Chapter Four

Russia

New defence reforms underway

In September 2008, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev launched an ambitious attempt to reform and modernise the Russian armed forces. The concept document was publicly presented on 14 October at the meeting of the Collegium of the Ministry of Defence (MoD), and was entitled 'The Future Outlook of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and Priorities for its Creation for the period of 2009–2020' (*Perspektivny oblik Vooruzhennykh Sil RF i pervoocherednye mery po ego formirovaniu na 2009–2020 gody)*.

Over the past 15 years, there have been a series of attempts to implement 'defence reform' in the Russian armed forces, so the change in terminology to 'Future Outlook' is itself of note. With these attempts at reform having been neither comprehensively implemented nor properly resourced, the term has become associated with reorganisations driven by particular service interests – such as the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) or the army – that have had little qualitative impact on the overall readiness of the armed forces or personnel welfare. The last such reform, initiated by former Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov, and officially 'completed' in 2004, led to some improvements, such as the creation of a limited number of permanent-readiness units and the recruitment of an equally small number of professional (contract) soldiers. Though it did not fundamentally change the structure of the Russian armed forces, it arguably paved the way for more systemic reform by subordinating the General Staff to the MoD.

Army General Nikolai Makarov, appointed on 3 June 2008 as Russian chief of the General Staff, has said the current moves are the most radical changes within the Russian armed forces in the past 200 years. Some analysts have said that, if successful, Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov's plans could create in the next decade fundamentally different armed forces for Russia: no longer would Russia have a mass-mobilisation army but a much smaller force suited for local or regional conflicts, and better able to support Russian foreign-policy objectives. But this strategy has also provoked resistance within the military and political class, and its success might be challenged by a shortage of resources and lack of political consensus on the armed forces' key missions.

Motivating factors

It is widely held that these changes were a response to the lessons learned in the brief August 2008 war with Georgia, though the aftermath of this campaign also provided an opportunity for Serdyukov to enact previously held plans. Russia's victory was mainly due to its numerical superiority, the basic military skills of its ground troops and the assistance received from highly motivated South Ossetian paramilitaries familiar with the difficult mountainous terrain. Analysis of Russia's performance during the campaign (see *The Military Balance 2009*, pp. 210–12) highlighted fundamental shortcomings in force composition, training, command and control, equipment and doctrine. This poor performance increased doubt that the military could be seen as a reliable instrument to support Russian foreign- and security-policy objectives, and also reinforced the perception that the armed forces could not in the future guarantee reliable conventional defence capabilities. But the plan also resulted from consideration of a number of other factors.

Negative demographic trends mean that the number of conscript-age males is declining. According to Makarov, in 2012 this number will be only half of the 2001 figure. Secondly, the Russian armed forces' inventory remains stocked with ageing Soviet equipment, and there is currently limited capacity to finance and produce substantial numbers of modernised or replacement systems, particularly if the mobilisation-centric doctrine remains. The so-called 'reserve units', little more than storage sites for equipment to be used by reservists in case of mobilisation, have even more outdated capabilities, with little operational value. Thirdly, a confluence of personnel issues was seen as hindering force effectiveness. Corruption, crime and peacetime casualties within the Russian army had by 2008 grown substantially, with the total number of crimes committed by the military reported at 20,425. Over 500 officers were prosecuted for corruption, including 117 senior commanding officers and 20 generals. A further 604 servicemen died as a result

of non-combat losses, with 231 committing suicide, often as a result of bullying. While the number of non-combat deaths and suicides had fallen in other paramilitary services, such as Interior Forces and Border Guards, it had increased by over 35% in the armed forces.

Fourthly, a number of reforms since the mid 1990s – conceived and implemented by the military and often influenced by personal or service interests – were conducted with no clear methodology for measuring success and with little transparency for the wider political and civilian constituencies that were formally tasked with oversight of the military. This resulted in increased political competition across the services, a lack of 'joint' military thought and a delegitimisation of the role of civilian oversight of, and participation in, defence-reform plans. Soviet-era thinking persisted in the military, sustained by an unreformed military-education system, a lack of meaningful interaction with other modern militaries and an inability to assess Russia's real military capabilities beyond broad judgements primarily relying on inventory numbers. With the 'victory' in Chechnya and military support for then President Vladimir Putin, there was also a lack of political will within Russia's leadership to push the military towards real modernisation, but the aftermath of the Georgia campaign galvanised public support, and political will, for reform.

Some changes were in fact announced earlier in 2008, such as the intention to replace warrant officers and midshipmen with professional NCOs. Conscript service was also reduced to one year in early 2008, and some MoD positions also transitioned to civilian staffs. But the August war provided a political window of opportunity for Serduykov's reform plans. Indeed, it has become apparent that the Russian MoD has been actively studying Western experience and ideas, though they are implementing the conclusions drawn from it in a distinctly Russian manner.

