencer; 50 Su-24M2 Fencer; 47 Su-27SM2 Flanker; 12 Su-27SM3; 4 Su-30M2; 6 Su-30SM; 28 Su-34 Fullback; 12 Su-35S Flanker
ATK 215: 150 Su-25 Frogfoot; 50 Su-25SM Frogfoot; 15 Su-25UB Frogfoot
ISR 114: 4 An-30 Clank; 10 MiG-25RB Forbat*; 100 Su-24MR Fencer*
ELINT 22 Il-22 Coot B
AEW&C 23: 19 A-50/A-50U Mainstay; 4 Il-76SKIP (Be-976 – telemetry aircraft)
C2 6: 2 Il-76KVP; 4 Il-86VVP Maxdome
TKR 20 Il-78/Il-78M Midas
TPT 390: Heavy 134; 12 An-124 Condor; 4 An-22 Cock; 118 Il-76MD/Il-76M Candid; Medium 50 An-12/An-12BK Cub;
Light 205: 25 An-24 Coke; 80 An-26 Curl; 15 An-72 Coaler;
5 An-140; 40 L-410; 30 Tu-134 Crusty; 10 Yak-40 Colling;
PAX 1 Tu-154 Careless
TRG 220: 190 L-39 Albatros; 30 Yak-130 Mitten

HELICOPTERS

ATK 392+: 12 Ka-50 Hokum; 30+ Ka-52A Hokum B; 290 Mi-24D/V/P Hind; 50+ Mi-28N Havoc B; 10+ Mi-35 Hind
EW 54: 50 Mi-8PPA Hip; 4 Mi-8TRP-1 Hip
TPT 566: Heavy 32 Mi-26 Halo; Medium 534 Mi-17 (Mi-8MT) Hip H/Mi-8 Hip
TRG 30: 10 Ka-226; 20 Ansat-U

UAV • ISR Light some Pchela-1T
AD • SAM • SP 1,900+ S-300PS (SA-10 Grumble)/S-300PM (SA-20 Gargoyle)/S-400 (SA-21 Growler); 96K6 Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound)

MSL

AAM • IR R-27T/ET (AA-10 Alamo B/D); R-73 (AA-11 Archer); R-60T (AA-8 Aphid); SARH R-27R/ER (AA-10 Alamo A/C); R-33/33S (AA-9 Amos A/B); ARH R-77/R-77-1 (AA-12 Adder); K-37M (AA-13 Axehead); PRH R-27P/EP (AA-10 Alamo E/F)
ARM Kh-58 (AS-11 Killer); Kh-25MP (AS-12 Kugler); Kh-15P (AS-16 Kickback) Kh-31P/PM (PM entering production) (AS-17A Krypton)
ASM Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen); Kh-59/Kh-59M (AS-13 Kingbolt/AS-18 Kazoo); Kh-29 (AS-14 Kedge); Kh-31A/AM (AM entering production) (AS-17B Krypton); Kh-38 (trials underway)
LACM Kh-22/32 (AS-4 Kitchen); Kh-55/55SM (AS-15A/B Kent); Kh-101; Kh-102; Kh-555 (AS-15C Kent)
BOMBS • Laser-guided KAB-500; KAB-1500L; TV-guided KAB-500KR; KAB-1500KR; KAB-500OD/UPAB 1500

Russian Military Districts

Western Military District
(ex-Leningrad & Moscow Military Districts & Kaliningrad Special Region) HQ at St Petersburg

Army

FORCES BY ROLE

CONMAN 2 army HQ

SPECIAL FORCES
2 (Spetsnaz) bde 1 (AB Recce) bn

MANOEUVRE
Armoured
1 tk div
1 tk bde
Mechanised
1 MR div
5 MR bde
Air Manoeuvre
3 (VdV) AB div

COMBAT SUPPORT
2 arty bde 1 MRL bde
1 SSM bde with Iskander-M 2 SSM bde with Tochka (SS-21 Scarab)
2 AD bde 1 engr bde 1 MP bde

Reserves

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE Armoured
1 tk bde
Mechanised
2 MR bde
Northern Fleet

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES 41

STRATEGIC 10 SSBN (1 SSBN’s Bulava SLBM not yet operational)

TACTICAL: 23: 3 SSGN; 13 SSN; 7 SSK

SUPPORT: 8: 7 SSAN (other roles); 1 SSA

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 10: 1 CV; 1 CGHM; 1 CGHM (in repair); 7 DDGM (of which 1 in refit)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12: 3 FSGM; 8 FSM

MINE WARFARE 12: 1 MHSO (in repair); 3 MSO; 8 MSC

AMPHIBIOUS 4 LST

Naval Aviation

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

2 sqn with Su-33 Flanker D; Su-25UTG Frogfoot

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

1 sqn with Il-20RT Coot A; Il-38 May*; Tu-134

3 sqn with Ka-27/Ka-29 Helix

1 sqn with Tu-142M/MR Bear F/J

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

FTR: 18 Su-33 Flanker D

ATK: 5 Su-25UTG Frogfoot

ASW: 13 Tu-142M/MR Bear F/J

EW: ELINT: Il-20RT Coot A

MP: 14 Il-38 May*

TPT: Tu-134

HELICOPTERS

ASW: Ka-27 Helix A

TPT: Ka-29 Helix B; Mi-8 Hip

Naval Infantry

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

1 MR bde

1 naval inf bde

1 naval inf regt

Coastal Artillery and Missile Troops

FORCES BY ROLE

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 ASHM regt

Baltic Fleet

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES: 3 SSK: 1 Lada; 2 Paltus (Kilo)

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 7: 2 DDGHM; 5 FGHM

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 20: 4 FSGM; 8 FSM; 7 PCFG; 1 PCM

MINE WARFARE: 4 MHC; 11 MHI

AMPHIBIOUS: 11: 4 LST; 5 LCM; 2 LCAC

Naval Aviation

FORCES BY ROLE

ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

1 sqn with Ka-27/Ka-29 Helix

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with An-24 Coke; An-26 Curl; Tu-134 Crusty

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

TPT: An-24 Coke/An-26 Curl/Tu-134 Crusty

HELICOPTERS

ASW: Ka-27 Helix

TPT: Medium Ka-29 Helix

Naval Infantry

FORCES BY ROLE

MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

1 MR bde

1 MR regt

1 naval inf bde

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bde

1 SAM regt

Coastal Artillery and Missile Troops

FORCES BY ROLE

COMBAT SUPPORT

1 ASHM regt

Military Air Forces

1st Air Force & Air Defence Command
(ex-6th & 16th Air Army)

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER

1 sqn with MiG-29 Fulcrum

2 sqn with MiG-29SMT Fulcrum

4 sqn with MiG-31 Foxhound

8 sqn with Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker

GROUND ATTACK

2 sqn with Su-24M/M2 Fencer

2 sqn with Su-34 Fullback

GROUND ATTACK/ISR

1 sqn with Su-24MR Fencer*

ISR

1 flt with A-30 Clank

1 sqn with MiG-25RB Foxbat*

2 sqn with Su-24MR Fencer E

ELECTRONIC WARFARE

1 sqn with Mi-8PPA Hip

TRANSPORT

1 sqn with An-12 Cub; An-26 Curl; Tu-134 Crusty

ATTACK HELICOPTER

6 sqn with Mi-24 Hind

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

6 sqn with Mi-8 Hip

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

FTR: 180: 20 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 51 MiG-31 Foxhound;

