

Chapter Five

Russia

Structural change continues

The Russian military has continued the ambitious reform programme launched in September 2008. The motivations behind Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov's plan for fundamental change, and the aspirations that the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) has for it, were detailed in *The Military Balance 2010* (pp. 211–16). However, so far the results of the process are mixed. Although a major plank of the army's transformation to a brigade-based structure – namely, the dissolution of the established army/corps/division organisational structure – had been officially completed by 1 December 2009, the precise composition of the new brigades remains under development. Indeed, Russian ground forces appear to have embarked on a modernisation process that is being tested and adjusted as it proceeds.

While this may, at first glance, seem to indicate problems in executing the changes, this adaptive process could, paradoxically, be the very means by which the Russian military arrives at improved structures. Structures are now being tested in exercise conditions and, if found wanting, are altered or discarded. What is clear is that, with the adoption of the brigade structure and the end of cadre units, the pre-revolutionary and Soviet system of a military force based on large-scale mobilisation has ended, with the stress now on transitioning to forces capable of being held (at least in theory) at high readiness.

Overall, the process of reform is proving flexible and is developing with impressive speed. However, in some areas it has not run smoothly. Coming after a lengthy period of relative stagnation, the implementation of, and adjustment to, fundamental changes in the nature of the Russian military has left some senior Russian servicemen – including those who support reform – expressing disorientation and bewilderment at the pace of change and at the constant stream of instructions in adjusting its course. Further significant changes should be expected during 2011.

Reforming central headquarters

Defence Minister Serdyukov focused much attention during 2010 on reforming the central headquarters and related staffs. This stemmed from a desire to improve

effectiveness by functionally dividing responsibilities between the MoD and the General Staff of the Armed Forces. The MoD is now considered a civilian institution with the task of implementing overall strategic direction and ensuring managerial competence. The General Staff is intended to focus on planning, command and control, military training and, of course, delivering military effect under the overall direction of the MoD and higher state command. This change in the decision-making structure of the ministry is designed at least in part to enable civilian control over financial matters – particularly regarding the procurement of armaments and associated military equipment – where there has traditionally been a high level of corruption. Previously, the post of first deputy minister of defence was occupied by a general who was responsible for the training of soldiers and their military service; the post is now occupied by a civil servant (currently a retired general) whose main task is to fulfil the State Defence Order and implement the State Armament Programme (see 'Rearmament' section, p. 179).

While sharpening the focus of the bodies in charge of Russia's armed forces, Serdyukov has also concentrated minds by continuing to reshuffle high-ranking military personnel. Since he assumed his post in 2007 almost all deputy ministers of defence, commanders-in-chief of armed services and branches, and commanders of military districts and fleets have been replaced, as was the chief of the main intelligence directorate of the Russian General Staff. Seven of the nine deputy ministers are now civilians, and five of these previously worked with Serdyukov in the Federal Tax Service. The individuals who remain in post, or have been appointed under Serdyukov, share his views and those of Chief of General Staff Army General Nikolay Makarov on the necessity of military reform; they are willing to assist in the far-reaching modernisation process now under way.

Other structural changes in 2010 have included the generation of a new Armed Forces Logistics and Procurement Command (*Material'no-tekhnicheskoye obespecheniye vooruzhennykh sil*, MTO). This body unifies the armed forces' logistics services and is intended to control operations and maintenance

tasks. While the development of similar joint logistic commands has been enacted and tested by foreign militaries, and this has informed Russian thinking, it remains to be seen how effective the command will be.

Reforming military administration

The general headquarters (*Glavkomat*) of the army, air force and navy have so far been left unchanged in the new armed-forces structure, although there are continuing reductions in the number of managerial levels within the headquarters. Similar reductions are also being made in service commands, military district and fleet headquarters, as well as in general and central directorates of the defence ministry. The exact number affected remains unclear, although it has been reported that personnel serving in central directorates and headquarters will ultimately be reduced from around 10,500 to 3,000. It was also planned that the number of staff officers up to and including the rank of general in the various service commands would fall from 300 to 100 during 2010; at the time of writing this lower figure had not been reached.

In line with staff reductions, the functions of the service headquarters have been cut back, with some tasks being transferred to other command structures. According to one source, the headquarters now have only four tasks, all specific to the respective service: organisational development; training; education; and equipment repair.

Overall, Chief of General Staff (CGS) Makarov has said that 700 of a total 1,200 generals' positions have already been cut. Some analysts have criticised these reductions in the higher ranks, saying that command and control may have been affected. Meanwhile, the pension and resettlement costs associated with the continuing retirement of large numbers of senior officers will have a substantial financial impact.

New command structures

On 6 July 2010 President Dmitry Medvedev issued a decree entitled 'Strategic Military Territorial Formations of the Russian Federation', establishing four joint strategic commands. July also saw the MoD begin the establishment of four military districts (in place of the previous six), a move that was formalised on 20 September when Medvedev signed a decree entitled 'On the Military Administrative Division of the Russian Federation'. These moves are part of a bid to streamline command and control within the

Russian armed forces; Makarov has said that enacting these formations will reduce the number of echelons of command from 11 to three. However, according to the draft of a further 'Statute on the Military District of the Russian Armed Forces', the military district will remain the main organisational division in peacetime, and the joint strategic-command function will only come into effect 'during special periods', i.e., during military exercises or in time of war. The activation of the joint strategic command would therefore serve as a significant indicator of imminent major activity by the Russian armed forces.

These joint strategic commands, based geographically on the new military districts, would also be led by the military district commanders, who are to combine both command responsibilities. All military units stationed on the territory of a joint strategic command, including navy, air-force and air-defence units – excepting strategic missile forces and space forces – are under the direct control of this commander. This individual also has operational command over Interior Ministry and Emergency Ministry units, border guards and other military formations. Airborne troops, meanwhile, remain a separate arm of service, while Long-Range Aviation (previously the 37th Air Army) and Military Transport Aviation (previously the 61st Air Army) continue to report to the commander-in-chief of the Russian Air Force.

The four new joint strategic commands are:

- Joint Strategic Command West, headquartered in St Petersburg, which combines units located in the old Moscow and Leningrad Military Districts, as well as the Baltic and Northern Fleets, and forces in Kaliningrad Oblast;
- Joint Strategic Command South, headquartered in Rostov-on-Don, which is based on units in the North Caucasus Military District, together with the Black Sea Fleet, the Caspian Flotilla, Military Base 102 in Gyumri (Armenia) and the Russian military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia;
- Joint Strategic Command Centre, with headquarters in Yekaterinburg, which combines the Volga-Urals Military District with the western part of the Siberian Military District as well as Military Base 4 on the outskirts of Dushanbe, Tajikistan, and the air-force base in Kant, Kyrgyzstan; and
- Joint Strategic Command East, headquartered in Khabarovsk, which combines the



Map 3 **Russian Military Commands**

eastern part of the Siberian Military District with the Far Eastern Military District, and also includes the Pacific Fleet and forces in the Kamchatka Special Territorial Region.

CGS Makarov has said that these organisational changes have streamlined the command and control of the armed forces by eradicating duplication. However, no precise definition has yet been released of the four commanders' role in the context of operations (as commander of a joint strategic command) and administration (as commander of a military district). Moscow has said it plans to minimise the administrative responsibilities of each district by handing more of these to the central directorates of the MoD. Meanwhile, more authority on operational matters should be delegated to the military district/joint strategic command. But if the commander of a military district and of a joint strategic command are still the same individual, who remains responsible for both administrative and operational decision-making, this calls into question some of the aims of streamlining command and control by separating out administrative functions. The effectiveness of the reorganisation has yet to be tested under operational conditions.

Other developments have included the formation of three new combined-arms armies (at Chita, Stavropol and St Petersburg) that are intended to be integrated into a new three-level command-and-control system (joint strategic command/army/brigade) instead of the previous four levels (military district/army/division/regiment).

The brigade system in action

By the end of 2009 the long-established means of organising Russian ground forces by divisions and regiments had officially ended. Russia's adoption of the brigade structure saw 23 division formations disbanded, with the exception of the 18th Machine Gun Artillery Division stationed on the South Kuril Islands disputed with Japan. According to official guidelines, these new Russian army units are 95% manned, have complete stocks of military equipment and are considered as permanent-readiness units.

In total, 40 combined-arms permanent-readiness brigades were formed, comprising four tank brigades, 35 motor rifle brigades and one logistics brigade. Forty-five other brigades relate to other service branches, including missile, artillery, multiple-launch rocket system (MLRS), engineer, signals and radio-

electronic warfare. A tank brigade consists of three tank battalions (31 tanks in each battalion) and one motor rifle battalion. A motor rifle brigade consists of three motor rifle battalions, and one tank battalion with 41 tanks. This is augmented by an auxiliary MLRS battalion, as well as two regimental artillery battalions, an auxiliary air-defence missile battalion and an air-defence artillery battalion. In reality, these new brigades broadly conform to structures seen in the former regiments of the Russian and Soviet armed forces, albeit reinforced by artillery, air-defence and logistics units. (An artillery brigade consists of three batteries, one of which is an anti-tank battery.) The storage and maintenance bases for weapons and military equipment (*Bazy khraneniya voyennoy tekhniki*) have been designated main reserve units; at present around 60 of these are planned.

Test and adjust

Unofficial assessments from the MoD have indicated that up to 60% of these new brigades are not combat-ready. Key reasons for this include a lack of modern military hardware and a dearth of up-to-date communications and combat-support systems, coupled with commanders' inability to exercise effective command and control using modern C4I (command, control, communications, computers and intelligence) systems. In a bid to address the latter problem, President Medvedev has directed that the army transforms its communications systems from analogue to

digital by 2012. Although this could be technically achieved by the domestic defence industry, it is unclear if sufficient funding is available.

In addition, readiness is compromised by the continuing reorganisation of units and personnel, including the after-effects of reducing the term of conscription from two years to one. During the *Vostok 2010* exercise, for example, some units were 80% staffed with conscripts who had served less than two months.

The new brigades have been tested in a series of major exercises, of which *Vostok* was the largest. Following a post-exercise review, the MoD reassessed the developing brigade structures, and the General Staff has since put forward designs for three types of combined-arms brigades: heavy (formed mainly of tank units); medium/multi-purpose (equipped with armoured personnel carriers); and light air-assault and mountain brigades (equipped with wheeled, armoured vehicles). The heavy-brigade concept is being tested by the 21st Separate Motor Rifle Brigade located in the Orenburg Oblast; the medium-brigade concept by the 23rd Separate Motor Rifle Brigade located in Samara Oblast; and the light-brigade concept by the 56th Separate Air Assault Brigade in Volgograd Oblast.

Airborne troops remain organised according to a divisional structure. Within the order of battle there are two airborne divisions (the 98th and 106th), two air-assault divisions (the 7th and 76th), two indepen-

Developing the T-50

Russia's T-50 fifth-generation fighter prototype aircraft was flown for the first time in January 2010 in Russia's Far East. Designed from the outset to meet low-observable requirements, the aircraft is intended to provide the air force with a stealthy multi-role platform.

Developed by Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi to meet the air force's PAK FA (*Perspektivny Aviatzionny Kompleks Frontovoy Aviatzii* or Future Tactical Aviation Aircraft System) requirement, the type is planned to enter service around 2016. As of the end of November 2010 only one prototype – the T-50-01 – was involved in the flight-test programme. It was anticipated that a second airframe would be ready to join the programme by around the turn of the year. A pre-production batch of up to ten aircraft could be ordered in 2012. The T-50 design was selected by the air force in 2002 as the basis for its future heavy fighter, in preference to a proposal from MiG.

The PAK FA project superseded the air force's MFI (*Mnogofunktsionalny Frontovoi Istrebitel* or Multi-Frontal

Fighter) programme, an effort dating back to the 1980s to produce a successor to the Su-27 *Flanker*. Repeatedly delayed and hampered by a lack of funding, the MFI – which was being developed by MiG – was eventually abandoned in the late 1990s.

