

---

### RUSSIA

---

Just over four years after the 'New Look' defence reform process started, the Russian Defence Ministry and armed forces began 2013 with new civilian and military leaders. President Vladimir Putin appointed Sergei Shoigu as defence minister on 6 November 2012, after dismissing Anatoly Serdyukov, ostensibly over a corruption scandal. Putin said Serdyukov's removal would allow an 'objective' investigation into allegations that defence-ministry-controlled military contractor Oboronservis was selling off ministry assets at below-market prices. Serdyukov's replacement, Shoigu, is a former long-term emergencies minister and loyal Putin ally. General Nikolay Makarov, Chief of General Staff, was also removed from his post, as was First Deputy Minister of Defence Aleksandr Sukhorukov.

Despite speculation that these changes at the top might prompt a wholesale revision of the reform process spearheaded by Serdyukov and Makarov, leaders in the Kremlin and the defence ministry are still pursuing most of the key objectives. One year on, it is clear there has been a change of tack rather than direction for the military reform process.

It was signalled early on that the fundamental organisational changes begun by Serdyukov, which finally broke away from the Soviet model, are irreversible. In a much-quoted speech, Putin told the Defence Ministry board: 'Once made, decisions must not be constantly changed. This is all the more important now that we have reached the stage of polishing and fine-tuning the many components in this complex military machine.' This 'polishing and fine-tuning' (*shlifovka*) has led to several top-level organisational changes. With a new law in December 2012, the president made the General Staff directly answerable to him, as Supreme Commander-in-Chief, instead of to the defence minister. The General Staff also acquired new functions, including command of local authorities and organisations outside the defence ministry for the purpose of organising territorial defence. This reversed the concentration of power in the person of the defence minister that was seen under Serdyukov.

The new defence minister, Shoigu, reshuffled his ministry, shifting responsibilities among the deputy ministers and increasing their number from eight to ten. He also replaced those officials most closely associated with Serdyukov. Makarov was replaced as Chief of General Staff by General Valeriy Gerasimov, though Makarov was appointed to an advisory role in early 2013.

Shoigu did embark on a review of the reforms initiated by his predecessor, tackling some particularly contentious issues, such as real-estate consolidation and sale, reductions in basing, proposed cuts to central administration and mergers of military academies. Personnel cuts at defence ministry headquarters were scaled back, amid concerns from some in the armed forces that the size of the reductions had damaged command-and-control at the strategic level. Serdyukov had planned to merge military academies into ten Joint Training Centres, but this was shelved and the academies are, after a three-year break, once again taking cadets.

Shoigu also re-established the Main Directorate of Combat Training. Following its closure in 2010, unit combat training had become the responsibility of the individual services, while inter-service and operational-level training was under the authority of the General Staff. First Deputy Defence Minister General Arkady Bakhin justified the reinstatement by citing the need to improve coordination and combat effectiveness, and said this would, as Tass news agency reported, 'primarily improve combat capability of the multi-service force groupings and improve the existing regulatory framework regulating the organisation of combat training'. This is consistent with the Russian push to develop skills in joint operations, as demonstrated by major exercises during 2013.

Analysts have noted that while rearmament and related financial issues were key for Serdyukov, Shoigu is more concerned with the organisation of training and regular activities of the forces. Therefore, many of the most important decisions of the Serdyukov-Makarov era remain untouched. Despite Serdyukov's sacking, the goal continues of restructuring the armed forces away from the mass-mobilisation model intended for large-scale conflict,

to professionalised armed forces at a higher state of readiness. Instead of relatively low-strength units, to be filled with mobilised personnel in time of crisis, Russia's ground forces are now mostly in mobile brigade-sized formations, more aligned with the combat requirements of low- and medium-intensity local and regional warfare. The perception of increased readiness has been reinforced by the re-introduction of surprise operational-readiness inspections at the military-district, combined-arms-unit and single-service levels, which were last carried out in the Soviet era. The presentation of a new, classified State Defence Plan early in Shoigu's tenure is evidence of continuity, since this document must have been drawn up under Shoigu and Gerasimov's predecessors.

The State Defence Plan was complemented by the publication of an Activity Plan 2013–20, which identifies intended levels of increased combat readiness, new or upgraded equipment, and increases in personnel costs for the remainder of the decade. The plan sets highly ambitious targets for manpower and the proportion of 'modern' (this term remains vague) weapons systems in service, tied in with the State Armaments Programme (see Defence Economics, p. 163). Interestingly, the plan constitutes the first official admission that the armed forces were at only 80% of planned strength in 2013, contrasting with repeated official claims that Russia has one million troops under arms. As noted in previous editions

of *The Military Balance*, recruitment and staffing have been key areas of concern for some years, with ongoing challenges in securing adequate numbers of conscripts and in recruiting enough of the contract personnel expected to fill so many roles within the future armed forces.

### Armed forces

Two elite **army** divisions, the 4th Tamanskaya and the 5th Kantemirovskaya divisions, were re-established in May 2013 having previously been 'reformed' into brigades. However, there was little indication during 2013 of any increase in personnel or equipment holdings to reflect this change in status, indicating that the defence ministry is not reconsidering the move to brigade-based structures more generally.

Considerable work remains to be done in establishing brigade structures within ground forces. Moves to create light, medium and heavy brigades remain at an experimental level. Nonetheless, the ministry is persisting with the plan, as analysis of combat-training exercises with these formations apparently shows that while they are far from ideal, they are better than the current 'New Look' motorised and tank brigades. The division structure is to be retained within the Airborne Forces and Strategic Missile Forces.

**Air force** reform and development is following three themes: improving command-and-control, modernising the combat aircraft fleet, and increasing

### Personnel issues

Manpower remains a key issue for Russian military planners. Conscript targets are hard to meet, and plans for recruiting professional ('contract') servicemen to serve as NCOs and in posts requiring advanced training are falling short of targets. It has long been clear that the armed forces as a whole are understaffed. Senior Russian officers, when persuaded to admit the problem, downplay it, saying that where necessary the 'rolling deficit' (*tekushchiy nekomplekt*) can be covered by calling up reservists.

The target is still for a total of 425,000 contract servicemen by 2017 (up from a claimed 241,400 in 2013). It appears that, as with previous failed programmes to recruit contractors, Russian leaders would prefer at present to maintain the narrative that this is achievable, rather than adjust the target or institute major change to reach it. As in all discussions of Russian military manpower, information is unclear and the challenge is understated; for example, Chief of the General Staff Gerasimov said in June

2013 that the target would be met by recruiting 60,000 contractors annually – without mentioning that many more than this must be recruited to allow for those leaving the service after their contract term expires.

Stopgap measures have been put in place to keep the junior command structure functioning while these targets remain unmet. Officers continue to serve in posts that are notionally intended for NCOs under the new structure. The post of *praporshchik*, normally translated as 'warrant officer', referred to a class of long-serving specialists, usually in roles demanding technical or administrative skills. Abolished entirely under Defence Minister Serdyukov, *praporshchiki* have been reinstated under his successor Shoigu, with plans to recruit (or re-enlist) up to 50,000. However, it remains unclear how the target of achieving 100% staffing by 2014, outlined in the defence ministry's Activity Plan 2013–20, can be achieved without revising the targets radically downwards.

the types and number of air-launched precision-guided weaponry. Deliveries of fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft have increased in the past few years, allowing units to be re-equipped fully with new or upgraded platforms.

One of the most significant revisions to the Serdyukov reforms so far concerns air-force structure. Air Force Commander-in-Chief Lieutenant General Viktor Bondarev initiated a shift away from the 'air base' (*aviabaza*) approach, which often involved hosting multiple types of aircraft at single airfields, towards a 'one airfield, one regiment' formula. This will in effect reinstate a division and regiment structure. The Serdyukov reforms eliminated air armies, divisions and regiments, replacing these with the *aviabaza* as the basic unit of air-force formations. These were divided into first- and second-class categories. First-class air bases comprised 5–8 wings, while second class-bases had 1–2 wings. Each wing consisted on average of three squadrons, each with different aircraft types. Before the reforms, an air regiment consisted of not more than two squadrons, each equipped with one aircraft type.

The navy is in the midst of recapitalising its infrastructure, while also bringing into service more modern designs to replace ageing Soviet-era platforms due to be decommissioned. Refurbishment work is also under way at most main bases, with infrastructure upgrade and construction a key objective for shore facilities, as well as for ancillary vessels such as tugs and auxiliaries.

Mediterranean deployments also attracted attention. During the Soviet era, the navy's Fifth Squadron operated in the area and although naval vessels returned to the Mediterranean in 2012, the deployment of a Mediterranean Task Force in June 2013 was seen as a key event. Ships are to be rotated through the task force deployment, and the squadron consists of vessels from the Black Sea, Baltic Sea, Northern and, in some cases, Pacific fleets.

Russian **Airborne Forces** are due to be bolstered by the end of 2013 with three air-assault brigades from the Eastern and Southern Military Districts (under Decree 776, signed by Putin on 11 October 2013). The brigades will become the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's reserve. This shift reflects the armed forces' desire, discussed and approved by the defence ministry in May, to be able to provide rapid-deployment forces as a core capability, with airborne units used as a crisis-reaction force. Along with airborne units, rapid-deployment forces are also

scheduled to include special taskforce brigades, marine units and special operations personnel. Meanwhile, a **Special Operations Command (SOC)** was established in 2013, in an attempt to unify special forces capabilities at the command level. The SOC is viewed as part of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief's reserve, alongside airborne units.

Sustaining and renewing Russia's nuclear forces remains a near-term priority. Lieutenant-General Sergey Karakayev, the **Strategic Rocket Forces** commander, claims that Russia has two new ICBM designs capable of penetrating missile-defence systems: one a solid-propellant missile, the other a long-discussed, liquid-fuelled model. Some media reports indicate that the liquid-fuelled design may be intended to replace the R36M (SS-18 *Satan*). The intent is that by 2021 almost all strategic missiles should be of new or recent design. There is also renewed interest in a rail-mobile system to succeed the *Molodets*, which was withdrawn from service in 2007. However, missile programmes continue to suffer development problems. A test firing of the *Bulava* (SS-NX-32) SLBM failed again in September 2013, prompting further concern over the project.

The **Aerospace Defence Forces** and associated air- and missile-defence systems are due to be fully integrated into the command-and-control system between 2016 and 2020. A key programme is the S-500 (*Triumf-M*) SAM system. Introduction into service of the S-500 is now promised for the beginning of 2018, but this date remains open to doubt, as the facilities for building the system are still under construction. The A-135 *Amur* ballistic-missile defence system for Moscow is also to be replaced with the A-235 *Samolyet-M*. As of the end of 2013 it appeared that the A-235 would use an improved variant of the 53T6 missile used in the A-135. The interceptor is intended to be capable of a kinetic kill, while also retaining the capacity to carry a nuclear warhead.

---

## DEFENCE ECONOMICS

---

### State Armaments Programme

The country's political and military leadership have shown considerable continued commitment to the ambitious State Armaments Programme to 2020, notwithstanding faltering economic performance. Spending on the programme is now nearly half of all expenditure under the 'National Defence' budget chapter, compared with less than one-third in 2005. The optimistic economic forecasts on which the

programme was originally based – average annual GDP growth of at least 6% – have not been achieved. Instead, economic growth has slowed, from 4.3% in 2011 (the first year of the programme's implementation) to barely 2% in 2013. Consequently, the government has had little choice but to alter its budgetary priorities to permit a steadily growing share of defence spending as a proportion of GDP. This is now projected to rise from 2.72% of GDP in 2011 to 3.15% in 2013 (see Table 4). The draft three-year budget for 2014–16, sent to the Duma at the end of September 2013, envisaged that this share would eventually rise to 3.9% of GDP by 2016, with a significant ramping up of real defence spending over the 2012–15 period. To fund the programme, the authorities have resorted increasingly to state-guaranteed credits. This is, in effect, a non-budgetary means of increasing spending, although the finance ministry has indicated that there will be no new credits after 2015.

### Defence industry restructuring

Since December 2011, the government's Military-Industrial Commission has been headed by the deputy prime minister, Dmitry Rogozin. Under his leadership, it has been transformed into a more interventionist coordinating agency, while Rogozin himself has played a prominent role in attempting to resolve issues arising from the implementation of the annual state defence order, the instrument with which the State Armaments Programme is put into effect. He has also promoted organisational restructuring, particularly through the consolidation of Russia's sprawling defence industries into large corporate structures. In addition, he has sought to boost private business involvement in the defence sector, including the use of small companies to fulfil defence contracts, though with only limited success so far.


As a result of these reforms, the defence sector is now dominated by a small number of large, predominantly state-owned corporations. The largest of these is Rostec (formerly Russian Technologies), established in 2007, which now has some 660 enterprises, both defence and civilian, employing 900,000 people. Under CEO Sergey Chemezov, there has been a concerted effort to establish an effective corporate structure, with factories grouped into a dozen or so holding companies, some playing a major role in defence work. (This development has parallels with post-war Italy, where state-owned Finmeccanica consolidated the defence and engineering assets of state holding company IRI, but eventually became a commercial business, albeit with a sizeable state shareholding.) Corporations within Rostec include: the state arms export company Rosoboronexport; Oboronprom, which includes Russian Helicopters, employing 40,000, and gas-turbine manufacturer the United Engine Corporation, employing 70,000; Radio-Electronic Technologies, comprising more than 50 enterprises employing 67,000, concerned with electronic warfare and aviation electronics, among others; Russian Electronics, responsible for most of Russia's electronics component base for military purposes; Shvabe, making military and civil optoelectronic equipment; avionics concern Aircraft Engineering; and high-precision tactical weapons firm Vysokotokhnye Kompleksy.

Other major structures include the United Aviation Corporation, responsible for almost all development and production of fixed-wing aircraft, military and civil, and now employing almost 100,000; the United Shipbuilding Corporation, responsible for approximately 90% of shipbuilding, including all naval work; Almaz-Antey, responsible for almost all development and manufacture of air-defence equipment,

Table 4 **Russian National Defence Expenditure Trends (2010–16)**

Year	GDP (R bn)	Real GDP Change (%)	National Defence Expenditure (R bn)	% change in Real Defence Expenditure	National Defence as a % of GDP
2016DB	86,869.0	3.3	3,377.3	5.4	3.89
2015DB	79,725.0	3.1	3,026.9	15.7	3.80
2014DB	73,354.0	3.0	2,489.4	12.4	3.39
2013B	66,515.0	2.4	2,098.4	11.5	3.15
2012	62,599.1	3.4	1,812.3	10.2	2.90
2011	55,799.6	4.3	1,516.0	2.8	2.72
2010	46,308.5	4.5	1,276.5	-5.9	2.76

Sources: Rosstat, Ministry of Finance, Kremlin Annual Budget Laws, Ministry of Economic Development and 2014–16 draft budget. National defence expenditure figures for 2010–12 reflect actual expenditure; figures for 2013 reflect the law on the budget; and figures for 2014–16 reflect the draft national budget as of September 2013. Spending in real terms calculated using the annual GDP deflator.



Map 3 **Russia and Eurasia Regional Defence Spending**<sup>1</sup>

with more than 60 enterprises employing almost 95,000; and the Tactical Missiles Corporation, uniting 25 enterprises and design organisations concerned with air-, land- and sea-based tactical missile systems. In late 2013 plans to reorganise the space-missile industry were announced, transforming the Federal Space Agency (Roskosmos) into a more effective, business-orientated, structure: the United Rocket and Space Corporation. These corporations are mostly state-owned, but the intention is to form joint-stock companies with the involvement of private capital. This is with the exception of the nuclear weapons industry, which will remain in state hands under the Rosatom state corporation.

### Remaining defence-industrial challenges

The R20tr (US\$610bn) State Armaments Programme to 2020 poses a major challenge for Russia's defence industry. Until its adoption, Russia's defence industry was largely dependent on foreign orders. Defence exports assisted in the recovery of the industry after the collapse of output during the 1990s. However, exports did not equally benefit all sectors. Enterprises obliged to focus on domestic orders because of the

nature of their work – for example, strategic missile manufacturers – were unable to rely on foreign orders to sustain their activities, and consequently lacked investment resources and had difficulty in retaining workers because of low pay rates. As a result, industrial capabilities now vary considerably across Russia's defence sectors. Some companies face capacity constraints, and find it difficult to meet both export demand and the increased domestic orders required by the State Armament Programme. This applies in particular to Almaz-Antey, which now has to build new factories to manufacture its air-defence systems. The same applies, albeit to a lesser degree, to the construction of conventionally powered submarines and other naval systems.

In parallel with the armaments programme there is another programme focused on development of the defence industry (to 2020), with a R2–3tr (approximately US\$65–98bn) budget for investment in new capacity and the refurbishment of existing production facilities. However, the rate of renewal of productive assets remains low, and many enterprises forced to use Soviet-era equipment have found it difficult to meet modern quality standards. Official






Figure 9 **Estimated Russian Defence Expenditure** as % of GDP

policy favours the installation of new Russian-built machinery, rather than imported equipment, but overall the volume of domestic production is inadequate.

The Russian defence industry now employs more than 1.3m people, including 440,000 in R&D. However, it is experiencing labour problems, above all difficulty in recruiting younger technical and R&D personnel and skilled shopfloor workers. The workforce is ageing, with a large cohort of personnel near or above the official retirement age (60) and relatively few under the age of 30. The average age of employees is reported to be 46 years at industrial enterprises and 48 in R&D. Relatively low pay is a major factor in the inability to recruit and retain. However, increased orders in recent years have enabled some companies to offer pay increases, which may be a way to reverse the negative trends of the past 20 years.

Defence companies are also experiencing difficulties in obtaining high-quality domestically produced components and systems. A feature of the Soviet defence industry was the low level of subcontracting. Many Soviet-era defence enterprises not only conducted final assembly in-house, but also manufactured a wide range of components – often using costly low-volume production methods – that in market economies are normally obtained from specialist suppliers, often small- or medium-sized companies. While this meant higher costs for in-house components, Soviet arms producers were able to minimise the supply disruptions that plagued many other sectors of the state-run economy. Today, most end-product producers are still state-owned, but specialist component suppliers, where they exist, are now often private businesses, and will only

undertake defence work if it is profitable. In reality, defence contracts are often loss-making or yield only modest profits. In these circumstances, there is little incentive for new companies to enter the field and some established suppliers have switched to more profitable civilian work. Soviet-style internal component production remains widespread, in part because of this lack of specialist firms, but costs remain high and achieving the quality required for defence products is a problem.

These difficulties now threaten the armaments programme. In some sectors, the scheduled increase in output is so large that it is difficult to see how it can be realised. For example, according to the Ministry of Economic Development, the state defence order will see the value of contracts for Russia's aviation industry increase by seven times between 2012 and 2016, while this will rise by a factor of six for shipbuilding. It is likely that some contracts will have to be fulfilled in the next armaments programme (2016–25). This will probably apply to such systems as naval vessels, transport aircraft, armoured vehicles and air-defence equipment.

### Foreign weapons procurement

Given the defence industry's problems, there has been interest in acquiring overseas military hardware. Importing arms and components from CIS countries, especially from Belarus, has been acceptable, but strains have developed with Ukraine, notwithstanding its significant role in the manufacture of transport aircraft, power units for ships and some types of missiles for aircraft. Serdyukov took the initiative in securing foreign supply, most prominently by buying two *Mistral*-class LPDs from France, with the option of building two more at a Russian shipyard. The two vessels are now being built at Saint-Nazaire, with the delivery of the first, the *Vladivostok* for the Pacific Fleet, scheduled for late 2014 and the second, the *Sevastopol*, at the end of 2015. However, it now seems unlikely that two more will be built in Russia. While there have been some foreign technology acquisitions, such as optical equipment from France, there have been only two other significant imports of end-product weapons: Iveco armoured vehicles from Italy and UAVs from Israel. In the latter case, some Israeli UAVs are now being assembled at a factory in Yekaterinburg.

Since Shoigu replaced Serdyukov there has been a policy change, in which Rogozin played a role. It is being stressed that Russia will no longer import

assembled weapons. However, cooperation with international partners will still be welcome, provided that Russia is an equal partner with direct access to the relevant technology. For instance, UralVagonZavod is now working jointly with France's Sagem and Renault Trucks Defense on a new combat vehicle, which may be built in Russia. Foreign systems can be manufactured in Russia but only with a high degree of local sourcing; simple assembly of imported components will no longer be permitted.

Russia is now dependent on imported microelectronic components, with Belarus a major supplier. In principle, all components of foreign origin have to undergo rigorous testing before they can be accepted for use in Russian armaments. In practice, this time-consuming and costly procedure is often bypassed, leading to the use of components of inadequate quality for military purposes. This is a matter of considerable policy concern, with efforts under way to increase the domestic supply of crucial components and systems.

Russia is also committed to achieving a significant modernisation of its armed forces' armaments, with the headline goal that by 2020 at least 70% of Russian inventories will be modern equipment. However, the current armaments programme is ambitious, and does not take adequate account of the development and production constraints facing the country's defence industry. While defence-industrial renewal is gradually beginning, it is taking longer than Russia's political and military leadership would wish.

---

## EURASIA

---

Military and security policy in Eurasia is driven by differing perceptions of the internal and external threat environment. Russia continues to play a key role in shaping some of the underlying assumptions regarding security, while states have divergent views about the potential security impact of the ISAF drawdown from Afghanistan. Policy development is marked by little unity of purpose, except in the relatively low-key common agreements emerging from the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and in the security dimension of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Beyond apparent determination to combat extremism, separatism and terrorism at a multilateral level, there is little consistency in terms of planning and threat assessment linked to Afghanistan, or on prioritising transnational security threats.

Russian security policy in Central Asia demonstrates further the collapse of the US–Russia 'reset' in relations. Moscow is primarily concerned with promoting or exploiting the perception of declining Western/NATO influence in light of the 2014 withdrawal. To this end, it is using both the CSTO and SCO as instruments to present local governments with alternatives to pursuing closer relations with NATO; pushing joint air-defence policies; and offering arms to the weaker Central Asian states as a means of boosting political influence and reducing these countries' appetite for cooperating with NATO. It also wants to further develop the CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Forces (KSOR), in case of a possible deterioration of the post-2014 security situation in Central Asia.

### Security policy and the Afghan drawdown

Since the ISAF drawdown was announced, both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have issued new military doctrines. Kazakhstan's 2011 Military Doctrine confirmed that Astana's security policy has not prioritised Afghanistan, and its force structure and armed forces modernisation suggest that Kazakhstan expects no deterioration in post-2014 security environment in Central Asia.

Kyrgyzstan's new doctrine, signed into law on 5 July 2013, sets out possible threats to the state, and notes plans to reform the armed forces. The security environment is described as unpredictable, with a risk of sudden conflict; the text then refers to the Middle East and Afghanistan. The doctrine identifies potential threats to Kyrgyz security, including international terrorism and interference in its domestic affairs, only afterwards adding possible recurrences of the ethnic violence that the country experienced in June 2010.