109 Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker
FGA 98: 28 MiG-29SMT Fulcrum; 6 MiG-29UBT Fulcrum; 44 Su-24M/M2 Fencer; 20+ Su-34 Fullback
ISR 42+: 4 An-30 Clank; 10+ MiG-25RB Foxbat* 28 Su-24MR Fencer*
TPT 12 An-12/An-26/Tu-134
HELICOPTERS
ATK 60 Mi-24 Hind
EW 10 Mi-8PPA Hip
TPT • Medium 60 Mi-8 Hip
AD • SAM 1,125 incl S-300V

Central Military District
(ex-Volga-Ural & part ex-Siberia Military Districts) HQ at Yekaterinburg

Army

FORCES BY ROLE
COMMAND 2 army HQ
SPECIAL FORCES 1 (Spetsnaz) SF bde
MANOEUVRE
Armoured
1 tk bde
Mechanised
1 (201st) MR div
7 MR bde
Air Manoeuvre
1 (VdV) AB bde

COMBAT SUPPORT
1 arty bde
1 MRL regt
2 SSM bde with Tochka (SS-21 Scarab)
2 AD bde
1 engr bde

Reserves

FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Mechanised
3 MR bde

Military Air Force

2nd Air Force & Air Defence Command
(ex-5th & elm ex-14th Air Army)

FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER
4 sqn with MiG-31 Foxhound
GROUND ATTACK
2 sqn with Su-24 Fencer
ISR
1 sqn with Su-24MR Fencer E
TRANSPORT
3 sqn with An-12 Cub; An-24 Coke; Il-86; Tu-134 Crusty; Tu-154; Mi-8 Hip
ATTACK HELICOPTER
2 sqn with Mi-24 Hind
TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
3 sqn with Mi-8 Hip/Mi-26 Halo

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT
FTR 73 MiG-31 Foxhound
FGA 26 Su-24M Fencer
ISR 13 Su-24MR Fencer E
TPT 36 An-12/An-24 Coke/Tu-134 Crusty/Tu-154 Careless
HELICOPTERS
ATK 24 Mi-24 Hind
TPT 46: 6 Mi-26 Halo; 40 Mi-8 Hip
AD • SAM S-300 (SA-10 Grumble)

Southern Military District
(ex-North Caucasus Military District — including Trans-Caucasus Group of Forces (GRVZ)) HQ located at Rostov-on-Don

Army

FORCES BY ROLE
COMMAND 2 army HQ
SPECIAL FORCES 2 (Spetsnaz) SF bde
MANOEUVRE
Mechanised
6 MR bde
2 MR bde (Armenia)
1 MR bde (Abkhazia)
1 MR bde (South Ossetia)
3 (lt/mtn) MR bde
Air Manoeuvre
1 (VdV) AB div
1 (army) air aslt bde

COMBAT SUPPORT
1 arty bde
1 MRL bde
1 MRL regt
1 SSM bde with Tochka (SS-21 Scarab)
2 AD bde
1 engr bde

Black Sea Fleet
The RUS Fleet is leasing bases in Sevastopol and Karantinnaya Bay, and is based, jointly with UKR warships, at Streletska Bay.

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL 1 SSK (also 1 Som (Tango) in reserve)
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 5: 2 CGHM; 1 DDGM; 2 FFGM
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 19: 4 FSGM; 6 FSM; 1 PHM; 5 PCFG; 2 PCM; 1 PHT
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 9: 1 MCO; 6 MSO; 2 MSC
AMPHIBIOUS 9: 8 LST; 1 LCU
**Naval Aviation**

**FORCES BY ROLE**

**FIGHTER**
- Anti-Surface Warfare/ISR
  - 2 sqn with Su-24M/MR Fencer

**ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE**
- 1 sqn with Ka-27 Helix
- 1 sqn with Mi-14 Haze

**MARITIME PATROL/ELECTRONIC WARFARE**
- 1 sqn with An-12 Cub; Be-12 Mail; Mi-8

**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

**AIRCRAFT**
- **FGA**
  - 18 Su-24M Fencer
- **ISR**
  - 4 Su-24MR Fencer E
- **MP**
  - 9 Be-12 Mail
- **EW/ELINT**
  - An-12 Cub
- **TPT**
  - An-12; An-26

**HELICOPTERS**
- **ASW**
  - Ka-27 Helix
- **TPT**
  - Medium Mi-8 Hip (MP/EW/Tpt)

**Naval Infantry**

**FORCES BY ROLE**

**MANOEUVRE**
- Mechanised
  - 1 naval inf bde

**COMBAT SUPPORT**
- 1 SAM regt

**Coastal Artillery and Missile Troops**

**FORCES BY ROLE**

1 AShM bde
- 1 indep AShM bn

**Caspian Sea Flotilla**

**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

**PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS**
- 2 FFGM

**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS**
- 6: 2 FCG; 3 PHM; 1 PCM

**MINE WARFARE**
- **MINE COUNTERMEASURES**
  - 5 MSC; 2 MHI

**AMPHIBIOUS**
- 11: 2 LCM; 4 LCU; 5 LCAC

**Military Air Force**

4th Air Force & Air Defence Command

**(ex 4th Air Army)**

**FORCES BY ROLE**

**FIGHTER**
- 3 sqn with MiG-29 Fulcrum
- 1 sqn with MiG-29 Fulcrum (Armenia)
- 3 sqn with Su-27 Flanker

**FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**
- 1 sqn with Su-27SM3 Flanker; Su-30M2

**GROUND ATTACK**
- 3 sqn with Su-24M Fencer
- 6 sqn with Su-25 Frogfoot
- 1 sqn with Su-34 Fullback (forming)

**ISR**
- 2 sqn with Su-24MR Fencer E

**TRANSPORT**
- 1 sqn with An-12 Cub/Mi-8 Hip

**ATTACK HELICOPTER**
- 3 sqn with Mi-24 Hind
- 2 sqn with Mi-28N Havoc B (forming)

**TRANSPORT HELICOPTER**
- 6 sqn with Mi-8 Hip/Mi-26 Halo

**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

**AIRCRAFT**
- **FTR**
  - 121: 63 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 58 Su-27 Flanker
- **FGA**
  - 80+: 62 Su-24M Fencer; 12 Su-27SM3 Flanker; 2 Su-30M2; 4+ Su-34 Fullback
- **ATK**
  - 129 Su-25 Frogfoot
- **ISR**
  - 24 Su-24MR Fencer
- **TPT**
  - An-12 An-12 Cub