The reform programme detailed a set of aspirations for the development of Russia's armed forces:

All ground forces to become fully manned, permanent-readiness units

Ground-force units would be outfitted with modern equipment, undergo regular training and be ready for deployment at short notice within their region of responsibility. Serdyukov's plan noted the adoption of a number of measures necessary to implement this goal. Firstly, overall personnel strength was to drop to 1 million by 2012. The number of officers, meanwhile, was to fall from 355,000 to 150,000. Generals were to be reduced from 1,107 to 886; colonels from 25,665 to 9,114; majors from 99,550 to 25,000; and captains from 90,000 to 40,000. (It was also planned that from 2008–11, 120,000 warrant officers and midshipmen would be made redundant, with 20,000 retained in the navy.) The number of lieutenants was to increase from 50,000 to 60,000, and new professional NCOs were to be recruited and trained at special training establishments. Indeed, all NCOs were to be professional, while the number of contract soldiers was to be increased. Three-year contracts are now being offered to private soldiers and NCOs. All brigades in the North Caucasus Military District were to be manned with professionals, and in other parts of Russia on a mixed professional–conscript basis. All 'cadre units' (units only to be fully manned – with reservists – during wartime) were to be closed down or transformed into 'logistical bases' for equipment storage, while logistics itself was to be reorganised and mostly 'civilianised' on the basis of public–private partnerships with private, commercial companies involved in providing services for the military.

Improving command effectiveness

The 'new look' programme also envisaged a change in the levels of command, from a four-tier structure (military district (MD), army, division, regiment) to a three-tier structure (MD, operational command, brigade). Military districts were to have command responsibility over all forces within their geographic territory, in a bid to reinforce 'joint' command. According to Makarov, each MD should have sufficient capacity to manage local conflict within its zone of responsibility without requiring the involvement of forces from another. Meanwhile, the operational commands should be able to carry out missions in different regions; Makarov said that from 2009 many exercises for permanent-readiness units would be conducted in other parts of the country.

The number of ground-force units was also slated to be reduced from 1,890 to 172, while the air force was to drop from 240 units to 120 and the navy from 240 to 123. If these totals were reached, ground forces would comprise 36% of the total force, up from the current 30%. One of the changes that prompted much analysis concerned the move from divisional formations to brigades. The plan was that, by 1 December 2009, ground-force divisions were to transform into brigades capable of independent operations, causing

23 motor-rifle and tank divisions, missile and artillery regiments, engineering units, air-defence, communication and support units to transform into 39 ground-force brigades, 21 missile and artillery brigades, seven army air-defence brigades, 12 communications brigades and two electronic-warfare brigades. In most cases each permanent-readiness division was due to be transformed into two brigades. One division would remain in the Far East; 17 independent regiments would also remain. (During an assessment of units published in November 2009, 60% of brigades received a 'satisfactory' rating, with 30% 'good'; four brigades were deemed 'unsatisfactory'; and only four were rated 'excellent', all of them naval units.)

Other forces were also to undergo change. While the SRF would retain its divisional structure, the number of missile divisions would be reduced from 12 to eight. (Space forces would be reduced from seven to six divisions.) The SRF was due to see 35 units eliminated in 2009, including two missile regiments, with ten units restructured. The percentage of contract NCOs was planned to increase to 100% in 2016 from the current 25%.

Airborne divisions were initially to be transformed into eight airborne brigades acting as essentially rapid-response forces in each military district, but this plan was abandoned in June 2009 after the appointment of Lieutenant-General Vladimir Shamanov as the commander of the VdV (Russian Airborne Troops). A new Airborne Brigade is due to be established in the Moscow MD and a separate parachute regiment in the Leningrad MD. The airborne forces average 37% contract or professional servicemen: in the Tula Division the proportion is 9% (the division is mostly manned by conscripts, many of whom later join as contract soldiers and move to other divisions); 60% in the Ulyanovsk Brigade; 37% in the Novorossyisk Division; 40% in the Pskov Division; and 49% in the Ivanov Division. Contract airborne troops receive a salary of R22–32,000 (US$746–1,085) per month.

By 2012 all air divisions and regiments in the air force are expected to be disbanded, with the formation of 55 air bases distributed throughout four strategic commands. These will each be assigned a category, depending on the number of squadrons and the quantity of tasks assigned. First-category bases will handle large-scale operations; second-category bases will fulfil tasks currently handled by aviation regiments; and third-category bases will include separate squadrons. The former Command of Special Air Defence Forces around Moscow will be incorporated into the air force and will become the basis of a new Air-Space Command within the force.