The PAK FA programme is of fundamental importance to the air force and to the Russian defence aerospace sector. It will provide the air force with a high-end replacement for the Su-27, at the same time as producing a successor to the *Flanker* for the export market. In October 2010 India indicated that it would become involved in the programme to meet what it terms its Fifth-Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) programme.

The T-50 prototype has a chined forward fuselage, with planform edge alignment that now typifies low-observable designs. The twin-engine aircraft's air-intake geometry is such that it helps to reduce the radar visibility of the engine compressor blades. There are two main internal weapon bays in the tunnel between the engines, as well as what appear to be two smaller single-missile bays.

Other air-force developments

- Four new Yak-130 jet trainer/light attack aircraft arrived after January 2010, although these were grounded after an accident in May;
- Four Su-34 strike aircraft delivered in December 2010;
- One Su-30M2 arrived from a 64-aircraft contract agreed in 2006 (48 Su-35, 12 Su-27 and 4 Su-30M2); and
- The Russian air force received five light *Ansat* multi-purpose helicopters and will receive three more by the end of 2010. The delivery of five new Mi-8 AMTSh helicopters will bring the total number of this variant to 20. Around five Mi-28 (anti-armour) attack helicopters have been fielded, with this fleet rising to between eight and ten within a year.

dent air-assault brigades, two independent airborne regiments, a training centre and support units. The airborne command's proposal to reinforce airborne forces has been adopted, increasing the number of airborne regiments from two to three and creating an air-defence missile regiment in each airborne division. Plans also exist to attach a helicopter regiment (a full complement would be 60 helicopters) to an air-assault brigade through a bulk purchase of helicopters. While this may aid tactical mobility, mobility in general is a serious challenge for the airborne troops. With today's assets, Russia's air force can only transport one airborne regiment (plus equipment) over distance. And although military airlift is another priority for the military-reform project, the airlift fleet is decreasing.

Air force and strategic rocket forces

The Russian air force is also overhauling its basing structure, with the aim of reducing its overall number of airfields, in part by co-locating units at a far smaller number of 'combined air bases' that will support a number of satellite airfields. The air force has replaced its air-regiment structure with that of air bases, with air groups the equivalent of the former regiments. Voronezh, Chelyabinsk and Domna will be locations for early 'enlarged' bases. Air bases consist of a headquarters, between one and seven squadrons, an airfield-maintenance battalion and a communications unit. As of late 2009, these air bases were divided into three categories: the first is equivalent to the former air divisions, the second to a former air regiment, and the third category to an independent squadron.

Fifty-two air bases had been formed by the end of 2009, replacing 72 air regiments, 14 former air bases, 12 independent air squadrons and an unspecified number of air-force and air-defence units. (The total number of air-force units, meanwhile, fell to 180 from 340.) But further reductions are planned. The number of airfields in use is also to be reduced; there are currently 245 of these, each costing an average of one billion roubles (US\$33.05 million) per year. It is envisaged that in future each air base will control two or three airfields, implying that more than half of those currently in use will close.

A further reform proposal is the creation of an aviation taskforce that would consist of bomber, close support, reconnaissance and fighter aircraft. Fielding the latest fifth-generation fighter technology would, of course, assist the effective generation of such capability, and Russia's contender for a fifth-generation multi-role fighter met with generally favourable comments after its maiden flight in January 2010. The Sukhoi T-50 stealth fighter is a key project (see box). The initial flight-test programme should end in 2013, while introduction into service is slated for 2015–16. However, testing has thus far been limited to the new air frame, while next-generation propulsion and some avionics have yet to be selected. Even when these have been decided, developing and producing the aircraft will be challenging. A shortage of technical specialists and of factories with serial-production techniques will hinder the fielding of the T-50.

The structure of the strategic rocket forces (SRF) has remained unchanged. Three rocket armies, consisting of 11 divisions, are the core of the SRF. However, it is planned that one of the armies (the 31st) will be disbanded by 2016 and the number of divisions will fall to nine. Instead of quantity, the SRF is focusing on increasing the quality of its missile systems. As the old R-36M2 and UR-100 UTTH multi-stage missiles are decommissioned, the light single-warhead *Topol-M* and RS-24 *Yars* missiles equipped with multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV) will comprise 80% of the SRF inventory. Further, it is reported that development work is proceeding on a new heavy MIRV-equipped intercontinental ballistic missile; this development work was confirmed in December 2009 by General Andrey Shvaychenko, then commander-in-chief of the SRF, who promised to put the missile into service by 2016. This new missile is reported to be liquid-fuelled, which would indicate that it is intended to

be silo-based; liquid-fuelled propulsion would allow a greater throw-weight compared to solid-fuelled missiles.

Military doctrine

President Medvedev approved a new military doctrine of the Russian Federation in February 2010, superseding the 2000 version which had been approved by Vladimir Putin. The new doctrine contains a carefully nuanced treatment of NATO. The Alliance is not referred to as a threat, but specific NATO activities are noted as military dangers that could under certain circumstances lead to an immediate threat – in particular, the development of military infrastructure closer to the borders of Russia, and use of force globally ‘in violation of international law’. Other problem areas for Russia are the militarisation of outer space, the deployment of advanced conventional precision-guided weapons, and the deployment of ballistic-missile defence systems. (However, at NATO’s November 2010 Lisbon Summit, NATO and Russia agreed on a joint ballistic-missile threat assessment, decided to resume theatre missile-defence cooperation and began, according to NATO, ‘a joint analysis of the future framework for broader missile-defence cooperation’.)

Belarus, which did not appear in the older doctrine, is mentioned as a main ally, and political–military cooperation with Minsk is declared a top priority. Other allies mentioned include the remaining member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) – Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Indeed, the mutual-defence provision of the Collective Security Treaty is reproduced in full in the new doctrine. This reinforces the obligations, spelled out elsewhere in the doctrine, for Russia to act militarily in support of its allies or its citizens abroad. Provisions for the use of Russian troops abroad reflect amendments to Russian legislation and a simplified procedure for presidential authorisation of operations outside Russia.

The doctrine was widely expected to contain a significant new provision for preventive or pre-emptive nuclear first strike. In fact, the section on nuclear weapons instead subtly raises the threshold for their use: Russia may now launch a nuclear strike only in response to weapons of mass destruction or otherwise ‘when the very existence of the state is under threat’. The precise formulation of Russia’s nuclear threshold is contained in a classified addendum to the doctrine.

Recruitment and manning

The MoD has halted, and indeed reversed, any growth in the number of contract personnel. From an official figure of 150,000 contract servicemen in late 2010, the number is expected to fall to 80,000 by 2015. This reflects continuing difficulties in managing and retaining professional servicemen, as well as a realisation of their true financial cost and, in part, the failure to launch the long-promised professional training for NCOs in any meaningful capacity. New professional training for career NCOs, intended to last up to two-and-a-half years, has proved difficult to implement while the concepts for employment of NCOs and the selection procedures for the training courses are still being developed. Meanwhile, most NCOs will continue to be one-year conscripts selected to complete a short ‘sergeant’s course’, who will subsequently be expected to maintain order among the same draft with which they were recruited. While a corps of professional NCOs remains an aspiration, there is little evidence that Russia has fully grasped the depth of organisational and social change that this implies.

The bulk of servicemen, therefore, will continue to be conscripts. This promises further difficulties in future, especially as Russia’s demographic situation leads to continuing sharp falls in the number of 18-year-olds available for conscription. In October 2010 Russia carried out a national census that it is widely hoped will, after decades of decline, show a slight upturn in the overall population – reflecting improvements in health care and recent social policies intended to encourage young families to have children. But this is of limited comfort to those planning military manpower in the short term. The 2011 conscription rounds will be drafting young men born in 1993, during the period of demographic collapse (1987–99) when the number of live male births in Russia fell by more than 50%. Thus, the pool of available manpower will continue to shrink drastically well into the 2020s, complicating aspirations to improve the average health and behaviour of conscripts through more stringent selection criteria.

Meanwhile, cuts in the number of mid-ranking officers continue, with a planned reduction to 150,000 by 2015. Although in some cases these are vacant posts that are being eliminated, the redundancy programme still affects tens of thousands of officers.

Military service and education

A key part of Defence Minister Serdyukov’s plans to improve the image of the armed forces revolves

Global Navigation Satellite System

Russia's Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) has received a surge in investment to address deficiencies, but the fruits of this extra funding have yet to be seen after a recent launch failure. The system's inadequacies had long been the subject of complaint, but were thrown into sharp focus during the Russia–Georgia conflict of August 2008. Lack of satellite navigation and guidance was identified as a specific problem for Russian forces during the conflict, with very low penetration of receiver and navigation equipment exacerbated by the lack of capacity and incomplete coverage of the GLONASS satellite system itself, particularly when compared to GPS systems used by Georgia.

A key problem was the insufficient number of satellites in orbit to ensure fully functioning coverage. In the wake of the conflict, there was a sudden burst of launch activity, with 15 of the 26 GLONASS satellites in orbit in early 2011 having been launched after the Georgia war. However, only 21 were working and three additional satellites, intended to bring the number of operational satellites to the 24 needed to fully deploy GLONASS, crashed into

the sea during launch in December 2010. Experts estimate this has set Russia's plans for GLONASS back by six months.

Meanwhile, ground systems using GLONASS data are also rapidly being brought into testing. After suffering relative neglect, GLONASS is now seen as key to the introduction of advanced C2 systems, including the *Sozvezdiye* automated system, and the laptop-based Integrated Tactical-Echelon Command and Control System (YeSU TZ), currently being tested by Western Military District's 5th Motor-Rifle Brigade. But in the short term it appears unlikely that GLONASS usage will permeate the military to the extent that GPS systems have outside Russia, because of the relatively primitive nature, bulk and high power consumption of the receivers and navigation units built around it.

For the same reason, take-up of GLONASS services remains slow outside the military; commercial use is hampered by a lack of receivers suitable for car or handheld use; the smallest GLONASS receiver unit publicly available in Russia is a circuit board measuring 5×7cm and costing US\$250.

around changes to the conditions of service for conscripts. However, administrative upheaval and the wholesale removal of units, headquarters and staff to other parts of the country have themselves had an impact on troops' quality of life.

One proposal is to fit all physical, combat and weapons training into a five-day week, with weekends treated as days off when conscripts can wear civilian clothes and leave base – a significant innovation in the Russian context. Serdyukov is also keen to outsource basic base administrative tasks, such as catering and cleaning, to commercial organisations. At present, external contractors provide catering services to 200 units, catering to more than 180,000 personnel, at a cost of R6.5bn (US\$214.87m) per year. As well as catering, these companies are responsible for supporting laundry and bathing facilities, some military transportation activities, providing fuel services (including for aircraft) and logistical support for the navy.

The MoD views these developments positively and hopes to increase their application in the future. The *Vostok-2010* exercise saw the first trial of civilian contractor services in the field in simulated combat conditions.

There are also proposals to improve servicemen's quality of life by reforming the system of pay and

allowances, the complexity of which provides broad scope for abuse. At the time of writing, it was unclear what form this overhaul would take, but continuing substantial pay rises have been proposed. Meanwhile, a scheme introduced in 2009 by Serdyukov to financially reward officers who meet specific criteria continues to prove corrosive and divisive.

In 2010, enrolment of officer cadets in military higher-education institutions was suspended for two years. In one sense a radical step to address an oversupply of junior officer graduates, this is also an attempt to 'reset' military education, creating space to overhaul curricula and reorganise the whole system. The number of educational establishments is to be reduced sharply: around 70 military higher-education institutions will be reduced and reorganised into just ten by 2013, the majority of them 'military–scientific centres' specific to individual arms of service.