**HELICOPTERS**
- **ATK**
  - 36: 24 Mi-24 Hind; 12+ Mi-28N Havoc B
- **TPT**
  - 72 Heavy 10 Mi-26 Halo Medium 28 Mi-8 Hip

**Eastern Military District**

**(ex-Far East & part ex-Siberia Military Districts)**

HQ at Khabarovsk

**Army**

**FORCES BY ROLE**

**COMMAND**
- 4 army HQ

**SPECIAL FORCES**
- 2 (Spetsnaz) SF bde

**MANOEUVRE**
- **Mechanised**
  - 1 tk bde
  - 9 MR bde
  - 1 MGA div

**Reserves**

**FORCES BY ROLE**

**MANOEUVRE**
- Mechanised
  - 6 MR bde

**Pacific Fleet**

**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

**SUBMARINES**
- 21
- **STRATEGIC**
  - 3 SSBN
- **TACTICAL**
  - 18: 5 SSGN; 4 SSN; 9 SSK

**PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS**
- 9: 1 CGHM; 8 DDGHM (of which one in reserve)

**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS**
- 23: 4 FFGM; 9 FSM; 10 PFG

**MINE WARFARE**
- **MINE COUNTERMEASURES**
  - 5 MSC; 2 MHI

**AMPHIBIOUS**
- 4 LST
Naval Aviation

FORCES BY ROLE
ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE
3 sqn with Ka-27/Ka-29 Helix
1 sqn with Il-38 May*
1 sqn with Tu-142M/MR Bear F/J*

TRANSPORT
2 sqn with An-12 Cub; An-26 Curl

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT
ASW 14 Tu-142M/MR Bear F/J*
MP 15 Il-38 May*
TPT An-12 Cub (MR/EW); An-26 Curl

HELICOPTERS
ASW Ka-27 Helix
TPT • Medium Ka-29 Helix; Mi-8 Hip

Naval Infantry

FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Mechanised
1 naval inf bde
1 naval inf regt

COMBAT SUPPORT
1 SAM regt

Coastal Artillery and Missile Troops

FORCES BY ROLE
COMBAT SUPPORT
1 AShM bde
1 AShM regt

Military Air Force

3rd Air Force & Air Defence Command
(ex 11th & elms 14th AF and AD Army)

FORCES BY ROLE
FIGHTER
3 sqn with MiG-29 Fulcrum
3 sqn with MiG-31 Foxhound
4 sqn with Su-27SM2 Flanker; Su-30M2

GROUND ATTACK
4 sqn with Su-24M/M2 Fencer
5 sqn with Su-25 Frogfoot

ISR
3 sqn with Su-24MR Fencer E

TRANSPORT
2 sqn with An-12 Cub/An-24 Coke/An-26 Curl/Tu-134 Crusty/Tu-154 Careless

ATTACK HELICOPTER
2 sqn with Mi-24 Hind
1 sqn (forming) with Ka-52A Hokum B

TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
6 sqn with Mi-8 Hind/Mi-26 Halo

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT
FTR 104: 60 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 44 MiG-31 Foxhound
FGA 103: 44 Su-24M Fencer; 10 Su-24M2 Fencer; 47 Su-27SM2 Flanker; 2 Su-30M2
ATK 72 Su-25 Frogfoot

ISR 28 Su-24MR Fencer E
TPT 22 An-12 Cub/An-24 Coke/An-26 Curl; 1 Tu-134 Crusty; 1 Tu-154 Careless

HELICOPTERS
ATK 32: 8 Ka-52A Hokum B; 24 Mi-24 Hind
TPT 60 Heavy 4 Mi-26 Halo; Medium 56 Mi-8 Hip
AD • SAM S-300P (SA-10 Grumble)

Direct Reporting Commands

Long-Range Aviation Command
Flying hours: 80–100 hrs/yr

FORCES BY ROLE
BOMBER
4 sqn with Tu-22M3/MR Backfire C

FORCES BY ROLE
TRANSPORT
2 sqn with An-124 Condor
1 flt with An-12BK Cub
1 sqn with An-22 Cock
13 sqn with Il-76MD Candid

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT
BBR 141: 63 Tu-22M3/MR Backfire C; 31 Tu-95MS6 Bear; 31 Tu-95MS16 Bear; 16 Tu-160 Blackjack

Transport Aviation Command
Flying hours 60 hrs/year

FORCES BY ROLE
TRANSPORT
2 sqn with An-124 Condor
1 flt with An-12BK Cub
1 sqn with An-22 Cock
13 sqn with Il-76MD Candid

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT
134: 12 An-124 Condor
4 An-22 Cock (Under MoD control); 118 Il-76MD/MF Candid Medium 6 An-12BK Cub

Paramilitary 519,000

Federal Border Guard Service £160,000

Directly subordinate to the president; now reportedly all contract-based personnel

FORCES BY ROLE
10 regional directorates

MANOEUVRE
Other
7 frontier gp

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIFV/APC (W) 1,000 BMP/BTR
ARTY • SP 90: 122mm 251; 120mm 2512; 120mm 259 Anona

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS
FRIGATES • FFHM 3 Neroy (Krivak III) with 1 twin lnchr with Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 quad 533mm TT lnchr, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 lnchr, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix A ASW hel)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 203
PCM 46:
2 Molniya II (Pauk II) with 1 quad lnchr with Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail SAM), 2 twin 533mm TT lnchr, 2 RBU 1200 lnchr, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
27 Svetljak (Svetlyak) with 1 quad lnchr with Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail SAM), 2 single 406mm TT, 1 76mm gun
17 Molniya 1 (Pauk I) with 1 quad lnchr with Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail SAM), 4 single 406mm TT, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
PHT 2 Antares (Mureayeg)
PCO 15: 8 Project 503 (Alpinist); 1 Sprut; 3 Rubin with 1 AK630 CIWS; 2 Antur; 1 Purga
PSO 4 Komandor
PCC 13 Tarantul (Stenka) with 4 406mm TT, 2 twin AK630 CIWS
PB 45: 3 Project 14310 (Mirazh); 13 Type 1496; 12 Grif (Zhuk); 17 Kulik
PBR 25: 3 Ogonek with 2 AK630 CIWS; 8 Piyavka with 1 AK630 CIWS; 5 Shmel with 1 76mm gun; 6 Moskit (Voskh); 2 Slepen (Yaz) with 2 115mm guns; 1 Gornostay
PBF 53: 1 A-125; 2 Bogomol with 2 twin AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun; 17 Mangust; 4 Mustang (Project 18623); 15 Saygak; 12 Sobol; 2 Sokzhoi
AMPHIBIOUS • LC • LCAC 7 Tsaplya (used for patrol duties)
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 41
AGB 5 Ivan Susanin (primarily used as patrol ships)
AGS 2 Yug (primarily used as patrol ships)
AK 8 Neon Antonow
AKSL 6 Kanin
AO 2: 1 Baskunchak; 1 Project 1510
ATF 18 Sorpen (primarily used as patrol ships)
AIRCRAFT • TPT 86: 70 An-24 Coke/An-26 Curl/An-72 Coaler/Il-76 Candid/Tu-134 Curl/Yak-40 Coaling; 16 SM-92
HELICOPTERS: ε200 Ka-28 (Ka-27) Helix ASW/Mi-24 Hind Atk/Mi-26 Halo Spt/Mi-8 Hip Spt