Introducing modern weapons and equipment

In March 2009, Serdyukov said that only 10% of all weapons and equipment in the contemporary Russian armed forces were 'modern'. If enacted, the 'new look' programme would increase the share of modern weapons in inventories to 30% by 2015 and 70% by 2020. Large-scale modernisation is due to start in 2011, but remains an ambitious target given the slow pace of domestic procurement coupled with the impact of the financial crisis (see Defence Economics, p. 216). It has been asserted that modernisation will focus on the comprehensive rearmament of entire units rather than the procurement of specific items of weapons and equipment. Meanwhile, authorities are for the first time considering the procurement of foreign-produced equipment: Russia signed a contract with an Israeli company to supply UAVs, and entered into talks with Paris to procure a *Mistral*-class amphibious-assault ship (Landing Helicopter Dock – LHD), and jointly build three more under licence in Russian shipyards.

Improving military education and career management

It is envisaged that by 2013 the current 65 military-education establishments will be reduced to ten 'educational centres' incorporating existing military schools and universities. Problems in attracting sufficient recruits led to the opening of a new NCO training centre on 1 December 2009 at the Ryazan Higher Airborne (VdV) School. The centre is meant to prepare junior command personnel and features a more ambitious training programme conducted over two years and ten months. (Under the plans, these NCOs will be paid the same monthly salary as active generals: R35,000.) Meanwhile, more selective admissions criteria are being applied at the General Staff Academy. As a result, in 2009 only 16 officers were admitted to the Senior General Staff Academy course, a significant reduction compared with previous years; most entrants were from the Interior Ministry or other security structures.

Dealing with redundancies and conditions for serving personnel

Although around 205,000 officer positions will be officially abolished in the proposed reorganisation, the actual number of redundancies will be much less. Taking into account existing vacancies, planned retire-

ments and the elimination of two-year officer service, the actual number of officers made redundant in the next three years is more likely to be around 117,500. As part of the manpower-reduction process, each officer and contract serviceman is being assessed as to his competencies and likely place in the future forces. In some cases, these evaluations may recommend the dismissal of an officer on the basis of non-fulfilment of contract; that individual would thus leave without the benefits and compensation which are legally guaranteed to any retiring officer (whether on the basis of reaching the retirement age or as a result of premature retirement from the armed forces). But a key obstacle to these plans is the requirement that officers leaving the forces should be provided with housing. According to MoD statistics, almost half of the officers to be made redundant have no housing; significant financial resources will be required within the next three years to provide the amount of housing needed to meet the planned reduction targets.

If one aim of the reform process is to attract more and better junior offices and professional servicemen, adjustments will have to be made in the forces' salary levels. Currently, a platoon commander receives R23,500 (US$797) per month, while a contract soldier receives R11–13,000 (US$373–441). Serdyukov has promised that from 1 January 2012 remuneration for all servicemen will increase by a factor of three, though it remains to be seen how this increase will be funded.

Challenges in implementation

Critics of the proposed reforms were vocal and more visible within the public debate, including in parliament and the press. While there were some efforts to explain the process to interested groups in Russia, as well as the general population (and also perhaps the international community), these public-outreach measures remained limited. Serdyukov established a Public Council tasked with providing public input and also public oversight over the activities of the MoD and its reform strategies, though it is unclear to what extent this council is able to provide advice and expert support in order to modify the reform plans.

The main criticism is that these plans were drawn up without a clear decision on the underlying strategic basis for them. In Russia, this strategic rationale is usually provided by the military doctrine, but no new doctrine was adopted before the current changes started. There is thus a lack of clarity and consensus within Russian society and the political elite about what kind of armed forces Russia needs and why it needs them. In other words, there is no general agreement about what the key threats to Russia are likely to be in the short, medium and long terms, and what the key tasks of the armed forces will be in light of these threats. The chief of the Russian General Staff responded to this criticism by stating that there was no time to shape this consensus and to develop such documents. In his view, the lack of comprehensive reforms since the end of the Soviet Union had resulted in such deterioration of the armed forces that urgent measures were needed to prevent an even deeper crisis. Still, the drafting process for a new defence doctrine began in 2009, and this document was due to be presented to the president before January 2010. In October 2009, Nikolai Patrushev, secretary of the National Security Council, said that several points in the new doctrine would be the same as in the 2003 document, such as an emphasis on regional wars and armed conflicts instead of large-scale conflict. But he also said that the document would provide for the use of nuclear weapons to deter attacks on Russia and in local conflicts in which Russia is attacked, and also in cases of pre-emption against a potential aggressor. These discussions have caused some disquiet abroad, as did the 9 November decree giving the president the right to operationally deploy Russian armed forces abroad without parliamentary permission. (In August 2008 no such permission was even sought before the deployment.) The amendment specified scenarios in which such a 'simplified' decision-making procedure is applicable: an attack against Russian forces stationed abroad; defence against or prevention of an attack on another state that has requested Russian support; protection of Russian citizens abroad from attack; and anti-piracy operations and the provision of maritime security.