Rearmament

Efforts to rationalise the system by which the Russian armed forces acquire arms and equipment appeared to be progressing. In July 2010 a deputy minister of defence for material and technical provision (*Material'no-tekhnicheskoye obespecheniye vooruzhen-nykh sil*, MTO) was appointed, heading a single new agency created to address what CGS Makarov called




Figure 5 **Estimated Russian Defence Expenditure** as % of GDP

problems and failures of coordination in procurement resulting from there being one deputy minister for logistics and one for armaments. This move marked the end of the short-lived *Rosoboronpostavka*, the federal agency for the supply of weapons, military, special technology and material means, which was established by former Defence Minister Sergey Ivanov in 2007, and was intended to finance and order equipment required by the armed forces.

Ambitious spending plans continued to be put forward. First Deputy Minister of Defence Vladimir Popovkin announced in mid-2010 that funding for the State Armaments Programme for 2011–20 would be increased by 50%. As well as strategic nuclear forces, the funds would be spent on precision weaponry, automated command systems and a wide range of transport aircraft to enable rapid movements of units across Russia.

A stated aim to move away from the long-standing practice of modernising and upgrading old models, and a long-overdue reduction in the number of types in inventory, is supposed to release additional funds for the purchase of completely new equipment. But the rolling State Armaments Programme and its cousin, the State Defence Order, have rarely had successful outcomes; the armaments programme is not even binding, unlike the State Defence Order, which includes fiscal commitments. The State Armaments Programme 1996–2005 failed after a year: by 2000 the rate of ‘modern’ arms and equipment induction had decreased by up to 20%. The next programme, the State Armaments Programme 2001–10, focused on strategic nuclear forces and also turned out to be untenable. This latest State Armaments Programme for 2011–20, adopted in 2006, is the fourth since the end of the Soviet Union.

Priorities for the development of the armed forces have been established to:

- maintain strategic deterrent forces;
- purchase high-precision weapons, with targeting informed by space-based assets;
- provide the armed forces with C4I systems (all branch and service command C4I should be integrated in two to three years);
- restore the military airlift inventory; and
- recapitalise naval forces. This is a long-term programme requiring significant financial support. It is intended that the Black Sea Fleet, for instance, should acquire ten new surface ships (Project 22350 frigates) and five diesel submarines (*Lada*-class, Project 677) by 2020.

According to official statements, 1,500 new aircraft and helicopters (including T-50 stealth fighters, see box p. 176) and 200 anti-aircraft systems are to be procured under this programme. It is hoped that the production line for An-124 strategic air-lifters will be restarted, while purchases of Il-112, Il-476, Il-76M and An-70 aircraft are also desired. The plan is for the Russian Air Force to receive around 400 new and upgraded combat- and assault-transport helicopters, including the Mi-28, Ka-52 and Mi-8. Long-term contracts have been signed for 60 Su-34 and Su-35C fixed-wing aircraft. Deliveries have recently started, though progress is slow and only several fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft have been fielded. Further plans include the purchase of five battalions’ worth of S-400 air-defence systems, although only two battalions have been delivered so far. Meanwhile, it is believed that ten *Pantsyr-C* combined short- to medium-range surface-to-air missile and anti-aircraft artillery systems have been inducted into air-force service.

Table 13 **Draft Russian National Defence Expenditure (Rm)**

A: Chapter 2 'National Defence'	2009	2010	2011
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation	894.6	952.2	1,115.3
Mobilisation of external forces	3.6	4.6	6.7
Mobilisation of the economy	4.6	4.9	4.9
Collective peacekeeping	0.6	7.7	0.45
Military nuclear programmes	19.1	18.8	27
International treaty obligations	4.8	4.05	4.8
Applied R&D	162.9	151.4	167
Other	121.7	133.15	194.6
Sub-total: Chapter 2 'National Defence'	1,211.9	1,276.8	1,520.8
B: Additional military-related expenditure	2009	2010	2011
Internal troops	58.2	66.9	71.9
Security organs of the state	178.9	196.5	233.4
Border troops	79.9	77.2	78.9
Subsidies to closed towns	n.a.	n.a.	n.a
Ministry of emergencies	57.2	125.1	72.6
Military pensions	223.2	240.8	237.24
Sub-total: Additional military-related expenditure	597.4	706.5	694
Total Defence-related Expenditure (A+B)	1,809.30	1,983.30	2,214.80
as % of GDP	4.63	4.41	4.34
as % of total outlays	18.2	19.2	-

The State Armaments Programme for 2011–20 runs to R19 trillion (US\$628.09bn) for the MoD, with R3.5tr (US\$115.7bn) to be spent in equipping other law-enforcement units. The programme is intended to provide for renewal of up to 9–11% of military hardware and weapon systems annually, which will enable the 70% increase in 'modern' arms and military equipment that Serdyukov has been advocating by 2020.

However, the amount of money allocated to arms procurement is invariably less than the amount planned in the State Armaments Programme. This situation is particularly affected by the forecast deflators included by the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade in each fiscal year; as a rule, these deflators are not proved accurate by the real rate of inflation.

The 2010 State Defence Order amounted to R1.15tr (US\$38.01bn), according to Prime Minister Putin, with R375bn (US\$12.39bn) spent on new military hardware. In the draft of the federal budget for 2011, and its planning for 2012–13, expenses on national defence

are predicted to steadily increase from R1.52tr in 2011 to R1.66tr in 2012 and R2.1tr in 2013.

Until 2005 information on the funds allocated in the defence budget to purchase, maintain and repair – as well as to develop – new military equipment was included in a separate appendix to the federal budget. But in the following years, there was a hiatus in the publication of defence-budget data, during which it became the source of informed speculation among defence officials and military officers. The Defence Committee of the State Duma has now released figures for 2010–13. This development may point to a greater openness in defence financing; on the other hand, the reliability of the figures given is unclear, and the subject remains something of a grey area.

Expenses on the purchase, maintenance and repair of armaments (less R&D) are R380bn (US\$12.56bn) in 2010, R460bn in 2011, R596bn in 2012, and R980bn in 2013. The percentage allocated to R&D is to fall from 22% in 2010 to 16% in 2013, and this has already led the MoD to cancel several procurement programmes that had not yielded effective capabilities. Meanwhile, the total spend on weapons is planned to be R487bn (US\$16.09bn) in 2010, R574bn in 2011, R726bn in 2012 and R1.165tr in 2013.

Notwithstanding these plans, the capacity of the Russian defence industry to satisfy the increasing State Defence Order has been questioned, particularly in light of the financial crisis. Production capacities are ageing, as is the defence-industrial workforce, and defence businesses now compete for personnel on the open employment market. Moreover, high-tech production lines have only been developed in a very few cases. Indeed, some analysts say that the military-industrial complex has only survived because of work to maintain and modernise Soviet-era equipment.

Problems in serially manufacturing high-tech defence equipment are a key concern. Although design bureaus are often able to create modern platforms, turning the design into a production model can prove problematic. The government is attempting to create a culture of innovation through the decision to establish an Advanced and Venture Developments Funding Organisation; the hope is that this will be analogous to the US Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency.

Meanwhile, the inability of the domestic defence industry to fulfil military equipment plans has led the MoD to purchase foreign equipment, including

Israeli unmanned aerial vehicles. Negotiations with France about the purchase and/or licensed production of *Mistral*-class helicopter carriers reached a conclusion on 24 December with an agreement between the French and Russian governments that two of the vessels will be constructed in France, with a further two to be built in Russia. No value was assigned to the deal at time of writing, while the issue of technology transfer (relating to the systems onboard the vessels) also remained unclear. In early 2011, the KAMAZ factory in Tatarstan was due to start production of the Italian *Iveco* LMV M65. A minimum of 500 are due to be produced.

Estimating Russian military expenditure

Estimating the real scale of Russian military spending is fraught with difficulty, not least because of recent changes in the presentation of budget data. Taken at face value, the official national-defence allocation for 2009, R1,211bn (US\$38.3bn), corresponded to 3.1% of GDP; however, as indicated in Table 13, this figure excludes funds made available for other military-related expenditures, such as pensions and paramilitary forces, not to mention the rising level of subsidies provided to the defence-industrial sector for which figures are unavailable. Including these additional budget allocations brings overall defence-

related expenditure for 2009 to around R1,809bn, or 4.63% of that year's GDP.

Using the prevailing market exchange rate for 2009, Russia's stated defence expenditure was worth US\$38.3bn, or US\$57.2bn with the additional expenditures factored in. However, when assessing macroeconomic data from countries in transition, the market exchange rate does not usually reflect the actual purchasing power of the domestic currency. Economists therefore use an alternative methodology to make currency conversions, known as Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). For example, in 2009 Russia's GDP measured US\$1,236bn when converted at market exchange rates; however, the International Monetary Fund has also calculated that, in PPP terms, Russia's 2009 GDP was equivalent to US\$2,116bn. If this crude methodology is applied to military spending, then total defence-related expenditure in 2009 would jump to the equivalent of US\$97.9bn.

Note: Although PPP rates can be a useful tool for comparing macroeconomic data, such as GDP, of countries at different stages of development, because there is no specific PPP rate to apply to the military sector, its use in this context should be treated with caution. In addition, there is no definitive guide as to which elements of military spending should be calculated using available PPP rates.

Russia RUS

Russian Rouble r		2009	2010	2011
GDP	r	39.1tr	45.0tr	
	US\$	1.24tr	1.49tr	
	US\$ a	2.12tr	2.11tr	
<i>per capita</i>	US\$	8,777	10,602	
Growth	%	-7.9	5.5	
Inflation	%	11.7	6.5	
Def exp	US\$	57.2bn		
	US\$ ^a	97.9bn		
Def bdgt	r	1.21tr	1.27tr	1.52tr
	US\$	38.3bn	41.4bn	
	US\$ ^a	65.5bn	61.8bn	
US\$1=r	MER	31.62	30.25	
	PPP	18.48	20.29	

^a PPP estimate

Population 140,366,561

Ethnic groups: Tatar 4%; Ukrainian 3%; Chuvash 1%; Bashkir 1%; Belarussian 1%; Moldovan 1%; Other 8%;

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	7.8%	2.7%	4.1%	4.2%	23.1%	3.9%
Female	7.4%	2.6%	4.0%	4.2%	26.7%	9.1%

Capabilities

ACTIVE 1,046,000 (Army 360,000 Airborne 35,000 Navy 161,000 Air 160,000 Strategic Deterrent Forces 80,000 Command and Support 250,000) Paramilitary 449,000

(Estimated 170,000 in the permanent readiness units)

Terms of service: 12 months conscription.

RESERVE 20,000,000 (all arms)

Some 2,000,000 with service within last 5 years; Reserve obligation to age 50.