There is no evidence in the references to military reform (section III, 31) that Kyrgyzstan is actively preparing for post-2014 Afghanistan-linked contingencies. Instead, it is said that existing structures have preserved the Soviet model which does not 'meet current requirements'. The reforms promise, among other things, a modern military with enhanced command-and-control, effective military logistics, and a modern air-defence system – adding the term 'mobilisation readiness'. In general, Kyrgyz combat readiness remains low, with large numbers of poorly trained conscripts in the armed forces. According to analysts, Bishkek is no closer to devising the force structure, doctrine, training and procurement policies that would support state security priorities.

The smaller Central Asian states, such as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, are preoccupied with internal stability and limited militant activity, with less focus on the post-2014 implications of the ISAF drawdown. Tajik security forces have intermittent problems coping with armed gangs linked to drug trafficking. Given the overall weaknesses of the Tajik armed and security forces – which suffer from inadequate special forces training and personnel issues revolving around high numbers of conscripts and low planning capacity – it is likely that low-level militant activity linked to drug trafficking will continue to challenge the armed forces.

The larger and more prosperous states are more or less indifferent to the possible effects of the Afghan drawdown. Priorities for Kazakhstan include protecting the capital during EXPO 2017, deploying peace-support elements abroad in support of future UN missions, and boosting its naval forces in the Caspian Sea. Having declared neutrality in 1999 and enshrined this in its 2009 Military Doctrine, Turkmenistan is mainly focused on its naval build-up in the Caspian. President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov plans to strengthen the country's naval forces by 2015, and the navy has already procured coastal assets, including fast patrol boats. A low level of training for officers and enlisted personnel, lack of spare parts and insufficient numbers of trained pilots, combined with the lack of contact with foreign armed forces, limit capability.

The one exception is Uzbekistan. Although security documents are classified as a state secret in Uzbekistan, statements by senior government officials imply that this is the sole Central Asian state to now consider Afghanistan the main potential security threat (although past security issues requiring state action have mainly stemmed from domestic issues). Tashkent's focus on Afghanistan-linked contingencies means that border security, mobility and small-scale operations are central to security thinking. The Uzbek government has lobbied Washington heavily to materially benefit from the drawdown. ISAF members have dampened this appetite among Central Asian states by insisting that any hardware transfers, based on what individual countries choose to leave behind, must be collected and transported by the recipient country.

In general, Central Asian states show little sign of preparing for any negative impact on their security arising from the 2014 ISAF drawdown. This reflects a mixture of political confidence in some capitals,

coupled with weak defence capacity in others. The smaller states refer to the potential threat increase post-2014 in order to extract a better security assistance package from NATO members; those states less focused on Afghanistan present requests more suited to varied security applications.

Consistent with its 2011 Military Doctrine, Kazakhstan continues to develop its peace support operation (PSO) capabilities in order to participate in UN peacekeeping operations (PKO). Legislation has been drafted that would give the defence ministry the power to send forces abroad. Kazakhstan's peacekeeping battalion (KAZBAT) functions as part of the emerging KAZBRIG peacekeeping brigade. Since 2003, this battalion has participated in annual *Steppe Eagle* exercises with US and UK forces. Other countries have recently joined the exercise, including small contingents from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. *Steppe Eagle 2013*, held in southern Kazakhstan in August, included an assessment under NATO Partnership for Peace arrangements of KAZBAT/KAZBRIG PSO capabilities, partly to help deployment preparations for UN PKOs. However, supporting security forces in responding to future domestic crises remains a core focus, as does enhancing forces assigned to the CSTO and developing CIS joint air-defence, mainly with Russia.

In the South Caucasus, Russian security policy remains focused on preventing tensions flaring between Georgia and the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Moscow has relaxed trade sanctions imposed on Tbilisi after the August 2008 war, though renewing diplomatic relations is proving more difficult.

Policy is more nuanced regarding Armenia and Azerbaijan. Moscow wants to avoid any renewal of territorial conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, yet arms sales proceed to both sides. Despite alarmist reporting on the defence policies of both Armenia and Azerbaijan, neither side appears closer to renewed conflict, with modernisation and defence reform plans progressing moderately.

### Defence economics

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan struggle to maintain defence spending at levels high enough to support structural reforms. The larger states in the region, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, have greater defence-spending capacity, although precise levels are impossible to establish in Uzbekistan, because of state secrecy. Defence spending in



Turkmenistan reached 1.6% of GDP in 2012 (around US\$538.9m) and in 2013 stabilised at around this figure.

**Kazakhstan's** cumulative 2013–15 defence budget of 1.01tr tenge (around US\$6.74bn) was approved in the Law on the Republic's Budget. In 2013 it reached 348.4bn tenge (US\$2.32bn, 0.95% of GDP), with year-on-year growth of 75bn tenge (approximately US\$511m), reflecting overall growth in the country's GDP. Progress in improving capacity in the domestic defence industry through the joint-stock company Kazakhstan Engineering is proceeding slowly. The number of joint ventures stands at four (Exocet, Eurocopter, Cessna and Otokar) with plans to increase this in the near future. President Nursultan Nazarbayev has set a target for 70% of the armed forces' modern weapons to be manufactured domestically by 2015. Joint ventures and in-country assembly will likely be central to this aim, as part of the country's 'multi-vector' defence policy (see *The Military Balance 2013*, p. 212). Kazakhstan is diversifying its foreign military cooperation with NATO and non-NATO members, while still serving as Russia's main partner within Central Asia. Its security policy, however, limits the level of potential cooperation with NATO, which will mostly centre on small-scale activities to boost peacekeeping capabilities. In January 2013, Astana took delivery of two Airbus C-295s, with the option of a further six. The contract also envisages a service package for spare parts and ground support. Kazakhstan's defence ministry is also discussing the possible procurement of A400M. Nonetheless, these procurement developments do not signal any move away from close defence cooperation with Russia.

#### *South Caucasus*

Defence spending in the South Caucasus continues to be dominated by **Azerbaijan's** disbursements. According to President Ilham Aliyev, the country's defence budget increased from US\$3bn in 2012 to US\$3.7bn in 2013. This funding will enable

the replacement of ageing equipment and weapons systems. Military procurement falls into three areas: diversification of Baku's foreign military cooperation; equipment purchases; and efforts to boost domestic production. Azerbaijan buys equipment from a range of suppliers, developing forms of defence cooperation with a variety of states. Ukraine was the main source of foreign equipment until a substantial 2012 deal with Russia, which will sell Baku US\$4bn-worth of equipment and weapons over three years. Azerbaijan is also reportedly interested in military equipment from South Korea, although details remain unclear. Also important is a related initiative to boost domestic defence production capacity. In 2012, the volume of such production increased by 12% on 2011, and there are now some 700 defence items produced domestically. It is likely, however, that Baku will rely on foreign procurement for high-tech requirements.

**Armenia's** 2013 defence budget was US\$447m. Although the country's fledgling domestic defence industry has developed in recent years, it is unlikely to become profitable before 2015 at the earliest, leaving Armenia's armed forces heavily reliant on a strategic partnership with Russia for upgrades, modernisation and maintenance of its predominantly Russian-manufactured inventory. Small joint ventures with Greece and Poland to modernise T-72 MBTs will mean the country is not completely reliant upon Russia, though contacts with Moscow will likely continue in relation to advanced systems, such as Armenia's S-300PM air-defence system. Yerevan is interested in enhancing its artillery capabilities, most recently demonstrated by an agreement to procure the Chinese A100 300mm MRL. (A military parade in 2006 showcased an earlier version of this MRL, which appears to have entered service in the 1990s.) Military-technical cooperation with China is unlikely to weaken Moscow's grip on this market, particularly given Yerevan's membership of the CSTO and its decision in September 2013 to enter the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia.

## Armenia ARM

Armenian Dram d		2012	2013	2014
GDP	d	3.98tr	4.33tr	
	US\$	10.1bn	10.3bn	
<i>per capita</i>	US\$	2,991	3,037	
Growth	%	7.18	4.30	
Inflation	%	2.51	4.20	
Def bdgt	d	159bn	188bn	
	US\$	402m	447m	
FMA (US)	US\$	2.7m	2.7m	2.7m
US\$1=d		395.54	419.66	

Population 2,974,184

Age	0 – 14	15 – 19	20 – 24	25 – 29	30 – 64	65 plus
Male	9.2%	3.8%	5.2%	5.0%	20.2%	3.6%
Female	8.0%	3.5%	5.1%	5.1%	24.9%	6.2%

## Capabilities

Armenia's armed forces focus on territorial defence, given continuing tensions with neighbouring Azerbaijan. While overall military doctrine remains influenced strongly by Russian thinking, Armenia's overseas deployments, which include support to ISAF in Afghanistan, enable the troops serving in the Pul-e Khumri PRT to learn lessons from their NATO counterparts. The ISAF contribution increased in 2011. In November 2011, Armenia signed a new Individual Partnership Action Plan with NATO. While conscription continues, there is a growing cohort of professional officers. The country's armed forces are generally held to be at least competent and well-motivated. Serviceability and maintenance have been a problem for the air force, and Russia provides national air defence from a leased base. The army exercises regularly, and aims to be able to deploy and sustain a battalion-sized contingent by 2015 as part of a multinational mission. To inform these developments, Armenia completed a Strategic Defense Review in May 2011.

**ACTIVE 44,800** (Army 41,850 Air/AD Aviation Forces (Joint) 1,100 other Air Defence Forces 1,850) Paramilitary 4,300

*Conscript liability 24 months.*

**RESERVES** some mob reported, possibly 210,000 with military service within 15 years.

## ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

**Army 22,900; 18,950 conscripts (total 41,850)**

### FORCES BY ROLE

#### SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF regt

#### MANOEUVRE

##### Mechanised

1 (1st) corps (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 2 MR regt, 1 maint bn)

1 (2nd) corps (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 2 MR regt, 1 lt inf regt, 1 arty bn)

1 (3rd) corps (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 4 MR regt, 1 lt inf regt, 1 arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 maint bn)

1 (4th) corps (4 MR regt; 1 SP arty bn; 1 sigs bn)

1 (5th) corps (with 2 fortified areas) (1 MR regt)

#### Other

1 indep MR trg bde

### COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bde

1 MRL bde

1 AT regt

1 AD bde

2 AD regt

1 (radiotech) AD regt

1 engr regt

### EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

**MBT** 109: 3 T-54; 5 T-55; 101 T-72

**AIFV** 98: 75 BMP-1; 6 BMP-1K; 5 BMP-2; 12 BRM-1K

**APC (W)** 130: 8 BTR-60; 100 look-a-like; 18 BTR-70; 4 BTR-80

**ARTY** 232

**SP** 38: **122mm** 10 2S1; **152mm** 28 2S3

**TOWED** 131: **122mm** 69 D-30; **152mm** 62: 26 2A36; 2 D-1; 34 D-20

**MRL** 51: **122mm** 47 BM-21; **273mm** 4 WM-80

**MOR** **120mm** 12 M120

**AT** • **MSL** 22

**SP** 22: 9 9P148 *Konkurs*; 13 9P149 MT-LB *Spiral*

### AD

#### SAM

**SP** 2K11 *Krug* (SA-4 *Ganef*); 2K12 *Kub* (SA-6 *Gainful*);

9K33 *Osa* (SA-8 *Gecko*)

**TOWED** S-75 *Dvina* (SA-2 *Guideline*); S-125 *Pechora* (SA-3 *Goa*)

**MANPAD** *Igla-1* (SA-16 *Gimlet*); *Igla* (SA-18 *Grouse*)

#### GUNS

**SP** ZSU-23-4

**TOWED** **23mm** ZU-23-2

**UAV** **Light** 15 *Krunk*

**RADAR** • **LAND** 6 SNAR-10

**MSL** • **TACTICAL** • **SSM** 12: 8 9K72 *Elbrus* (SS-1C *Scud* B); 4 9K79 *Tochka* (SS-21 *Scrab*)

**AEV** MT-LB

**ARV** BREhM-D; BREM-1

## Air and Air Defence Aviation Forces 1,100

1 Air & AD Joint Command

### FORCES BY ROLE

#### GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with Su-25/Su-25UBK *Frogfoot*

### EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

**AIRCRAFT** 15 combat capable

**ATK** 15: 13 Su-25 *Frogfoot*; 2 Su-25UBK *Frogfoot*

**TPT** 3 **Heavy** 2 Il-76 *Candid*; **PAX** 1 A319CJ

**TRG** 14: 4 L-39 *Albatros*; 10 Yak-52

### HELICOPTERS

**ATK** 8 Mi-24P *Hind*

**ISR** 4: 2 Mi-24K *Hind*; 2 Mi-24R *Hind* (cbt spt)

**MRH** 10 Mi-8MT (cbt spt)

**C2** 2 Mi-9 *Hip* G (cbt spt)

TPT • Light 7 PZL Mi-2 *Hoplite*  
SAM • SP S-300/S-300PM (SA-10 *Grumble*)

## Paramilitary 4,300

### Ministry of Internal Affairs

#### FORCES BY ROLE

##### MANOEUVRE

###### Other

4 paramilitary bn

#### EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIFV 55: 5 BMD-1; 44 BMP-1; 1 BMP-1K; 5 BRM-1K  
APC (W) 24 BTR-60/BTR-70/BTR-152

### Border Troops

Ministry of National Security

#### EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIFV 43: 5 BMD-1; 35 BMP-1; 3 BRM-1K  
APC (W) 23: 5 BTR-60; 18 BTR-70

## DEPLOYMENT

### Legal provisions for foreign deployment:

**Constitution:** Codified constitution (1995, amended 2005)

**Specific legislation:** 'Law on Defence of the Republic of Armenia'

**Decision on deployment of troops abroad:** by the president, in accordance with 'Law on Defence of the Republic of Armenia' (Article 5 (2) (1)). Also, under Art. 55 (13) of constitution, president can call for use of armed forces (and National Assembly shall be convened). (Also Art. 81 (3) of constitution.)

#### AFGHANISTAN

NATO • ISAF 131

#### BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

OSCE • Bosnia and Herzegovina 2

#### LEBANON

UN • UNIFIL 1

#### SERBIA

NATO • KFOR 36

## FOREIGN FORCES

OSCE figures represent total Minsk Conference mission personnel in both Armenia and Azerbaijan

Bulgaria OSCE 1

Czech Republic OSCE 1

Poland OSCE 1

Russia 3,303: 1 MR bde; 74 MBT; 201 AIFV; 84 arty; (12 MRL; 72 SP/towed); 1 ftr sqn with 18 MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; 2 SAM bty with S-300V (SA-12 *Gladiator/Giant*); 1 SAM bty with 2K12 *Kub* (SA-6 *Gainful*)

Sweden OSCE 1

Ukraine OSCE 1

United Kingdom OSCE 1

## Azerbaijan AZE

Azerbaijani New Manat m		2012	2013	2014
GDP	m	54bn	58.9bn	
	US\$	68.8bn	77.2bn	
<i>per capita</i>	US\$	7,450	8,297	
Growth	%	2.16	4.14	
Inflation	%	1.08	3.37	
Def bdgt <sup>a</sup>	m	1.38bn	1.53bn	1.64bn
	US\$	1.76bn	2bn	
FMA (US)	US\$	2.7m	2.7m	2.7m
US\$1=m		0.78	0.76	

<sup>a</sup> Official budget

Population 9,590,159

Age	0 – 14	15 – 19	20 – 24	25 – 29	30 – 64	65 plus
Male	12.1%	4.2%	5.2%	4.8%	20.7%	2.4%
Female	10.5%	3.9%	5.0%	4.6%	22.7%	3.9%

## Capabilities

While the armed forces have yet to successfully transition from a Soviet-era model, increasing defence expenditure has provided the opportunity to acquire some more capable military equipment. Rising oil revenues have provided the financial headroom for acquisitions, including the S-300 SAM system, but it is unclear whether the potential benefits brought by these modern systems have been felt in terms of operational capability. The armed forces still rely on conscription, and readiness within the services varies considerably between units. Peacekeeping deployments have included a small number of personnel in Afghanistan. Azerbaijan maintains defence relationships with NATO through an IPAP, and has a close relationship with Turkey. With NATO support, the Internal Troops are developing a police support unit to be available for NATO-led operations. US military assistance has included support to maritime-security operations in the Caspian Sea. The air force suffers from training and maintenance problems. The armed forces cannot organically support external deployments.

**ACTIVE 66,950** (Army 56,850 Navy 2,200 Air 7,900)

**Paramilitary 15,000**

*Conscript liability* 17 months, but can be extended for ground forces.

**RESERVE 300,000**

Some mobilisation reported, 300,000 with military service within 15 years

## ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

### Army 56,850

#### FORCES BY ROLE

##### COMMAND

5 corps HQ

##### MANOEUVRE

**Mechanised**

4 MR bde

**Light**

19 MR bde

**Other**

1 sy bde

**COMBAT SUPPORT**

1 arty bde

1 arty trg bde

1 MRL bde

1 AT bde

1 engr bde

1 sigs bde

**COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT**

1 log bde

**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****MBT** 433: 95 T-55; 244 T-72; 94 T-90S**AIFV** 211: 20 BMD-1; 43 BMP-1; 33 BMP-2; 100 BMP-3; 15 BRM-1**APC** 575**APC (T)** 336 MT-LB**APC (W)** 149: 10 BTR-60; 132 BTR-70; 7 BTR-80A**PPV** 90: 45 *Marauder*; 45 *Matador***ARTY** 542**SP** 87: **122mm** 46 2S1; **152mm** 24: 6 2S3; 18 2S19 *Msta-S*;  
**155mm** 5 *ATMOS-2000*; **203mm** 12 2S7**TOWED** 207: **122mm** 129 D-30; **130mm** 36 M-46; **152mm**  
42: 18 2A36; 24 D-20**GUN/MOR** **120mm** 36: 18 2S9 *NONA*; 18 2S31 *Vena***MRL** 100+: **122mm** 52+: 43 BM-21; 9+ IMI *Lynx*; **128mm**  
12 RAK-12; **220mm** 6 TOS-1A; **300mm** 30 9A52 *Smerch***MOR** **120mm** 112: 5 *CARDOM*; 107 *PM-38***AT** • **MSL** • **MANPATS** 9K11 *Malyutka* (AT-3 *Sagger*);  
9K111 *Fagot* (AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K113 *Konkurs* (AT-5 *Spandrel*);  
9K115 *Metis* (AT-7 *Saxhorn*); *Spike-LR***AD** • **SAM** • **SP** 9K35 *Strela-10* (SA-13 *Gopher*); 2K11 *Krug*  
(SA-4 *Ganef*): 9K33 *Osa* (SA-8 *Gecko*)†**MANPAD** 9K32 *Strela* (SA-7 *Grail*); 9K34 *Strela-3*; (SA-14  
*Gremlin*); 9K310 *Igla-1* (SA-16 *Gimlet*); 9K338 *Igla-S* (SA-24  
*Grinch*)**MSL** • **SSM** ε4 9M79 *Tochka* (SS-21 *Scarab*)**RADAR** • **LAND SNAR-1** *Long Trough/SNAR-2/-6* *Pork  
Trough* (arty); *Small Fred/Small Yawn/SNAR-10* *Big Fred*  
(veh, arty); GS-13 *Long Eye* (veh)**UAV** • **ISR** • **Medium** 3 *Aerostar***AEV** MT-LB**MW** *Bozena***Navy** 2,200**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS** 8**CORVETTES** • **FS** 1 *Petya II* with 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2,  
2 twin 76mm gun**PSO** 1 *Luga* (*Woodnik* 2 Class) (FSU Project 888; additional  
trg role)**PCC** 3: 2 *Petrushka* (FSU UK-3; additional trg role); 1  
*Shelon* (FSU Project 1388M)**PB** 3: 1 *Bryza* (FSU Project 722); 1 *Turk* (TUR AB 25); 1  
*Poluchat* (FSU Project 368)**MINE WARFARE** • **MINE COUNTERMEASURES** 4**MHC** 4: 2 *Yevgenya* (FSU Project 1258); 2 *Yakhont* (FSU  
*Sonya*)**AMPHIBIOUS** 6**LSM** 3: 1 *Polnochny A* (FSU Project 770) (capacity 6 MBT;  
180 troops); 2 *Polnochny B* (FSU Project 771) (capacity 6  
MBT; 180 troops)**LCU** 1 *Vydrat* (FSU) (capacity either 3 AMX-30 MBT or  
200 troops)**LCM** 2 T-4 (FSU)**LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT** 5**AGS** 1 (FSU Project 10470)**ARS** 1 *Iva* (FSU *Vikhr*)**YTB** 2**YTD** 1**Air Force and Air Defence** 7,900**FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER**1 sqn with MiG-29 *Fulcrum***FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**1 regt with MiG-21 *Fishbed*; Su-17 *Fitter*; Su-24 *Fencer*;  
Su-25 *Frogfoot*; Su-25UB *Frogfoot B***TRANSPORT**1 sqn with An-12 *Cub*; Yak-40 *Codling***ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER**1 regt with Mi-8 *Hip*; Mi-24 *Hind*; Mi-35M *Hind*; PZL  
Mi-2 *Hoplite***EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT** 44 combat capable**FTR** 14 MiG-29 *Fulcrum***FGA** 11: 4 MiG-21 *Fishbed* (1 more in store); 4 Su-17 *Fitter*;  
1 Su-17U *Fitter*; 2 Su-24 *Fencer*†**ATK** 19: 16 Su-25 *Frogfoot*; 3 Su-25UB *Frogfoot B***TPT** 4: **Medium** 1 An-12 *Cub*; **Light** 3 Yak-40 *Codling***TRG** 40: 28 L-29 *Delfin*; 12 L-39 *Albatros***HELICOPTERS****ATK** 42: 26 Mi-24 *Hind*; 16 Mi-35M *Hind***MRH**: 20+ Mi-17-IV *Hip***TPT** 20: **Medium** 13 Mi-8 *Hip*; **Light** 7 PZL Mi-2 *Hoplite***UAV** • **ISR** • **Medium** 4 *Aerostar***AD** • **SAM** S-75 *Dvina* (SA-2 *Guideline*); S-125 *Neva* (SA-  
3 *Goa*); /S-200 *Vega* (SA-5 *Gammon*) static; S-300PM/PMU2  
(SA-10 *Grumble*/SA-20 *Gargoyle*)**MSL** • **AAM** • **IR** R-60 (AA-8 *Aphid*); R-73 (AA-11 *Archer*)  
**IR/SARH** R-27 (AA-10 *Alamo*)**Paramilitary** ε15,000**Border Guard** ε5,000

Ministry of Internal Affairs

**AIFV** 168 BMP-1/2**APC (W)** 19 BTR-60/70/80**Coast Guard**The Coast Guard was established in 2005 as part of the  
State Border Service.**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS** 10**PBF** 6: 1 *Osa II* (FSU Project 205); 2 Silver Ships 48ft;  
3 *Stenka***PB** 4: 2 Baltic 150; 1 *Point* (US); 1 *Grif* (FSU *Zhuk*)

**Militia 10,000+**

Ministry of Internal Affairs  
APC (W) 7 BTR-60/BTR-70/BTR-80

**DEPLOYMENT**

**Legal provisions for foreign deployment:**

**Constitution:** Codified constitution (1995)

**Decision on deployment of troops abroad:** By parliament upon proposal by president (Art. 109, No. 28)

**AFGHANISTAN**

NATO • ISAF 94

**SERBIA**

OSCE • Kosovo 1

**FOREIGN FORCES**

OSCE figures represent total Minsk Conference mission personnel in both Armenia and Azerbaijan

**Bulgaria** OSCE 1

**Czech Republic** OSCE 1

**Poland** OSCE 1

**Sweden** OSCE 1

**Ukraine** OSCE 1

**United Kingdom** OSCE 1

**TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL**

Data presented here represent an assessment of the de facto situation. Nagorno-Karabakh was part of the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR), but mostly populated by ethnic Armenians. In 1988, when inter-ethnic clashes between Armenians and Azeris erupted in Azerbaijan, the local authorities declared their intention to secede from Azerbaijan and join the Armenian SSR. Baku rejected this and armed conflict erupted. A ceasefire was brokered in 1994. All ethnic Azeris had been expelled from Nagorno-Karabakh and almost all ethnic Armenians were forced to leave Azerbaijan. Since 1994, Armenia has controlled most of Nagorno-Karabakh, and also seven adjacent regions of Azerbaijan, often called the 'occupied territories'. While Armenia provides political, economic and military support to Nagorno-Karabakh, the region has declared itself independent – although this has not been recognised by any other state, including Armenia. Azerbaijan claims, and the rest of the international community generally regards, Nagorno-Karabakh and the occupied territories as part of Azerbaijan. (See IISS Strategic Comment, *Medvedev momentum falters in Nagorno-Karabakh*, August 2011.)