The financial crisis may have an impact on the progress of modernisation. Russia has experienced a large budget deficit for the first time in almost a decade (see Defence Economics, p. 216). While the budgets of other 'force ministries' – the Interior Ministry, Federal Security Service and Ministry of Emergencies – have been reduced by 15%, President Medvedev said he would reduce the MoD's budget by only 9% and keep unchanged the amounts originally allocated for social programmes for servicemen and for the implementation of the State Defence Order. It is difficult to predict whether the Russian

government will be able to keep meeting the increasing need for funds to support both the professionalisation of the armed forces and the ambitious social programmes. Added to this, the scale of the proposed modernisation programme will require significant funds in the next decade, and defence will be competing with other sectors for modernisation and diversification.

The success of the plans largely depends on the ability of the Russian defence industry to deliver on its promises of rapid modernisation and re-equipment. So far, domestic procurement plans have been relatively unsuccessful, particularly those related to the development and serial production of key new platforms. Future challenges for modernisation concern the poor state of Russian defence-industry and defence-science R&D; continuing high inflation in machine-building and the defence industry (which limits the purchasing power of allocated resources); and an acute shortage of specialist workers who will be required to enable mass production of major new platforms for the armed forces. In his annual speech to parliament, in an apparent attempt to put pressure on the defence industry, President Medvedev discussed the contents of the 2010 State Defence Order, saying 'In the next year we need to provide the Armed Forces with more than 30 ballistic land- and sea-based missiles, 5 *Iskander* missile systems, about 300 modern armoured vehicles, 30 helicopters, 28 combat aircraft, 3 nuclear-powered submarines, 1 corvette-class battleship and 11 spacecraft. All this simply has to be done'. (He also set a deadline to replace analogue with digital communications systems by 2012, with priority to the North Caucasus MD.) But analysts have raised questions over the viability of Moscow's shopping list. It remains unclear whether industry can deliver 30 ballistic missiles of the types desired: *Topol* missiles will continue to be supplied, but the *Bulava* programme is still experiencing problems, with a number of unsuccessful tests this year. This has implications for the *Borey*-class submarines due to receive *Bulava* missiles.

Elements of the current reforms have been poorly explained to, and are poorly understood by, many within their key constituency: the armed forces. There is abundant confusion about impending redundancies, relocation and changes in the requirements for serving officers, and protests have taken place in units that were directed to change location quickly without guarantees that social infrastructure would be ready on arrival. Many officers resigned or were pushed out when they expressed disagreement with the proposals. The perception also exists that many mid-level officers are being made redundant because they lack necessary qualifications and have been deemed unsuitable for retraining. As a consequence, morale within the armed forces has suffered, although in the long run the current changes should benefit young officers, who may enjoy new equipment and better living conditions. But the risk is still that many able officers will leave, at a time when difficulties in recruiting and retaining younger officers and qualified NCOs continue.

If the proposed reductions in professional officers, elimination of all two-year 'conscripted' officers and removal of all warrant officers are implemented, there is concern over whether the armed forces' numbers might actually drop below 1 million; some experts believe that in 2010–12 manning could fall to around 800,000. If sufficient funding is not provided to attract more officers, NCOs and contract soldiers there is a possibility that the numbers could fall even further. Moreover, the quality of conscripts remains low: according to MoD data, only 68% are deemed suitable for service; others require basic physical and educational training before they can fulfil their duties, while the dwindling recruitment pool has led to the drafting of not only those with criminal convictions but also some with prison records. The recruitment of contract soldiers and NCOs also remains problematic. In 2009, the first months of recruitment for NCO training courses showed that many candidates did not meet educational requirements, while some analysts say it will be increasingly difficult to fill professional NCO positions given falling interest in the forces. It is not known whether the MoD has a clear strategy for increasing retention levels among current contract soldiers.

Although the proposed reforms are directed at improving the armed forces' overall readiness levels, it remains unclear how quickly these can be improved, and it is likely that several years will pass before the 'new look' programme will deliver a new level of readiness. In mid-to-late 2009 the *Kazkaz 2009* and *West 2009* exercises were designed to test the impact of the reforms on readiness levels, with emphasis on interoperability and force mobility. On 17 November, Makarov told an expanded session of the MoD board that the response time involved after issuing the order to deploy had been reduced from 24 hours to one hour.

Implications

These proposals mark a significant point of discontinuity from Soviet traditions in terms of the structure of the armed forces, command and control, and recruitment and training. If successful, the Russian armed forces will likely be better suited to operate on the modern battlefield and to be more effective in fighting local and regional conflicts. At the same time, the transformation will signify the end of the mass-mobilisation army. However, the success of this transformation will ultimately depend not on organisational restructuring but on the ability of the state and of military leaders to attract and retain sufficient talent into the army, to provide them with necessary training, to delegate authority to NCOs and to implement the ambitious re-armament and modernisation programme.