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Strategic Deterrent Forces €80,000 (incl personnel assigned from the Navy and Air Force)

Navy

SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC • SSBN 14

5 (1+) *Kalmar* (Delta III) each with 16 RSM-50 (SS-N-18 *Stingray*) strategic SLBM;

5 *Delfin* (Delta IV) each with 16 RSM-54 (SS-N-23 *Skiff*) strategic SLBM;

1 *Delfin* (Delta IV) in refit with 16 RSM-52 (SS-N-23 *Skiff*) strategic SLBM;

2 *Akula* (*Typhoon*) in reserve awaiting refit each with 20 RSM-52 (SS-N-20 *Sturgeon*) strategic SLBM;

1 *Akula* (*Typhoon*)† in reserve with capacity for 20 RSM-52 (SS-N-20) *Sturgeon* strategic SLBM/*Bulava* (SS-N-X-32) strategic SLBM (trials/testing);

(1 *Borey* limited OC undergoing sea trials; 2 additional units in build)

Strategic Rocket Force Troops

3 Rocket Armies operating silo and mobile launchers with 430 missiles and 1,605 nuclear warheads organised in 12 divs (reducing to 8). Launcher gps normally with 10 silos (6 for SS-18) and one control centre

MSL • STRATEGIC 376

ICBM 376: 60 RS-20 (SS-18 *Satan*) (mostly mod 4/5, 10 MIRV per msl); 170 RS12M (SS-25 *Sickle*) (mobile single warhead); 70 RS18 (SS-19 *Stiletto*) (mostly mod 3, 6 MIRV per msl.); 52 *Topol-M* (SS-27) silo-based/18 *Topol M* (SS-27) road mobile single warhead (5 regts); 6 RS-24 (MIRV)

Long-Range Aviation Command

FORCES BY ROLE

Bbr 1 sqn with Tu-160 *Blackjack*; 3 sqn with Tu-95MS *Bear*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT •

LRSA 79: 16 Tu-160 *Blackjack* each with up to 12 KH-55SM(AS-15B *Kent*) nuclear ALCM; 32 Tu-95MS6 (*Bear H-6*) each with up to 6 Kh-55 (AS-15A *Kent*) nuclear ALCM; 31 Tu-95MS16 (*Bear H-16*) each with up to 16 Kh-55 (AS-15A *Kent*) nuclear ALCM

Warning Forces 3rd Space and Missile Defence Army

ICBM/SLBM launch-detection capability. 3 operational satellites

RADAR (9 stations) 1 ABM engagement system located at Sofrino (Moscow). Russia leases ground-based radar stations in Baranovichi (Belarus); Balkhash (Kazakhstan); Gaballa (Azerbaijan). It also has radars on its own territory at Lekhtusi, (St. Petersburg); Armavir, (southern Russia); Olenegorsk (northwest Arctic); Pechora (northwest Urals); Mishchelevka (east Siberia).

MISSILE DEFENCE 2,064: 32 SH-11 *Gorgon*; 68 SH-08 *Gazelle*; 1,900 S-300 (SA-10 *Grumble*); 64 S-400 (SA-21 *Growler*)

Space Forces 40,000

Formations and units withdrawn from Strategic Missile and Air Defence Forces to detect missile attack on the RF and its allies, to implement BMD, and to be responsible for military/dual-use spacecraft launch and control.

Army €205,000 (incl 35,000 AB); €190,000 conscript (total 395,000)

Transformation process continues; previous 6 Military Districts have been consolidated into 4 (West (HQ St Petersburg), Centre (HQ Yekaterinburg), South (HQ Rostov-on-Don) & East (HQ Khabarovsk), each with a unified Joint Strategic Command. Current plans call for the establishment of 28 new bdes (6 MR; 2 air aslt; 1 engr; 1 AD & 18 army avn), and for the restructuring of the existing MR brigades into new light, medium and heavy formations.

FORCES BY ROLE

Comd	10 army HQ (3 established 2010)
Tk	4 bde (each: 3 tk bn; 1 armd recce bn; 1 MR bn; 1 arty bn; 1 MRL bn; 2 AD bn; 1 engr bn; 1 EW coy; 1 NBC coy)
Recce	1 bde
MR	1 div (201st); 31 bde (each: 1 tk bn; 1 recce bn; 3 MR bn; 2 arty bn; 1 MRL bn; 1 AT bn; 2 AD bn; 1 engr bn; 1 EW coy; 1 NBC coy); 2 bde (each: 4-5 MR bn; 1 arty bn; 1 AD bn; 1 engr bn); 3 (lt/mtn) bde (each: 1 recce bn; 2 MR bn; 1 arty bn)
SF	7 (Spetsnaz) bde; 1 (AB Recce) regt
Air Aslt	3 bde
AB	4 (VdV) div (each: 2 para/air aslt regt; 1 arty regt; 1 AD regt); 1 (VdV) indep bde
Arty	8 bde
AD	10 bde
MRL	4 bde; 2 regt
SSM	1 bde with <i>Iskander-M/Tochka</i> (SS-21 <i>Scarab</i>); 8 bde each with <i>Tochka</i> (SS-21 <i>Scarab</i>) (to be replaced by <i>Iskander-M</i>)
MGA	1 div (18th) with (2 MGA regt; 1 arty regt; 1 tk bn; 2 AD bn)
Engr	1 bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT 2,800+: 1,500 T-72B/BA; 1,000 T-80BV/U; 300+ T-90/T-90A; (18,000 in store: 2,800 T-55; 2,500 T-62; 2,000 T-64A/T-64B; 7,500 T-72/T-72A/T-72B; 3,000 T-80B/T-80BV/T-80U; 200 T-90)

RECCE 1,200: 100+ *Dozor*, 100+ *Tigr*, 1,000 BRDM-2/2A; (1,000+ BRDM-2 in store)

AIFV 7,360+: 700 BMD-1; 600 BMD-2; 100 BMD-3; 60+ BMD-4; 1,000 BMP-1; 3,500 BMP-2; 500+ BMP-3; 700 BRM-1K; 200+ BTR-80A; (8,500 in store: 7,000 BMP-1; 1,500 BMP-2)

APC 9,700+
APC (T) 5,700: 700 BTR-D; 5,000 MT-LB; (2,000 MT-LB in store)
APC (W) 4,000+ BTR-60/70/80; (4,000 BTR-60/70 in store)

ARTY 5,436+
SP 1,820: **122mm** 400 2S1; **152mm** 1,400: 800 2S3; 150 2S5; 450 2S19; **203mm** 20 2S7; (4,050 in store: **122mm** 1,800 2S1; **152mm** 1,950: 1,000 2S3; 800 2S5; 150 2S19; **203mm** 300 2S7)
TOWED 550: **122mm** 400 D-30; **152mm** 150 2A65; (12,215 in store: **122mm** 7,950: 4,200 D-30; 3,750 M-30 *M-1938*; **130mm** 650 M-46; **152mm** 3,575: 1,100 2A36; 600 2A65; 1,075 D-20; 700 D-1 *M-1943*; 100 ML-20 *M-1937*; **203mm** 40 B-4M)

GUN/MOR 970+
SP **120mm** 870+: 790 2S9 *NONA-S*; 30 2S23 *NONA-SVK*; 50+ 2S34
TOWED **120mm** 100 2B16 *NONA-K*

MRL 1,106+ **122mm** 800 BM-21; **220mm** 200 9P140 *Uragan*; **300mm** 106 9A52 *Smerch*; (2,920 in store: **122mm** 2,120: 1,700 BM-21; 420 9P138; **132mm** 100 BM-13; **220mm** 700 9P140 *Uragan*)

MOR 990

SP **240mm** 20 2S4; (410 2S4 in store)
TOWED 970+: **120mm** 970: 50+ 2B23; 920 2S12; (2,100 in store: **120mm** 1,800: 900 2S12; 900 PM-38; **160mm** 300 M-160)

AT

MSL • SP & MANPATS 9K11/9K14 *Malyutka* (AT-3 *Sagger*); 9K111 *Fagot* (AT-4 *Spigot*); 9K112 *Kobra* (AT-8 *Songster*); 9K113 *Konkurs* (AT-5 *Spandrel*); 9K114 *Shturm* (AT-6 *Spiral*); 9K115 *Metis* (AT-7 *Saxhorn*); 9K115-1 *Metis-M* (AT-13 *Saxhorn 2*); 9K116 *Bastion/Basnya* (AT-10 *Stabber*); 9K119 *Reflex/Svir* (AT-11 *Sniper*); 9K123 *Khrisantema* (AT-15 *Springer*); 9K135 *Kornet* (AT-14 *Spriggan*); 9M120 *Ataka* (AT-12 *Swinger*)
RCL **73mm** SPG-9
RL **64mm** RPG-18; **73mm** RPG-16/RPG-22/RPG-26/RPG-7; **105mm** RPG-27/RPG-29
GUNS 562+
SP: **125mm** 36+ 2S25
TOWED **100mm** 526 MT-12; (**100mm** 2,000 T-12/MT-12 in store)

AD

SAM 1,570+
SP 1,320+: 350+ *Buk* (SA-11/17 *Gadfly*); 450 *Osa-AK/AKM* (SA-8 *Gecko*); 400 *Strela-10* (SA-13 *Gopher*); 120+ *Tor* (SA-15 *Gauntlet*)
SPAAGM 250+ 2S6 *Tunguska* (SA-19 *Grison*)
MANPAD *Igla-1* (SA-16 *Gimlet*); *Igla* (SA-18 *Grouse*); *Igla-S* (SA-24 *Grinch*); *Strela-3* (SA-14 *Gremlin*)
GUNS
SP **23mm** ZSU-23-4
TOWED **23mm** ZU-23-2; **57mm** S-60

UAV • Heavy Tu-143 *Reys*; Tu-243 *Reys*/Tu-243 *Reys-D*; Tu-300 *Korshun* **Light** BLA-07; *Pchela-1*; *Pchela-2*

MSL • SSM 200+: 200 *Tochka* (SS-21 *Scarab*); some *Iskander* (SS-26 *Stone*); (some FROG in store; some *Scud* in store)

FACILITIES

Bases 1 in Abkhazia; 1 in South Ossetia, 1 in Tajikistan, 1 in Armenia

Reserves

Cadre formations, on mobilisation form

Tk	1 bde
MR	13 bde

Navy 161,000

4 major fleet organisations (Northern Fleet, Pacific Fleet, Baltic Fleet, Black Sea) and Caspian Sea Flotilla

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**SUBMARINES** 67**STRATEGIC • SSBN** 14:

5 *Kalmar* (*Delta* III) (1+) each with 16 RSM-50 (SS-N-18 *Stingray*) strategic SLBM
5 *Delfin* (*Delta* IV) each with 16 RSM-54 (SS-N-23 *Skiff*) strategic SLBM
1 *Delfin* (*Delta* IV) in refit each with 16 RSM-52 (SS-N-23 *Skiff*) strategic SLBM
2 *Akula* (*Typhoon*) in reserve awaiting refit each with 40 RSM-52 (SS-N-20 *Sturgeon*) strategic SLBM

1 *Akula (Typhoon)*† in reserve for training with capacity for 20 RSM-52 (SS-N-20 *Sturgeon*) strategic SLBM/*Bulava* (SS-N-X-32) strategic SLBM (trials/testing)

(1 *Borey* sea trials completed in September 2010; *Bulava* (SS-N-X-32) SLBM not yet operational; 3 additional units in build)

TACTICAL 45

SSGN 8:

8 *Antyey (Oscar II)* (of which 3 in reserve) each with 2 single 650mm TT each with T-65 HWT, 4 single 533mm TT each with 3M45 *Granit* (SS-N-19 *Shipwreck*) AShM

SSN 17:

2 *Schuka-B (Akula II)* each with 4 single 533mm TT each with 3M10 *Granat* (SS-N-21 *Sampson*) SLCM, 4 single 650mm TT each with T-65 HWT

8 *Schuka-B (Akula I)* (of which 2 in reserve) each with 4 single 533mm TT each with 3M10 *Granat* (SS-N-21 *Sampson*) SLCM, 4 single 650mm TT each with T-65 HWT

2 *Kondor (Sierra II)* with 4 single 533mm TT each with 3M10 *Granat* (SS-N-21 *Sampson*) SLCM, 4 single 650mm TT each with T-65 HWT

1 *Barracuda (Sierra I)* with 4 single 533mm TT each with SS-N-21 *Sampson* SLCM, SS-N-15 *Starfish* and T-53 HWT, 4 single 650mm TT each with SS-N-16 *Stallion* AShM and T-65 HWT

4 *Schuka (Victor III)* (of which 1 in reserve) each with 4 single 533mm TT each with 3M10 *Granat* (SS-N-21 *Sampson*) SLCM, 2 single 650mm TT each with T-65 HWT

SSK 20:

15 *Paltus (Kilo)* each with 6 single 533mm TT each with T-53 HWT

4 *Varshavyanka (Kilo)* each with 6 single 533mm TT

1 *Lada* with 6 single 533mm TT (2 additional vessels in build)

SUPPORT 8

SSAN 7: 1 *Orenburg (Delta III Stretch)*; 1 *Losharik*; 2 Project 1851 (*Paltus*); 3 *Kashalot (Uniform)*