Federal Agency for Special Construction (MOD) €50,000

Federal Communications and Information Agency €55,000

FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Other
4 paramilitary corps
28 paramilitary bde

Federal Protection Service €10,000–30,000 active
Org include elm of ground forces (mech inf bde and AB regt)

FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Mechanised
1 mech inf regt
Air Manoeuvre
1 AB regt
Other
1 (Presidential) gd regt

Federal Security Service €4,000 active (armed)

FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Other
Some cdo unit (including Alfa and Vympe1 units)

Interior Troops €170,000

FORCES BY ROLE
7 Regional Commands: Central, Urals, North Caucasus, Volga, Eastern, North-Western and Siberian

MANOEUVRE
Other
3 (55th, 95th & ODOM) paramilitary div (2–5 paramilitary regt)
18 (OBRON) paramilitary bde (3 mech bn, 1 mor bn)
2 indep paramilitary bde (OBR/OSMBR)
102 paramilitary regt (incl special motorised units)
11 (special) paramilitary unit
Aviation
8 sqn

COMBAT SUPPORT
1 arty regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
MBT 9
AIFV/APC (W) 1,650 BMP-1/BMP-2/BTR-80
ARTY 35
TOWED 122mm 20 D-30
MOR 120mm 15 PM-38
AIRCRAFT TPT 23: Heavy 9 Il-76 Candid; Medium 2 An-12 Cub; Light 12 An-26 Curl; 6 An-72 Cooler
HELICOPTERS • TPT 70: Heavy 10 Mi-26 Halo; Medium 60 Mi-8 Hip

Railway Troops (MOD) €50,000

Cyber

Until 2003, activities within the cyber domain were the responsibility of the Russian SIGINT agency, FAPSI. In 2003, this agency was abolished and its responsibilities divided between the Defence Ministry and the internal security service FSB, with the latter having responsibility for investigating cyber crime. Moscow State University’s Institute for Information Security Issues conducts research on technical issues, including cryptography, and counts the General Staff and the FSB among its clients. In March 2012, Dmitry Rogozin, deputy prime minister with responsibility for the defence industry, said Russia was considering establishing a ‘Cyber Security Command’ in the armed forces, though there is scant detail. The first official doctrinal statement on the role of the Russian military in cyberspace, the ‘Conceptual Views on the Activity of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in Information Space’, was released at the end of 2011, and described cyber force tasks with little correlation to those of equivalent commands in the West. In particular, the document contains no mention of the possibility of offensive cyber activity. The document is entirely defensive in tone, and focuses on force protection and prevention of information war, including allowing for a military role in negotiating international treaties governing information security. Following mixed performance in the information aspects of the armed conflict with Georgia in 2008, there was discussion about creating ‘Information Troops’, whose role would include cyber capability; but this initiative was publicly scotched by the FSB. In January 2012, then-CGS Makarov gave a different picture of the three main tasks for any new command: ‘disrupting adversary information...
systems, including by introducing harmful software; defending our own communications and command systems’; and ‘working on domestic and foreign public opinion using the media, Internet and more’. The third task is a reminder that, unlike some other nations with advanced cyber capabilities, Russia deals in cyber warfare as an integral component of information warfare.

![Image](image-url)

**DEPLOYMENT**

**ARMENIA**
3,214; 1 MR bde; 74 MBT; 201 AIFV; 72 SP/towed arty; 12 MRL; 1 sqn with 18 MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; 2 AD bty with S-300V (SA-12 *Gladiator/Giant*); 1 AD bty with 2K12 *Kub* (SA-6 *Gainful*)

**BELARUS**
1 radar station at Baranovichi (*Volga* system; leased); 1 Naval Communications site

**CÔTE D’IVOIRE**
UN • UNOCI 6 obs

**DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO**
UN • MONUSCO 1; 27 obs

**GEORGIA**
7,000; Abkhazia 1 MR bde; South Ossetia 1 MR bde; some atk hel; some S-300 SAM

**GULF OF ADEN**
1 CGHM; 1 AORL; 1 ATF

**KAZAKHSTAN**
1 radar station at Balkash (*Dnepr* system; leased)

**KYRGYZSTAN**
250; 5 Su-25 *Frogfoot*; 2 Mi-8 *Hip* spt hel

**LIBERIA**
UN • UNMIL 4 obs

**MIDDLE EAST**
UN • UNTSO 5 obs

**MOLDOVA/TRANSDNIESTR**
1,500 (including 350 peacekeepers); 2 MR bn; 100 MBT/AIFV/APC; 7 Mi-24 *Hind*; some Mi-8 *Hip*

**SOUTH SUDAN**
UN • UNMISS 4; 3 obs

**SUDAN**
UN • UNISFA 2 obs

**SYRIA**
1 naval facility at Tartus

**TAJIKISTAN**
5,000; 1 mil base with (1 (201st) MR div(-)); 54 T-72; 300 BMP-2/BTR-80/MT-LB; 100 2S1/2S3/2S12/9P140 *Uragan*; 5 Su-25 *Frogfoot*; 4 Mi-8 *Hip*

**UKRAINE**
13,000; 102 AIFV/APC; 24 arty; 1 Fleet HQ located at Sevastopol; 2 radar stations located at Sevastopol (*Dnepr* system, leased) and Mukachevo (*Dnepr* system, leased).

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**WESTERN SAHARA**
UN • MINURSO 16 obs

![Tajikistan Table](image-url)

**Tajikistan TJK**

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*Defence and law enforcement expenses*

**Population**
7,910,041

**Ethnic groups:** Tajik 67%; Uzbek 25%; Russian 2%; Tatar 2%

**Age**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>0–14</th>
<th>15–19</th>
<th>20–24</th>
<th>25–29</th>
<th>30–64</th>
<th>65 plus</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
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<td>16.0%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Capabilities**

Internal and border security is a particular concern for Tajikistan, with the country sharing an extended border with Afghanistan. Tajik security forces have intermittent problems with groups of armed gangs linked to drug trafficking. Given the overall weaknesses of the armed and security forces – which include inadequate special forces training and personnel issues revolving around high numbers of conscripts and low planning capacity – it is likely that low-level militant activity linked to drug trafficking will continue to burden and challenge the armed forces. Most military equipment is of Soviet origin. The country has little capacity to deploy other than token forces, though the armed forces are an active participant in CSTO and SCO military exercises. Russia maintains a military base in the country, though this was the source of friction between the two as signature of a lease extension was delayed by Tajikistan during the first half of 2013. India, which also has basing interests in Tajikistan, has offered to provide Mi-8/17 helicopters.