Available estimates vary with reference to military holdings in Nagorno-Karabakh. Main battle tanks are usually placed at around 200–300 in number, with similar numbers for armoured combat vehicles and artillery pieces, with small numbers of fixed- and rotary-wing aviation. Available personnel number estimates are between 18,000–20,000.

**Belarus BLR**

Belarusian Ruble r		2012	2013	2014
GDP	r	527tr	698tr	
	US\$	63.3bn	72.9bn	
<i>per capita</i>	US\$	6,739	7,807	
Growth	%	1.50	2.11	
Inflation	%	59.22	20.50	
Def bdgt	r	4.61tr		
	US\$	552m		
US\$1=r		8336.92	9573.73	

Population 9,625,888

Age	0 – 14	15 – 19	20 – 24	25 – 29	30 – 64	65 plus
Male	7.8%	2.7%	3.7%	4.3%	23.7%	4.4%
Female	7.4%	2.5%	3.5%	4.2%	26.3%	9.6%

**Capabilities**

The primary role of the armed forces is to protect territorial integrity. Much of Belarus's military inventory consists of ageing Soviet-era equipment. High inflation during 2011 is believed to have adversely affected morale within the conscript-based armed forces; these have reduced in size. As of late-2013 the fate of the air force's Su-27 *Flankers* remained unclear. This threatened to leave the MiG-29 *Fulcrum* as the country's only fighter aircraft. Air combat capabilities could be bolstered by the creation of a Russian air base in Belarus. Moscow is Minsk's main ally. Early 2013 saw a second *Tor-M2* battery enter service, with an additional S-300 (SA-10/20) battery now expected in 2014. Belarusian forces exercise with their Russian counterparts regularly and could support notionally a regional joint operation with Moscow, though the actual combat capacity of its ground forces is limited. Alongside its close bilateral defence and security ties to Russia, through the CSTO and the Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia Customs Union, Belarus is also developing a relationship with China, and has defence-industrial ties with Ukraine. Belarus hosted in September 2013 the CSTO's Rapid Reaction Forces *Zapad-13* exercise, to which it contributes an air assault brigade.

**ACTIVE 48,000 (Army 22,500 Air 15,000 Joint 10,500) Paramilitary 110,000**

**RESERVE 289,500 (Joint 289,500 with mil service within last 5 years)**

**ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE**

**Joint 10,500 (Centrally controlled units and MoD staff)**

**Army 22,500**

**FORCES BY ROLE****COMMAND**

2 comd HQ (West & North West)



**SPECIAL FORCES**

1 SF bde

**MANOEUVRE****Mechanised**

1 (mobile) armd inf bde

1 (mobile) mech bde

4 mech bde

**COMBAT SUPPORT**

2 arty bde

1 arty gp

1 MRL bde

2 MRL regt

2 SSM bde

2 AD bde

2 engr bde

2 engr regt

1 EW unit

1 NBC regt

1 ptn bridging regt

2 sigs bde

**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****MBT** 515: 446 T-72; 69 T-80**AIFV** 1,111: 100 BMD-1; 875 BMP-2; 136 BRM-1**APC** 264**APC (T)** 72: 22 BTR-D; 50 MT-LB**APC (W)** 192: 39 BTR-70; 153 BTR-80**ARTY** 1,005**SP** 434: **122mm** 198 2S1; **152mm** 236: 108 2S3; 116 2S5; 12 2S19 *Farm***TOWED** 228: **122mm** 48 D-30; **152mm** 180: 48 2A36; 132 2A65**GUN/MOR** **120mm** 48 2S9 *NONA***MRL** 234: **122mm** 126 BM-21; **220mm** 72 9P140 *Uragan*;**300mm** 36 9A52 *Smerch***MOR** **120mm** 61 2S12**AT • MSL****SP** 236: 126 9P148 *Konkurs*; 110 9P149 *Shturm***MANPATS** 9K111 *Fagot* (AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K113 *Konkurs* (AT-5 *Spandrel*); 9K114 *Shturm* (AT-6 *Spiral*); 9K115 *Metis* (AT-7 *Saxhorn*)**AD • SAM • SP** 350 9K37 *Buk* (SA-11 *Gadfly*); S-300V (SA-12A *Gladiator*/SA-12B *Giant*); 9K35 *Strela-10* (SA-13 *Gopher*); 9K33 *Osa* (SA-8 *Gecko*) (700–2,100 eff.); *Tor-M2E* (SA-15 *Gauntlet*)**RADAR • LAND** GS-13 *Long Eye*/SNAR-1 *Long Trough*/SNAR-2/-6 *Pork Trough* (arty); some *Small Fred*/*Small Yawn*/SNAR-10 *Big Fred* (veh, arty)**MSL • TACTICAL • SSM** 96: 36 FROG/SS-21 *Scarab* (*Tochka*); 60 *Scud***AEV** MT-LB**VLB** MTU**Air Force and Air Defence Forces** 15,000

Flying hours 15 hrs/year

**FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER**2 sqn with MiG-29S/UB *Fulcrum***GROUND ATTACK**2 sqn with Su-25K/UBK *Frogfoot A/B***TRANSPORT**1 base with An-12 *Cub*; An-24 *Coke*; An-26 *Curl*; Il-76 *Candid*; Tu-134 *Crusty***TRAINING**Some sqn with L-39 *Albatros***ATTACK HELICOPTER**Some sqn with Mi-24 *Hind***TRANSPORT HELICOPTER**Some (cbt spt) sqn with Mi-6 *Hook*; Mi-8 *Hip*; Mi-24K *Hind G2*; Mi-24R *Hind G1*; Mi-26 *Halo***EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT** 72 combat capable**FTR** 38 MiG-29S/UB *Fulcrum***FGA** (21 Su-27P/UB *Flanker B/C* poss. non-operational)**ATK** 34 Su-25K/UBK *Frogfoot A/B***TPT** 13: **Heavy** 2 Il-76 *Candid* (+9 civ Il-76 available for mil use); **Medium** 3 An-12 *Cub*; **Light** 8: 1 An-24 *Coke*; 6 An-26 *Curl*; 1 Tu-134 *Crusty***TRG** Some L-39 *Albatros***HELICOPTERS****ATK** 49 Mi-24 *Hind***ISR** 20: 8 Mi-24K *Hind G2*; 12 Mi-24R *Hind G1***TPT** 168: **Heavy** 43: 29 Mi-6 *Hook*; 14 Mi-26 *Halo*;**Medium** 125 Mi-8 *Hip***MSL****ASM** Kh-25 (AS-10 *Karen*); Kh-29 (AS-14 *Kedge*)**ARM** Kh-58 (AS-11 *Kilter*)**AAM • IR** R-60 (AA-8 *Aphid*); R-73 (AA-11 *Archer*)**SARH** R-27R (AA-10 *Alamo A*)**Air Defence**

AD data from Uzal Baranovich EW radar

**FORCES BY ROLE****AIR DEFENCE**

1 bde (2 AD bn)

**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AD • SAM** S-300PS (SA-10B *Grumble*); S-125 *Pechora* (SA-3 *Goa*); S-200 (SA-5 *Gammon*)**Paramilitary** 110,000**Border Guards** 12,000

Ministry of Interior

**Militia** 87,000

Ministry of Interior

**Ministry of Interior Troops** 11,000**DEPLOYMENT****LEBANON**

UN • UNIFIL 5

**SOUTH SUDAN**

UN • UNMISS 4 obs

**FOREIGN FORCES****Russia:** Military Air Forces: 4 SAM units with S-300 (SA-10 *Grumble* (quad))

## Georgia GEO

Georgian Lari		2012	2013	2014
GDP	lari	26.3bn	28.9bn	
	US\$	15.9bn	17bn	
<i>per capita</i>	US\$	3,543	3,763	
Growth	%	6.55	5.98	
Inflation	%	-0.94	0.96	
Def bdtg	lari	651m	660m	711m
	US\$	394m	389m	
FMA (US)	US\$	14m	14m	12m
US\$1=lari		1.65	1.70	

Population 4,555,911

Age	0 – 14	15 – 19	20 – 24	25 – 29	30 – 64	65 plus
Male	8.2%	3.2%	4.0%	3.9%	22.0%	6.4%
Female	7.2%	2.9%	3.9%	4.0%	24.5%	9.7%

## Capabilities

Georgia's armed forces continue to make efforts to address lessons from the conflict with Russia in 2008, while tensions with Moscow remain. The brief war revealed significant shortcomings in key areas, including anti-armour and air-defence capabilities, though performance in air defence was better. It has also acquired the Israeli *Spyder* short-range air-defence system. A substantial number of Georgia's T-72 MBTs were destroyed during the short conflict. Current plans call for the small air force – comprising Soviet-era ground-attack aircraft and combat-support helicopters as well as transport and utility helicopters – to merge with the army. Georgia currently deploys personnel to ISAF in Afghanistan, and has aspirations for NATO membership. Training activity involves international forces, including the US. Moves are under way to generate a pool of four-year contract servicemen to boost professionalisation.

**ACTIVE 20,650 (Army 17,750 Air 1,300 National Guard 1,600) Paramilitary 11,700**

*Conscript liability 18 months*

## ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

**Army 14,000; 3,750 conscript (total 17,750)**

### FORCES BY ROLE

#### SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF bde

#### MANOEUVRE

Light

5 inf bde

Amphibious

2 mne bn (1 cadre)

#### COMBAT SUPPORT

2 arty bde

1 engr bde

1 sigs bn

1 SIGINT bn

1 MP bn

### COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1 med bn

### EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT 123: 23 T-55; 100 T-72

RECCE 4+ *Didgori-2*

AIFV 72: 25 BMP-1; 46 BMP-2; 1 BRM-1K

APC 199+

APC (T) 69+: 3+ *Lazika*; 66 MT-LB

APC (W) 120+: 25 BTR-70; 19 BTR-80; 8+ *Didgori-1*; 3+ *Didgori-3*; 65 *Ejder*

PPV 10 *Cougar*

### ARTY 240

SP 67 **152mm** 66: 32 DANA; 20 2S1; 13 2S3; 1 2S19;

**203mm** 1 2S7

TOWED 71: **122mm** 58 D-30; **152mm** 13: 3 2A36; 10 2A65

MRL **122mm** 37: 13 BM-21; 6 GRADLAR; 18 RM-70

MOR **120mm** 65: 14 2S12; 33 M-75; 18 M120

AT ε50

MSL ε10

GUNS ε40

AD • SAM • SP 9K35 *Strela-10* (SA-13 *Gopher*); *Spyder*

MANPAD *Grom*; 9K32 *Strela-2* (SA-7 *Grail*)†; 9K36

*Strela-3* (SA-14 *Gremlin*); 9K310 *Igla-1* (SA-16 *Gimlet*)

## Air Force 1,300 (incl 300 conscript)

1 avn base, 1 hel air base

AIRCRAFT 12 combat capable

ATK 12: 3 Su-25 *Frogfoot*; 7 Su-25K *Frogfoot A*; 2 Su-25UB *Frogfoot B*

TPT • Light 9: 6 An-2 *Colt*; 1 Tu-134A *Crusty* (VIP); 2

Yak-40 *Codling*

TRG 9 L-29 *Delfin*

### HELICOPTERS

ATK 6 Mi-24 *Hind*

TPT 29 Medium 17 Mi-8T *Hip*; Light 12 Bell 205 (UH-1H *Iroquois*)

UAV • ISR • Medium 1+ *Hermes 450*

AD • SAM 1–2 bn 9K37 *Buk-M1* (SA-11 *Gadfly*), 8 9K33

*Osa-AK* (SA-8B *Gecko*) (two bty), 6–10 9K33 *Osa-AKM* updated SAM systems.

**National Guard 1,600 active reservists opcon Army**

### FORCES BY ROLE

#### MANOEUVRE

Light

1 inf bde

## Paramilitary 11,700

**Border Guard 5,400**

### Coast Guard

HQ at Poti. The Navy was merged with the Coast Guard in 2009 under the auspices of the Georgian Border Guard, within the Ministry of the Interior.

**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 16**

PBF 2: 1 *Kaan 33*; 1 *Kaan 20*

**PB 14:** 7 *Zhuk* (3 ex-UKR); 2 *Point*; 2 *Dauntless*; 2 *Dilos* (ex-GRC); 1 *Akhmeta* (up to 20 patrol launches also in service)

**AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • LCU 1 *Vydra***  
(ex-BUL)

**LOGISTIC AND SUPPORT • YTL 1**

**Ministry of Interior Troops 6,300**

## DEPLOYMENT

**Legal provisions for foreign deployment of armed forces:**

**Constitution:** Codified constitution (1995)

**Decision on deployment of troops abroad:** By the presidency upon parliamentary approval (Art. 100)

### AFGHANISTAN

NATO • ISAF 1,561; 2 inf bn

### SERBIA

OSCE • Kosovo 4

## TERRITORY WHERE THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT EXERCISE EFFECTIVE CONTROL

Following the August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia, the areas of Abkhazia and South Ossetia declared themselves independent. Data presented here represents the de facto situation and does not imply international recognition as sovereign states.

## FOREIGN FORCES

**Russia** Army 7,000; 1 MR bde at Gudauta (Abkhazia); 1 MR bde at Djava/Tskhinvali (S. Ossetia)

## Kazakhstan KAZ

Kazakhstani Tenge t		2012	2013	2014
<b>GDP</b>	t	29.3tr	32.2tr	
	US\$	196bn	214bn	
<i>per capita</i>	US\$	11,773	12,708	
<b>Growth</b>	%	5.04	5.50	
<b>Inflation</b>	%	5.12	7.22	
<b>Def bdtg</b>	t	340bn	348bn	377bn
	US\$	2.28bn	2.32bn	
<b>FMA (US)</b>	US\$	1.8m	1.8m	1.5m
<b>US\$1=t</b>		149.11	150.28	

**Population** 17,736,896

**Ethnic groups:** Kazakh 51%; Russian 32%; Ukrainian 5%; German 2%; Tatar 2%; Uzbek 13%

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
<b>Male</b>	12.4%	3.9%	4.7%	4.6%	19.9%	2.3%
<b>Female</b>	12.3%	3.8%	4.6%	4.6%	22.3%	4.5%

## Capabilities

The Soviet origins of Kazakhstan's conscript-based armed forces remain. The 2011 Military Doctrine identified both internal and external security concerns, and risks from regional instability. There were few force structure changes in that document, with much focus on the development of Kazakhstan's indigenous defence industry. Kazakhstan is a member of the CSTO and also participates in Shanghai Cooperation Organisation military exercises. Moscow and Astana signed an agreement on the creation of a joint regional air-defence system at the beginning of 2013. As of mid-2013, it appeared that delivery of the S-300PMU-1, under discussion since 2010, had not yet begun. The services are at varying levels of preparedness. In the army, air mobile units are held at the highest level of readiness, with other units at considerably lower levels. There are ongoing efforts to improve the navy and the air force, with modest procurement projects underway. Rotary- and fixed-wing transport is being improved, while some combat aircraft have also been upgraded. The air force reportedly struggles to keep its aircraft airworthy, although air-defence fighters fare better than strike aircraft. Tactical airlift is being bolstered with the purchase of the C-295; deliveries began in 2013. Ukraine is also emerging as a defence-industrial partner, with collaboration on armoured vehicle production.

**ACTIVE 39,000 (Army 20,000 Navy 3,000 Air 12,000 MoD 4,000) Paramilitary 31,500**

*Conscript liability* 12 months

## ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

### Army 20,000

4 regional cmd: Astana, East, West and Southern

### FORCES BY ROLE

#### MANOEUVRE

##### Armoured

1 tk bde

##### Mechanised

4 mech bde

##### Air Manoeuvre

4 air aslt bde

#### COMBAT SUPPORT

3 arty bde

1 SSM unit

3 cbt engr bde

#### EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

**MBT** 300 T-72

**RECCE** 100: 40 BRDM; 60 BRM

**AIFV** 652: 500 BMP-2; 107 BTR-80A; 43 BTR-82A; 2 BTR-3E

**APC** 357

**APC (T)** 150 MT-LB

**APC (W)** 207: 190 BTR-80; 17 *Cobra*

**ARTY** 602

**SP** 246: **122mm** 126: 120 2S1; 6 *Semser*; **152mm** 120 2S3

**TOWED** 150: **122mm** 100 D-30; **152mm** 50 2A65;

(**122mm** up to 300 D-30 in store)

**GUN/MOR 120mm** 25 2S9 *Anona*  
**MRL 118: 122mm** 100 BM-21 *Grad*; **300mm** 18 *Lynx*  
 (with 50 msl); (**122mm** 100 BM-21 *Grad*; **220mm** 180  
 9P140 *Uragan* all in store)  
**MOR 63 SP 120mm** 18 CARDOM **120mm** 45 2B11/M120

**AT****MSL**

SP 3 BMP-T

**MANPATS** 9K111 *Fagot* (AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K113 *Konkurs*  
 (AT-5 *Spandrel*); 9K115 *Metis* (AT-6 *Spiral*)

**GUNS 100mm** 68 MT-12/T-12

**MSL • SSM** 12 9K79 *Tochka* (SS-21 *Scarab*)

**AEV** MT-LB

**Navy 3,000****PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 17**

**PCG** 1 *Kazakhstan* with 2 quad Inchr with 3424 *Uran*  
 (SS-N-25 *Switchblade*) **AShM**, 1 *Ghibka* Inchr with SA-N-  
 10 *Gimlet* **SAM**

**PBF 5:** 3 *Sea Dolphin*; 2 *Saygak*;

**PB 15:** 4 *Almaty*; 1 *Dauntless*; 1 *Turk* (AB25); 2 *Zhuk* (of  
 which 1 may be operational); 4 *Sardar*; 3 *Archangel*;

**LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AGS** 1 *Zhaik*

**Coastal Defence****MANOEUVRE****Other**

1 coastal defence bde

**Air Force 12,000 (incl Air Defence)**

Flying hours 100 hrs/year

**FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER**

1 sqn with MiG-29/MiG-29UB *Fulcrum*

2 sqn with MiG-31/MiG-31BM *Foxhound*

**FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**

2 sqn with MiG-27 *Flogger D*; MiG-23UB *Flogger C*

2 sqn with Su-27/Su-27UB *Flanker*

**GROUND ATTACK**

1 sqn with Su-25 *Frogfoot*

**TRANSPORT**

1 unit with Tu-134 *Crusty*; Tu-154 *Careless*,

1 sqn with An-12 *Cub*, An-26 *Curl*, An-30 *Clank*, An-72  
*Coaler*

**TRAINING**

1 sqn with L-39 *Albatros*

**ATTACK HELICOPTER**

5 sqn with Mi-24V *Hind*

**TRANSPORT HELICOPTER**

Some sqn with Bell 205 (UH-1H); EC145; Mi-8 *Hip*; Mi-  
 17V-5 *Hip*; Mi-26 *Halo*

**AIR DEFENCE**

Some regt with S-75M *Volkhov* (SA-2 *Guideline*); S-125  
*Neva* (SA-3 *Goa*); S-300 (SA-10 *Grumble*); 2K11 *Krug*  
 (SA-4 *Ganef*); S-200 *Angara* (SA-5 *Gammon*); 2K12 *Kub*  
 (SA-6 *Gainful*)

**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT** 121 combat capable

**FTR** 55: 12 MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; 2 MiG-29UB *Fulcrum*; 41  
 MiG-31/MiG-31BM *Foxhound*

**FGA** 53: 24 MiG-27 *Flogger D*; 4 MiG-23UB *Flogger C*; 21  
 Su-27 *Flanker*; 4 Su-27UB *Flanker*

**ATK** 14: 12 Su-25 *Frogfoot*; 2 Su-25UB *Frogfoot*

**ISR** 1 An-30 *Clank*

**TPT** 15: **Medium** 2 An-12 *Cub*; **Light** 12; 6 An-26 *Curl*,  
 2 An-72 *Coaler*; 2 C-295; 2 Tu-134 *Crusty*; **PAX** 1 Tu-154  
*Careless*

**TRG** 17 L-39 *Albatros*

**HELICOPTERS**

**ATK** 40+ Mi-24V *Hind* (first 9 upgraded)

**MRH** 20 Mi-17V-5 *Hip*

**TPT** 64 **Heavy** 2 Mi-26 *Halo*; **Medium** 50 Mi-8 *Hip*; **Light**  
 12: 6 Bell-205 (UH-1H); 6 EC145

**AD • SAM 147+**

**SP** 47+: 20 2K12 *Kub* (SA-6 *Gainful*); 27+ 2K11 *Krug* (SA-4  
*Ganef*)/S-200 *Angara* (SA-5 *Gammon*); static; S-300 (SA-10  
*Grumble*)

**TOWED** 100 S-75M *Volkhov* (SA-2 *Guideline*); S-125 *Neva*  
 (SA-3 *Goa*)

**MSL**

**ASM** Kh-23 (AS-7 *Kerry*)†; Kh-25 (AS-10 *Karen*); Kh-29  
 (AS-14 *Kedge*)

**ARM** Kh-28 (AS-9 *Kyle*); Kh-27 (AS-12 *Kegler*); Kh-58  
 (AS-11 *Kilter*)

**AAM • IR** R-60 (AA-8 *Aphid*); R-73 (AA-11 *Archer*) **IR/**

**SARH** R-27 (AA-10 *Alamo*) **SARH** R-33 (AA-9 *Amos*)

**ARH** R-77 (AA-12 *Adder* – on MiG-31BM)

**Paramilitary 31,500****Government Guard 500****Internal Security Troops €20,000**

Ministry of Interior

**Presidential Guard 2,000****State Border Protection Forces €9,000**

Ministry of Interior

**HEL • TPT • Medium** 1 Mi-171

**Kyrgyzstan KGZ**

Kyrgyzstani Som s		2012	2013	2014
<b>GDP</b>	s	304bn	348bn	
	US\$	6.47bn	7.23bn	
<b>per capita</b>	US\$	1,158	1,282	
<b>Growth</b>	%	-0.90	7.37	
<b>Inflation</b>	%	2.77	8.61	
<b>Def bdtg<sup>a</sup></b>	s	4.95bn	4.91bn	4.87bn
	US\$	105m	102m	
<b>FMA (US)</b>	US\$	1.5m	1.5m	1.5m
<b>US\$1=s</b>		47.02	48.11	

<sup>a</sup> Expenses on Ministry of Defence & Ministry of Interior.