SSA 1 *Sarov*

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 32

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CV 1 *Orel (Kuznetsov)* with 12 cell VLS with 3M45 *Granit* (SS-N-19 *Shipwreck*) AShM, 4 sextuple VLS (24 eff.) each with 3K95 *Kindzhal* (SA-N-9 *Gauntlet*) SAM (capacity 18-24 Su-33 *Flanker D* FGA ac; 4 Su-25UTG *Frogfoot* ac, 15 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel, 2 Ka-31 *Helix* AEW hel)

CRUISERS 6

CGHM 2:

2 *Orlan (Kirov)* with 10 twin VLS (20 eff.) each with 3M45 *Granit* (SS-N-19 *Shipwreck*) AShM, 2 twin Inchr (4 eff.) each with *Osa-M* (SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 12 single VLS each with *Fort/Fort M* (SA-N-6 *Grumble*/*SA-N-20 Gargoyle*) SAM, 2 octuple VLS (16 eff.) each with 3K95 *Kindzhal* (SA-N-9 *Gauntlet*) SAM, 10 single 533mm ASTT, 1 twin 130mm gun (2 eff.), (capacity 3 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel) (2nd *Orlan* undergoing extensive refit currently non operational)

CGHM 4:

1 *Berkot-B (Kara)*, with 2 quad Inchr (8 eff.) each with *Rastrub* (SS-N-14 *Silex*) AShM/ASW, 2 twin Inchr (4 eff.) each with 4K60 *Shtorm* (SA-N-3 *Goblet*) SAM, 2 twin Inchr (4 eff.) each with *Osa-M* (SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 quintuple 533mm ASTT (10 eff.), 2 RBU 6000 (24 eff.), 2 twin 76mm gun (4 eff.), (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel) (2nd *Berkot-B* laid up awaiting decommissioning)

3 *Atlant (Slava)* each with 8 twin Inchr (16 eff.) each with 4K80 *Bazalt* (SS-N-12 *Sandbox*) AShM, 8 octuple VLS (64 eff.) each with 8 SA-N-6 *Grumble* SAM, 2 quintuple 533mm ASTT (10 eff.), 1 twin 130mm gun (2 eff.), (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)

DESTROYERS 18

DDGHM 17:

8 *Sarych (Sovremenny)* (of which 3 in reserve) each with 2 quad Inchr (8 eff.) each with 3M80 *Moskit* (SS-N-22 *Sunburn*) AShM, 2 twin Inchr (4 eff.) each with *Uragan/Yezh* (SA-N-7 *Gadfly*/*SA-N-12 Grizzly*) SAM, 2 twin 533mm TT (4 eff.), 2 twin 130mm gun (4 eff.), (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)

8 *Fregat (Udaloy I)* each with 2 quad Inchr (8 eff.) each with *Rastrub* (SS-N-14 *Silex*) AShM/ASW, 8 octuple VLS (64 eff.) each with 3K95 *Kindzhal* (SA-N-9 *Gauntlet*) SAM, 2 quad 533mm ASTT (8 eff.), 2 100mm gun, (capacity 2 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)

1 *Fregat (Udaloy II)* with 2 quad Inchr (8 eff.) each with 3M80 *Moskit* (SS-N-22 *Sunburn*) AShM, 8 octuple VLS (64 eff.) each with 3K95 *Kindzhal* (SA-N-9 *Gauntlet*) SAM, 2 CADS-N-1 CIWS with 9M311 *Kashtan* (SA-N-11 *Grisson*) SAM, 10 single 533mm ASTT, 2 100mm gun, (capacity 2 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)

DDGM 1:

1 *Komsomolets Ukrainy (Kashin mod)* with 2 quad Inchr (8 eff.) each with 3M24 *Uran* (SS-N-25 *Switchblade*) AShM, 2 twin Inchr (4 eff.) each with *Volnya* (SA-N-1 *Goa*) SAM, 5 single 533mm ASTT, 1 twin 76mm gun (2 eff.)

FRIGATES 7

FFGHM 2:

2 *Jastreb (Neustrashimy)* each with 4 octuple VLS (32 eff.) each with 3K95 *Kindzhal* (SA-N-9 *Gauntlet*) SAM, 6 single 533mm ASTT, 1 RBU 12000 (10 eff.), 1 100mm gun, (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW) (3rd in build)

FFGM 4:

1 *Gepard* with 2 quad Inchr (8 eff.) each with 3M24 *Uran* (SS-N-25 *Switchblade*) AShM, 1 twin Inchr (2 eff.) with *Osa-M* (SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 30mm CIWS, 1 76mm gun, (2nd vessel on trials)

1 *Burevestnik (Krivak I mod)* with 1 quad Inchr (4 eff.) with *Rastrub* (SS-N-14 *Silex*) AShM/ASW, 1 twin Inchr (2 eff.) with *Osa-M* (SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 quad 533mm ASTT (8 eff.), 2 twin 76mm gun (4 eff.)

2 *Burevestnik M (Krivak II)* each with 1 quad Inchr (4 eff.) with *Rastrub* (SS-N-14 *Silex*) AShM/ASW, 2 twin Inchr (4 eff.) each with 10 *Osa-M* (SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 quad 533mm ASTT (8 eff.), 2 RBU 6000 (24 eff.), 2 100mm gun

FFM 1:

1 *Steregushchiy* with 2 quad lnchr (8 eff.) with *Kashtan* (SA-N-11 *Grisson*) SAM, 1 100mm gun, (4 additional vessels in build)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 78**CORVETTES 47:****FSGM 16:**

2 *Sivuchi* (*Dergach*) each with 2 quad lnchr (8 eff.) each with 3M80 *Moskit* (SS-N-22 *Sunburn*) ASHM, 1 twin lnchr (2 eff.) with *Osa-M* (SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 1 76mm gun

12 *Ovod* (*Nanuchka* III) each with 2 triple lnchr (6 eff.) each with P-120 *Malakhit* (SS-N-9 *Siren*) ASHM, 1 twin lnchr (2 eff.) with *Osa-M* (SA-N-4 *Gecko*), 1 76mm gun

1 *Ovod* (*Nanuchka* IV) with 2 triple lnchr (6 eff.) each with 3M55 *Onix* (SS-N-26) ASHM, 1 twin lnchr (2 eff.) with *Osa-M* (SA-N-4 *Gecko*), 1 76mm gun

FSM 31:

3 *Albatros* (*Grisha* III) each with 1 twin lnchr (2 eff.) with *Osa-M* (SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT (4 eff.), 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch 2* (24 eff.)

21 *Albatros* (*Grisha* V) each with 1 twin lnchr (2 eff.) with *Osa-M* (SA-N-4 *Gecko*) SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT (4 eff.), 1 RBU 6000 *Smerch 2* (12 eff.), 1 76mm gun

8 *Parchim* II (one in reserve following a fire in 2008) each with 2 quad lnchr (8 eff.) each with *Strela-2* (SA-N-5 *Grail*) SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT (4 eff.), 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch 2* (24 eff.), 1 76mm gun

PCFG 25:

6 *Molnya* (*Tarantul* II) each with 2 twin lnchr (4 eff.) each with P-15M *Termit* (SS-N-2C/D *Styx*) ASHM

19 *Molnya* (*Tarantul* III) each with 2 twin lnchr (4 eff.) each with 3M80 *Moskit* (SS-N-22 *Sunburn*) ASHM

PHG 4 *Vekhr* (*Matka*) each with 2 single lnchr each with P-15M *Termit* (SS-N-2C/D *Styx*) ASHM

PHT 1 *Sokol* (*Mukha*) with 2 quad 406mm TT (8 eff.)

PCM 1 *Buyan* (Project 21630) with some 9K310 *Igla-1* (SA-16 *Gimlet*) SAM, 1 100mm gun

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 50

MHO 2 *Rubin* (*Gorya*)

MSO 10 *Akvamaren* (*Natya*)

MSC 23 *Yakhont* (*Sonya*)

MHI 15: 9 *Sapfir* (*Lida*); 3 Project 696 (*Tolya*); 3 *Malakhit* (*Olya*)

AMPHIBIOUS 38**LANDING SHIPS 25****LSM 6:**

6 Project 771 (*Polnochny* B) (of which 5 in reserve) (capacity 6 MBT; 180 troops)

LST 19:

4 *Tapir* (*Alligator*) (capacity 20 tanks; 300 troops)

12 Project 775 (*Ropucha* I) (capacity either 10 MBT and 190 troops or 24 APC (T) and 170 troops)

3 Project 775M (*Ropucha* II) (capacity either 10 MBT and 190 troops or 24 APC (T) and 170 troops) (1 *Tapir* (*Alligator* (mod))) (capacity 1 Ka-29 *Helix* B; 13 MBT; 300 troops) (expected ISD 2011)

LANDING CRAFT 13

LCU 8: 1 *Dyagon*; 7 Project 11770 (*Serna*) (capacity 100 troops)

LCAC 5:

2 *Dzheryan* (*Aist*) (capacity 4 lt tk)

3 *Pomornik* (*Zubr*) (capacity 230 troops; either 3 MBT or 10 APC (T))

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 249

A significant element of the RUS Auxiliary and Support Fleet (estimated at 370+ vessels) is either no longer active, at extended readiness or awaiting disposal.

AOR 5 *Boris Chilikin*

AOL 13: 2 *Dubna*; 5 *Uda*; 6 *Altay* (mod)

AORL 3: 1 *Kaliningradneft*; 2 *Olekma*

AWT 2 *Manych*

AS 1 Project 2020 (*Malina*); 2 *Amga* (msl spt ship)

ARS 14: 4 *Mikhail Rudnitsky*; 10 *Goryn*

AR 13 *Amur*

ARC 7: 4 *Emba*; 3 *Klasma*

AG 2 *Vytegrales*

ATF 48: 2 *Baklazzhan*; 5 *Katun*; 3 *Ingul*; 2 *Neftegaz*; 14 *Okhtensky*; 18 *Prometey*; 1 *Prut*; 3 *Sliva*

AH 3 *Ob †*

AGOR 6: 2 *Akademik Krylov*; 2 *Sibiriyakov*; 2 *Vinograd*

AGE 2: 1 *Tchusovoy*; 1 *Zvezdochka* **AGSH 4:** 1 *Samara*; 3 *Vaygach*

AGI 12: 2 *Alpinist*; 2 *Balzam*; 2 *Moma*; 6 *Vishnya*

AGM 1 *Marshal Nedelin*

AGS 18: 3 *BGK-797*; 6 *Kamenka*; 9 *Omega*

AGS(I) 52: 8 *Biya*; 25 *Finik*; 7 *Moma*; 12 *Yug*

AGB 4 *Dobrynya Mikitich*

ABU 12: 8 *Kashtan*; 4 *Sura*

ATF 13 *Sorum*

AXL 12: 10 *Petrushka*; 2 *Smolny*

Naval Aviation €35,000

4 Fleet Air Forces

Flying hours €40 hrs/year

FORCES BY ROLE

Bbr Some sqn with Tu-22M *Backfire* C

Ftr/FGA Some sqn with MiG-31 *Foxhound*; Su-24 *Fencer*; Su-27 *Flanker*; Su-33 *Flanker D*;

ASW Some sqn with Ka-27 *Helix*; Mi-14 *Haze-A*; sqn with Be-12 *Mail*; Il-38 *May*; Tu-142 *Bear*

MP/EW Some sqn with An-12 *Cub*; Il-20 RT *Coot-A*; Mi-8 *Hip*

Tpt Some sqn with An-12 *Cub*/An-24 *Coke*/An-26 *Curl*

Trg Some sqn with Su-25UTG *Frogfoot*

Atk Hel Some sqns with Mi-24 *Hind*

Tpt Hel Some sqns with Ka-25 PS *Hormone* C, Ka-27 PS *Helix* D; Mi-6 *Hook*; Mi-14 PS *Haze* C; Ka-29 *Helix*; Mi-8 *Hip*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 276 combat capable