RUSSIA – DEFENCE ECONOMICS

After a decade of uninterrupted economic growth, Russia has been severely affected by the world financial crisis and the decline in global energy prices. Although GDP growth measured a respectable 5.6% in 2008, the first half of 2009 saw an extraordinary double-digit contraction in the Russian economy and the return of a large budget deficit. During the eight years of Vladimir Putin's presidency from 2000 to 2008, Russia enjoyed robust growth, accumulated very large foreign-currency reserves and ran large budget surpluses. As the decline in the economy deepened, however, it exposed Putin's reluctance to embrace economic reforms and emphasised the government's still-high dependence on revenues from oil and gas. As the global recession worsened and oil prices fell, the Russian economy contracted by 10.2% in the first five months of 2009, the rouble fell by 35% and at one stage the Russian stock market plummeted by 75%.

For the first time in many years, Russia is set to record a budget deficit in 2009, expected to be around 5% of GDP. In the short term, the government will be able to cover the deficit from its healthy reserves and the return on its investments. But the dire state of Russia's finances revealed the economy's overwhelming dependence on the export of hydrocarbons and other commodities. At first the government was slow to react to the global financial crisis, arguing that it was a US phenomenon and that Russia would remain largely unaffected. By early 2009, however, President Medvedev was forced to concede that his country's emerging economic problems had Russia-specific characteristics. By mid 2009 therefore the government had introduced a range of policy responses including the distribution of funds to support the banking system and high-tech companies; cuts in oil-export duties and corporate and personnel taxes; greater provision of social support; and increased investment in infrastructure projects. Even so, the World Bank estimated that in 2009 unemployment would reach 13% (the highest rate since Putin became president) and that 17% of the population would be living below the poverty level.

During the 1990s, Russia endured a series of crippling budget deficits, but beginning in 2000 a convergence of positive factors helped turn the government's fiscal position around. In 1997 the consolidated budget deficit measured 6.5% of GDP, but in 2006 a surplus of 8.3% was achieved, thanks not only to hydrocarbon revenues but government initiatives that included eliminating tax loopholes, more rigorous enforcement of tax laws and tight management of government expenditure. In 2006, with the 2007 Duma elections looming, spending restraints were weakened as the government increased spending on civil servants' salaries, education, health, housing and defence. Fearing that the government's hard-won budget discipline would further deteriorate in the run-up to the elections (and partly, it was suggested, to tie the hands of his successor), Putin introduced a shift in fiscal policy in July 2007 when for the first time he submitted a three-year budget, which included substantial future increases in national defence expenditure, indicative of the growing priority afforded to Russian's armed forces.

Since the economic crisis of 1998, Russian defence spending has been on an upward path, more than doubling in real terms by 2007. And budgets presented before the current economic downturn had called for spending to increase further from R820 billion in 2007 to R1,400bn in 2010. Although current economic circumstances have resulted in a revision to this target it seems that the long-term upward trajectory in defence spending will continue, albeit at a slower rate than originally envisaged. For example, in 2005 the government passed legislation outlining the 'State Programme of Armament 2007–2015' (*Gosuardstvennyi Programm Vooruzheniya*, GPV) which earmarked R5 trillion (US$169bn) for military procurement during the nine-year period. In 2007, only 10% of Russia's military inventory was classified as 'modern', and the goal of the GPV was to raise this figure to 30% by 2015 and ultimately to 70% by 2020.

While the programme contained a laundry list of new weapons systems, its primary focus was the improvement of Russia's strategic nuclear forces, which were slated to receive 34 new silo-launched and 66 mobile-launched *Topol*-M missile systems, while the navy would acquire SSBN submarines among 31 new vessels. The plan also provided for the modernisation of 159 long-range aviation platforms including Tu-160, Tu-95 and Tu-22 aircraft, many of which are thought to be in storage. However, the GPV was built on the premise that the economy would grow at an average rate of almost 6.5% to 2020, and it now seems highly unlikely that it will be implemented in full. Indeed, to date all of post-communist Russia's long-term GPVs have had to be abandoned when it was found that they had been based on unrealistic expectations regarding economic growth and the cost of new weapons systems. In March 2009, Medvedev indicated that the existing GPV was effectively dead and announced that work was under way on a draft of a new GPV to cover the period 2011–20 and based on a new economic forecast provided by the Ministry of Economic Development (Minekon). Given the depth of the economic crisis it seems unlikely that the economy will return to strong growth for some time, meaning the new version of the GPV is bound to be more modest that its predecessor. In terms of total national defence spending, the government appears to have decided that a level of about 2.5% of GDP is sustainable, and although the defence budget will jump to nearly 3% of GDP in 2009, this should be seen as a reflection of the contracting economy rather than a deliberate change in policy.