**ACTIVE 8,800** (Army 7,300, Air Force/Air Defence 1,500) Paramilitary 7,500

**Conscript liability** 24 months

---

**ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE**

**Army 7,300**

**FORCES BY ROLE**

**MANOEUVRE**

**Mechanised**

3 MR bde
Turkmenistan

**Air Force/Air Defence** 1,500

**FORCES BY ROLE**

**TRANSPORT**
- 1 sqn with Tu-134A Crusty

**ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER**
- 1 sqn with Mi-24 Hind; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-17TM Hip H

**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

**AIRCRAFT**
- TPT • Light 1 Tu-134A Crusty
- TRG 4+: 4 L-39 Albatros; some Yak-52

**HELICOPTERS**
- ATK 4 Mi-24 Hind
- TPT • Medium 11 Mi-8 Hip/Mi-17TM Hip H

**Paramilitary** 7,500

**Interior Troops** 3,800

**National Guard** 1,200

**Emergencies Ministry** 2,500

**Border Guards**

**DEPLOYMENT**

**MALI**
- UN • MINUSMA 1

**FOREIGN FORCES**

- **India** Air Force: 1 Fwd Op Base located at Farkhar
- **Russia** 5,000 Army: 1 mil base (subord Central MD) with (1 (201st) MR div;): 54 T-72; 300 BMP-2/BTR-80/MT-LB; 100 2S1/2S3/2S12/9P140 Uragan • Military Air Forces: 5 Su-25 Frogfoot; 2 Mi-8 Hip

**Capacities**

Turkmenistan declared neutrality in 1999 and enshrined this principle in its 2009 Military Doctrine. A military reform programme is under way, intended to improve Turkmenistan’s conscript-based armed forces. These continue to rely on Soviet-era equipment and doctrine. Delivery of around 30 T90S MBTs, ordered from Russia in 2011, is yet to take place. The air force has a limited number of fixed-wing combat aircraft and helicopters, though the level of availability is uncertain. Internal security and counter-narcotics are priorities. There are plans to strengthen coastal naval forces by 2015, and some assets have already been procured. Military capability is believed to be limited by low levels of training and availability of spare parts.

**ACTIVE 22,000 (Army 18,500 Navy 500 Air 3,000)**

*Conscript liability 24 months*

**ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE**

**Army** 18,500

5 Mil Districts

**FORCES BY ROLE**

**MANOEUVRE**
- Mechanised 3 MR div
- 2 MR bde
- Air Manouvre 1 air aslt bn
- Other 1 MR trg div

**COMBAT SUPPORT**
- 1 arty bde
- 1 MRL regt
- 1 AT regt

1 SSM bde with Scud
EQUIMENT BY TYPE†

- **MBT** 680: 10 T-90S; 670 T-72
- **RECCE** 170 BRDM/BRDM-2
- **AIFV** 942-930 BMP-1/BMP-2; 12 BRM
- **APC (W)** 829 BTR-60/BTR-70/BTR-80
- **ARTY** 570
  - SP 56: 122mm 40 251; 152mm 16 253
  - Towed 269: 122mm 180 D-30; 152mm 89: 17 D-1; 72 D-20
  - **GUN/MOR** 120mm 17 259 Anona
  - **MRL** 131: 122mm 65: 9 9P138; 56 BM-21; 220mm 60 9P140 Uragan; 300mm 6 BM 9A52 Smerch
  - **MOR** 97: 82mm 31; 120mm 66 PM-38

**AIR DEFENCE**

- **SAM**• **MANPATS** 100 9K11 (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 (AT-4 Spigot); 9K113 (AT-5 Spandrel); 9K115 (AT-6 Spiral)
- **GUNS** 100mm 72 MT-12-T-12

**AIR FORCE** 3,000

- **FORCES BY ROLE**
  - **FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK** 2 sqn with MiG-29 Fulcrum; MiG-29UB Fulcrum; Su-17 Fitter; Su-25MK Frogfoot
  - **TRANSPORT** 1 sqn with An-26 Curl; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-24 Hind
  - **TRAINING** 1 unit with Su-7B Fitter A; L-39 Albatros
  - **AIR DEFENCE** Some sqn with S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline); S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa); S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon)

**AIRCRAFT** 94 combat capable

- **FTR** 24: 22 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 2 MiG-29UB Fulcrum
- **FGA** 68: 3 Su-7B Fitter A; 65 Su-17 Fitter B
- **ATK** 2 Su-25MK Frogfoot (41 more being refurbished)
- **TPT** 4 Light 1 An-26 Curl
- **TRG** 2 L-39 Albatros

**HELICOPTERS**

- **ATK** 10 Mi-24 Hind
- **TPT** 8 Mi-8 Hip
- **AD** • **SAM** 50 S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline)/S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa)/S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon)

**UKRAINE UKR**

**Ukrainian Hryvnia h**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>GDP</th>
<th>Growth</th>
<th>Inflation</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1.41tr</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.57</td>
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<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1.48tr</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2.05bn</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Capabilities**

The armed forces are tasked with ensuring territorial integrity and having the capability to participate in international peace-keeping operations. There is at least a notionable ability for limited force projection using air-mobile troops. However, the armed forces have suffered from inadequate finances and a 2006–11 defence programme was significantly underfunded. Procurement targets were missed and plans to end conscription were not achieved. A reform programme covering the period to 2017 has been drafted by the ministry, which includes the objective of increasing the number of contract personnel. The services continue to operate mainly Soviet-era equipment, which increasingly needs replacement, such as much of the SAM inventory. Aircraft availability and serviceability remain low, as do flying hours. Funding restrictions have constrained naval ambitions, though the programme to re-equip the fleet with a new class of corvette is proceeding slowly. The navy is also attempting to return its one Foxtrot-class submarine to service condition, after more than a decade of inactivity. The armed forces take part in national and multinational exercises, and also provide personnel for UN peacekeeping operations. Ukraine has an industrial relationship with China in certain areas of defence technology. The Russian Black Sea Fleet continues to use leased facilities at Sevastopol.

**ACTIVE 129,950** (Army 64,750 Navy 13,950 Air 45,250 Airborne 6,000) **PARAMILITARY 84,900**

**Conscript liability** Army, Air Force 18 months, Navy 2 years. During the Autumn 2013 draft, authorities indicated that conscription could be suspended in 2014. Contract servicemen comprise just over 50% of the armed forces.

**RESERVE 1,000,000** (Joint 1,000,000)

Military service within 5 years
**ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE**

**Ground Forces (Army)** 64,750

Transformation due to be completed by 2015.