BBR 56 Tu-22M *Backfire* C

FTR 97: 49 Su-27 *Flanker*; 18 Su-33 *Flanker D*; 30 MiG-31 *Foxhound*

FGA 47 Su-24 *Fencer*

ATK 5 Su-25UTG *Frogfoot*
 ASW 27 Tu-142 *Bear F/J**
 MP 44: 15 Be-12 *Mail**; 29 Il-38 *May**
 EW • ELINT 2 Il-20 RT *Coot-A*; 5 An-12 *Cub*
 TPT 37: 37 An-12 *Cub*/An-24 *Coke*/An-26 *Curl*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 11 Mi-24 *Hind*
 ASW 90: 70 Ka-27 *Helix*; 20 Mi-14 *Haze-A*
 EW 8 Mi-8 *Hip J*
 SAR 62: 22 Ka-25 PS *Hormone C*/Ka-27 PS *Hormone-D*;
 40 Mi-14 PS *Haze C*
 TPT 64 **Heavy** 10 Mi-6 *Hook* **Medium** 54: 28 Ka-29
Helix; 26 Mi-8 *Hip*

MSL

ASM Kh-25 (AS-10 *Karen*); Kh-23 (AS-7 *Kerry†*); Kh-59
 (AS-13 *Kingbolt*)
 ARM Kh-58 (AS-11 *Kilter*); Kh-25MP (AS-12 *Kegler*)
 LACM Kh-22 (AS-4 *Kitchen*)
 AAM • IR AAM R-27T/ET (AA-10B/D *Alamo*); R-60
 (AA-8 *Aphid*); R-73 (AA-11 *Archer*) SARH AAM R-27R/
 ER (AA-10A/C *Alamo*); R-33/33S (AA-9A/B *Amos*)

Coastal Defence • Naval Infantry (Marines) 9,500

FORCES BY ROLE

Naval inf 1 indep bde; 3 indep regt;
 SF 3 (fleet) bde (1 op, 2 cadre) (each: 1 para bn,
 1 spt elm, 2-3 underwater bn)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT 160 T-55M/T-72/T-80
 RECCE 60 BRDM-2 each with 9K11 (AT-3 *Sagger*)
 AIFV 150+: ε150 BMP-2; BMP-3; BRM-1K
 APC 750+
 APC (T) 250 MT-LB
 APC (W) 500+ BTR-60/BTR-70/BTR-80
 ARTY 367
 SP 113: 122mm 95 2S1 *Carnation*; 152mm 18 2S3
 TOWED 122mm 45 D-30
 GUN/MOR 113
 SP 120mm 95: 20 2S23 *NONA-SVK*; 75 2S9 SP
NONA-S
 TOWED 120mm 18 2B16 *NONA-K*
 MRL 122mm 96 9P138
 AT • MSL • MANPATS 72 9K11 (AT-3 *Sagger*)/9K113
 (AT-5 *Spandrel*)
 GUNS 100mm T-12
 AD • SAM 320
 SP 70: 20 *Osa* (SA-8 *Gecko*); 50 *Strela-1*/*Strela-10*
 (SA-9 *Gaskin*/SA-13 *Gopher* [200 eff])
 MANPAD 250 *Strela-2* (SA-7 *Grail*)
 GUNS 23mm 60 ZSU-23-4

Coastal Defence Troops 2,000

FORCES BY ROLE

(All units reserve status)
 Coastal Def 2 bde
 Arty 2 regt
 SAM 2 regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT 350 T-64
 AIFV 450 BMP
 APC 320
 APC (T) 40 MT-LB
 APC (W) 280 BTR-60/BTR-70/BTR-80
 ARTY 364
 SP 152mm 48 2S5
 TOWED 280: 122mm 140 D-30; 152mm 140: 50 2A36;
 50 2A65; 40 D-20
 MRL 122mm 36 BM-21
 AD • SAM 50

Military Air Forces 160,000 reducing to 148,000 (incl conscripts)

Flying hours 80 to 100 hrs/year

HQ at Balashikha, near Moscow. A joint CIS Unified Air Defence System covers RUS, ARM, BLR, KAZ, KGZ, TJK, TKM, UKR and UZB. The Russian Air Force is currently undergoing a period of significant restructuring, both in terms of general organisation as well as air base and unit structure.

FORCES BY ROLE

Bbr 6 sqn with Tu-22M3/MR *Backfire C*; 3 sqn
 with Tu-95MS *Bear*; 1 sqn with Tu-160
Blackjack
 Ftr 7 sqn with MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; 3 sqn with MiG-
 29SMT *Fulcrum*; 9 sqn with MiG-31/31BM
Foxhound; 9 sqn with Su-27 *Flaner*; 4 sqn
 with Su-27SM *Flaner*
 Atk 15 sqn with Su-24/Su-24M2 *Fencer*; 14 sqn
 with Su-25/SM *Frogfoot*
 EW 1 sqn with Mi-8PPA *Hip*
 ISR 1 sqn with MiG-25RB *Foxbat**; 4 sqn with
 Su-24MR *Fencer**; 1 flt with An-30 *Clank*;
 AEW&C 1 sqn with A-50 *Mainstay*/A-50U *Mainstay*
 Tkr 1 sqn with Il-78/Il-78M *Midas*
 Tpt 7 (mixed) sqn with An-12 *Cub*/An-24 *Coke*/
 An-26 *Curl*/Mi-8 *Hip*/Tu-134 *Crusty*/Tu-154
Careless; 1 sqn with An-124 *Condor*/Il-76MD
Candid; 1 sqn with An-12BK *Cub*/Il-76MD
Candid; 1 sqn with An-22 *Cock*; 6 sqn with
 Il-76MD *Candid*
 Atk Hel 10 sqn with Mi-24 *Hind*; 1 sqn (forming)
 with Mi-28 *Havoc*
 Tpt Hel 16 sqn with Mi-8 *Hip*/Mi-26 *Halo*
 SAM 35 regt with S-300PS (SA-10 *Grumble*)
 (quad); S-300PM (SA-20 *Gargoyle* (quad); 3
 bn with S-400 (SA-21 *Growler*) (five more
 planned by end 2010).

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 1,604 combat capable
 BBR 195: 116 Tu-22M-3/Tu-22MR *Backfire C*; 32 Tu-
 95MS6 *Bear*; 31 Tu-95MS16 *Bear*; 16 Tu-160 *Blackjack*
 FTR 707: 226 MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; 40 MiG-29UB *Fulcrum*;
 188 MiG-31/31BM *Foxhound*; 232 Su-27 *Flaner*; 21 Su-
 27UB *Flaner*

FGA 337: 36 MiG-29 SMT *Fulcrum*; 212 Su-24 *Fencer*; 16 Su-24 *Fencer* (instructor trg); 12 Su-24M2 *Fencer*; 48 Su-27SM *Flanker*; 4 Su-30; 9 Su-34 *Fullback*

ATK 256: 241 Su-25/SM *Frogfoot*; 15 Su-25UB *Frogfoot*
ISR 113: 4 An-30 *Clank*; 30 MiG-25RB *Foxbat**; 79 Su-24MR *Fencer**

AEW&C 20 A-50 *Mainstay/A-50U Mainstay*

C&C 4 Il-87 *Maxdome*

TKR 20 IL-78 *Midas/Il-78M Midas*

TPT 298: **Heavy** 112: 12 An-124 *Condor*; 21 An-22 *Cock* (Under MoD control); 79 Il-76M/MD/MF *Candid*; **Medium** 50 An-12/An-12BK *Cub*; **Light** 105: 25 An-24 *Coke*; 80 An-26 *Curl* **PAX** 31: 30 Tu-134 *Crusty*; 1 Tu-154 *Careless*

TRG 193 L-39 *Albatros*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 325: 12 Ka-50 *Hokum*; 9 Ka-52A *Hokum B*; 280 Mi-24 *Hind D/V/P*; 24 Mi-28N *Havoc B*

EW 60 Mi-8PPA *Hip*

TPT 560: **Heavy** 40: 32 Mi-26 *Halo*; 8 Mi-6 *Hook*;

Medium 520 Mi-17 (Mi-8MT) *Hip H/Mi-8 Hip*

UAV • **ISR** Some **Light** *Pchela-1T*

AD • **SAM** • **SP** 1,900+ S-300PS (SA-10 *Grumble*) (quad)/S-300PM (SA-20 *Gargoyle*) (quad)/S-400 (SA-21 *Growler*)

MSL •

AAM • **IR AAM** R-27T/ET (AA-10 *Alamo B/D*); R-73 (AA-11 *Archer*); R-60T (AA-8 *Aphid*) • **SARH AAM** R-27R/ER (AA-10 *Alamo A/C*); R-33/33S (AA-9 *Amos A/B*) • **ARH AAM** R-77 (A-12 *Adder*) R-37M (AA-X-13) • **PRH AAM** R-27P/EP (AA-10 *Alamo E/F*)

ARM Kh-58 (AS-11 *Kilter*); Kh-25MP (AS-12 *Kegler*); Kh-15P (AS-16 *Kickback*) Kh-31P (AS-17 *Krypton*)

ASM Kh-25 (AS-10 *Karen*); Kh-59/Kh-59M (AS-13 *Kingbolt/AS-18 Kazoo*) Kh-29 (AS-14 *Kedge*); Kh-31A (AS-17 *Krypton*); Kh-38 (AS-XX - in development)

LACM Kh-22 (AS-4 *Kitchen*); Kh-55/55SM (AS-15 *Kent A/B*); Kh-101; Kh-102; Kh-555

BOMBS • **Laser-guided** KAB-500; KAB-1500L • **TV-guided** KAB-500KR; KAB-1500KR; KAB-500OD; UPAB 1500

Russian Military Districts

Western Military District

(ex-Leningrad & Moscow Military Districts & Kalinin-grad Special Region)

Combined 1 HQ at St Petersburg Service

Army

FORCES BY ROLE

Comd	2 army HQ
Tk	2 bde
MR	5 bde
SF	2 (Spetsnaz) bde; 1 (AB Recce) bn
AB	3 (VdV) div
Arty	2 bde
AD	2 bde
MRL	1 bde

SSM 1 bde with *Iskander-M/Tochka* (SS-21 *Scarab*); 2 bde with *Tochka* (SS-21 *Scarab*)

Reserves

FORCES BY ROLE

Tk	1 bde
MR	2 bde

Northern Fleet

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES 40

STRATEGIC 9 **SSBN**

TACTICAL 23: 3 **SSGN**; 13 **SSN**; 7 **SSK**

SUPPORT 8: 7 **SSAN** (other roles); 1 **SSA**

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 10: 1 **CV**; 1

CGHMN; 1 **CGHM**; 7 **DDGHM** (of which 1 in refit)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12: 3

FSGM; 9 **FSM**

MINE WARFARE 11: 1 **MHSO**; 3 **MSO**; 7 **MSC**

AMPHIBIOUS 5: 4 **LST**; 1 **LSM**

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 20+

FACILITIES

Bases Located at Severomorsk and Kola Peninsula

Naval Aviation

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

BBR 39 Tu-22M *Backfire C*

FTR 18 Su-33 *Flanker D*

ATK 5 Su-25UTG *Frogfoot*

ASW 13 Tu-142M/MR *Bear F/J*

MP 14 Il-38 *May**

TPT An-12 *Cub/An-24 Coke/An-26 Curl*

HELICOPTERS

ASW Ka-27 *Helix A*

TPT Ka-29 *Helix B*; Mi-8 *Hip*

Naval Infantry

Naval inf 1 regt

Coastal Defence

Coastal def 1 bde with 360 MT-LB; 134 arty

AD 1 regt

Baltic Fleet

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES • **TACTICAL** 3 **SSK**: 1 *Lada*; 2 *Paltus* (*Kilo*)