The 2009 and 2010 defence budgets

In August 2008, before the economic crisis was fully apparent, Minekon produced a background report on which the 2009 budget was based. The report itself was based on the rather optimistic assumption that oil prices would average US$95 a barrel during 2009 and that this would create growth of around 7%. Given these assumption, the 2009 national defence budget was set at R1,336bn (US$45.3bn). However, shortly after the budget became law, Minekon revised its forecast, and in the end the defence budget was reduced by 9% to R1,211bn (US$41bn). In spite of the cut, however, both Medvedev and now Prime Minister Putin signalled that spending on equipment programmes and social benefits would be maintained as originally planned and that savings would have to be found from elsewhere within the budget. Unfortunately, in recent years a number of changes to the way state budgets are presented have made the collection and analysis of precise military-spending data more difficult. In 2005, chapters in the federal budget were revised and the chapter on 'National Defence' was broadened to include certain military-related expenditures that had hitherto been part of separate ministries. Then, in 2006, details of the state defence order and other aspects of national defence spending were classified. In 2007, the government adopted its three-year budget framework, only to confuse matters further when, in response to the uncertainty generated by the economic crisis, it reverted to an annual budget for 2009.

At the height of the crisis in March 2009, Medvedev said that plans to modernise the country's armed

Table 20 **Estimated Russian Defence Expenditure** as % of GDP



forces would remain on track, claiming that 'despite the current financial difficulties, Russia has never had more favourable conditions to create modern and highly efficient armed forces'. He reinforced this view later in the year when he confirmed that procurement and housing benefits would be ring-fenced. Whether the Ministry of Defence is able to honour these pledges remains to be seen, but the statements are consistent with the prioritisation of spending on the Russian armed forces, also reflected in the support given to the country's defence industries since the start of the crisis. The economic crisis came at an awkward time for the Russian defence industry, which was two years into a major modernisation programme intended to help it to meet the twin challenges of domestic rearmament and a hefty export order book. Before the crisis struck, Boris Alyoshin, president of the Russian League of Assistance to Defence Enterprises, had already suggested that the 'entire work pattern of the Russian defence industry is obsolete' and forecast that retooling and modernising the industry would cost around US$5bn a year. In November 2008, former Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov revealed that the country's defence firms had been 'crippled' by the global financial crisis and were facing a 'dire cash shortage'. With the commercial sector unwilling to lend money to Russia's already heavily subsidised and largely loss-making defence companies the government was forced to step in with a rescue package. Totalling US$5.4bn, the measures included US$1.8bn to subsidise interest payments on loans, US$3.6bn of state guarantees for loans, the exchange of equity for support and the prevention of bankruptcies. Many observers, long critical of the inefficient and corrupt nature of Russia's defence-industrial base, suggested that the problems of dated management practices and a lack of entrepreneurship were unlikely to be helped by even greater state intervention. In light of the new, harsher financial climate, former Deputy Defence Minister for Financial and Economic Matters Lyubov Kudelina revealed that the defence ministry had drastically cut research and development spending on any projects that would not result in new arms for 2009–10, and later reports indicated that 300 projects had been halted.

The scale of the problems facing many defence companies was illustrated in August 2009 when Putin announced that plans by the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) to pay off its debts had failed due to the economic downturn. UAC and its subsidiaries owe around US$3.7bn to creditors and had planned to settle the debt through the sale of 'unprofitable assets, refinancing or floating shares'. Putin criticised the company for, among other things, selling aircraft at a loss, and went on to warn the aviation sector in general that the state would not 'cover losses indefinitely, pull you out of debt and correct management mistakes'. He instructed the government to draft a financial rehabilitation programme for the aircraft-manufacturing industry.

By a stroke of good fortune, the Defence Ministry had finalised a 2009–11 state defence order (*Gosudarstvennyi Oboronnyi Zakaz* (GOZ)) in late August 2008, before the full effects of the financial crisis were apparent, and both the president and prime minister promised to uphold that part of the budget, if not for the entire period then certainly for 2009. Although the precise content of GOZ is never revealed, details do appear from time to time, usually in interviews or speeches by leading defence figures. The 2009 GOZ is thought to include 14 new ICBMs, seven new space launchers, six satellites, 24 MiG-29SMT aircraft originally exported to Algeria but later returned as defective, two Su-34 aircraft, 63 T-90 tanks, 31 new and modernised helicopters and over 300 armoured vehicles. Details for 2010 and 2011 are sparse, but it seems likely that the army will receive new *Buk*-M3 and *Tor*-M2 air-defence systems and *Iskander*-M theatre ballistic missiles, and the navy is expecting to take delivery of *Bulava* submarine-launched ballistic missiles. This programme, however, is years behind schedule and previous delivery dates have come and gone without orders being filled.