**Population** 5,548,042

**Ethnic groups:** Kyrgyz 56%; Russian 17%; Uzbek 13%; Ukrainian  
 3%

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	15.2%	4.7%	5.2%	4.8%	17.3%	1.9%
Female	14.5%	4.5%	5.1%	4.7%	19.1%	3.0%

## Capabilities

A new military doctrine was enacted in July 2013, setting out possible threats to the state and plans to reform the armed forces. The security environment is characterised as being marked by unpredictability and the sudden emergence of conflict. The reform plans promise, among other things, a modern military with enhanced C2, effective military logistics and a modern air-defence system, adding the term 'mobilisation readiness'. In general, combat readiness remains low with large numbers of poorly trained conscripts within the armed forces and, according to analysts, Bishkek is no closer to devising the force structure, doctrine, training and procurement policies that would support state security priorities. Kyrgyzstan is a member of the CSTO and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. In mid-2013 the army conducted an anti-terrorist exercise with Russian air force units from Kant air base. The US and Russia have a base each in the country, though the agreement allowing the US to use Manas expires in 2014.

**ACTIVE 10,900 (Army 8,500 Air 2,400) Paramilitary 9,500**

*Conscript liability 18 months*

## ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

### Army 8,500

#### FORCES BY ROLE

##### SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF bde

##### MANOEUVRE

**Mechanised**

2 MR bde

1 (mtn) MR bde

##### COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bde

1 AD bde

#### EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

**MBT** 150 T-72

**RECCE** 30 BRDM-2

**AIFV** 320: 230 BMP-1; 90 BMP-2

**APC (W)** 35: 25 BTR-70; 10 BTR-80

**ARTY** 246

**SP 122mm** 18 2S1

**TOWED** 141: 100mm 18 M-1944; 122mm 107: 72 D-30; 35 M-30 (M-1938); 152mm 16 D-1

**GUN/MOR 120mm** 12 2S9 *Anona*

**MRL** 21: 122mm 15 BM-21; 220mm 6 9P140 *Uragan*

**MOR 120mm** 54: 6 2S12; 48 M-120

**AT • MSL • MANPATS** 9K11 (AT-3 *Sagger*); 9K111 (AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K113 (AT-5 *Spandrel*)

**RCL 73mm** SPG-9

**GUNS 100mm** 18 MT-12/T-12

**AD • SAM • MANPAD** 9K32 *Strela-2* (SA-7 *Grail*)‡

**GUNS** 48

**SP 23mm** 24 ZSU-23-4

**TOWED 57mm** 24 S-60

## Air Force 2,400

#### FORCES BY ROLE

##### FIGHTER

1 regt with L-39 *Albatros*\*

##### FIGHTER/TRANSPORT

1 (comp avn) regt with MiG-21 *Fishbed*; An-2 *Colt*; An-26 *Curl*

##### ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 regt with Mi-24 *Hind*; Mi-8 *Hip*

##### AIR DEFENCE

Some regt with S-125 *Pechora* (SA-3 *Goa*); S-75 *Dvina* (SA-2 *Guideline*)

#### EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

**AIRCRAFT** 33 combat capable

**FGA** 29 MiG-21 *Fishbed*

**TPT • Light** 6: 4 An-2 *Colt*; 2 An-26 *Curl*

**TRG** 4 L-39 *Albatros*\*

##### HELICOPTERS

**ATK** 2 Mi-24 *Hind*

**TPT • Medium** 8 Mi-8 *Hip*

##### AD • SAM

**SP** 2K11 *Krug* (SA-4 *Ganef*)

**TOWED** S-75 *Dvina* (SA-2 *Guideline*); S-125 *Pechora* (SA-3 *Goa*)

## Paramilitary 9,500

**Border Guards** 5,000 (KGZ conscript, RUS officers)

### Interior Troops 3,500

### National Guard 1,000

## DEPLOYMENT

#### BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

OSCE • Bosnia and Herzegovina 1

#### LIBERIA

UN • UNMIL 3 obs

#### SOUTH SUDAN

UN • UNMISS 2 obs

#### SUDAN

UN • UNAMID 2 obs

## FOREIGN FORCES

**Russia** €500 Military Air Forces: 5 Su-25 *Frogfoot*; 2 Mi-8 *Hip*



## Moldova MDA

Moldovan Leu L		2012	2013	2014
GDP	L	87.8bn	96.9bn	
	US\$	7.25bn	7.89bn	
<i>per capita</i>	US\$	2,037	2,218	
Growth	%	-0.82	4.00	
Inflation	%	4.66	4.64	
Def bdgt <sup>a</sup>	L	270m	292m	330m
	US\$	22m	24m	
FMA (US)	US\$	1.25m	1.25m	1.25m
US\$1=L		12.11	12.29	

<sup>a</sup> Includes military pensions

Population 3,619,925

Age	0 – 14	15 – 19	20 – 24	25 – 29	30 – 64	65 plus
Male	9.1%	3.4%	4.3%	4.7%	23.0%	4.0%
Female	8.5%	3.2%	4.0%	4.4%	24.6%	6.7%

## Capabilities

Moldova is a neutral state with limited military capability. Its conscript-based army's primary focus is on the disputed territory of Transdnestr, though the country is also looking to develop further the capacity to contribute to peacekeeping and crisis management missions in a multinational context. Political upheaval during the first half of 2013 may have delayed its ambitions to sign an association agreement with the European Union, though this could be initialled at November's Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius. Russia continues to support an army garrison as well as a peacekeeping contingent in Transdnestr. Moldova's air capability is limited to a small fixed- and rotary-wing transport fleet. Implementing the recommendations of the Strategic Defence Review, carried out with UK support in 2011, is a priority, though funding problems mean this could prove a challenge. Moldovan forces are deployed in small numbers on UN operations.

**ACTIVE 5,350** (Army 3,250 Air 800 Logistic Support 1,300) Paramilitary 2,400

**RESERVE 58,000** (Joint 58,000)

## ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

**Army 1,300; 1,950 conscript (total 3,250)**

### FORCES BY ROLE

#### SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF bn

#### MANOEUVRE

##### Light

3 mot inf bde

1 mot inf bn

##### Other

1 gd bn

#### COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bn

1 engr bn

1 NBC coy

1 sigs coy

### EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

RECCE 5 BRDM-2

AIFV 44 BMD-1

APC 164

APC (T) 64: 9 BTR-D; 55 MT-LB

APC (W) 100: 11 BTR-80; 89 TAB-71

ARTY 148

TOWED 69: 122mm 17 (M-30) *M-1938*; 152mm 52: 21

2A36; 31 D-20

GUN/MOR • SP 120mm 9 2S9 *Anona*

MRL 220mm 11 9P140 *Uragan*

MOR 59: 82mm 52; 120mm 7 M-120

AT

MSL • MANPATS 9K111 *Fagot* (AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K113

*Konkurs* (AT-5 *Spandrel*); 9K114 *Shturm* (AT-6 *Spiral*)

RCL 73mm SPG-9

GUNS 100mm 36 MT-12

AD • GUNS • TOWED 39: 23mm 28 ZU-23; 57mm 11 S-60

RADAR • LAND 4: 2 ARK-1; 2 SNAR-10

## Air Force 800 (incl 250 conscripts)

### FORCES BY ROLE

#### TRANSPORT

2 sqn with An-2 *Colt*; An-26 *Curl*; An-72 *Coaler*; Mi-8PS

*Hip*; Yak-18

#### AIR DEFENCE

1 regt with S-125 *Neva* (SA-3 *Goa*)

### EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

#### AIRCRAFT

TPT • Light 6: 2 An-2 *Colt*; 1 An-26 *Curl*; 2 An-72 *Coaler*

1 Yak-18

#### HELICOPTERS

MRH 4 Mi-17-1V *Hip* H

TPT • Medium 2 Mi-8PS *Hip*

AD • SAM 12 S-125 *Neva* (SA-3 *Goa*)

## Paramilitary 2,400

Ministry of Interior

OPON 900 (riot police)

Ministry of Interior

## DEPLOYMENT

Legal provisions for foreign deployment:

Constitution: Codified constitution (1994)

Decision on deployment of troops abroad: By the parliament (Art. 66)

### BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

OSCE • Bosnia and Herzegovina 1

### CÔTE D'IVOIRE

UN • UNOCI 3 obs

### LIBERIA

UN • UNMIL 2 obs

**SERBIA**

OSCE • Kosovo 1  
 OSCE • Serbia 1  
 UN • UNMIK 1 obs

**SOUTH SUDAN**

UN • UNMISS 3 obs

**FOREIGN FORCES**

Czech Republic OSCE 1  
 Estonia OSCE 2  
 France OSCE 1  
 Germany OSCE 1  
 Poland OSCE 1  
 Russia €1,500 (including 350 peacekeepers) Military Air Forces 7 Mi-24 *Hind*/Mi-8 *Hip*  
 Serbia OSCE 1  
 Spain OSCE 1  
 Sweden OSCE 1  
 Switzerland OSCE 1  
 Ukraine 10 mil obs (Joint Peacekeeping Force)  
 United Kingdom OSCE 1  
 United States OSCE 3

**Russia RUS**

Russian Rouble r		2012	2013	2014
GDP	r	62.4tr	68.1tr	
	US\$	2.02tr	2.21tr	
	US\$ <sup>a</sup>	2.52tr	2.64tr	
<i>per capita</i>	US\$	14,247	15,650	
Growth	%	3.40	3.37	
Inflation	%	5.07	6.86	
Def bdtg	r	1.81tr	2.1tr	2.49tr
	US\$	58.8bn	68.2bn	
	US\$ <sup>a</sup>	73bn	81.4bn	
US\$1=r	MER	30.84	30.78	
	PPP	24.81	25.81	

<sup>a</sup> PPP estimate

**Population** 142,500,482

**Ethnic groups:** Tatar 4%; Ukrainian 3%; Chuvash 1%; Bashkir 1%; Belarussian 1%; Moldovan 1%; Other 8%

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	8.2%	2.4%	3.5%	4.4%	23.7%	4.0%
Female	7.8%	2.3%	3.3%	4.4%	26.8%	9.1%

**Capabilities**

Russia remains a significant continental military power, and is in the process of renewing its nuclear arsenal. The first of the *Borey*-class SSBNs, the *Yury Dolgoruky*, formally joined the fleet at the beginning of 2013, and is intended as part of a broader recapitalisation of the country's nuclear capability. The Russian armed forces are undergoing a reform process,

begun by Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov in 2008. His replacement by Sergey Shoigu in November 2012 raised questions about the future of the reform process. However, main elements, such as the initiative to transform the army towards a combined arms brigade-based structure, appear to continue. Though pay rates were increased in 2012, the recruitment of contract personnel in adequate numbers remains a challenge, particularly for NCOs and specialist roles; this is also a reflection of demographic issues. The warrant officer rank cut by the Serdyukov reforms – a class of long-serving specialists usually in roles demanding technical or administrative skills – was reinstated and an ambitious 50,000 recruitment target set. Conventional re-equipment continues with all three services taking delivery of modern combat systems, if sometimes in modest numbers. Force restructuring – such as the establishment of the Special Operations Command – is intended to improve capability amid smaller armed forces. The deployment of the Russian Mediterranean Task Force in response to the 2013 Syria crisis and the Western naval presence was a significant show of maritime power. Deployments in Eurasia and on UN missions continue. (See pp. 161–3.)

**ACTIVE 845,000 (Army 250,000 Airborne 35,000 Navy 130,000 Air 150,000 Strategic Deterrent Forces 80,000 Command and Support 200,000) Paramilitary 519,000**

*Conscript liability* 12 months conscription.

**RESERVE 2,000,000 (all arms)**

Some 2,000,000 with service within last 5 years; Reserve obligation to age 50.

**ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE**

**Strategic Deterrent Forces** €80,000 (incl personnel assigned from the Navy and Air Force)

**Navy**

**SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC • SSBN 11**

- 3 *Kalmar* (*Delta* III) with 16 RSM-50 (SS-N-18 *Stingray*) strategic SLBM
- 6 *Delfin* (*Delta* IV) with 16 R-29RMU *Sineva* (SS-N-23 *Skiff*) strategic SLBM (of which 1 vessel in repair following a fire; expected return to service 2014)
- 1 *Akula* (*Typhoon*)† in reserve with capacity for 20 *Bulava* (SS-N-X-32) strategic SLBM (trials/testing)
- 1 *Borey* with capacity for 16 *Bulava* (SS-N-X-32) SLBM (missiles not yet operational), (2 additional units completed sea trials with a notional ISD 2014; 2 further units in build)

**Strategic Rocket Force Troops**

3 Rocket Armies operating silo and mobile launchers organised in 12 divs (reducing to 8). Launcher gps normally with 10 silos (6 for RS-20/SS-18), or 9 mobile lnchr, and one control centre

**MSL • STRATEGIC 356**

**ICBM 356:** 54 RS-20 (SS-18 *Satan*) (mostly mod 5, 10 MIRV per msl); 160 RS-12M (SS-25 *Sickle*) (mobile single warhead); 40 RS-18 (SS-19 *Stiletto*) (mostly mod

3, 6 MIRV per msl.); 60 RS-12M2 *Topol-M* (SS-27M1) silo-based (single warhead); 18 RS-12M2 *Topol-M* (SS-27M1) road mobile (single warhead); 24 RS-24 *Yars* (SS-27M2; €3 MIRV per msl)

## Long-Range Aviation Command

### FORCES BY ROLE

#### BOMBER

1 sqn with Tu-160 *Blackjack*  
3 sqn with Tu-95MS *Bear*

### EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

#### AIRCRAFT

**BBR 78:** 16 Tu-160 *Blackjack* each with up to 12 Kh-55 SM (AS-15A/B *Kent*) nuclear ALCM; 31 Tu-95MS6 (*Bear H-6*) each with up to 6 Kh-55/SM (AS-15A/B *Kent*) nuclear ALCM; 31 Tu-95MS16 (*Bear H-16*) each with up to 16 Kh-55 (AS-15A *Kent*) nuclear ALCM; (Kh-102 likely now in service on Tu-95MS)

## Warning Forces 3rd Space and Missile Defence Army

**ICBM/SLBM launch-detection capability:** 3 operational satellites

**RADAR** (9 stations) 1 ABM engagement system located at Sofrino (Moscow). Russia leases ground-based radar stations in Baranovichi (Belarus); Balkhash (Kazakhstan). It also has radars on its own territory at Lekhtusi, (St Petersburg); Armavir, (southern Russia); Olenegorsk (northwest Arctic); Pechora (northwest Urals); Mishellevka (east Siberia).

**MISSILE DEFENCE** 1,996: 68 53T6 (ABM-3 *Gazelle*); 1,800 S-300 (SA-10 *Grumble*); 96 S-400 (SA-21 *Growler*); (32 51T6 (ABM-4 *Gorgon*) in store; possibly destroyed)

## Space Forces 40,000

Formations and units to detect missile attack on the RF and its allies, to implement BMD, and to be responsible for military/dual-use spacecraft launch and control. May become part of new Air-Space Defence Command.

### SATELLITES 63

**COMMUNICATIONS** 24: 2 Mod *Globus* (*Raduga-1M*); 11 *Strela*; 8 *Rodnik* (*Gonets-M*); 3 *Meridian*

**NAVIGATION/POSITIONING/TIMING** 32 GLONASS **ELINT/SIGINT** 4: 1 *Kondor*; 1 *Liana* (*Lotos-S*); 1 *Persona*; 1 *Tselina-2*;

**EARLY WARNING** 3 *Oko*

## Army €205,000 (incl 35,000 AB); €80,000 conscript (total 285,000)

Transformation process continues; previous 6 Military Districts have been consolidated into 4 (West (HQ St Petersburg), Centre (HQ Yekaterinburg), South (HQ Rostov-on-Don) & East (HQ Khabarovsk), each with a unified Joint Strategic Command. Current plans call for the establishment of 28 new bdes (6 MR; 2 air aslt; 1 engr; 1 AD & 18 army avn), and for the restructuring of the existing MR brigades into new light, medium and heavy formations.

### FORCES BY ROLE

#### COMMAND

10 army HQ

### SPECIAL FORCES

7 (Spetsnaz) SF bde  
1 (AB Recce) SF regt

### MANOEUVRE

#### Reconnaissance

1 recce bde

#### Armoured

1 (4th) tk div (1 armd recce bn; 3 tk bn; 1 MR bn; 1 arty bn; 1 MRL bn; 2 AD bn; 1 engr bn; 1 EW coy; 1 NBC coy)  
3 tk bde (1 armd recce bn; 3 tk bn; 1 MR bn; 1 arty bn; 1 MRL bn; 2 AD bn; 1 engr bn; 1 EW coy; 1 NBC coy)

#### Mechanised

1 (5th) MR div (1 recce bn; 1 tk bn; 3 MR bn; 2 arty bn; 1 MRL bn; 1 AT bn; 2 AD bn; 1 engr bn; 1 EW coy; 1 NBC coy)

1 (201st) MR div

30 MR bde (1 recce bn; 1 tk bn; 3 MR bn; 2 arty bn; 1 MRL bn; 1 AT bn; 2 AD bn; 1 engr bn; 1 EW coy; 1 NBC coy)  
2 MR bde (4–5 MR bn; 1 arty bn; 1 AD bn; 1 engr bn)  
3 (lt/mtn) MR bde (1 recce bn; 2 MR bn; 1 arty bn)

1 (18th) MGA div (2 MGA regt; 1 arty regt; 1 tk bn; 2 AD bn)

#### Air Manoeuvre

4 AB div (2 para/air aslt regt; 1 arty regt; 1 AD regt)  
1 indep AB bde  
3 air aslt bde

### COMBAT SUPPORT

8 arty bde

4 MRL bde

2 MRL regt

2 SSM bde with *Iskander-M* (SS-26 *Stone*)

7 SSM bde with *Tochka* (SS-21 *Scarab* — to be replaced by *Iskander-M*)

10 AD bde

4 engr bde

1 MP bde

### EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

**MBT** 2,550: 1,400 T-72B/BA; 150 T-72B3; 650 T-80BV/U; 350 T-90/T-90A; (18,000 in store: 2,800 T-55; 2,500 T-62; 2,000 T-64A/B; 7,500 T-72/T-72A/B; 3,000 T-80B/BV/U; 200 T-90)  
**RECCE** 1,200+: 100+ *Dozor*, 100+ *Tigr*, 1,000 BRDM-2/2A; (1,000+ BRDM-2 in store)

**AIFV** 7,360+: 700 BMD-1; 600 BMD-2; 100 BMD-3; 60+ BMD-4; 1,000 BMP-1; 3,500 BMP-2; 500+ BMP-3; 700 BRM-1K; 200+ BTR-80A/82A; (8,500 in store: 7,000 BMP-1; 1,500 BMP-2)

**APC** 9,700+

**APC (T)** 5,700+: some BMO-T; 700 BTR-D; 5,000 MT-LB; (2,000 MT-LB in store)

**APC (W)** 4,000+ BTR-60/70/80; (4,000 BTR-60/70 in store)

**ARTY** 5,436+

**SP** 1,820: **122mm** 400 2S1; **152mm** 1,400: 800 2S3; 150 2S5; 450 2S19; **203mm** 20 2S7; (4,050 in store: **122mm** 1,800 2S1; **152mm** 1,950: 1,000 2S3; 800 2S5; 150 2S19; **203mm** 300 2S7)

**TOWED** 550: **122mm** 400 D-30; **152mm** 150 2A65; (12,215 in store: **122mm** 7,950: 4,200 D-30; 3,750 M-30 M-1938; **130mm** 650 M-46; **152mm** 3,575: 1,100 2A36; 600 2A65; 1,075 D-20; 700 D-1 M-1943; 100 ML-20 M-1937; **203mm** 40 B-4M)

**GUN/MOR 970+**

**SP 120mm** 870+: 790 2S9 NONA-S; 30 2S23 NONA-SVK; 50+ 2S34

**TOWED 120mm** 100 2B16 NONA-K

**MRL** 1,106+ **122mm** 800 BM-21; **220mm** 200 9P140 *Uragan*; some TOS-1A; **300mm** 106 9A52 *Smerch*; (2,920 in store: **122mm** 2,120; 1,700 BM-21; 420 9P138; **132mm** 100 BM-13; **220mm** 700 9P140 *Uragan*)

**MOR 990**

**SP 240mm** 20 2S4; (410 2S4 in store)

**TOWED 970+**: **120mm** 970: 50+ 2B23; 920 2S12; (2,100 in store: **120mm** 1,800: 900 2S12; 900 PM-38; **160mm** 300 M-160)

**AT****MSL**

**SP BMP-T** with 9K120 *Ataka* (AT-9 *Spiral* 2); 9P149 with 9K114 *Shturm* (AT-6 *Spiral*); 9P157-2 with 9K123 *Khrisantema* (AT-15 *Springer*)

**MANPATS** 9K11/9K14 *Malyutka* (AT-3 *Sagger*); 9K111 *Fagot* (AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K112 *Kobra* (AT-8 *Songster*); 9K113 *Konkurs* (AT-5 *Spandrel*); 9K114 *Shturm* (AT-6 *Spiral*); 9K115 *Metis* (AT-7 *Saxhorn*); 9K115-1 *Metis-M* (AT-13 *Saxhorn* 2); 9K116 *Bastion/Basniya* (AT-10 *Stabber*); 9K119 *Reflex/Svir* (AT-11 *Sniper*); 9K135 *Kornet* (AT-14 *Spriggan*)

**RCL 73mm** SPG-9**RL 105mm** RPG-29**GUNS** 562+

**SP: 125mm** 36+ 2S25

**TOWED 100mm** 526 MT-12; (**100mm** 2,000 T-12/MT-12 in store)

**AD • SAM** 1,570+

**SP** 1,320+: 350+ 9K37/9K317 *Buk* (SA-11 *Gadfly*); 400 9K33M3 *Osa-AKM* (SA-8 *Gecko*); 400 9K35M3 *Strela-10* (SA-13 *Gopher*); 120+ 9K330/9K331 *Tor* (SA-15 *Gauntlet*) **SPAAGM** 250+ 2K22 *Tunguska* (SA-19 *Grison*)

**MANPAD** *Igla-1* (SA-16 *Gimlet*); 9K38 *Igla* (SA-18 *Grouse*); 9K338 *Igla-S* (SA-24 *Grinch*); 9K34 *Strela-3* (SA-14 *Gremlin*)