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 6: 2 **DDGHM**;

2 **FFGHM**; 1 **FFGM**; 1 **FFM**

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 19: 4 **FSGM**; 7 **FSM**; 8 **PCFG**

MINE WARFARE • **MINE COUNTERMEASURES** 15: 4 **MSC**; 11 **MHI**

AMPHIBIOUS 4 Project 775 (*Ropucha*)

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 8+

FACILITIES

Bases located at Kronstadt and Baltiysk

Naval Aviation**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT**

FTR 24 Su-27 *Flanker*
 FGA 29 Su-24/Su-24MR *Fencer*
 TPT An-12 *Cub*/An-24 *Coke*/An-26 *Curl*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 11 Mi-24 *Hind*
 ASW Ka-27 *Helix*
 TPT • Medium Ka-29 *Helix*; Mi-8 *Hip*

Naval Infantry**FORCES BY ROLE**

Naval inf 1 regt

Coastal Defence**FORCES BY ROLE**

Arty 2 regt
 AShM 1 regt with P5/P-35 (SS-C-1B *Sepal*)

Military Air Forces**Special Purpose Aviation Command**

(elm ex-16th Air Army)

FORCES BY ROLE

Comd 3 bde HQ
 Ftr 3 sqn with MiG-29SMT *Fulcrum*; 2 sqn with MiG-31 *Foxhound*; 2 sqn with Su-27 *Flanker*
 Atk 2 sqn with Su-24M *Fencer*; 3 sqn with Su-25 *Frogfoot*
 ISR 1 sqn with MiG-25RB *Foxbat**

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT**

FTR 71: 41 MiG-31 *Foxhound*; 30 Su-27 *Flanker*
 FGA 70: 36 MiG-29SMT *Fulcrum*; 6 MiG-29UB *Fulcrum*; 28 Su-24M/M2 *Fencer*
 ATK 52 Su-25 *Frogfoot*
 ISR 8 MiG-25RB *Foxbat**

AD • SAM 600

1st Air Force & Air Defence Command

(ex-6th & elm ex-16th Air Army)

FORCES BY ROLE

Comd 3 bde HQ
 Ftr 2 sqn with MiG-31 *Foxhound*; 4 sqn with Su-27 *Flanker*
 ISR 1 flt with A-30 *Clank*; 1 sqn with Su-24MR *Fencer-E*
 EW 1 sqn with Mi-8PPA *Hip*
 Tpt 1 sqn with An-12 *Cub*/An-26 *Curl*/Tu-134 *Crusty*
 Atk Hel 4 sqn with Mi-24 *Hind*
 Tpt Hel 4 sqn with Mi-8 *Hip*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT**

FTR 89: 34 MiG-31 *Foxhound*; 55 Su-27 *Flanker*

ISR 18: 4 An-30 *Clank*; 14 Su-24MR *Fencer**

TPT 12 An-12/An-26/Tu-134

HELICOPTERS

ATK 48 Mi-24 *Hind*
 EW 10 Mi-8
 TPT • Medium 48 Mi-8 *Hip*
 AD • SAM 525 incl S-300V

Central Military District

(ex-Volga-Ural & part ex-Siberia Military Districts)

Combined Service 1 HQ at Yekaterinburg

Army**FORCES BY ROLE**

Comd 2 army HQ
 Tk 1 bde
 MR 1 div (201st); 7 bde
 SF 1 (Spetsnaz) bde
 AB 1 (VdV) bde
 Arty 1 bde
 AD 2 bde
 MRL 1 regt
 SSM 2 bde each with *Tochka* (SS-21 *Scarab*)

Reserves**FORCES BY ROLE**

MR 3 Bde

FACILITIES

Training Centre 1 located at Kamshlov (district)

Military Air Force**2nd Air Force & Air Defence Command**

(ex-5th & elm ex-14th Air Army)

FORCES BY ROLE

Comd 2 bde HQ
 Ftr 4 sqn with MiG-31 *Foxhound*
 Tpt 3 sqn with An-12 *Cub*/An-26 *Curl*/Tu-134 *Crusty*/Mi-8 *Hip*
 Atk Hel 2 sqn with Mi-24 *Hind*
 Tpt Hel 4 sqn with Mi-8 *Hip*/Mi-26 *Halo*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**AIRCRAFT**

FTR 73 MiG-31 *Foxhound*
 TPT 36 An-12/An-26 *Curl*/Tu-134 *Crusty*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 24 Mi-24 *Hind*
 TPT 46: 6 Mi-26 *Halo*; 40 Mi-8 *Hip*
 AD • SAM S-300

Southern Military District

(ex-North Caucasus Military District - including Trans-Caucasus Group of Forces (GRVZ))

Combined Service 1 HQ located at Rostov-on-Don

Army**FORCES BY ROLE**

Comd 2 army HQ

Recce	1 bde
MR	7 bde; 3 (lt/mtn) bde; 2 bde (Armenia); 1 bde (Abkhazia); 1 bde (South Ossetia)
SF	2 (Spetsnaz) bde
Air Aslt	1 bde
AB	1 (VdV) div
Arty	1 bde
MRL	1 bde; 1 regt
SSM	1 bde with <i>Tochka</i> (SS-21 <i>Scarab</i>)

Black Sea Fleet

The RUS Fleet is leasing bases in Sevastopol and Karantinnaya Bay, and is based, jointly with UKR warships, at Streletskaia Bay. The Fleet's overall serviceability is assessed as medium.

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES • TACTICAL 1 SSK (also 1 *Som (Tango)* in reserve)

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 5: 2 CGHM (1 in reserve awaiting decommissioning); 1 DDGM; 2 FFGM

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12: 4 FSGM; 6 FSM; 1 PHM; 1 PHT

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 9: 1 MCO; 6 MSO; 2 MSC

AMPHIBIOUS 7: 4 Project 775 (*Ropucha*); 3 *Tapir (Alligator)*

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 6+

FACILITIES

Bases located at Sevastopol, Novorossiysk and Temryuk

Naval Aviation

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

FGA 20 Su-24 *Fencer/Su-24MR*

MP 15 Be-12 *Mail**

TPT An-12 *Cub* (MR/EW); An-26

HELICOPTERS

ASW Ka-27 *Helix*

TPT • **Medium** Mi-8 *Hip* (MP/EW/Tpt)

Naval Infantry

FORCES BY ROLE

Naval inf 1 regt

Caspian Sea Flotilla

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 1 FFGM

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 6: 2 PCFG; 3 PHG; 1 PCM

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 6: 5 MSC; 1 MHI

AMPHIBIOUS 6

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 5+

FACILITIES

Bases located at Astrakhan, Kaspiysk and Makhachkala

Military Air Force

4th Air Force & Air Defence Command

(ex 4th Air Army)

FORCES BY ROLE

Comd	1 bde HQ
Ftr	3 sqn with MiG-29 <i>Fulcrum</i> ; 1 sqn (Armenia) with MiG-29 <i>Fulcrum</i> ; 3 sqn with Su-27 <i>Flanker</i>
Atk	5 sqn with Su-24M <i>Fencer</i> ; 6 sqn with Su-25 <i>Frogfoot</i>
ISR	1 sqn with Su-24MR <i>Fencer-E</i>
Tpt	1 sqn with An-12 <i>Cub</i> /Mi-8 <i>Hip</i>
Atk Hel	2 sqn with Mi-24 <i>Hind</i>
Tpt Hel	3 sqn with Mi-8 <i>Hip</i> /Mi-26 <i>Halo</i>

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

FTR 118: 60 MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; 58 Su-27 *Flanker*

FGA 62 Su-24M *Fencer*

ATK 77 Su-25 *Frogfoot*

ISR 14 Su-24MR *Fencer**

TPT 12 An-12 *Cub*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 24 Mi-24 *Hind*

TPT 72 **Heavy** 10 Mi-26 *Halo* **Medium** 28 Mi-8 *Hip*

Eastern Military District

(ex Far East & part ex-Siberia Military Districts)

Combined Service 1 HQ located at Khabarovsk

Army

FORCES BY ROLE

Comd	4 army HQ
Tk	1 bde
MR	10 bde
SF	2 bde
Air Aslt	2 bde
Arty	4 bde
AD	4 bde
MRL	2 bde
SSM	3 bde each with <i>Tochka</i> (SS-21 <i>Scarab</i>)
MGA	1 div

Reserves

FORCES BY ROLE

MR 8 bde

FACILITIES

Training Centre 1 located at Khabarovsk (district)

Pacific Fleet

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES 23

STRATEGIC 5 SSBN (of which one in reserve)

TACTICAL 18: 5 SSGN; 4 SSN; 9 SSK

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 8: 1 CGHM; 7 DDGHM

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 23: 4 FSGM; 9 FSM; 10 PCFG
 MINE WARFARE 7: 2 MSO; 5 MSC
 AMPHIBIOUS 4
 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 15+

FACILITIES

Bases located at Fokino, Magadan, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, Sovetskya Gavan, Viliuchinsk and Vladivostok

Naval Aviation

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

BBR 17 Tu-22M *Backfire C*
 FTR 30 MiG-31 *Foxhound*
 ASW 14 Tu-142M/MR *Bear F/J*
 MP 15 Il-38 *May*
 TPT An-12 *Cub* (MR/EW); An-26 *Curl*

HELICOPTERS

ASW Ka-27 *Helix*
 TPT • **Medium** Ka-29 *Helix*; Mi-8 *Hip*

Naval Infantry

FORCES BY ROLE

Naval Inf 1 bde with (1 tk bn, 3 inf bn, 1 arty bn)

Coastal Defence

FORCES BY ROLE

Coastal Def 1 bde

Military Air Force

3rd Air Force & Air Defence Command

ex 11th elms 14th AF and AD Army

FORCES BY ROLE

Comd 4 bde HQ
 Ftr 3 sqn with MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; 1 sqn with MiG-31 *Foxhound*; 4 sqn with Su-27SM *Flanker*
 Atk 8 sqn with Su-24M/M2 *Fencer*; 5 sqn with Su-25 *Frogfoot*
 ISR 2 sqn with Su-24MR *Fencer-E*
 Tpt 2 sqn with An-12 *Cub*/An-24 *Coke*/An-26 *Curl*/Tu-134 *Crusty*/Tu-154 *Careless*
 Atk Hel 2 sqn with Mi-24 *Hind*
 Tpt Hel 5 sqn with Mi-8 *Hind*/Mi-26 *Halo*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

FTR 74: 60 MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; 14 MiG-31 *Foxhound*
 FGA 173: 115 Su-24M *Fencer*; 10 Su-24M2 *Fencer*; 48 Su-27SM *Flanker*
 ATK 72 Su-25 *Frogfoot*
 ISR 28 Su-24MR *Fencer-E**
 TPT 22 An-12 *Cub*/An-24 *Coke*/An-26 *Curl*; 1 Tu-134 *Crusty*; 1 Tu-154 *Careless*

HELICOPTERS

ATK 24 Mi-24 *Hind*
 TPT 48 **Heavy** 4 Mi-26 *Halo* **Medium** 56 Mi-8 *Hip*
 AD • SAM S-300P

Direct Reporting Commands

Long-Range Aviation Command

Flying hours: 80–100 hrs/yr

FORCES BY ROLE

Bbr 1 sqn with Tu-160 *Blackjack*; 6 sqn with Tu-22M3/MR *Backfire C*; 3 sqn with Tu-95MS *Bear*
 Tkr 1 sqn with 20 Il-78 *Midas*/Il-78M *Midas*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT

BBR 195: 116 Tu-22M-3/Tu-22MR *Backfire C*; 32 Tu-95MS6 *Bear*; 31 Tu-95MS16 *Bear*; 16 Tu-160 *Blackjack*
 TKR 20 IL-78 *Midas*/Il-78M *Midas*