Delays in the delivery of the *Bulava* missiles have come against a backdrop of broader problems within Russia's shipbuilding industry. In March 2007, then President Putin created the United Shipbuilding Company (USC) with the intention of consolidating the entire Russian shipbuilding sector, including design bureaus, maintenance docks and major shipyards, into a single state-owned enterprise within three years. However, in July 2009 a report by the *Independent Military Review* alleged that the Russian navy was facing an 'irreversible collapse' due to the poor state of the shipbuilding industry, which it characterised as 'incapable of producing warships in either the quantity or at the level of quality' required by the navy. The situation was later acknowledged by the commander in chief of the Russian navy, Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky, who declared that he didn't want to waste billions of roubles repairing ageing ships that only had ten years of service life remaining, and that

he was therefore open-minded about the prospect of acquiring new ships from overseas manufacturers. In that respect Russian industry officials have held talks with both DCNS of France and Thales of the UK that might lay the groundwork for a set of cooperative arrangements. The first project could result in Russia taking delivery of up to four *Mistral*-class amphibious-assault ships.

As part of the new GPV, the air force has revealed its preferred future structure and equipment needs. According to the commander of the Russian air force, Alexander Zelin, the backbone of the service will consist of a strategic aviation force comprising Tu-95C and Tu-160 bombers, as well as Tu-22M3 long-range bombers and IL-78 aerial tankers. The aircraft will be equipped with new systems that will also allow them to use conventional unguided bombs, and optimised to improve operational ranges. In addition to the fifth-generation fighter being jointly developed with India, the air force will also receive modernised Su-27SM and MiG-29SMT aircraft, Su-35S and MiG-35C fighters, and will replace its ageing Su-24 bombers with the more advanced Su-34. Of the 300 transport planes currently in service, the An-12s, An-22s and An-26s will be decommissioned and replaced by lighter IL-112B aircraft and a new medium-lift, 20-tonne-capacity fleet also being jointly developed with India. Existing An-124 and IL-76 platforms will be retained and upgraded. As for helicopters, the existing fleet of Mi-24 attack aircraft will be completely replaced with new-generation Mi-28 *Night Hunter* and Ka-52 *Alligator* attack helicopters. The first orders for a number of these aircraft were placed during the 2009 Moscow Aviation and Space Salon air show with the signing of a major contract between Sukhoi and the Russian government. Under the deal, Russia's Vnesheconombank will lend Sukhoi $110 million to start production of the Su-35, an aircraft originally conceived for export sales only but which, due to delays in the development of Russia's fifth-generation fighter, is now needed by the Russian air force itself. The total deal includes 48 Su-35s, 12 Su-27SMs and four Su-30MK2 aircraft that were originally intended for China.

Details about the 2010 defence budget remain sparse and, as in 2009, figures for only one year rather than three are available. According to the 2010 federal budget, spending on national defence will increase modestly compared with 2009, rising by 3.5% to R1,253bn (US$42.5bn), but with inflation hovering around 10% this represents an actual cut and is significantly less than the figure of R1,391 (US$47.2bn) proposed in the three-year budget of 2008. To date only 54% of national defence spending is declassified; the limited details available about the 2010 State Defence Order are noted on p. 215.

Table 21 **Draft Russian National Defence Expenditure (Rm)**

A: Chapter 2 'National Defence'	2008	2009	2010
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation	771.7	894.6	945.9
Mobilisation of external forces	4.6	3.6	2.6
Mobilisation of the economy	4.7	4.6	4.9
Collective peacekeeping	0.3	0.6	11.1
Military nuclear programmes	17.1	19.1	18.8
International treaty obligations	2.7	4.8	4.4
Applied R&D	129.7	162.9	137.9
Other	110.1	121.7	127.5
Sub-total: Chapter 2 'National Defence'	**1,040.9**	**1,211.9**	**1,253.2**

B: Additional military-related expenditure	2008	2009	2010
Internal troops	54.7	58.2	65.4
Security organs of the State	147.7	178.9	205.6
Border troops	64.9	79.9	77.6
Subsidies to closed towns	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
Ministry of emergencies	49.9	57.2	60.2
Military pensions	212.0	223.2	240.8
Sub-total: Additional military-related expenditure	**529.2**	**597.4**	**649.6**
Total Defence-related Expenditure (A+B)	**1,570.1**	**1,809.3**	**1,902.8**
as % of GDP	3.76	4.46	4.07
as % of total outlays	20.7	18.2	19.2