**GUNS**

**SP 23mm** ZSU-23-4

**TOWED 23mm** ZU-23-2; **57mm** S-60

**UAV • Heavy** Tu-143 *Reys*; Tu-243 *Reys*/Tu-243 *Reys* D; Tu-300 *Korshun* **Light** BLA-07; *Pchela-1*; *Pchela-2*

**MSL • SSM** 200+: 200 *Tochka* (SS-21 *Scarab*); some *Iskander-M* (SS-26 *Stone*); (some FROG in store; some *Scud* in store)

**AEV** BAT-2; IMR; IMR-2; IRM; MT-LB

**ARV** BMP-1; BREM-1/64/D/K/L; BREhM-D; BTR-50PK(B); M1977; MTP-LB; RM-G; T-54/55; VT-72A

**VLB** KMM; MT-55A; MTU; MTU-20; MTU-72; PMM-2

**MW** BMR-3M; GMX-3; MCV-2 (reported); MTK; MTK-2

**Reserves**

Cadre formations, on mobilisation form

**MANOEUVRE****Armoured**

1 tk bde

**Mechanised**

13 MR bde

**Navy** €130,000

4 major fleet organisations (Northern Fleet, Pacific Fleet, Baltic Fleet, Black Sea) and Caspian Sea Flotilla

**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****SUBMARINES** 64**STRATEGIC • SSBN** 11:

3 *Kalmar* (*Delta* III) with 16 R-29R *Volna* (SS-N-18 *Stingray*) strategic SLBM

6 *Delfin* (*Delta* IV) with 16 R-29RMU *Sineva* (SS-N-23 *Skiff*) strategic SLBM (of which 1 vessel in repair following a fire; expected return to service 2014)

1 *Akula* (*Typhoon*)† in reserve for training with capacity for 20 *Bulava* (SS-N-X-32) strategic SLBM (trials/testing - 2 more awaiting decommissioning)

1 *Borey* with capacity for 16 *Bulava* (SS-N-X-32) SLBM (missiles not yet operational), (2 additional units completed sea trials with expected ISD 2014; 2 further units in build)

**TACTICAL** 45**SSGN** 8:

8 *Antyey* (*Oscar* II) (of which 3 in reserve) with 2 single 650mm TT each with T-65 HWT, 4 single 553mm TT with 3M45 *Granit* (SS-N-19 *Shipwreck*) AShM

**SSN** 17:

2 *Schuka-B* (*Akula* II) with 4 single 533mm TT each with 3M10 *Granat* (SS-N-21 *Sampson*) SLCM, 4 single 650mm TT with T-65 HWT (one further boat leased to India for 10 years from 2012)

8 *Schuka-B* (*Akula* I) (of which 2 in reserve) with 4 single 533mm TT with 3M10 *Granat* (SS-N-21 *Sampson*) SLCM, 4 single 650mm TT with T-65 HWT

2 *Kondor* (*Sierra* II) with 4 single 533mm TT each with 3M10 *Granat* (SS-N-21 *Sampson*) SLCM, 4 single 650mm TT with T-65 HWT

1 *Barracuda* (*Sierra* I) with 4 single 533mm TT with 3M10 (SS-N-21 *Sampson*) SLCM, RPK-2 (SS-N-15 *Starfish*) and T-53 HWT, 4 single 650mm TT with RPK-7 (SS-N-16 *Stallion*) AShM and T-65 HWT

4 *Schuka* (*Victor* III) (of which 1 in reserve) with 4 single 533mm TT each with 3M10 *Granat* (SS-N-21 *Sampson*) SLCM, 2 single 650mm TT with T-65 HWT

(1 *Yasen* (*Graney*) in sea trials; expected ISD 2014; 2 more units in build)

**SSK** 20:

15 *Paltus* (*Kilo*) with 6 single 533mm TT with T-53 HWT

4 *Varshavyanka* (*Kilo*) with 6 single 533mm TT (3 additional vessels under construction)

1 *Lada* with 6 single 533mm TT (2 additional vessels in build)

**SUPPORT** 8

**SSAN** 7: 1 *Orenburg* (*Delta* III *Stretch*); 1 *Losharik* (one further vessel under construction); 2 Project 1851 (*Paltus*); 3 *Kashalot* (*Uniform*)

**SSA** 1 *Sarov*



## PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 33

**AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CV 1** *Orel (Kuznetsov)* with 1 12-cell VLS with 3M45 *Granit* (SS-N-19 *Shipwreck*) AShM, 4 sextuple VLS with 3K95 *Kindzhal* (SA-N-9 *Gauntlet*) SAM, 2 RBU 12000 *Udav* 1, 8 CADS-N-1 *Kashtan* CIWS with 9M311 (SA-N-11 *Grison*) SAM, 6 AK630 CIWS, (capacity 18-24 Su-33 *Flanker D* FGA ac; 4 Su-25UTG *Frogfoot* ac, 15 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel, 2 Ka-31R *Helix* AEW hel)

## CRUISERS 5

## CGHMN 1:

1 *Orlan (Kirov)* with 10 twin VLS with 3M45 *Granit* (SS-N-19 *Shipwreck*) AShM, 2 twin Inchr with *Osa-M* (SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 12 single VLS with *Fort/Fort M* (SA-N-6 *Grumble*/SA-N-20 *Gargoyle*) SAM, 2 octuple VLS with 3K95 *Kindzhal* (SA-N-9 *Gauntlet*) SAM, 10 single 533mm ASTT, 1 RBU 12000 *Udav* 1, 2 RBU 1000 *Smerch* 3, 6 CADS-N-1 *Kashtan* CIWS with 9M311 (SA-N-11 *Grison*) SAM, 1 twin 130mm gun, (capacity 3 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel) (2nd *Orlan* undergoing extensive refit currently non operational; expected return to service in 2017)

## CGHM 4:

1 *Berkot-B (Kara)*† (scheduled to be decommissioned), with 2 quad Inchr with *Rastrub* (SS-N-14 *Silex*) ASHm/ASW, 2 twin Inchr with 4K60 *Shtorm* (SA-N-3 *Goblet*) SAM, 2 twin Inchr with *Osa-M* (SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 quintuple 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000, 2 twin 76mm gun, (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)

3 *Atlant (Slava)* with 8 twin Inchr with *Vulkan* (SS-N-12 mod 2 *Sandbox*) ASHm, 8 octuple VLS with *Fort/Fort M* (SA-N-6 *Grumble*/SA-N-20 *Gargoyle*) SAM, 2 single Inchr with *Osa-M* (SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 quintuple 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2, 6 AK650 CIWS, 1 twin 130mm gun, (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel) (one *Atlant* entered repairs in June 2011, currently non-operational; expected return to service in 2014)

## DESTROYERS 18

## DDGHM 17:

8 *Sarych (Sovremenny)* (of which 3 in reserve) with 2 quad Inchr with 3M80 *Moskit* (SS-N-22 *Sunburn*) ASHm, 2 twin Inchr with 3K90 *Uragan*/9K37 *Yezh* (SA-N-7 *Gadfly*/SA-N-12 *Grizzly*) SAM, 2 twin 533mm TT, 2 RBU 1000 *Smerch* 3, 4 AK630 CIWS, 2 twin 130mm gun, (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)

8 *Fregat (Udaloy I)* each with 2 quad Inchr with *Rastrub* (SS-N-14 *Silex*) ASHm/ASW, 8 octuple VLS with 3K95 *Kindzhal* (SA-N-9 *Gauntlet*) SAM, 2 quad 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2, 4 AK630 CIWS, 2 100mm gun, (capacity 2 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)

1 *Fregat (Udaloy II)* with 2 quad Inchr with 3M80 *Moskit* (SS-N-22 *Sunburn*) ASHm, 8 octuple VLS with 3K95 *Kindzhal* (SA-N-9 *Gauntlet*) SAM, 2 CADS-N-1 *Kashtan* CIWS with 9M311 (SA-N-11 *Grison*) SAM, 10 single 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2, 2 130mm gun, (capacity 2 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)

## DDGM 1:

1 *Komsomolets Ukrainy (Kashin mod)* with 2 quad Inchr with 3M24 *Uran* (SS-N-25 *Switchblade*) ASHm, 2 twin Inchr with *Volnya* (SA-N-1 *Goa*) SAM, 5 single 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2, 1 twin 76mm gun

## FRIGATES 9

## FFGHM 5:

2 *Jastreb (Neustrashimy)* with 2 quad Inchr with 3M24 *Uran* (SS-N-25 *Switchblade*) ASHm, 4 octuple VLS with 3K95 *Kindzhal* (SA-N-9 *Gauntlet*) SAM, 4 single 533mm ASTT, 1 RBU 12000, 2 CADS-N-1 *Kashtan* CIWS with 9M311 (SA-N-11 *Grison*) SAM, 1 100mm gun, (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW) (3rd vessel launched, but production halted in 1997; unclear status)

1 *Steregushchiy* with 2 quad Inchr with 3M24 *Uran* (SS-N-25 *Switchblade*) ASHm, 2 quad 324mm ASTT, 1 CADS-N-1 *Kashtan* CIWS with 9M311 (SA-N-11 *Grison*) SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun

2 *Steregushchiy* with 2 quad Inchr with 3M24 *Uran* (SS-N-25 *Switchblade*) ASHm, 1 12-cell VLS with 9M96 *Redut* SAM, 2 quad 324mm ASTT, 1 CADS-N-1 *Kashtan* CIWS with 9M311 (SA-N-11 *Grison*) SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (5 additional vessels in build, of which two are improved *Steregushchiy* II)

## FFGM 4:

1 *Gepard* with 2 quad Inchr with 3M24 *Uran* (SS-N-25 *Switchblade*) ASHm, 1 twin Inchr with *Osa-M* (SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun

1 *Gepard* with 1 8-cell VLS with 3M14 (SS-N-30 *Kaliber*) LACM, 2 quad Inchr with 3M24 *Uran* (SS-N-25 *Switchblade*) ASHm, 1 twin Inchr with *Osa-M* (SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun

1 *Burevestnik (Krivak I mod)*† with 1 quad Inchr with *Rastrub* (SS-N-14 *Silex*) ASHm/ASW, 1 twin Inchr with *Osa-M* (SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 quad 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2, 2 twin 76mm gun

1 *Burevestnik M (Krivak II)* each with 1 quad Inchr with RPK-3 *Rastrub* (SS-N-14 *Silex*) ASHm/ASW, 2 twin Inchr with 10 *Osa-M* (SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 quad 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2, 2 100mm gun

## PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 82

## CORVETTES 46:

## FSGM 15:

2 *Sivuchi (Dergach)* with 2 quad Inchr with 3M80 *Moskit* (SS-N-22 *Sunburn*) ASHm, 1 twin Inchr with *Osa-M* (SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun

12 *Ovod (Nanuchka III)* with 2 triple Inchr with P-120 *Malakhit* (SS-N-9 *Siren*) ASHm, 1 twin Inchr with *Osa-M* (SA-N-4 *Gecko*), 1 76mm gun

1 *Ovod (Nanuchka IV)* with 2 triple Inchr with 3M55 *Onix* (SS-N-26) ASHm, 1 twin Inchr with *Osa-M* (SA-N-4 *Gecko*), 1 76mm gun

## FSM 31:

3 *Albatros (Grisha III)* with 1 twin Inchr with *Osa-M* (SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2, 2 twin 57mm gun



21 *Albatros (Grisha V)* with 1 twin Inchr with Osa-M (SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT, 1 RBU 6000 *Smerch 2*, 1 76mm gun

7 *Parchim II* with 2 quad Inchr with *Strela-2* (SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch 2*, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun

#### PCFG 25:

6 *Molnya (Tarantul II)* with 2 twin Inchr with P-15M *Termit* (SS-N-2C/D *Styx*) AShM, 1 quad Inchr (manual aiming) with *Strela-2* (SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun

19 *Molnya (Tarantul III)* with 2 twin Inchr with 3M80 *Moskit* (SS-N-22 *Sunburn*) AShM, 1 quad Inchr (manual aiming) with *Strela-2* (SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun

#### PCM 6:

3 *Astrakhan (Buyan)* with some 9K310 *Igla-1* (SA-16 *Gimlet*) SAM, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 100mm gun (6 improved *Buyan-M* vessels under construction)

3 *Grachonok* with 4 9K38 *Igla* (SA-18 *Grouse*) SAM (original design was as diving tender)

PHG 4 *Vekhr (Matka)* with 2 single Inchr with P-15M *Termit* (SS-N-2C/D *Styx*) AShM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun

PHT 1 *Sokol (Mukha)* with 2 quad 406mm TT, 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun (damaged in 2007 and laid up since; unclear status)

#### MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 53

MHO 2 *Rubin (Gorya)* with 2 quad Inchr with *Strela-2* (SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun

MSO 11: 10 *Akvamaren (Natya)*; 1 *Agat (Natya II)* (all with 2 quad Inchr (manual aiming) with *Strela-2* (SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM, 2 RBU1200 *Uragan*, 2 twin AK230 CIWS

MSC 25: 23 *Yakhont (Sonya)* with 4 AK630 CIWS (some with 2 quad Inchr with *Strela-2* (SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM); 2 Project 1258 (*Yevgenya*)

MHI 15: 9 *Sapfir (Lida)* with 1 AK630 CIWS; 3 Project 696 (*Tolya*); 3 *Malakhit (Olya)*

#### AMPHIBIOUS

##### LANDING SHIPS • LST 20:

4 *Tapir (Alligator)* with 2-3 twi Inchr with *Strela-2* (SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM, 2 twin 57mm guns, (capacity 20 tanks; 300 troops)

12 Project 775 (*Ropucha I*) with 2 twin 57mm guns, (capacity either 10 MBT and 190 troops or 24 APC (T) and 170 troops)

3 Project 775M (*Ropucha II*) with 2 AK630 CIWS, 2 twin 57mm guns, (capacity either 10 MBT and 190 troops or 24 APC (T) and 170 troops)

1 *Tapir (Alligator (mod))* with 2 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun, (capacity 1 Ka-29 *Helix B*; 13 MBT; 300 troops) (vessel launched in 2012; expected ISD end-2013))

##### LANDING CRAFT 19

###### LCU 5:

1 *Dyugon* (4 more in build)

4 Project 11770 (*Serna*) (capacity 100 troops)

###### LCM 7 *Akula (Ondatra)* (capacity 1 MBT)

###### LCAC 7:

2 *Dzheryan (Aist)* with 2 twin AK630 CIWS (capacity 4 lt tk)

2 *Pomornik (Zubr)* (capacity 230 troops; either 3 MBT or 10 APC (T))

3 *Kalmar (Lebed)* (capacity 2 lt tk)

#### LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 636

ABU 12: 8 *Kashtan*; 4 *Sura*

AE 2: 1 *Muna*; 1 *Dubnyak*

AEM 3: 2 *Amga*; 1 *Lama*

AG 3: 2 *Vytegrales*; 1 *Potok*

AGB 4 *Dobrynya Mikitich*

AGE 2: 1 *Tchusovoy*; 1 *Zvezdochka* (2 more vessels under construction)

AGI 11: 2 *Alpinist*; 1 *Balzam*; 3 *Moma*; 5 *Vishnya*

AGM 1 *Marshal Nedelin*

AGOR 6: 1 *Akademik Krylov*; 2 *Sibiriyakov*, 2 *Vinograd*; 1 *Seliger*

AGS 21: 3 *BGK-797*; 6 *Kamenka*; 9 *Omega*; 3 *Vaygach*

AGSH 4: 1 *Samara*; 3 *Vaygach*

AGSI 52: 8 *Biya*; 25 *Finik*; 7 *Moma*; 14 *Yug*

AH 3 *Ob +*

AK 2 *Bira*

AOL 13: 2 *Dubna*; 5 *Uda*; 6 *Altay* (mod)

AOR 5 *Boris Chilikin*

AORL 3: 1 *Kaliningradneft*; 2 *Olekma*

AOS 1 *Luza*

AR 13 *Amur*

ARC 7: 4 *Emba*; 3 *Klasma*

ARS 14: 4 *Mikhail Rudnitsky*; 10 *Goryn*

AS 1 Project 2020 (*Malina*)

ASR 2: 1 *Nepal*; 1 *Alagez*

ATF 61: 2 *Baklazhan*; 5 *Katun*; 3 *Ingul*; 2 *Neftegaz*; 14 *Okhtensky*; 18 *Prometey*; 1 *Prut*; 3 *Sliva*; 13 *Sorum*

AWT 2 *Manych*

AXL 12: 10 *Petrushka*; 2 *Smolny*

YDG 15 *Bereza*

YDT 104: 40 *Flamingo*; 20 *Nyryat 2*; 28 *Yelva*; 3 Project 11980; 13 *Pelym*

YGS 60 *GPB-480*

YO 36: 5 *Khobi*; 30 *Toplivo*; 1 *Konda*

YPB 30 *Bolva*

YPT 43: 12 *Shelon*; 31 *Poluchat*

YTB 46: 11 *Stividor*; 35 *Sidehole*

YTR 42: 27 *Pozharny*; 15 *Morkov*

#### Naval Aviation €28,000

4 Fleet Air Forces; most combat aircraft previously assigned to Naval Aviation were transferred to Air Force command by end-2011.

Flying hours 60+ hrs/year

#### FORCES BY ROLE

##### FIGHTER

2 sqn with Su-33 *Flanker D*; Su-25UTG *Frogfoot*

##### ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE/ISR

2 sqn with Su-24M/MR *Fencer*

##### ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

2 sqn with Il-20RT *Coot A*; Il-38 *May\**

8 sqn with Ka-27/Ka-29 *Helix*

1 sqn with Mi-14 *Haze A*

2 sqn with Tu-142M/MR *Bear F/J\**

1 unit with Ka-31R

**MARITIME PATROL/ELECTRONIC WARFARE**

1 sqn with An-12 *Cub*; Be-12 *Mail\**; Mi-8 *Hip*

**TRANSPORT**

3 sqn with An-12 *Cub*; An-24 *Coke*; An-26 *Curl*; Tu-134

**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

**AIRCRAFT** 104 combat capable

**FTR** 18 Su-33 *Flanker D*

**FGA** 18 Su-24M *Fencer*

**ATK** 5 Su-25UTG *Frogfoot*

**ASW** 27 Tu-142M/MR *Bear F/J*

**MP** 32: 6 Be-12 *Mail\**; 26 Il-38 *May\**

**ISR** 4 Su-24MR *Fencer E\**

**EW • ELINT** 7: 2 Il-20RT *Coot A*; 5 An-12 *Cub*

**TPT** 38 An-12 *Cub*/An-24 *Coke*/An-26 *Curl*/An-140/Tu-134

**HELICOPTERS**

**ASW** 90: 70 Ka-27 *Helix*; 20 Mi-14 *Haze A*

**EW** 8 Mi-8 *Hip J*

**AEW** 2 Ka-31R *Helix*

**SAR** 62: 22 Ka-25PS *Hormone C*/Ka-27PS *Helix D*; 40 Mi-14PS *Haze C*

**TPT** 50 **Heavy** 10 Mi-6 *Hook*; **Medium** 40: 28 Ka-29 *Helix*; 12 Mi-8 *Hip*

**MSL**

**ASM** Kh-25 (AS-10 *Karen*); Kh-59 (AS-13 *Kingbolt*)

**ARM** Kh-58 (AS-11 *Kilter*); Kh-25MP (AS-12 *Kegler*)

**AShM** Kh-22 (AS-4 *Kitchen*)

**AAM • IR** R-27T/ET (AA-10B/D *Alamo*); R-60 (AA-8 *Aphid*); R-73 (AA-11 *Archer*); **SARH** R-27R/ER (AA-10A/C *Alamo*)

**Naval Infantry (Marines) €20,000****FORCES BY ROLE****SPECIAL FORCES**

1 (fleet) SF bde (1 para bn, 2–3 underwater bn, 1 spt unit)

2 (fleet) SF bde (cadre) (1 para bn, 2–3 underwater bn, 1 spt unit)

**MANOEUVRE****Mechanised**

2 MR bde

1 MR regt

3 indep naval inf bde

2 indep naval inf regt

**COMBAT SUPPORT**

1 arty bde

3 SAM regt

**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

**MBT** 200 T-72/T-80

**RECCE** 60 BRDM-2 each with 9K11 (AT-3 *Sagger*)

**AIFV** 300 BMP-2

**APC** 800

**APC (T)** 300 MT-LB

**APC (W)** 500 BTR-80

**ARTY** 365

**SP** 263: **122mm** 113: 95 2S1; 18 2S19; **152mm** 150: 50 2A36; 50 2A65; 50 2S3

**GUN/MOR** 66

**SP** **120mm** 42: 12 2S23 NONA-SVK; 30 2S9 NONA-S

**TOWED** **120mm** 24 2B16 NONA-K

**MRL** **122mm** 36 BM-21

**AT****MSL**

**SP** 9P149 with 9K114 *Shturm* (AT-6 *Spiral*)

**MANPATS** 9K11 (AT-3 *Sagger*); 9K113 (AT-5 *Spandrel*)

**GUNS** **100mm** T-12

**AD****SAM**

**SP** 70: 20 9K33 *Osa* (SA-8 *Gecko*); 50 *Strela-1/ Strela-10* (SA-9 *Gaskin*/SA-13 *Gopher*)

**MANPAD** 9K32 *Strela-2* (SA-7 *Grail*)

**GUNS** **23mm** 60 ZSU-23-4

**Coastal Missile and Artillery Troops 2,000****FORCES BY ROLE****COMBAT SUPPORT**

3 AShM bde

2 AShM regt

1 indep AShM bn

**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

**ARTY • SP** **130mm** €36 A-222 *Bereg*

**AShM** 36+: 24 3K60 *Bal* (SSC-6 *Sennight*); 12 K-300P *Bastion* (SSC-5 *Stooge*); some 4K44 *Redut* (SSC-1 *Sepal*); some 4K51 *Rubezh* (SSC-3 *Styx*)

**Military Air Forces €150,000 (incl conscripts — reducing to 148,000)**

Flying hours 60 to 100 hrs/year (combat aircraft)  
120+ (transport aircraft)

HQ at Balashikha, near Moscow. A joint CIS Unified Air Defence System covers RUS, ARM, BLR, KAZ, KGZ, TJK, TKM, UKR and UZB. The Russian Air Force is currently undergoing a period of restructuring, both in terms of general organisation as well as air base and unit structure.