**FORCES BY ROLE:**

**COMMAND**

3 corps HQ

**SPECIAL FORCES**

2 SF regt

**MANOEUVRE**

Armoured

2 tk bde

Mechanised

8 mech bde

1 mech regt

Aviation

3 avn regt

**COMBAT SUPPORT**

3 arty bde

3 MRL regt

1 SSM bde

3 AD regt

4 engr regt

1 EW regt

1 CBRN regt

4 sigs regt

**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

**COMBAT SUPPORT**

- **MANOEUVRE**
  - APC 490
  - APC (W) 475: up to 10 BTR-4; 15 BTR-60; 300 BTR-70; 150 BTR-80
  - ARMY 1,952
    - SP 273: 122mm 300 251; 152mm 334: 40 2519 Farm; 270 253; 24 255; 203mm 99 257
    - TOWED 595: 122mm 100 D-30; 152mm 495: 200 2A36; 165 2A65; 130 D-20
  - GUN/MOR • 120mm • TOWED 2 B16 NONA-K
    - MRL 372: 122mm 220: 20 9P138; 200 BM-21; 132mm 2 BM-13: 220mm 70 9P140 Uragan; 300mm 80 9A52 Smerch
    - MOR 120mm 250: 210 2S12; 40 PM-38
  - AT
    - MSL • MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (Spigot); 9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 9K114 Shturm (AT-6 Spiral)
    - GUNS 100mm c500 MT-12/T-12
  - HELICOPTERS
    - ATK 139 Mi-24 Hind
    - TPT • Medium 38 Mi-8 Hip
  - AD
    - SAM • SP 435: 60 9K37 Buk (SA-11 Gadfly); c150 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher); 100 2K11 Krug (SA-4 Ganef); 125 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko); S-300V (SA-12 Gladiator)
    - GUNS 470;
    - SP 30mm 70 256
    - TOWED 57mm c400 S-60
  - RADAR • LAND Small Fred/Small Yawn/SNAR-10 Big Fred (arty)

**ORDNANCE**

- MSL • SSM 212: 50 FROG; 90 Tochka (SS-21 Scarab); 72 Scud-B
- AEV 53 BAT-2; MT-LB
- ARV BREM-2; BREM-64; T-54/T-55
- VLB MTU-20

**Navy** 11,950; 2,000 conscript (total 13,950 incl Naval Aviation and Naval Infantry)

After intergovernmental agreement in 1997, the Russian Federation Fleet currently leases bases in Sevastopol and Karantinnaya Bays and also shares facilities jointly with UKR warships at Streletskaia Bay. The overall serviceability of the fleet is assessed as low.

**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

**SUBMARINES**

- TACTICAL • SSK 1 Foxtrot (T-641) with 10 533mm TT

**PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS**

- FRIGATES • FFHM 1 Hetman Sagaidachny (RUS Kriuk III) with 1 twin lnchr with Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 quad 533mm ASTT with T-53 HWT, 1 100mm gun, (capacity 1 Ka-27 Helix ASW hel)

**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS**

- CORVETTES • FSM 3 Grisha (II/V) with 1 twin lnchr with Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT with SAET-60 HWT, 1 to 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2, 176mm gun
- PCCGM 2 Tarantul II (FSU Molnya) with 2 twin lnchr with P-15 Termit-R (SS-N-2D Styx) ASH; 1 quad lnchr (manual aiming) with 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail); 1 76mm gun
- PHG 2 Matka (FSU Vekhr) with 2 single lnchr with P-15 Termit-M/R (SS-N-2C/D Styx) ASH; M, 1 76mm gun
- PCMT 2 Pauk 1 (FSU Molnya III) with 1 quad lnchr (manual aiming) with 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 4 single 406mm TT, 2 RBU-1200, 1 76mm gun
- PB 1 Zhuk (FSU Grif)

**MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES**

- MHI 1 Yevgenya (FSU Korund)
- MSO 2 Nayta with 2 RBU 1200
- MSC 2 Sonja (FSU Yakhong)

**AMPHIBIOUS**

- **LANDING SHIPS**
  - LSM 1 Polnochny C (capacity 6 MBT; 180 troops)
  - LST 1 Ropucha with 4 quad lnchr with 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 2 twin 57mm guns, (capacity either 10 MBT or 190 troops; either 24 APC (T) or 170 troops)

**LANDING CRAFT**

- LCAC 1 Pomornik (Zubr) with 2 quad lnchr with 9K32 Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, (capacity 230 troops; either 3 MBT or 10 APC (T))
- LCU 2

**LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT**

- ABU 1 Shostka
- ADG 1 Berezka
- AGI 2 Muna
- AGF 2: 1 Bambuk (fitted with 2 quad lnchr with SA-N-5/8 Grail SAM (manual aiming)); 1 Amur (can also act as a spt ship for surface ships and submarines)
- AGS 2: 1 Moma (mod); 1 Biya
AWT 1 Sudak
AXL 3 Petrushka
YDT 13: 1 Volva; 12 other
YTM 6
YTR 2 Pozharny
YY 1 Sokal

**Naval Aviation £2,500**

**AIRCRAFT** 10 combat capable
ASW 10 Be-12 Mail
TPT 16: Medium 5 An-12 Cub; Light 10: 1 An-24 Coke; 8 An-26 Curl; 1 Tu-134 Crusty; PAX 1 Il-18 Coot

**HELICOPTERS**
ASW 72: 28 Ka-25 Hormone; 2 Ka-27E Helix; 42 Mi-14 Haze
TPT • Heavy 5 Mi-6 Hook

**Naval Infantry 3,000**

**FORCES BY ROLE**
MANOEUVRE
Mechanised
1 mech inf bde

**COMBAT SUPPORT**
1 arty bde

**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

**MBT** 40 T-64

**AIFV** 75 BMP-2

**APC (W)** 100: 50 BTR-70; 50 BTR-80

**ARTY** 90

**SP • 122mm** 12 2S1

**TOWED** 36: 122mm 18 D-30; 152mm 18 2A36

**MRL • 122mm** 18 BM-21

**MOR 120mm** 24 2S12

**Air Forces 45,250**

Flying hours 40 hrs/yr

**FORCES BY ROLE**

**FIGHTER**
5 bde with MiG-29 Fulcrum; Su-27 Flanker

**FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**
2 bde with Su-24M Fencer; Su-25 Frogfoot

**ISR**
2 sqn with Su-24MR Fencer E*

**TRANSPORT**
3 bde with An-24; An-26; An-30; Il-76 Candid; Tu-134 Crusty

**TRAINING**
Some sqn with L-39 Albatros

**TRANSPORT HELICOPTER**
Some sqn with Mi-8; Mi-9; PZL Mi-2 Hoplite

**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

**AIRCRAFT** 221 combat capable
FTR 126: 90 MiG-29 Fulcrum; 36 Su-27 Flanker
FGA 36 Su-24 Fencer
ATK 36 Su-25 Frogfoot
ISR 26: 3 An-30 Clank; 23 Su-24MR Fencer E*
TPT 46: Heavy 20 Il-76 Candid; Light 26: 3 An-24 Coke; 21 An-26 Curl; 2 Tu-134 Crusty
TRG 39 L-39 Albatros

**HELICOPTERS**
C2 4 Mi-9
TPT 34: Medium 31 Mi-8 Hip; Light 3 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite

**AD • SAM** 825 S-300PS (SA-10 Grumble)/SA-11
Gadfly S-75 Volkov (SA-2 Guideline) (towed)/S-125
Pechora (SA-3 Goa) (towed)/S-200V Angara (SA-5 Sammy) (static)/9K37M Buk-M1 (SA-11 Gadfly)