Transport Aviation Command

Flying hours 60 hrs/year

FORCES BY ROLE

Tpt 1 sqn with An-124 *Condor*/Il-76MD *Candid*; 1 sqn with An-12BK *Cub*/Il-76MD *Candid*; 1 sqn with An-22 *Cock*; 6 sqn with Il-76MD *Candid*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT • TPT 118 **Heavy** 112: 12 An-124 *Condor*; 21 An-22 *Cock* (Under MoD control); 79 Il-76M/MD/MF *Candid* **Medium** 6 An-12BK *Cub*

Paramilitary 449,000

Federal Border Guard Service €160,000 active

Directly subordinate to the President; now reportedly all contract-based personnel

FORCES BY ROLE

10 regional directorates
 Frontier 7 gp

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIFV/APC (W) 1,000 BMP/BTR
 ARTY • SP 90: 122mm 2S1 *Carnation*; 120mm 2S12; 120mm 2S9 *Anona*

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 14

FRIGATES 13

FFGHM 7 *Nerey* (*Krivak* III) each with 1 twin (2 eff.) with *Osa-M* (SA-N-4 *Gecko*) naval SAM, 2 quad 533mm TT (8 eff.), 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch 2* (24 eff.), (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix A* ASW hel; 1 100mm)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 180

CORVETTES • FSM 3: 1 *Albatros* (*Grisha* II); 2 *Albatros* (*Grisha* III) PCM 46:

2 *Molnya* II (*Pauk* II) each with 1 quad (4 eff.) with SA-N-5 *Grail* naval SAM, 2 twin 533mm TT (4 eff.), 2 RBU 1200 (10 eff.), 1 76mm

27 *Svetljak* (*Svetlyak*) each with 1 quad (4 eff.) with SA-N-5 *Grail* naval SAM, 2 single 406mm TT, 1 76mm

17 *Molnya* I (*Pauk* I) each with 1 quad (4 eff.) with SA-N-5 *Grail* naval SAM, 4 single 406mm TT, 1 76mm

PHT 2 *Antares* (*Muravey*)

PCO 9: 8 Project 503 (*Alpinist*); 1 *Sprut*

PSO 4 *Komandor*

PCC 13 *Tarantul (Stenka)*

PB 70: 9 Project 14310 (*Mirazh*); 27 *Type 1496*; 12 *Grif (Zhuk)*; 2 *Antur*; 17 *Kulik*; 3 *Terrier* PBR 35: 3 *Ogonek*; 8 *Piyavka*; 15 *Shmel*; 7 *Moskit (Vosh)*; 2 *Slepen (Yaz)*

PBF 38: 1 *A-125*; 2 *Enforcer II*; 6 *Mangust*; 1 *Mustang* (Project 18623); 15 *Saygak*; 12 *Sobol*; 1 *Sokzhoi*

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 42:

AO 1 *Baskunchak*

AK 10 *Neon Antonov*

AKSL 6 *Kanin*

AGS 2 *Yug* (primarily used as patrol ships)

AGB 5 *Ivan Susanin* (primarily used as patrol ships)

ATF 18 *Sorum* (primarily used as patrol ships)

AIRCRAFT • TPT ε86: 70 *An-24 Coke/An-26 Curl/An-72 Coaler/Il-76 Candid/Tu-134 Crusty/Yak-40 Codling*; 16 *SM-92*

HELICOPTERS: ε200 *Ka-28 (Ka-27) Helix ASW/Mi-24 Hind Atk/Mi-26 Halo Spt/Mi-8 Hip Spt*

Interior Troops 200,000 active

FORCES BY ROLE

7 Regional Commands: Central, Urals, North Caucasus, Volga, Eastern, North-Western and Siberian

Paramilitary 5 (special purpose) indep div (ODON) (each: 2–5 paramilitary regt); 6 div; 65 regt (bn – incl special motorised units); 10 (special designation) indep bde (OBRON) (each: 1 mor bn, 3 mech bn); 19 indep bde

Avn gp

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT 9

AIFV/APC (W) 1,650 *BMP-1/BMP-2/BTR-80*

ARTY 35

TOWED 122mm 20 *D-30*

MOR 120mm 15 *PM-38*

HELICOPTERS • ATK 4 *Mi-24 Hind*

Federal Security Service ε4,000 active (armed)

Cdo unit (incl *Alfa* and *Vypel* units)

Federal Protection Service ε10,000–30,000 active

Org include elm of ground forces (mech inf bde and AB regt)

Mech inf 1 bde

AB 1 regt

Presidential Guard 1 regt

Federal Communications and Information Agency ε55,000 active

MOD • Railway Troops ε50,000

Paramilitary 4 (rly) corps; 28 (rly) bde

Special Construction Troops 50,000

DEPLOYMENT

ARMENIA

Army 3,214; 2 MR bde; 74 MBT; 330 AIFV; 14 APC (T)/APC (W); 68 SP/towed arty; 8 mor; 8 MRL; 1 base

Military Air Forces 1 sqn with 18 *MiG-29 Fulcrum*; 2 AD bty with *S-300V (SA-12A Gladiator)*; 1 AD bty with *SA-6 Gainful*; 1 air base at *Yerevan*

BELARUS

Strategic Deterrent Forces • Warning Forces 1 radar station at *Baranovichi (Volga system)*; leased) Navy 1 Naval Communications site

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

OSCE • Bosnia and Herzegovina 3

CÔTE D'IVOIRE

UN • UNOCI 11 obs

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC/CHAD

UN • MINURCAT 119; 1 hel pl with 4 *Mi-17 (Mi-8MT) Hip-H*

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

UN • MONUSCO 28 obs

GEORGIA

Army 7000; *Abkhazia* 1 MR bde; *South Ossetia* 1 MR bde; Military Air Forces some atk hel

GULF OF ADEN

Navy: 1 *DDGHM*; 1 *AORL*; 1 ATF

KAZAKHSTAN

Strategic Deterrent Forces • Warning Forces 1 radar station at *Balkash (Dnepr system)*; leased)

KYRGYZSTAN

Military Air Forces ε500; 5 *Su-25 Frogfoot*; 2 *Mi-8 Hip spt hel*

LIBERIA

UN • UNMIL 4 obs

MIDDLE EAST

UN • UNTSO 5 obs

MOLDOVA/TRANSDNESTR

Army ε1,500 (including 335 peacekeepers); 2 MR bn; 100 MBT/AIFV/APC;

Military Air Forces 7 *Mi-24 Hind*; some *Mi-8 Hip*

SERBIA

OSCE • Kosovo 2

SUDAN

UN • UNMIS 123; 13 obs; 1 hel coy

SYRIA

Army/Navy 150; 1 naval facility under renovation at *Tartus*

TAJIKISTAN

Army 5,000; 1 mil base (subord *Volga-Ural MD*) with (1 MR div (201st — understrength); 54 *T-72*; 300 *BMP-2/BTR-80/MT-LB*; 100 *2S1/2S3/2S12/9P140 Uragan*

Military Air Forces: 5 *Su-25 Frogfoot*; 4 *Mi-8 Hip*

UKRAINE

Navy • Coastal Defence • 13,000 including Naval Infantry (Marines) 1,100; 102 AIFV/APC: 24 arty

Navy Black Sea Fleet; 1 Fleet HQ located at Sevastopol:
Strategic Deterrent Forces. Warning Forces; 2 radar

stations located at Sevastopol (*Dnepr* System, leased) and Mukachevo (*Dnepr* system, leased).

WESTERN SAHARA

UN • MINURSO 17 obs

Table 14 Selected Arms Procurements and Deliveries, Russia

Designation	Type	Quantity	Contract Value	Supplier Country	Prime Contractor	Order Date	First Delivery Due	Notes
<i>Bulava</i> 30 (SS-NX-30)	SLBM	n.k.	n.k.	RUS	n.k.	n.k.	2009	In development. For <i>Borey</i> -class SSBN
T-72 and T-80	MBT	180	n.k.	RUS	n.k.	2006	2007	Some to be modernised. Number may be subject to change
BTR-80 and BTR-90	APC (W)	100	n.k.	RUS	n.k.	2005	2006	Delivery status unclear
Almaz-Antey <i>Tor-M2</i> (SA-15 <i>Gauntlet</i>)	SAM	n.k.	n.k.	RUS	n.k.	n.k.	2010	Bty formations. First AD regts due to be re-equipped by 2010–11
<i>Buk-M2</i> (SA-17 <i>Grizzly</i>)	SAM	n.k.	n.k.	RUS	n.k.	n.k.	n.k.	To replace <i>Buk-M1-2</i> systems in service with army AD
S-400 <i>Triumf</i> (SA-21 <i>Growler</i>)	SAM	18 bn	n.k.	RUS	n.k.	n.k.	2007	Three bn deployed by mid 2010; 5 more bn were due by end of 2010
<i>Pantsir-S1</i>	AD	n.k.	n.k.	RUS	KBP	n.k.	2010	Delivery status unclear
Project 955 <i>Borey</i>	SSBN	4	n.k.	RUS	Sevmash Shipyard	1996	2006	Lead vessel launched Feb 2008; remains in test
Project 885 <i>Yasen</i>	SSN	6	n.k.	RUS	Sevmash Shipyard	1993	2010	Construction of second vessel began 2009. First of class, <i>Severodvinsk</i> , launched Jun 2010, with expected ISD 2011. Delayed for financial reasons
Project 22350/ <i>Admiral Gorshkov</i>	FFGHM	1	US\$400m	RUS	Severnaya Verf Shipyard	2005	2011	Navy estimates need for up to 20 vessels by 2015. Delayed. First launch due 2011
Project 20380/ <i>Steregushchiy</i> -class	FFM	4	n.k.	RUS	Severnaya Verf Shipyard	n.k.	2009	First vessel delivered. Second vessel (<i>Stoiky</i>) launched Mar 2010; expected ISD 2011. Up to 20 planned
Project 21631 <i>Buyan-M</i>	FSG	5	n.k.	RUS	Zelenodolsk Shipyard	2010	n.k.	For Caspian Flotilla
<i>Mistral</i>	LHD	4	n.k.	FRA	DCNS/STX	2011	2013	2 built in FRA; 2 in RUS
<i>Dyugon</i>	LCU	1	R200m (US\$69m)	RUS	Volga Shipyard	2005	2007	Laid down 2006. Delivery status unclear
<i>Seliger</i>	AGOR	2	n.k.	RUS	Yantar Shipyard	2009	2011	First vessel expected ISD 2011
Tu-160 <i>Blackjack</i>	Bbr ac upgrade	15	—	RUS	UAC	2007	2012	Upgrade of 15 current Tu-160s
Su-34 <i>Fullback</i>	FGA ac	32	US\$864m	RUS	Sukhoi	2008	n.k.	5 delivered. 4 more due for delivery late 2010, early 2011. Deliveries due to be complete by 2013
Su-35S <i>Flanker</i>	FGA ac	48	n.k.	RUS	Sukhoi	2009	2015	Upgrade with with new avionics, longer range air-to-air radar and more powerful engines
Su-27SM, Su-30MK2	FGA ac	16 (12 Su-27, 4 Su-30)	n.k.	RUS	Sukhoi	2009	2015	Combined with above deal in contract worth US\$2.5bn
Yak-130 AJT (Advanced Jet Trainer)	Trg ac	200	n.k.	RUS	Yakolev	2005	2015	To replace current L-39.
Mi-28N <i>Night Hunter</i>	Atk Hel	8	n.k.	RUS	Rostvertol	2005	2009	Plans for 45 to 67 Mi-28N. Delivery status unclear
Ka-52 <i>Hokum-B</i>	Atk Hel	30	n.k.	RUS	Progress	2008	2009	Twin-seat version of Ka-50 <i>Black Shark</i> For air force. Final delivery 2012. Delivery status unclear
<i>Searcher II</i>	ISR UAV	n.k.	US\$50m	ISR	IAI	2009	n.k.	Contract incl I-View 150 and Bird-Eye 400