**FORCES BY ROLE****BOMBER**

4 sqn with Tu-22M3/MR *Backfire C*

3 sqn with Tu-95MS *Bear*

1 sqn with Tu-160 *Blackjack*

**FIGHTER**

8 sqn with MiG-29 *Fulcrum*

3 sqn with MiG-29SMT *Fulcrum*

11 sqn with MiG-31/MiG-31BM *Foxhound*

10 sqn with Su-27 *Flanker*

4 sqn with Su-27SM2 *Flanker*; Su-30M2

**FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**

1 sqn with Su-27SM3 *Flanker*; Su-30M2

**GROUND ATTACK**

11 sqn with Su-24M/M2 *Fencer*

13 sqn with Su-25/Su-25SM *Frogfoot*

2 sqn with Su-34 *Fullback*

1 sqn with Su-34 *Fullback* (forming)

**GROUND ATTACK/ISR**

1 sqn with Su-24M/MR *Fencer\**

**ELECTRONIC WARFARE**

1 sqn with Mi-8PPA *Hip*

**ISR**

1 sqn with MiG-25RB *Foxbat\**

8 sqn with Su-24MR *Fencer*\*

1 flt with An-30 *Clank*

#### AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL

1 sqn with A-50/A-50U *Mainstay*

#### TANKER

1 sqn with Il-78/Il-78M *Midas*

#### TRANSPORT

7 (mixed) sqn with An-12 *Cub*/An-24 *Coke*/An-26 *Curl*/  
Mi-8 *Hip*/Tu-134 *Crusty*/Tu-154 *Careless*

2 sqn with An-124 *Condor*

1 flt with An-12BK *Cub*

1 sqn with An-22 *Cock*

13 sqn with Il-76MD *Candid*

#### ATTACK HELICOPTER

2 sqn with Ka-52A *Hokum* B

12 sqn with Mi-24 *Hind*

2 sqn with Mi-28N *Havoc* B

1 sqn with Mi-28N *Havoc* B (forming)

#### TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

17 sqn with Mi-8 *Hip*/Mi-26 *Halo*

#### AIR DEFENCE

35 regt with S-300PS (SA-10 *Grumble*); S-300PM (SA-20  
*Gargoyle*)

6 regt with S-400 (SA-21 *Growler*); 96K6 *Pantsir-S1* (SA-  
22 *Greyhound*)

#### EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

##### AIRCRAFT 1,389 combat capable

**BBR** 141: 63 Tu-22M3/MR *Backfire* C; 31 Tu-95MS6 *Bear*;  
31 Tu-95MS16 *Bear*; 16 Tu-160 *Blackjack*

**FTR** 580: 150 MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; 40 MiG-29UB *Fulcrum*;  
120 MiG-31B/31BS *Foxhound*; 40 MiG-31B/31BS *Foxhound*;  
200 Su-27 *Flanker*; 30 Su-27UB *Flanker*

**FGA** 343: 28 MiG-29SMT *Fulcrum*; 6 MiG-29UBT  
*Fulcrum*; 150 Su-24M *Fencer*; 50 Su-24M2 *Fencer*; 47 Su-  
27SM2 *Flanker*; 12 Su-27SM3; 4 Su-30M2; 6 Su-30SM; 28  
Su-34 *Fullback*; 12 Su-35S *Flanker*

**ATK** 215: 150 Su-25 *Frogfoot*; 50 Su-25SM *Frogfoot*; 15 Su-  
25UB *Frogfoot*

**ISR** 114: 4 An-30 *Clank*; 10 MiG-25RB *Foxbat*\*; 100 Su-  
24MR *Fencer*\*

**ELINT** 22 Il-22 *Coot* B

**AEW&C** 23: 19 A-50/A-50U *Mainstay*; 4 Il-76SKIP (Be-976  
– telemetry aircraft)

**C2** 6: 2 Il-76VKP; 4 Il-86VKP *Maxdome*

**TKR** 20 Il-78/Il-78M *Midas*

**TPT** 390: **Heavy** 134: 12 An-124 *Condor*; 4 An-22 *Cock*; 118  
Il-76MD/MF *Candid*; **Medium** 50 An-12/An-12BK *Cub*;  
**Light** 205: 25 An-24 *Coke*; 80 An-26 *Curl*; 15 An-72 *Coaler*;  
5 An-140; 40 L-410; 30 Tu-134 *Crusty*; 10 Yak-40 *Codling*;  
**PAX** 1 Tu-154 *Careless*

**TRG** 220: 190 L-39 *Albatros*; 30 Yak-130 *Mitten*

#### HELICOPTERS

**ATK** 392+: 12 Ka-50 *Hokum*; 30+ Ka-52A *Hokum* B; 290  
Mi-24D/V/P *Hind*; 50+ Mi-28N *Havoc* B; 10+ Mi-35 *Hind*

**EW** 54: 50 Mi-8PPA *Hip*; 4 Mi-8TRP-1 *Hip*

**TPT** 566: **Heavy** 32 Mi-26 *Halo*; **Medium** 534 Mi-17 (Mi-  
8MT) *Hip* H/Mi-8 *Hip*

**TRG** 30: 10 Ka-226; 20 *Ansats-U*

**UAV • ISR Light** some *Pchela-1T*

**AD • SAM • SP** 1,900+ S-300PS (SA-10 *Grumble*)/S-300PM  
(SA-20 *Gargoyle*)/S-400 (SA-21 *Growler*); 96K6 *Pantsir-S1*  
(SA-22 *Greyhound*)

#### MSL

**AAM • IR** R-27T/ET (AA-10 *Alamo* B/D); R-73 (AA-11  
*Archer*); R-60T (AA-8 *Aphid*); **SARH** R-27R/ER (AA-10  
*Alamo* A/C); R-33/33S (AA-9 *Amos* A/B); **ARH** R-77/R-77-1  
(AA-12 *Adder*); K-37M (AA-13 *Axehead*); **PRH** R-27P/EP  
(AA-10 *Alamo* E/F)

**ARM** Kh-58 (AS-11 *Kilter*); Kh-25MP (AS-12 *Kegler*);  
Kh-15P (AS-16 *Kickback*) Kh-31P/PM (PM entering  
production) (AS-17A *Krypton*)

**ASM** Kh-25 (AS-10 *Karen*); Kh-59/Kh-59M (AS-13  
*Kingbolt*/AS-18 *Kazoo*); Kh-29 (AS-14 *Kedge*); Kh-31A/  
AM (AM entering production) (AS-17B *Krypton*); Kh-38  
(trials underway)

**LACM** Kh-22/32 (AS-4 *Kitchen*); Kh-55/55SM (AS-15A/B  
*Kent*); Kh-101; Kh-102; Kh-555 (AS-15C *Kent*)

**BOMBS • Laser-guided** KAB-500; KAB-1500L; **TV-guided**  
KAB-500KR; KAB-1500KR; KAB-500OD; UPAB 1500

## Russian Military Districts

### Western Military District

(ex-Leningrad & Moscow Military Districts & Kalinin-  
grad Special Region) HQ at St Petersburg

#### Army

##### FORCES BY ROLE

##### COMMAND

2 army HQ

##### SPECIAL FORCES

2 (Spetsnaz) bde

1 (AB Recce) bn

##### MANOEUVRE

##### Armoured

1 tk div

1 tk bde

##### Mechanised

1 MR div

5 MR bde

##### Air Manoeuvre

3 (VdV) AB div

##### COMBAT SUPPORT

2 arty bde

1 MRL bde

1 SSM bde with *Iskander-M*

2 SSM bde with *Tochka* (SS-21 *Scarab*)

2 AD bde

1 engr bde

1 MP bde

#### Reserves

##### FORCES BY ROLE

##### MANOEUVRE

##### Armoured

1 tk bde

##### Mechanised

2 MR bde

## Northern Fleet

### EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

#### SUBMARINES 41

STRATEGIC 10 SSBN (1 SSBN's *Bulava* SLBM not yet operational)

TACTICAL 23: 3 SSGN; 13 SSN; 7 SSK

SUPPORT 8: 7 SSAN (other roles); 1 SSA

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 10: 1 CV; 1 CGHMN; 1 CGHM (in repair); 7 DDGHM (of which 1 in refit)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12: 3

FSGM; 9 FSM

MINE WARFARE 12: 1 MHSO (in repair); 3 MSO; 8 MSC

AMPHIBIOUS 4 LST

## Naval Aviation

### FORCES BY ROLE

#### FIGHTER

2 sqn with Su-33 *Flanker D*; Su-25UTG *Frogfoot*

#### ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

1 sqn with Il-20RT *Coot A*; Il-38 *May\**; Tu-134

3 sqn with Ka-27/Ka-29 *Helix*

1 sqn with Tu-142M/MR *Bear F/J*

### EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

#### AIRCRAFT

FTR 18 Su-33 *Flanker D*

ATK 5 Su-25UTG *Frogfoot*

ASW 13 Tu-142M/MR *Bear F/J*

EW • ELINT Il-20RT *Coot A*

MP 14 Il-38 *May\**

TPT Tu-134

#### HELICOPTERS

ASW Ka-27 *Helix A*

TPT Ka-29 *Helix B*; Mi-8 *Hip*

## Naval Infantry

### FORCES BY ROLE

#### MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

1 MR bde

1 naval inf bde

1 naval inf regt

## Coastal Artillery and Missile Troops

### FORCES BY ROLE

#### COMBAT SUPPORT

1 ASHM bde

## Baltic Fleet

### EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES • TACTICAL 3 SSK: 1 *Lada*; 2 *Paltus (Kilo)*

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 7: 2 DDGHM; 5 FFGHM

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 20: 4 FSGM; 8 FSM; 7 PCFG; 1 PCM

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 15: 4 MSC; 11 MHI

AMPHIBIOUS 11: 4 LST; 5 LCM; 2 LCAC

## Naval Aviation

### FORCES BY ROLE

#### ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

1 sqn with Ka-27/Ka-29 *Helix*

#### TRANSPORT

1 sqn with An-24 *Coke*; An-26 *Curl*; Tu-134 *Crusty*

### EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

#### AIRCRAFT

TPT An-24 *Coke*/An-26 *Curl*/Tu-134 *Crusty*

#### HELICOPTERS

ASW Ka-27 *Helix*

TPT • Medium Ka-29 *Helix*

## Naval Infantry

### FORCES BY ROLE

#### MANOEUVRE

Mechanised

1 MR bde

1 MR regt

1 naval inf bde

#### COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bde

1 SAM regt

## Coastal Artillery and Missile Troops

### FORCES BY ROLE

#### COMBAT SUPPORT

1 ASHM regt

## Military Air Forces

### 1st Air Force & Air Defence Command

(ex-6th & 16th Air Army)

### FORCES BY ROLE

#### FIGHTER

1 sqn with MiG-29 *Fulcrum*

2 sqn with MiG-29SMT *Fulcrum*

4 sqn with MiG-31 *Foxhound*

8 sqn with Su-27/Su-27UB *Flanker*

#### GROUND ATTACK

2 sqn with Su-24M/M2 *Fencer*

2 sqn with Su-34 *Fullback*

#### GROUND ATTACK/ISR

1 sqn with Su-24M/MR *Fencer\**

#### ISR

1 flt with A-30 *Clank*

1 sqn with MiG-25RB *Foxbat\**

2 sqn with Su-24MR *Fencer E*

#### ELECTRONIC WARFARE

1 sqn with Mi-8PPA *Hip*

#### TRANSPORT

1 sqn with An-12 *Cub*; An-26 *Curl*; Tu-134 *Crusty*

#### ATTACK HELICOPTER

6 sqn with Mi-24 *Hind*

#### TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

6 sqn with Mi-8 *Hip*

### EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

#### AIRCRAFT

FTR 180: 20 MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; 51 MiG-31 *Foxhound*;

109 Su-27/Su-27UB *Flanker*

**FGA** 98: 28 MiG-29SMT *Fulcrum*; 6 MiG-29UBT *Fulcrum*; 44 Su-24M/M2 *Fencer*; 20+ Su-34 *Fullback*  
**ISR** 42+: 4 An-30 *Clank*; 10+ MiG-25RB *Foxbat\** 28 Su-24MR *Fencer\**  
**TPT** 12 An-12/An-26/Tu-134

**HELICOPTERS**

**ATK** 60 Mi-24 *Hind*  
**EW** 10 Mi-8PPA *Hip*  
**TPT • Medium** 60 Mi-8 *Hip*  
**AD • SAM** 1,125 incl S-300V

**Central Military District**

(ex-Volga-Ural & part ex-Siberia Military Districts) HQ at Yekaterinburg

**Army****FORCES BY ROLE****COMMAND**

2 army HQ

**SPECIAL FORCES**

1 (Spetsnaz) SF bde

**MANOEUVRE****Armoured**

1 tk bde

**Mechanised**

1 (201st) MR div

7 MR bde

**Air Manoeuvre**

1 (VdV) AB bde

**COMBAT SUPPORT**

1 arty bde

1 MRL regt

2 SSM bde with *Tochka* (SS-21 *Scarab*)

2 AD bde

1 engr bde

**Reserves****FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Mechanised**

3 MR bde

**Military Air Force****2nd Air Force & Air Defence Command**

(ex-5th & elm ex-14th Air Army)

**FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER**

4 sqn with MiG-31 *Foxhound*

**GROUND ATTACK**

2 sqn with Su-24 *Fencer*

**ISR**

1 sqn with Su-24MR *Fencer E*

**TRANSPORT**

3 sqn with An-12 *Cub*; An-24 *Coke*; Il-86; Tu-134 *Crusty*; Tu-154; Mi-8 *Hip*

**ATTACK HELICOPTER**

2 sqn with Mi-24 *Hind*

**TRANSPORT HELICOPTER**

3 sqn with Mi-8 *Hip*/Mi-26 *Halo*

**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT**

**FTR** 73 MiG-31 *Foxhound*

**FGA** 26 Su-24M *Fencer*

**ISR** 13 Su-24MR *Fencer E*

**TPT** 36 An-12/An-24 *Coke*/Tu-134 *Crusty*/Tu-154 *Careless*

**HELICOPTERS**

**ATK** 24 Mi-24 *Hind*

**TPT** 46: 6 Mi-26 *Halo*; 40 Mi-8 *Hip*

**AD • SAM** S-300 (SA-10 *Grumble*)

**Southern Military District**

(ex-North Caucasus Military District — including Trans-Caucasus Group of Forces (GRVZ)) HQ located at Rostov-on-Don

**Army****FORCES BY ROLE****COMMAND**

2 army HQ

**SPECIAL FORCES**

2 (Spetsnaz) SF bde

**MANOEUVRE****Reconnaissance**

1 recce bde

**Mechanised**

6 MR bde

2 MR bde (Armenia)

1 MR bde (Abkhazia)

1 MR bde (South Ossetia)

3 (lt/mtn) MR bde

**Air Manoeuvre**

1 (VdV) AB div

1 (army) air aslt bde

**COMBAT SUPPORT**

1 arty bde

1 MRL bde

1 MRL regt

1 SSM bde with *Tochka* (SS-21 *Scarab*)

2 AD bde

1 engr bde

**Black Sea Fleet**

The RUS Fleet is leasing bases in Sevastopol and Karantinnaya Bay, and is based, jointly with UKR warships, at Streletskaia Bay.

**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

**SUBMARINES • TACTICAL** 1 SSK (also 1 *Som* (*Tango*) in reserve)

**PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS** 5: 2 CGHM;

1 DDGM; 2 FFGM

**PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS** 19: 4

FSGM; 6 FSM; 1 PHM; 5 PCFG; 2 PCM; 1 PHT

**MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES** 9:

1 MCO; 6 MSO; 2 MSC

**AMPHIBIOUS** 9: 8 LST; 1 LCU



## Naval Aviation

### FORCES BY ROLE

#### FIGHTER

#### ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE/ISR

2 sqn with Su-24M/MR *Fencer*

#### ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

1 sqn with Ka-27 *Helix*

1 sqn with Mi-14 *Haze*

#### MARITIME PATROL/ELECTRONIC WARFARE

1 sqn with An-12 *Cub*; Be-12 *Mail\**; Mi-8

### EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

#### AIRCRAFT

FGA 18 Su-24M *Fencer*

ISR 4 Su-24MR *Fencer E*

MP 9 Be-12 *Mail\**

EW • ELINT An-12 *Cub*

TPT An-12; An-26

#### HELICOPTERS

ASW Ka-27 *Helix*

TPT • **Medium** Mi-8 *Hip* (MP/EW/Tpt)

## Naval Infantry

### FORCES BY ROLE

#### MANOEUVRE

**Mechanised**

1 naval inf bde

#### COMBAT SUPPORT

1 SAM regt

## Coastal Artillery and Missile Troops

### FORCES BY ROLE

1 AShM bde

1 indep AShM bn

## Caspian Sea Flotilla

### EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 2 FFGM

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 6: 2

PCFG; 3 PHM; 1 PCM

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 7:

5 MSC; 2 MHI

AMPHIBIOUS 11: 2 LCM; 4 LCU; 5 LCAC

## Military Air Force

### 4th Air Force & Air Defence Command

(ex 4th Air Army)

### FORCES BY ROLE

#### FIGHTER

3 sqn with MiG-29 *Fulcrum*

1 sqn with MiG-29 *Fulcrum* (Armenia)

3 sqn with Su-27 *Flanker*

#### FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 sqn with Su-27SM3 *Flanker*; Su-30M2

#### GROUND ATTACK

3 sqn with Su-24M *Fencer*

6 sqn with Su-25 *Frogfoot*

1 sqn with Su-34 *Fullback* (forming)

#### ISR

2 sqn with Su-24MR *Fencer E*

### TRANSPORT

1 sqn with An-12 *Cub*/Mi-8 *Hip*

### ATTACK HELICOPTER

3 sqn with Mi-24 *Hind*

2 sqn with Mi-28N *Havoc B* (forming)

### TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

6 sqn with Mi-8 *Hip*/Mi-26 *Halo*

### EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

#### AIRCRAFT

FTR 121: 63 MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; 58 Su-27 *Flanker*

FGA 80+: 62 Su-24M *Fencer*; 12 Su-27SM3

*Flanker*; 2 Su-30M2; 4+ Su-34 *Fullback*

ATK 129 Su-25 *Frogfoot*

ISR 24 Su-24MR *Fencer\**

TPT 12 An-12 *Cub*

#### HELICOPTERS

ATK 36: 24 Mi-24 *Hind*; 12+ Mi-28N *Havoc B*

TPT 72 **Heavy** 10 Mi-26 *Halo* **Medium** 28 Mi-8 *Hip*

## Eastern Military District

(ex-Far East & part ex-Siberia Military Districts) HQ

located at Khabarovsk

## Army

### FORCES BY ROLE

#### COMMAND

4 army HQ

#### SPECIAL FORCES

2 (Spetsnaz) SF bde

#### MANOEUVRE

**Armoured**

1 tk bde

**Mechanised**

10 MR bde

1 MGA div

**Air Manoeuvr**

2 (army) air aslt bde

#### COMBAT SUPPORT

4 arty bde

2 MRL bde

3 SSM bde with *Tochka* (SS-21 *Scarab*)

4 AD bde

1 engr bde

## Reserves

### FORCES BY ROLE

#### MANOEUVRE

**Mechanised**

8 MR bde

## Pacific Fleet

### EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

#### SUBMARINES 21

STRATEGIC 3 SSBN

TACTICAL 18: 5 SSGN; 4 SSN; 9 SSK

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 9: 1 CGHM;

8 DDGHM (of which one in reserve)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 23: 4

FSGM; 9 FSM; 10 PCFG

MINE WARFARE 7: 2 MSO; 5 MSC

AMPHIBIOUS 4 LST

## Naval Aviation

### FORCES BY ROLE

#### ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE

- 3 sqn with Ka-27/Ka-29 *Helix*
- 1 sqn with Il-38 *May\**
- 1 sqn with Tu-142M/MR *Bear F/J\**

#### TRANSPORT

- 2 sqn with An-12 *Cub*; An-26 *Curl*

### EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

#### AIRCRAFT

- ASW 14 Tu-142M/MR *Bear F/J\**
- MP 15 Il-38 *May\**
- TPT An-12 *Cub* (MR/EW); An-26 *Curl*

#### HELICOPTERS

- ASW Ka-27 *Helix*
- TPT • **Medium** Ka-29 *Helix*; Mi-8 *Hip*

## Naval Infantry

### FORCES BY ROLE

#### MANOEUVRE

- Mechanised**
- 1 naval inf bde
- 1 naval inf regt

#### COMBAT SUPPORT

- 1 SAM regt

## Coastal Artillery and Missile Troops

### FORCES BY ROLE

#### COMBAT SUPPORT

- 1 ASHM bde
- 1 ASHM regt

## Military Air Force

### 3rd Air Force & Air Defence Command

(ex 11th & elms 14th AF and AD Army)

### FORCES BY ROLE

#### FIGHTER

- 3 sqn with MiG-29 *Fulcrum*
- 3 sqn with MiG-31 *Foxhound*
- 4 sqn with Su-27SM2 *Flanker*; Su-30M2

#### GROUND ATTACK

- 4 sqn with Su-24M/M2 *Fencer*
- 5 sqn with Su-25 *Frogfoot*

#### ISR

- 3 sqn with Su-24MR *Fencer E*

#### TRANSPORT

- 2 sqn with An-12 *Cub*/An-24 *Coke*/An-26 *Curl*/Tu-134 *Crusty*/Tu-154 *Careless*

#### ATTACK HELICOPTER

- 2 sqn with Mi-24 *Hind*
- 1 sqn (forming) with Ka-52A *Hokum B*

#### TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

- 6 sqn with Mi-8 *Hind*/Mi-26 *Halo*

### EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

#### AIRCRAFT

- FTR 104: 60 MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; 44 MiG-31 *Foxhound*
- FGA 103: 44 Su-24M *Fencer*; 10 Su-24M2 *Fencer*; 47 Su-27SM2 *Flanker*; 2 Su-30M2
- ATK 72 Su-25 *Frogfoot*

ISR 28 Su-24MR *Fencer E*

TPT 22 An-12 *Cub*/An-24 *Coke*/An-26 *Curl*; 1 Tu-134 *Crusty*; 1 Tu-154 *Careless*

### HELICOPTERS

- ATK 32: 8 Ka-52A *Hokum B*; 24 Mi-24 *Hind*
- TPT 60 **Heavy** 4 Mi-26 *Halo*; **Medium** 56 Mi-8 *Hip*
- AD • SAM S-300P (SA-10 *Grumble*)

## Direct Reporting Commands

### Long-Range Aviation Command

Flying hours: 80–100 hrs/yr

### FORCES BY ROLE

#### BOMBER

- 4 sqn with Tu-22M3/MR *Backfire C*
- 3 sqn with Tu-95MS *Bear*
- 1 sqn with Tu-160 *Blackjack*

### EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

#### AIRCRAFT

BBR 141: 63 Tu-22M3/MR *Backfire C*; 31 Tu-95MS6 *Bear*; 31 Tu-95MS16 *Bear*; 16 Tu-160 *Blackjack*

### Transport Aviation Command

Flying hours 60 hrs/year

### FORCES BY ROLE

#### TRANSPORT

- 2 sqn with An-124 *Condor*
- 1 flt with An-12BK *Cub*
- 1 sqn with An-22 *Cock*
- 13 sqn with Il-76MD *Candid*

### EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT • TPT 140 **Heavy** 134: 12 An-124 *Condor*; 4 An-22 *Cock* (Under MoD control); 118 Il-76MD/MF *Candid* **Medium** 6 An-12BK *Cub*

## Paramilitary 519,000

### Federal Border Guard Service €160,000

Directly subordinate to the president; now reportedly all contract-based personnel