**MSL**
ASM: Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen); Kh-59 (AS-13 Kingbolt); Kh-29 (AS-14 Kedje);
ARM: Kh-58 (AS-11 Kilter); Kh-25MP (AS-12 Kegler);
Kh-28 (AS-9 Kyle)
AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer)
SARH R-27 (AA-10A Alamo)

**Airborne Forces 6,000**

**FORCES BY ROLE:**

**MANOEUVRE**
Air Manoeuvre
1 AB bde
2 air mob bde
1 air mob regt

**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

**AIFV** 98: 35 BMD-1; 63 BMD-2

**APC 180**

**APC (T) 25 BTR-D**

**APC (W) 155: 5 BTR-60; 150 BTR-80**

**ARTY 128**

**TOWED • 122mm** 54 D-30

**GUN/MOR • SP • 120mm 50 2S9 Anona**

**MOR 120mm** 24 2S12

**Paramilitary**

**MVS £39,900 active**
(Ministry of Internal Affairs)

**FORCES BY ROLE**

**MANOEUVRE**

**Other**
4 paramilitary tp

**COMBAT SUPPORT**
1 (Internal Security) MP tp

**Border Guard 45,000 active**

**Maritime Border Guard**
The Maritime Border Guard is an independent subdivision of the State Commission for Border Guards and is not part of the navy.

**FORCES BY ROLE**

**PATROL**
4 (cutter) bde
2 rvn bde

**MINE WARFARE**
1 MCM sqn

**TRANSPORT**
3 sqn

**TRANSPORT HELICOPTER**
1 sqn
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
1 trg div
1 (aux ships) gp

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 27
PCFT 6 Stenta with 4 single 406mm TT
PCT 3 Pauk I with 4 single 406mm TT, 2 RBU-1200, 1 76mm gun
PHT 1 Muravey with 2 single 406mm TT, 1 76mm gun
PB 13: 12 Zhuk; 1 Orlan (seven additional vessels under construction)
PBR 4 Shmel

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AGF 1

AIRCRAFT • TPT Medium An-8 Camp; Light An-24 Coke; An-26 Curl; An-72 Coaler

HELICOPTERS • ASW: Ka-27 Helix A

Civil Defence Troops 9,500+ (civilian)
(Ministry of Emergency Situations)

FORCES BY ROLE
MANOEUVRE
Other
4 paramilitary bde
4 paramilitary regt

DEPLOYMENT

Legal provisions for foreign deployment:
Constitution: Codified constitution (1996)

Decision on deployment of troops abroad: Parliament authorised to approve decision to provide military assistance, deploy troops abroad and allow foreign military presence in Ukraine (Art. 85, para 23); Also, in accordance with Art. 7 of the specific legislation (above), president is authorised to take a decision to deploy troops abroad and at the same time to submit a draft law to the Parliament of Ukraine for approval.

AFGHANISTAN
NATO • ISAF 26

ARMENIA/azerbaijan
OSCE • Minsk Conference 1

CÔTE D’IVOIRE
UN • UNOCI 38; 1 atk hel flt

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
UN • MONUSCO 254; 11 obs; 2 atk hel sqn

GULF OF ADEN & SOMALI BASIN
NATO • Operation Ocean Shield 1 FFHM

LIBERIA
UN • UNMIL 238; 2 obs; 1 hel sqn

MOLDOVA
10 obs

SERBIA
NATO • KFOR 163; 1 inf coy

OSCE • Kosovo 1
UN • UNMIK 2 obs

SOUTH SUDAN
UN • UNMISS 1; 3 obs

SUDAN
UN • UNISFA 2 obs

FOREIGN FORCES

Russia ε13,000 Navy 1 Fleet HQ at Sevastopol; 1 indep naval inf bde; 102 AIFV/APC (T)/APC (W); 24 arty

Uzbekistan UZB

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Uzbekistani Som s</th>
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<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
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<td>per capita</td>
<td>US$</td>
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<td>Def bdgt</td>
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<td>US$1=s</td>
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<td>1889.24</td>
<td>2078.74</td>
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Population 28,661,637
Ethnic groups: Uzbek 73%; Russian 6%; Tajik 5%; Kazakh 4%; Karakalpak 2%; Tatar 2%; Korean <1%; Ukrainian <1%

Age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>0–14</th>
<th>15–19</th>
<th>20–24</th>
<th>25–29</th>
<th>30–64</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Capabilities

Uzbekistan’s conscript-based armed forces are the most capable in Central Asia, and better-equipped than those of its immediate neighbours. Uzbekistan is a member of the SCO, but suspended its membership of the CSTO in mid-2012. It maintains bilateral defence ties with Russia, and relations with Moscow improved following a heads-of-state meeting in the second quarter of 2013. Security issues after the ISAF drawdown from Afghanistan were part of the discussion. As part of an agreement covering transit rights for US and UK military equipment being returned from Afghanistan, the Uzbek armed forces will receive some military equipment, although the type and amount were unclear at November 2013. Air force flying hours are reported to be low, with significant logistical and maintenance shortcomings affecting the availability of aircraft.

ACTIVE 48,000 (Army 24,500 Air 7,500 Joint 16,000)
Paramilitary 20,000

Conscript liability conscription 12 months
ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Army 24,500
4 Mil Districts; 2 op comd; 1 Tashkent Comd

FORCES BY ROLE

SPECIAL FORCES
1 SF bde

MANOEUVRE

Armoured
1 tk bde
Mechanised
11 MR bde

Air Manoeuvre
1 air aslt bde
1 AB bde
Mountain
1 lt mtn inf bde

COMBAT SUPPORT
3 arty bde
1 MRL bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT
340: 70 T-72; 100 T-64; 170 T-62

RECCE
19: 13 BRDM-2; 6 BRM

AIFV
399: 120 BMD-1; 9 BMD-2; 270 BMP-2

APC
309
APC (T) 50 BTR-D
APC (W) 259: 24 BTR-60; 25 BTR-70; 210 BTR-80

ARTY
487+
SP 83+: 122mm 18 2S1; 152mm 17+: 17 2S3; 255 (reported); 203mm 48 2S7
Towed 200: 122mm 60 D-30; 152mm 140 2A36

GUN/MOR
120mm 399+ 24 9P138; 36 BM-21; 220mm 48 9P140 Uragan

MOR
120mm 42: 5 2B11; 19 2S12; 18 PM-120

AT • MSL • MANPATS
9K11 (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 (AT-4 Spigot)
GUNS
100mm 36 MT-12/T-12

Air Force 7,500

FORCES BY ROLE

FIGHTER
1 regt with MiG-29/MiG-29UB Fulcrum; Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker

FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK
1 regt with Su-24 Fencer; Su-24MP Fencer F* (ISR)

GROUND ATTACK
1 regt with Su-25/Su-25BM Frogfoot; Su-17M (Su-17MZ)
Fitter C/Su-17UM-3 (Su-17UMZ) Fitter G