### FORCES BY ROLE

10 regional directorates

### MANOEUVRE

#### Other

- 7 frontier gp

### EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIFV/APC (W) 1,000 BMP/BTR

ARTY • SP 90: 122mm 2S1; 120mm 2S12; 120mm 2S9 *Anona*

### PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS

FRIGATES • FFHM 3 *Nerey* (*Krivak* III) with 1 twin Inchr with *Osa-M* (SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 quad 533mm TT Inchr, 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 Inchr, 1 100mm gun (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix A* ASW hel)

### PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 203

#### PCM 46:

- 2 *Molnya* II (*Pauk* II) with 1 quad Inchr with *Strela-2* (SA-N-5 *Grail* SAM), 2 twin 533mm TT Inchr, 2 RBU 1200 Inchr, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun
- 27 *Svetljak* (*Svetlyak*) with 1 quad Inchr with *Strela-2* (SA-N-5 *Grail* SAM), 2 single 406mm TT, 1 76mm gun

17 *Molnya I (Pauk I)* with 1 quad Inchr with *Strela-2* (SA-N-5 *Grail SAM*), 4 single 406mm TT, 1 AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun

**PHT** 2 *Antares (Muravey)*

**PCO** 15: 8 Project 503 (*Alpinist*); 1 *Sprut*; 3 *Rubin* with 1 AK630 CIWS; 2 *Antur*; 1 *Purga*

**PSO** 4 *Komandor*

**PCC** 13 *Tarantul (Stenka)* with 4 406mm TT, 2 twin AK630 CIWS

**PB** 45: 3 Project 14310 (*Mirazh*); 13 Type 1496; 12 *Grif (Zhuk)*; 17 *Kulik*

**PBR** 25: 3 *Ogonek* with 2 AK630 CIWS; 8 *Piyavka* with 1 AK630 CIWS; 5 *Shmel* with 1 76mm gun; 6 *Moskit (Vosh)*; 2 *Slepen (Yaz)* with 2 115mm guns; 1 *Gornostay*

**PBF** 53: 1 A-125; 2 *Bogomol* with 2 twin AK630 CIWS, 1 76mm gun; 17 *Mangust*; 4 *Mustang* (Project 18623); 15 *Saygak*; 12 *Sobol*; 2 *Sokzhoi*

**AMPHIBIOUS • LC • LCAC** 7 *Tsaplya* (used for patrol duties)

#### LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 41

**AGB** 5 *Ivan Susanin* (primarily used as patrol ships)

**AGS** 2 *Yug* (primarily used as patrol ships)

**AK** 8 *Neon Antonov*

**AKSL** 6 *Kanin*

**AO** 2: 1 *Baskunchak*; 1 Project 1510

**ATF** 18 *Sorum* (primarily used as patrol ships)

**AIRCRAFT • TPT** €86: 70 An-24 *Coke/An-26 Curl/An-72 Coaler/Il-76 Candid/Tu-134 Crusty/Yak-40 Codling*; 16 SM-92

**HELICOPTERS:** €200 Ka-28 (Ka-27) *Helix ASW/Mi-24 Hind Atk/Mi-26 Halo Spt/Mi-8 Hip Spt*

### Federal Agency for Special Construction (MOD) €50,000

### Federal Communications and Information Agency €55,000

#### FORCES BY ROLE

##### MANOEUVRE

###### Other

4 paramilitary corps

28 paramilitary bde

### Federal Protection Service €10,000–30,000 active

Org include elm of ground forces (mech inf bde and AB regt)

#### FORCES BY ROLE

##### MANOEUVRE

###### Mechanised

1 mech inf regt

###### Air Manoeuvr

1 AB regt

###### Other

1 (Presidential) gd regt

### Federal Security Service €4,000 active (armed)

#### FORCES BY ROLE

##### MANOEUVRE

###### Other

Some cdo unit (including Alfa and Vypel units)

### Interior Troops €170,000

#### FORCES BY ROLE

7 Regional Commands: Central, Urals, North Caucasus, Volga, Eastern, North-Western and Siberian

#### MANOEUVRE

##### Other

3 (55th, 59th & ODON) paramilitary div (2–5 paramilitary regt)

18 (OBRON) paramilitary bde (3 mech bn, 1 mor bn)

2 indep paramilitary bde (OBR/OSMBR)

102 paramilitary regt/bn (incl special motorised units)

11 (special) paramilitary unit

##### Aviation

8 sqn

#### COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty regt

#### EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

##### MBT 9

**AIFV/APC (W)** 1,650 BMP-1/BMP-2/BTR-80

##### ARTY 35

**TOWED 122mm** 20 D-30

**MOR 120mm** 15 PM-38

**AIRCRAFT TPT** 23: **Heavy** 9 Il-76 *Candid*; **Medium** 2

An-12 *Cub*; **Light** 12 An-26 *Curl*; 6 An-72 *Coaler*

**HELICOPTERS • TPT** 70: **Heavy** 10 Mi-26 *Halo*;

**Medium** 60 Mi-8 *Hip*

### Railway Troops (MOD) €50,000

### Cyber

Until 2003, activities within the cyber domain were the responsibility of the Russian SIGINT agency, FAPSI. In 2003, this agency was abolished and its responsibilities divided between the Defence Ministry and the internal security service FSB, with the latter having responsibility for investigating cyber crime. Moscow State University's Institute for Information Security Issues conducts research on technical issues, including cryptography, and counts the General Staff and the FSB among its clients. In March 2012, Dmitry Rogozin, deputy prime minister with responsibility for the defence industry, said Russia was considering establishing a 'Cyber Security Command' in the armed forces, though there is scant detail. The first official doctrinal statement on the role of the Russian military in cyberspace, the 'Conceptual Views on the Activity of the Russian Federation Armed Forces in Information Space', was released at the end of 2011, and described cyber force tasks with little correlation to those of equivalent commands in the West. In particular, the document contains no mention of the possibility of offensive cyber activity. The document is entirely defensive in tone, and focuses on force protection and prevention of information war, including allowing for a military role in negotiating international treaties governing information security. Following mixed performance in the information aspects of the armed conflict with Georgia in 2008, there was discussion about creating 'Information Troops', whose role would include cyber capability; but this initiative was publicly scotched by the FSB. In January 2012, then-CGS Makarov gave a different picture of the three main tasks for any new command: 'disrupting adversary information

systems, including by introducing harmful software; defending our own communications and command systems'; and 'working on domestic and foreign public opinion using the media, Internet and more'. The third task is a reminder that, unlike some other nations with advanced cyber capabilities, Russia deals in cyber warfare as an integral component of information warfare.

## DEPLOYMENT

### ARMENIA

3,214; 1 MR bde; 74 MBT; 201 AIFV; 72 SP/towed arty; 12 MRL; 1 sqn with 18 MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; 2 AD bty with S-300V (SA-12 *Gladiator/Giant*); 1 AD bty with 2K12 *Kub* (SA-6 *Gainful*)

### BELARUS

1 radar station at Baranovichi (*Volga* system; leased); 1 Naval Communications site

### CÔTE D'IVOIRE

UN • UNOCI 6 obs

### DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

UN • MONUSCO 1; 27 obs

### GEORGIA

7,000; Abkhazia 1 MR bde; South Ossetia 1 MR bde; some atk hel; some S-300 SAM

### GULF OF ADEN

1 CGHM; 1 AORL; 1 ATF

### KAZAKHSTAN

1 radar station at Balkash (Dnepr system; leased)

### KYRGYZSTAN

€500; 5 Su-25 *Frogfoot*; 2 Mi-8 *Hip* spt hel

### LIBERIA

UN • UNMIL 4 obs

### MIDDLE EAST

UN • UNTSO 5 obs

### MOLDOVA/TRANSNIESTR

€1,500 (including 350 peacekeepers); 2 MR bn; 100 MBT/AIFV/APC; 7 Mi-24 *Hind*; some Mi-8 *Hip*

### SOUTH SUDAN

UN • UNMISS 4; 3 obs

### SUDAN

UN • UNISFA 2 obs

### SYRIA

1 naval facility at Tartus

### TAJIKISTAN

5,000; 1 mil base with (1 (201st) MR div(-); 54 T-72; 300 BMP-2/BTR-80/MT-LB; 100 2S1/2S3/2S12/9P140 *Uragan*; 5 Su-25 *Frogfoot*; 4 Mi-8 *Hip*

### UKRAINE

13,000; 102 AIFV/APC; 24 arty; 1 Fleet HQ located at Sevastopol; 2 radar stations located at Sevastopol (*Dnepr* system, leased) and Mukachevo (*Dnepr* system, leased).

## WESTERN SAHARA

UN • MINURSO 16 obs

## Tajikistan TJK

Tajikistani Somoni Tr		2012	2013	2014
GDP	Tr	36.2bn	41.8bn	
	US\$	7.59bn	8.56bn	
<i>per capita</i>	US\$	953	1,052	
Growth	%	7.50	7.00	
Inflation	%	5.80	7.72	
Def bdgt <sup>a</sup>	Tr	808m	923m	
	US\$	170m	189m	
FMA (US)	US\$	0.8m	0.8m	1.5m
US\$1=Tr		4.76	4.88	

<sup>a</sup> Defence and law enforcement expenses

Population 7,910,041

Ethnic groups: Tajik 67%; Uzbek 25%; Russian 2%; Tatar 2%

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	17.0%	5.0%	5.4%	5.1%	16.0%	1.3%
Female	16.4%	4.8%	5.2%	5.0%	17.0%	1.9%

## Capabilities

Internal and border security is a particular concern for Tajikistan, with the country sharing an extended border with Afghanistan. Tajik security forces have intermittent problems with groups of armed gangs linked to drug trafficking. Given the overall weaknesses of the armed and security forces – which include inadequate special forces training and personnel issues revolving around high numbers of conscripts and low planning capacity – it is likely that low-level militant activity linked to drug trafficking will continue to burden and challenge the armed forces. Most military equipment is of Soviet origin. The country has little capacity to deploy other than token forces, though the armed forces are an active participant in CSTO and SCO military exercises. Russia maintains a military base in the country, though this was the source of friction between the two as signature of a lease extension was delayed by Tajikistan during the first half of 2013. India, which also has basing interests in Tajikistan, has offered to provide Mi-8/17 helicopters.

**ACTIVE 8,800 (Army 7,300, Air Force/Air Defence 1,500) Paramilitary 7,500**

*Conscript liability 24 months*

## ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

### Army 7,300

#### FORCES BY ROLE

#### MANOEUVRE

**Mechanised**

3 MR bde

**Air Manoeuvre**

1 air aslt bde

**COMBAT SUPPORT**

1 arty bde

1 SAM regt

**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****MBT** 37: 30 T-72; 7 T-62**AIFV** 23: 8 BMP-1; 15 BMP-2**APC (W)** 23 BTR-60/BTR-70/BTR-80**ARTY** 23

TOWED 122mm 10 D-30

MRL 122mm 3 BM-21

MOR 120mm 10

**AD • SAM** 20+TOWED 20 S-75 *Dvina* (SA-2 *Guideline*); S-125 *Pechora-2M* (SA-3 *Goa*)MANPAD 9K32 *Strela-2* (SA-7 *Grail*)‡**Air Force/Air Defence 1,500****FORCES BY ROLE****TRANSPORT**1 sqn with Tu-134A *Crusty***ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER**1 sqn with Mi-24 *Hind*; Mi-8 *Hip*; Mi-17TM *Hip H***EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT**TPT • Light 1 Tu-134A *Crusty*TRG 4+: 4 L-39 *Albatros*; some Yak-52**HELICOPTERS**ATK 4 Mi-24 *Hind*TPT • Medium 11 Mi-8 *Hip*/Mi-17TM *Hip H***Paramilitary 7,500****Interior Troops 3,800****National Guard 1,200****Emergencies Ministry 2,500****Border Guards****DEPLOYMENT****MALI**

UN • MINUSMA 1

**FOREIGN FORCES****India** Air Force: 1 Fwd Op Base located at Farkhar**Russia** 5,000 Army: 1 mil base (subord Central MD) with (1 (201st) MR div(-); 54 T-72; 300 BMP-2/BTR-80/MT-LB; 100 2S1/2S3/2S12/9P140 *Uragan* • Military Air Forces: 5 Su-25 *Frogfoot*; 2 Mi-8 *Hip***Turkmenistan TKM**

Turkmen New Manat TMM		2012	2013	2014
<b>GDP</b>	TMM	96bn	115bn	
	US\$	33.7bn	40.2bn	
<i>per capita</i>	US\$	5,999	7,051	
<b>Growth</b>	%	10.97	7.71	
<b>Inflation</b>	%	4.87	5.64	
<b>Def bdgt</b>	TMM	€1.54bn		
	US\$	€538.9m		
<b>FMA (US)</b>	US\$			0.69m
<b>USD1=TMM</b>		2.85	2.85	

**Population** 5,113,040**Ethnic groups:** Turkmen 77%; Uzbek 9%; Russian 7%; Kazak 2%

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
<b>Male</b>	13.5%	5.1%	5.3%	5.0%	18.8%	1.8%
<b>Female</b>	13.2%	5.0%	5.3%	5.0%	19.6%	2.4%

**Capabilities**

Turkmenistan declared neutrality in 1999 and enshrined this principle in its 2009 Military Doctrine. A military reform programme is under way, intended to improve Turkmenistan's conscript-based armed forces. These continue to rely on Soviet-era equipment and doctrine. Delivery of around 30 T90S MBTs, ordered from Russia in 2011, is yet to take place. The air force has a limited number of fixed-wing combat aircraft and helicopters, though the level of availability is uncertain. Internal security and counter-narcotics are priorities. There are plans to strengthen coastal naval forces by 2015, and some assets have already been procured. Military capability is believed to be limited by low levels of training and availability of spare parts.

**ACTIVE 22,000** (Army 18,500 Navy 500 Air 3,000)*Conscript liability* 24 months**ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE****Army 18,500**

5 Mil Districts

**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Mechanised**

3 MR div

2 MR bde

**Air Manoeuvre**

1 air aslt bn

**Other**

1 MR trg div

**COMBAT SUPPORT**

1 arty bde

1 MRL regt

1 AT regt

1 SSM bde with *Scud*



2 SAM bde  
1 engr regt

**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE †**

**MBT** 680: 10 T-90S; 670 T-72

**RECCE** 170 BRDM/BRDM-2

**AIFV** 942: 930 BMP-1/BMP-2; 12 BRM

**APC (W)** 829 BTR-60/BTR-70/BTR-80

**ARTY** 570

**SP** 56: **122mm** 40 2S1; **152mm** 16 2S3

**TOWED** 269: **122mm** 180 D-30; **152mm** 89: 17 D-1; 72 D-20

**GUN/MOR** **120mm** 17 2S9 *Anona*

**MRL** 131: **122mm** 65: 9 9P138; 56 BM-21; **220mm** 60 9P140 *Uragan*; **300mm** 6 BM 9A52 *Smerch*

**MOR** 97: **82mm** 31; **120mm** 66 PM-38

**AT**

**MSL** • **MANPATS** 100 9K11 (AT-3 *Sagger*); 9K111 (AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K113 (AT-5 *Spandrel*); 9K115 (AT-6 *Spiral*)

**GUNS** **100mm** 72 MT-12/T-12

**AD • SAM** 53+

**SP** 53: 40 9K33 *Osa* (SA-8 *Gecko*); 13 9K35 *Strela-10* (SA-13 *Gopher*)

**MANPAD** 9K32 *Strela-2* (SA-7 *Grail*) ‡

**GUNS** 70

**SP** **23mm** 48 ZSU-23-4

**TOWED** **57mm** 22 S-60

**MSL** • **SSM** 10 SS-1 *Scud*

**Navy** 500**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS** 19

**PCFG** 2 *Edermen* (RUS *Molnya*) with 4 quad Inchr with 3M24E *Uran* AShM, 1 quad Inchr (manual aiming) with 9K32 *Strela-2* (SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM, 1 76mm gun

**PCC** 4 *Arkadag*

**PBF** 12: 5 *Grif-T*; 5 *Dearsan* 14: 2 *Sobol*

**PB** 1 *Point*

**Air Force** 3,000**FORCES BY ROLE****FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK**

2 sqn with MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; MiG-29UB *Fulcrum*; Su-17 *Fitter*; Su-25MK *Frogfoot*

**TRANSPORT**

1 sqn with An-26 *Curl*; Mi-8 *Hip*; Mi-24 *Hind*

**TRAINING**

1 unit with Su-7B *Fitter A*; L-39 *Albatros*

**AIR DEFENCE**

Some sqn with S-75 *Dvina* (SA-2 *Guideline*); S-125 *Pechora* (SA-3 *Goa*); S-200 *Angara* (SA-5 *Gammon*)

**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

**AIRCRAFT** 94 combat capable

**FTR** 24: 22 MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; 2 MiG-29UB *Fulcrum*

**FGA** 68: 3 Su-7B *Fitter A*; 65 Su-17 *Fitter B*

**ATK** 2 Su-25MK *Frogfoot* (41 more being refurbished)

**TPT** • **Light** 1 An-26 *Curl*

**TRG** 2 L-39 *Albatros*

**HELICOPTERS**

**ATK** 10 Mi-24 *Hind*

**TPT** • **Medium** 8 Mi-8 *Hip*

**AD** • **SAM** 50 S-75 *Dvina* (SA-2 *Guideline*)/S-125 *Pechora* (SA-3 *Goa*)/S-200 *Angara* (SA-5 *Gammon*)

**Ukraine UKR**

Ukrainian Hryvnia h		2012	2013	2014
<b>GDP</b>	h	1.41tr	1.48tr	
	US\$	176bn	182bn	
<b>per capita</b>	US\$	3,877	4,015	
<b>Growth</b>	%	0.15	0.36	
<b>Inflation</b>	%	0.57	0.48	
<b>Def bdtgt</b>	h	16.4bn	19.7bn	25.8bn
	US\$	2.05bn	2.42bn	
<b>FMA (US)</b>	US\$	7m	7m	4.2m
<b>US\$1=h</b>		7.99	8.15	

**Population** 44,573,205

Age	0 – 14	15 – 19	20 – 24	25 – 29	30 – 64	65 plus
<b>Male</b>	7.1%	2.7%	3.5%	4.3%	23.3%	5.1%
<b>Female</b>	6.7%	2.6%	3.4%	4.2%	26.8%	10.5%

**Capabilities**

The armed forces are tasked with ensuring territorial integrity and having the capability to participate in international peace-keeping operations. There is at least a notional ability for limited force projection using air-mobile troops. However, the armed forces have suffered from inadequate finances and a 2006–11 defence programme was significantly underfunded. Procurement targets were missed and plans to end conscription by 2011 were not achieved. A reform programme covering the period to 2017 has been drafted by the ministry, which includes the objective of increasing the number of contract personnel. The services continue to operate mainly Soviet-era equipment, which increasingly needs replacement, such as much of the SAM inventory. Aircraft availability and serviceability remain low, as do flying hours. Funding restrictions have constrained naval ambitions, though the programme to re-equip the fleet with a new class of corvette is proceeding slowly. The navy is also attempting to return its one *Foxtrot*-class submarine to service condition, after more than a decade of inactivity. The armed forces take part in national and multinational exercises, and also provide personnel for UN peacekeeping operations. Ukraine has an industrial relationship with China in certain areas of defence technology. The Russian Black Sea Fleet continues to use leased facilities at Sevastopol.

**ACTIVE 129,950 (Army 64,750 Navy 13,950 Air 45,250 Airborne 6,000) Paramilitary 84,900**

*Conscript liability* Army, Air Force 18 months, Navy 2 years. During the Autumn 2013 draft, authorities indicated that conscription could be suspended in 2014. Contract servicemen comprise just over 50% of the armed forces.

**RESERVE 1,000,000 (Joint 1,000,000)**

Military service within 5 years

## ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

### Ground Forces (Army) 64,750

Transformation due to be completed by 2015.

#### FORCES BY ROLE:

##### COMMAND

3 corps HQ

##### SPECIAL FORCES

2 SF regt

##### MANOEUVRE

###### Armoured

2 tk bde

###### Mechanised

8 mech bde

1 mech regt

###### Aviation

3 avn regt

##### COMBAT SUPPORT

3 arty bde

3 MRL regt

1 SSM bde

3 AD regt

4 engr regt

1 EW regt

1 CBRN regt

4 sigs regt

#### EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

**MBT** 1,110: 10 T-84 *Oplot* (development complete); 1,100 T-64; (165 T-80; 600 T-72; 650 T-64; 20 T-55 all in store)

**RECE** 600+ BRDM-2

**AIFV** 1,484: 15 BMD-1, 15 BMD-2; 250 BMP-1; 1,050 BMP-2; 4 BMP-3; 150 BRM-1K

**APC** 490

**APC (T)** 15 BTR-D

**APC (W)** 475: up to 10 BTR-4; 15 BTR-60; 300 BTR-70; 150 BTR-80

**ARTY** 1,952

**SP** 733: **122mm** 300 2S1; **152mm** 334: 40 2S19 *Farm*; 270 2S3; 24 2S5; **203mm** 99 2S7

**TOWED** 595: **122mm** 100 D-30; **152mm** 495: 200 2A36; 165 2A65; 130 D-20

**GUN/MOR** • **120mm** • **TOWED** 2 2B16 NONA-K

**MRL** 372: **122mm** 220: 20 9P138; 200 BM-21; **132mm** 2

BM-13; **220mm** 70 9P140 *Uragan*; **300mm** 80 9A52 *Smerch*

**MOR** **120mm** 250: 210 2S12; 40 PM-38

**AT**

**MSL** • **MANPATS** 9K111 *Fagot* (*Spigot*); 9K113 *Konkurs* (AT-5 *Spandrel*); 9K114 *Shturm* (AT-6 *Spiral*)

**GUNS** **100mm** €500 MT-12/T-12

#### HELICOPTERS

**ATK** 139 Mi-24 *Hind*

**TPT** • **Medium** 38 Mi-8 *Hip*

**AD**

**SAM** • **SP** 435: 60 9K37 *Buk* (SA-11 *Gadfly*); €150 9K35 *Strela-10* (SA-13 *Gopher*); 100 2K11 *Krug* (SA-4 *Ganef*); 125 9K33 *Osa* (SA-8 *Gecko*); S-300V (SA-12 *Gladiator*)

**GUNS** 470:

**SP** **30mm** 70 2S6

**TOWED** **57mm** €400 S-60

**RADAR** • **LAND** *Small Fred*/*Small Yawn*/SNAR-10 *Big Fred* (arty)

**MSL** • **SSM** 212: 50 *FROG*; 90 *Tochka* (SS-21 *Scarab*); 72 *Scud-B*

**AEV** 53 BAT-2; MT-LB

**ARV** BREM-2; BREM-64; T-54/T-55

**VLB** MTU-20

### Navy 11,950; 2,000 conscript (total 13,950 incl Naval Aviation and Naval Infantry)

After intergovernmental agreement in 1997, the Russian Federation Fleet currently leases bases in Sevastopol and Karantinnaya Bays and also shares facilities jointly with UKR warships at Streletskaaya Bay. The overall serviceability of the fleet is assessed as low.

#### EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

**SUBMARINES** • **TACTICAL** • **SSK** 1 *Foxtrot* (T-641) with 10 533mm TT

#### PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 1

**FRIGATES** • **FFHM** 1 *Hetman Sagaidachny* (RUS *Krivak* III) with 1 twin Inchr with *Osa-M* (SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 quad 533mm ASTT with T-53 HWT, 1 100mm gun, (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)

#### PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10

**CORVETTES** • **FSM** 3 *Grisha* (II/V) with 1 twin Inchr with *Osa-M* (SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT with SAET-60 HWT, 1 to 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2, 1 76mm gun

**PCFGM** 2 *Tarantul* II (FSU *Molnya*) with 2 twin Inchr with P-15 *Termit-R* (SS-N-2D *Styx*) ASHM; 1 quad Inchr (manual aiming) with 9K32 *Strela-2* (SA-N-5 *Grail*); 1 76mm gun

**PHG** 2 *Matka* (FSU *Vekhr*) with 2 single Inchr with P-15 *Termit-M/R* (SS-N-2C/D *Styx*) ASHM, 1 76mm gun

**PCMT** 2 *Pauk* I (FSU *Molnya* II) with 1 quad Inchr (manual aiming) with 9K32 *Strela-2* (SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM, 4 single 406mm TT, 2 RBU-1200, 1 76mm gun

**PB** 1 *Zhuk* (FSU *Grif*)

#### MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 5

**MHI** 1 *Yevgenya* (FSU *Korund*)

**MSO** 2 *Natya* with 2 RBU 1200

**MSC** 2 *Sonya* (FSU *Yakhont*)

#### AMPHIBIOUS

##### LANDING SHIPS 2

**LSM** 1 *Polnochny* C (capacity 6 MBT; 180 troops)

**LST** 1 *Ropucha* with 4 quad Inchr with 9K32 *Strela-2* (SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM, 2 twin 57mm guns, (capacity either 10 MBT or 190 troops; either 24 APC (T) or 170 troops)

##### LANDING CRAFT 3

**LCAC** 1 *Pomornik* (*Zubr*) with 2 quad Inchr with 9K32 *Strela-2* (SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM, (capacity 230 troops; either 3 MBT or 10 APC (T))

**LCU** 2

#### LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 34

**ABU** 1 *Shostka*

**ADG** 1 *Bereza*

**AGI** 2 *Muna*

**AGF** 2: 1 *Bambuk* (fitted with 2 quad Inchr with SA-N-5/8 *Grail* SAM (manual aiming)); 1 *Amur* (can also act as a spt ship for surface ships and submarines)

**AGS** 2: 1 *Moma* (mod); 1 *Biya*

AWT 1 *Sudak*  
 AXL 3 *Petrushka*  
 YDT 13: 1 *Yelva*; 12 other  
 YTM 6  
 YTR 2 *Pozharny*  
 YY 1 *Sokal*

### Naval Aviation €2,500

AIRCRAFT 10 combat capable  
 ASW 10 Be-12 *Mail*  
 TPT 16: **Medium** 5 An-12 *Cub*; **Light** 10: 1 An-24 *Coke*;  
 8 An-26 *Curly*; 1 Tu-134 *Crusty*; **PAX** 1 Il-18 *Coot*

### HELICOPTERS

ASW 72: 28 Ka-25 *Hormone*; 2 Ka-27E *Helix*; 42 Mi-14  
*Haze*  
 TPT • **Heavy** 5 Mi-6 *Hook*

### Naval Infantry 3,000

#### FORCES BY ROLE

##### MANOEUVRE

###### Mechanised

1 mech inf bde

##### COMBAT SUPPORT

1 arty bde

#### EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT 40 T-64

AIFV 75 BMP-2

APC (W) 100: 50 BTR-70; 50 BTR-80

ARTY 90

SP • **122mm** 12 2S1

TOWED 36: **122mm** 18 D-30; **152mm** 18 2A36

MRL • **122mm** 18 BM-21

MOR **120mm** 24 2S12

### Air Forces 45,250

Flying hours 40 hrs/yr

#### FORCES BY ROLE

##### FIGHTER

5 bde with MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; Su-27 *Flanker*

##### FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

2 bde with Su-24M *Fencer*; Su-25 *Frogfoot*

##### ISR

2 sqn with Su-24MR *Fencer E\**

##### TRANSPORT

3 bde with An-24; An-26; An-30; Il-76 *Candid*; Tu-134  
*Crusty*

##### TRAINING

Some sqn with L-39 *Albatros*

##### TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

Some sqn with Mi-8; Mi-9; PZL Mi-2 *Hoplite*

#### EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 221 combat capable

FTR 126: 90 MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; 36 Su-27 *Flanker*

FGA 36 Su-24 *Fencer*

ATK 36 Su-25 *Frogfoot*

ISR 26: 3 An-30 *Clank*; 23 Su-24MR *Fencer E\**

TPT 46: **Heavy** 20 Il-76 *Candid*; **Light** 26: 3 An-24 *Coke*;  
 21 An-26 *Curly*; 2 Tu-134 *Crusty*

TRG 39 L-39 *Albatros*

### HELICOPTERS

C2 4 Mi-9

TPT 34: **Medium** 31 Mi-8 *Hip*; **Light** 3 PZL Mi-2 *Hoplite*

AD • **SAM** 825 S-300PS (SA-10 *Grumble*)/SA-11

*Gadfly*/S-75 *Volkhov* (SA-2 *Guideline*) (towed)/S-125

*Pechora* (SA-3 *Goa*) (towed)/S-200V *Angara* (SA-5 *Gammon*)  
 (static)/9K37M *Buk-M1* (SA-11 *Gadfly*)

#### MSL

ASM: Kh-25 (AS-10 *Karen*); Kh-59 (AS-13 *Kingbolt*); Kh-  
 29 (AS-14 *Kedge*);

ARM: Kh-58 (AS-11 *Kilter*); Kh-25MP (AS-12 *Kegler*);

Kh-28 (AS-9 *Kyle*)

AAM • **IR** R-60 (AA-8 *Aphid*); R-73 (AA-11 *Archer*)

SARH R-27 (AA-10A *Alamo*)

### Airborne Forces 6,000

#### FORCES BY ROLE:

##### MANOEUVRE

###### Air Manoeuvre

1 AB bde

2 air mob bde

1 air mob regt

#### EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIFV 98: 35 BMD-1; 63 BMD-2

APC 180

APC (T) 25 BTR-D

APC (W) 155: 5 BTR-60; 150 BTR-80

ARTY 128

TOWED • **122mm** 54 D-30

GUN/MOR • SP • **120mm** 50 2S9 *Anona*

MOR **120mm** 24 2S12

### Paramilitary

MVS €39,900 active

(Ministry of Internal Affairs)

#### FORCES BY ROLE

##### MANOEUVRE

###### Other

4 paramilitary tp

##### COMBAT SUPPORT

1 (Internal Security) MP tp

### Border Guard 45,000 active

#### Maritime Border Guard

The Maritime Border Guard is an independent subdivision of the State Commission for Border Guards and is not part of the navy.

#### FORCES BY ROLE

##### PATROL

4 (cutter) bde

2 rvn bde

##### MINE WARFARE

1 MCM sqn

##### TRANSPORT

3 sqn

##### TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 sqn

**COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT**

- 1 trg div
- 1 (aux ships) gp

**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 27**

- PCFT 6 *Stenka* with 4 single 406mm TT
- PCT 3 *Pauk* I with 4 single 406mm TT, 2 RBU-1200, 1 76mm gun
- PHT 1 *Muravey* with 2 single 406mm TT, 1 76mm gun
- PB 13: 12 *Zhuk*; 1 *Orlan* (seven additional vessels under construction)
- PBR 4 *Shmel*

**LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • AGF 1**

**AIRCRAFT • TPT Medium** An-8 *Camp*; **Light** An-24 *Coke*; An-26 *Curl*; An-72 *Coaler*

**HELICOPTERS • ASW:** Ka-27 *Helix A*

**Civil Defence Troops 9,500+ (civilian)**

(Ministry of Emergency Situations)

**FORCES BY ROLE****MANOEUVRE****Other**

- 4 paramilitary bde
- 4 paramilitary regt

**DEPLOYMENT****Legal provisions for foreign deployment:**

**Constitution:** Codified constitution (1996)

**Specific legislation:** 'On the procedures to deploy Armed Forces of Ukraine units abroad' (1518-III, March 2000).

**Decision on deployment of troops abroad:** Parliament authorised to approve decision to provide military assistance, deploy troops abroad and allow foreign military presence in Ukraine (Art. 85, para 23); Also, in accordance with Art. 7 of the specific legislation (above), president is authorised to take a decision to deploy troops abroad and at the same time to submit a draft law to the Parliament of Ukraine for approval.

**AFGHANISTAN**

NATO • ISAF 26

**ARMENIA/AZERBAIJAN**

OSCE • Minsk Conference 1

**CÔTE D'IVOIRE**

UN • UNOCI 38; 1 atk hel flt

**DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO**

UN • MONUSCO 254; 11 obs; 2 atk hel sqn

**GULF OF ADEN & SOMALI BASIN**

NATO • *Operation Ocean Shield* 1 FFHM

**LIBERIA**

UN • UNMIL 238; 2 obs; 1 hel sqn

**MOLDOVA**

10 obs

**SERBIA**

NATO • KFOR 163; 1 inf coy

OSCE • Kosovo 1

UN • UNMIK 2 obs

**SOUTH SUDAN**

UN • UNMISS 1; 3 obs

**SUDAN**

UN • UNISFA 2 obs

**FOREIGN FORCES**

Russia €13,000 Navy 1 Fleet HQ at Sevastopol; 1 indep naval inf bde; 102 AIFV/APC (T)/APC (W); 24 arty

**Uzbekistan UZB**

Uzbekistani Som s	2012	2013	2014
GDP	s	96.7tr	117tr
	US\$	51.2bn	56.5bn
<i>per capita</i>	US\$	1,737	1,895
Growth	%	8.00	7.00
Inflation	%	12.06	10.94
Def bdgt	s	€2.75tr	
	US\$	€1.46bn	
FMA (US)	US\$	2.7m	2.7m
			1.15m
US\$1=s		1889.24	2078.74

Population 28,661,637

**Ethnic groups:** Uzbek 73%; Russian 6%; Tajik 5%; Kazakh 4%; Karakalpak 2%; Tatar 2%; Korean <1%; Ukrainian <1%

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	13.0%	5.2%	5.5%	5.2%	18.9%	2.0%
Female	12.3%	5.0%	5.4%	5.1%	19.6%	2.7%

**Capabilities**

Uzbekistan's conscript-based armed forces are the most capable in Central Asia, and better-equipped than those of its immediate neighbours. Uzbekistan is a member of the SCO, but suspended its membership of the CSTO in mid-2012. It maintains bilateral defence ties with Russia, and relations with Moscow improved following a heads-of-state meeting in the second quarter of 2013. Security issues after the ISAF drawdown from Afghanistan were part of the discussion. As part of an agreement covering transit rights for US and UK military equipment being returned from Afghanistan, the Uzbek armed forces will receive some military equipment, although the type and amount were unclear at November 2013. Air force flying hours are reported to be low, with significant logistical and maintenance shortcomings affecting the availability of aircraft.

**ACTIVE 48,000 (Army 24,500 Air 7,500 Joint 16,000)**

**Paramilitary 20,000**

*Conscript liability* conscription 12 months

---

## ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

---

### Army 24,500

4 Mil Districts; 2 op comd; 1 Tashkent Comd

#### FORCES BY ROLE

##### SPECIAL FORCES

1 SF bde

##### MANOEUVRE

**Armoured**

1 tk bde

**Mechanised**

11 MR bde

**Air Manoeuvr**

1 air aslt bde

1 AB bde

**Mountain**

1 lt mtn inf bde

##### COMBAT SUPPORT

3 arty bde

1 MRL bde

##### EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

**MBT** 340: 70 T-72; 100 T-64; 170 T-62

**RECCE** 19: 13 BRDM-2; 6 BRM

**AIFV** 399: 120 BMD-1; 9 BMD-2; 270 BMP-2

**APC** 309

**APC (T)** 50 BTR-D

**APC (W)** 259: 24 BTR-60; 25 BTR-70; 210 BTR-80

**ARTY** 487+

**SP** 83+: **122mm** 18 2S1; **152mm** 17+: 17 2S3; 2S5 (reported); **203mm** 48 2S7

**TOWED** 200: **122mm** 60 D-30; **152mm** 140 2A36

**GUN/MOR** **120mm** 54 2S9 *Anona*

**MRL** 108: **122mm** 60: 24 9P138; 36 BM-21; **220mm** 48 9P140 *Uragan*

**MOR** **120mm** 42: 5 2B11; 19 2S12; 18 PM-120

**AT • MSL • MANPATS** 9K11 (*AT-3 Sagger*); 9K111 (*AT-4 Spigot*)

**GUNS** **100mm** 36 MT-12/T-12

---

### Air Force 7,500

#### FORCES BY ROLE

##### FIGHTER

1 regt with MiG-29/MiG-29UB *Fulcrum*; Su-27/Su-27UB *Flanker*

##### FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK

1 regt with Su-24 *Fencer*; Su-24MP *Fencer F\** (ISR)

##### GROUND ATTACK

1 regt with Su-25/Su-25BM *Frogfoot*; Su-17M (Su-17MZ) *Fitter C*/Su-17UM-3 (Su-17UMZ) *Fitter G*

##### ELINT/TRANSPORT

1 regt with An-12/An-12PP *Cub*; An-26/An-26RKR *Curl*

##### TRANSPORT

Some sqn with An-24 *Coke*; Tu-134 *Crusty*

##### TRAINING

Some sqn with L-39 *Albatros*

##### ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER

1 regt with Mi-24 *Hind* (attack); Mi-26 *Halo* (tpt); Mi-8 *Hip* (aslt/tpt);

1 regt with Mi-6 *Hook* (tpt); Mi-6AYa *Hook C* (C2)

#### EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

**AIRCRAFT** 135 combat capable

**FTR** 30 MiG-29/MiG-29UB *Fulcrum*

**FGA** 74: 26 Su-17M (Su-17MZ)/Su-17UM-3 (Su-17UMZ)

*Fitter C/G*; 23 Su-24 *Fencer*; 25 Su-27/Su-27UB *Flanker*

**ATK** 20 Su-25/Su-25BM *Frogfoot*

**EW/Tpt** 26 An-12 *Cub* (med tpt)/An-12PP *Cub* (EW)

**ELINT** 11 Su-24MP *Fencer F\**

**ELINT/Tpt** 13 An-26 *Curl* (lt tpt)/An-26RKR *Curl* (ELINT)

**TPT • Light** 2: 1 An-24 *Coke*; 1 Tu-134 *Crusty*

**TRG** 5 L-39 *Albatros* (9 more in store)

##### HELICOPTERS

**ATK** 29 Mi-24 *Hind*

**C2** 2 Mi-6AYa *Hook C*

**TPT** 79 **Heavy** 27: 26 Mi-6 *Hook*; 1 Mi-26 *Halo*; **Medium**

52 Mi-8 *Hip*

##### AD • SAM 45

**TOWED** S-75 *Dvina* (SA-2 *Guideline*); S-125 *Pechora* (SA-3 *Goa*)

**STATIC** S-200 *Angara* (SA-5 *Gammon*)

##### MSL

**ASM** Kh-23 (AS-7 *Kerry*); Kh-25 (AS-10 *Karen*)

**ARM** Kh-25P (AS-12 *Kegler*); Kh-28 (AS-9 *Kyle*); Kh-58 (AS-11 *Kilter*)

**AAM • IR** R-60 (AA-8 *Aphid*); R-73 (AA-11 *Archer*); **IR/SARH** R-27 (AA-10 *Alamo*)

---

## Paramilitary up to 20,000

### Internal Security Troops up to 19,000

Ministry of Interior

### National Guard 1,000

Ministry of Defence

---

## FOREIGN FORCES

**Germany** 100; some C-160 *Transall*



Table 5 Selected Arms Procurements and Deliveries, Russia and Eurasia

Designation	Type	Quantity (Current)	Contract Value	Prime Nationality	Prime Contractor	Order Date	First Delivery Due	Notes
<b>Armenia (ARM)</b>								
A100	MRL (300mm)	n.k.	n.k.	PRC	China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology	2013	n.k.	–
<b>Azerbaijan (AZE)</b>								
Mi-35M <i>Hind</i>	Atk hel	24	n.k.	RUS	Rosvertol	2010	2011	First four delivered Dec 2011; 12 delivered by Aug 2012
Mi-17-1V <i>Hip</i>	MRH hel	40	n.k.	RUS	Rosvertol	2010	2010	–
<b>Belarus (BLR)</b>								
<i>Tor-M2 (SA-15 Gauntlet)</i>	SAM	12	n.k.	RUS	Almaz-Antey	2011	2011	Second bty delivered Dec 2012; third due in 2013
Yak-130	Trg ac	4	n.k.	RUS	UAC (Irkut)	2012	2015	–
<b>Kazakhstan (KAZ)</b>								
C-295	Tpt ac	2	n.k.	Int'l	EADS (CASA)	2013	2014	Follow on to original 2012 order for two. Part of an eight ac MoU
<b>Russia (RUS)</b>								
<i>Bulava (SS-NX-30)</i>	SLBM	n.k.	n.k.	RUS	MITT	n.k.	2009	In development. For <i>Borey</i> -class SSBN
BTR-82A	APC (W)	n.k.	n.k.	RUS	VPK	n.k.	n.k.	–
<i>Buk-M2 (SA-17 Grizzly)</i>	SAM	n.k.	n.k.	RUS	Almaz-Antey	n.k.	n.k.	One bde set delivered. May be succeeded by <i>Buk-M3</i>
<i>S-400 Triumph (SA-21 Growler)</i>	SAM	18 bn	n.k.	RUS	Almaz-Antey	n.k.	2007	Five regt deployed by late 2013
<i>S-300V4 (SA-23 Gladiator/Giant)</i>	SAM	12	n.k.	RUS	Almaz-Antey	2012	n.k.	Three battalions
<i>Pantsir-S1</i>	AD	n.k.	n.k.	RUS	KBP Instrument Design Bureau	n.k.	2010	Delivery in progress to S-400 regiments
<i>Borey</i> -class	SSBN	3	n.k.	RUS	Sevmash Shipyard	1996	2012	Lead vessel delivered Dec 2012. Second vessel in sea trials; third vessel launched Dec 2012. 16 launch tubes
<i>Borey-A</i> -class	SSBN	5	n.k.	RUS	Sevmash Shipyard	2012	2015	Construction delayed by price dispute. Contract signed in May 2012, although pricing dispute continues and will be reviewed in 2015. 20 launch tubes
<i>Yasen</i> -class	SSN	5	n.k.	RUS	Sevmash Shipyard	1993	2014	Construction of third vessel began Jun 2013. Delayed for financial reasons
<i>Kilo</i> -class	SSK	6	n.k.	RUS	Admiralty Shipyards	2010	2014	First three due for delivery 2014
<i>Lada</i> -class	SSK	3	n.k.	RUS	Admiralty Shipyards	1997	2010	First vessel launched in 2010. Construction on further two boats suspended in 2011 but resumed in 2012/13
<i>Admiral Gorshkov</i> -class	FFGHM	6	US\$400m	RUS	Severnaya Verf Shipyard	2005	2013	First-of-class ISD expected Nov 2013 with Northern Fleet
<i>Steregushchiy</i> -class	FFGHM	6	n.k.	RUS	Severnaya Verf Shipyard/ Komosololsk Shipyard	2001	2008	Third vessel delivered to Baltic Fleet May 2013; fourth vessel launched. Two more in build for Pacific Fleet

Table 5 Selected Arms Procurements and Deliveries, Russia and Eurasia

Designation	Type	Quantity (Current)	Contract Value	Prime Nationality	Prime Contractor	Order Date	First Delivery Due	Notes
Improved <i>Steregushchiy</i> -class	FFGHM	2	n.k.	RUS	Severnaya Verf Shipyard	2011	2015	First-of-class laid down Feb 2012
<i>Admiral Grigorovich</i> -class ( <i>Krivak IV</i> )	FFGHM	6	n.k.	RUS	Yantar Shipyard	2010	2014	Four vessels in build for Black Sea Fleet. Two more ordered. First ISD expected 2014
<i>Buyan-M</i> -class	FSG	6	n.k.	RUS	Zelenodolsk Shipyard	2010	2013	For Caspian Flotilla. To be fitted with <i>Kalibr</i> -NK msl. First and second vessels to commission by end 2013
<i>Vladivostok</i> -class	LHD	2	US\$1.2bn	FRA/RUS	DCNS/STX/USC	2011	2014	Contract signed in 2011 for two vessels. A further two vessels are expected
<i>Ivan Gren</i> -class	LST	1	n.k.	RUS	Yantar Shipyard	2004	2013	Launched May 2012. Delivery currently planned for 2013. Up to four more vessels planned
<i>Seliger</i> -class	AGOR	2	n.k.	RUS	Yantar Shipyard	2009	2012	For Baltic Fleet. First vessel commissioned Jan 2013
<i>Igor Belousov</i> -class	AGOR	2	n.k.	RUS	Admiralty Shipyards	2005	2014	R11.5bn contract signed in Nov 2011 for completion. Launched Oct 2012
<i>Admiral Yuri Ivanov</i> -class	AGI	2	n.k.	RUS	Severnaya Verf Shipyard	n.k.	2013	First intelligence vessel to be constructed since the Soviet era. First vessel now scheduled for delivery in Nov 2013 after slippage
MiG-29K <i>Fulcrum D</i>	Ftr ac	24	n.k.	RUS	UAC (MiG)	2012	2013	20 MiG-29K and four MiG-29KUB. For navy. First ac in flight test late 2013
Su-30SM	FGA ac	30	n.k.	RUS	UAC (Sukhoi)	2012	2012	Six delivered by late 2013. Order to be complete by end-2015
Su-34 <i>Fullback</i>	FGA ac	92	n.k.	RUS	UAC (Sukhoi)	2008	2010	28 delivered by late 2013
Su-35S <i>Flanker</i>	FGA ac	48	See notes	RUS	UAC (Sukhoi)	2009	2012	Part of combined order for 48 Su-35S, 12 Su-27SM3 and four Su-30, worth US\$2.5bn. 12 delivered by late 2013
An-140	Tpt ac	11	n.k.	UKR	Antonov	2011	2012	Ten for air force, four for navy. Four delivered to air force, one to navy
An-148-100	Tpt ac	15	US\$450m	RUS	VASO	2013	2013	First delivery due 2013
Yak-130	Trg ac	55	n.k.	RUS	UAC (Irkut)	2012	2012	To replace current L-39. 30 delivered by late-2013
<b>Turkmenistan (TKM)</b>								
T-90S	MBT	30	n.k.	RUS	UKBTM	2011	n.k.	—
<b>Ukraine (UKR)</b>								
<i>Gaiduck</i> -class	FFGHM	4	UAH16.2bn (US\$2.01bn)	UKR	Chernomorsky Shipbuilding	2011	2015	First keel laid down 2011. All vessels expected to be delivered by 2016