ELINT/TRANSPORT
1 regt with An-12/An-12PP Cub; An-26/An-26RKR Curl

TRANSPORT
Some sqn with An-24 Coke; Tu-134 Crusty

TRAINING
Some sqn with L-39 Albatros

ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER
1 regt with Mi-24 Hind (attack); Mi-26 Halo (tpt); Mi-8 Hip (aslt/tpt);
1 regt with Mi-6 Hook (tpt); Mi-6AYa Hook C (C2)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 135 combat capable

FTR 30 MiG-29/MiG-29UB Fulcrum
FGA 74: 26 Su-17M (Su-17MZ)/Su-17UM-3 (Su-17UMZ)
Fitter C/G; 23 Su-24 Fencer; 25 Su-27/Su-27UB Flanker
ATK 20 Su-25/Su-25BM Frogfoot
EW/Tpt 26 An-12 Cub (med tpt)/An-12PP Cub (EW)
ELINT 11 Su-24MP Fencer F*
ELINT/Tpt 13 An-26 Curl (lt tpt)/An-26RKR Curl (ELINT)
TPT • Light 2: 1 An-24 Coke; 1 Tu-134 Crusty
TRG 5 L-39 Albatros (9 more in store)

HELICOPTERS

ATK 29 Mi-24 Hind
C2 2 Mi-6AYa Hook C
TPT 79 Heavy 27: 26 Mi-6 Hook; 1 Mi-26 Halo; Medium 52 Mi-8 Hip
AD • SAM 45
TOWED S-75 Divina (SA-2 Guideline); S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa)
STATIC S-200 Angara (SA-5 Gammon)

MSL
ASM Kh-23 (AS-7 Kerry); Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen)
ARM Kh-25P (AS-12 Kegler); Kh-28 (AS-9 Kyle); Kh-58 (AS-11 Kilter)
AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer); IR/SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo)

Paramilitary up to 20,000

Internal Security Troops up to 19,000
Ministry of Interior

National Guard 1,000
Ministry of Defence

FOREIGN FORCES

Germany 100; some C-160 Transall
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Contract Value</th>
<th>Prime Nationality</th>
<th>Prime Contractor</th>
<th>Order Date</th>
<th>First Delivery Due</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armenia (ARM)</td>
<td>A100</td>
<td>MRL (300mm)</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan (AZE)</td>
<td>Mi-35M Hind</td>
<td>Atk hel</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>First four delivered Dec 2011; 12 delivered by Aug 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mi-17-1V Hip</td>
<td>MRH hel</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belarus (BLR)</td>
<td>Tor-M2 (SA-15 Gauntlet)</td>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Second bty delivered Dec 2012; third due in 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yak-130</td>
<td>Trg ac</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan (KAZ)</td>
<td>C-295</td>
<td>Tpt ac</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>Int'l</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Follow on to original 2012 order for two. Part of an eight ac MoU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia (RUS)</td>
<td>Bulava (SS-NX-30)</td>
<td>SLBM</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>In development. For Borey-class SSBN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BTR-82A</td>
<td>APC (W)</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Buk-M2 (SA-17 Grizzly)</td>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>One bde set delivered. May be succeeded by Buk-M3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S-400 Triumf (SA-21 Growler)</td>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>18 bn</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Five regt deployed by late 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S-300V4 (SA-23 Gladiator/Giant)</td>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Three battalions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pantsir-S1</td>
<td>AD</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Delivery in progress to S-400 regiments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Borey-class</td>
<td>SSBN</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>Sevmash Shipyard</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Borey-A-class</td>
<td>SSBN</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>Sevmash Shipyard</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yassen-class</td>
<td>SSN</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>Sevmash Shipyard</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kilo-class</td>
<td>SSK</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>Admiralty Shipyards</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lada-class</td>
<td>SSK</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>Admiralty Shipyards</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Admiral Gorshkov-class</td>
<td>FFGHM</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>US$400m</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>Severnaya Verf Shipyard</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Steregushchikh-class</td>
<td>FFGHM</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>Severnaya Verf Shipyard/ Komosoloisk Shipyard</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 5: Selected Arms Procurements and Deliveries, Russia and Eurasia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity (Current)</th>
<th>Contract Value</th>
<th>Prime Nationality</th>
<th>Prime Contractor</th>
<th>Order Date</th>
<th>First Delivery Due</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improved Steregushchiy-class</td>
<td>FFGHM</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>Severnaya Verf Shipyard</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>First-of-class laid down Feb 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admiral Grigorovich-class (Krivak IV)</td>
<td>FFGHM</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>Yantar Shipyard</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Four vessels in build for Black Sea Fleet. Two more ordered. First ISD expected 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buyan-M-class</td>
<td>FSG</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>Zelenodolsk Shipyard</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>For Caspian Flotilla. To be fitted with Kalibr-NK msl. First and second vessels to commission by end 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vladivostock-class</td>
<td>LHD</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>US$1.2bn</td>
<td>FRA/RUS</td>
<td>DCNS/STX/USC</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Contract signed in 2011 for two vessels. A further two vessels are expected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivan Gren-class</td>
<td>LST</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>Yantar Shipyard</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Launched May 2012. Delivery currently planned for 2013. Up to four more vessels planned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seliger-class</td>
<td>AGOR</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>Yantar Shipyard</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>For Baltic Fleet. First vessel commissioned Jan 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admiral Yuri Ivanov-class</td>
<td>AGI</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>Severnaya Verf Shipyard</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>First intelligence vessel to be constructed since the Soviet era. First vessel now scheduled for delivery in Nov 2013 after slippage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIG-29K Fulcam D</td>
<td>Ftr ac</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>UAC (MiG)</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>20 MiG-29K and four MiG-29KUB. For navy. First ac in flight test late 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Su-30SM</td>
<td>FGA ac</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>UAC (Sukhoi)</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Six delivered by late 2013. Order to be complete by end-2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Su-34 Fullback</td>
<td>FGA ac</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>UAC (Sukhoi)</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>28 delivered by late 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Su-35S Flanker</td>
<td>FGA ac</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>See notes</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>UAC (Sukhoi)</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Part of combined order for 48 Su-35S, 12 Su-27SM3 and four Su-30, worth US$2.5bn. 12 delivered by late 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An-140</td>
<td>Tpt ac</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>UKR</td>
<td>Antonov</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Ten for air force, four for navy. Four delivered to air force, one to navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An-148-100</td>
<td>Tpt ac</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>US$450m</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>VASO</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>First delivery due 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yak-130</td>
<td>Trg ac</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>n.k.</td>
<td>RUS</td>
<td>UAC (Irkut)</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>To replace current L-39. 30 delivered by late-2013</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Turkmenistan (TKM)**

| T-90S                | MBT      | 30                 | n.k.           | RUS               | UKBTM                 | 2011       | n.k.               | _                                                                      |

**Ukraine (UKR)**

| Gaiduck-class        | FFGHM    | 4                  | UAH16.2bn (US$2.01bn) | UKR | Chernomorsky Shipbuilding | 2011 | 2015 | First keel laid down 2011. All vessels expected to be delivered by 2016 |