Arms exports

In the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian arms manufacturers saw both exports and domestic orders plummet. In the last decade, however, Russian manufacturers have successfully forged new relationships and exports have boomed, often bringing in higher revenue than weapons delivered to the Russian armed forces themselves. Among the largest customers for Russian arms are China and India, which together have accounted for around 70% of arms exports in recent years. In 1993 Russia and India signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation which included a defence-cooperation accord aimed at ensuring a continued supply of Russian arms and spare parts for India's military and the promotion of joint production of

defence equipment. Since then, India has bought a wide range of equipment from Russia including T-90 tanks, multiple-launch rocket systems, howitzers, diesel-submarine upgrades, *BrahMos* anti-ship missiles and Su-30MKI fighter aircraft specifically designed for the Indian air force and built under licence by Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. In 2009, the two countries were expected to finalise details of a new India–Russia Long-Term Inter-Governmental Agreement for Military Technical Cooperation, and work is continuing on a range of joint ventures including a fifth-generation fighter aircraft and a new multi-role transport aircraft. Meanwhile, China, Russia's other main trade partner, has imported over US$16bn of Russian equipment since 2001, averaging US$1bn a year in weapons imports since 1992, including Su-27 and Su-30 fighter aircraft, *Sovremenny*-class destroyers and *Kilo*-class diesel-electric submarines.

In recent years, however, as China and India have attempted to produce more of their own military equipment, the economic value of these two relationships to Russia has begun to wane. In 2005, China decided not to import additional Su-30s, leading Russian officials to express concern that Indian and Chinese demand for weapons systems would decline in the next five to ten years. The signing of a historic nuclear-cooperation agreement between India and the US will open the Indian market to US firms. China's position is less clear: the Western embargo on selling military equipment to Beijing makes Russia the only major advanced military power willing to sell equipment to the People's Liberation Army, but it seems unlikely that trade will increase from current levels. Indeed, in 2008 China accounted for only 18% of total Russian defence exports compared with some 50% earlier in the decade.

The most notable new market for Russian exports is Latin America. Contracts with Venezuela, Mexico, Peru, Colombia and Brazil have been signed, and future deals are currently being negotiated with Bolivia, Uruguay and Ecuador. In 2007, Venezuela emerged as Russia's second-largest export market when it agreed to purchase a substantial package of weapons including 24 Su-30MKV fighter aircraft, nine Mi-17 transport helicopters, five Mi-35 attack helicopters, two Mi-26 heavy-lift helicopters and 100,000 assault rifles. Since then the relationship has deepened, and in 2008 Moscow agreed to provide a US$1bn credit facility to the Venezuelan government for the purchase of Russian defence equipment. In 2009 this facility was increased to a total of US$2.2bn. In the short term the facility will cover the delivery of around 100 T-72 main battle tanks and *Smerch* multiple-launch rocket systems from Russia, though in the longer term it is thought the credit arrangement is linked to an eventual acquisition by Venezuela of a multilayered air-defence system that would include *Tor*-M1 short- to medium-range air-defence batteries as well as S-300, *Buk*-M2 and *Pechora* units. Russia's strategy of using loans to facilitate weapons sales has been extended to a number of other countries, most notably Indonesia, where a US$1bn facility is in place. Moscow has also adopted other financial arrangements in an effort to boost weapons sales. Part of its deal with Venezuela, for example, includes access to Venezuelan oil fields by Russian companies, and as part of its multi-year weapons deal signed with Algeria in 2006, Russia agreed to write off around US$5bn in Algerian debt in return for access to Algerian oil and gas fields by LUKOIL and Gazprom.

In the Middle East, Russian firms are hoping that the imminent delivery of *Pantsir* air-defence systems to the UAE will revive regional interest in Russian military technology first sparked in 2000 when then President Putin cancelled an agreement with the US to restrict Russia's arms and nuclear sales to Iran, and later boosted by the Algerian deal. The most likely catalyst for an increase in trade would come if Russian firms could make inroads into the Saudi Arabian defence market, the largest in the region. In February 2009, Russia's state arms-export agency, Rosoboronexport, announced that it had secured a deal with an unnamed Middle Eastern country, widely believed to be Saudi Arabia. It is thought that a prospective US$2bn deal is currently being discussed that would see Saudi Arabia buy a variety of equipment including 30 Mi-35 attack helicopters, 120 Mi-17 transport helicopters, 150 T-90 tanks and 250 BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles. Reports also suggest that Russia is hoping to sell its advanced S-400 air-defence systems to Riyadh, though whether this is an attempt by Saudi Arabia to convince Moscow not to sell the same weapons to Iran is unclear. Given that there are no overwhelming practical reasons for Saudi Arabia to embark on such an extensive procurement drive, any agreed contracts between the two countries could be interpreted as an attempt by Riyadh to achieve some leverage over Russia regarding its relationship with Tehran. Elsewhere in the region, Libya is emerging as a likely purchaser of significant quanti-

ties of Russian military equipment. At the 2009 Libyan Aviation Exhibition the two countries announced the completion of five contracts that follow on from a US$2.5bn agreement for military equipment and support services first outlined in mid 2008. According to Rosoboronexport, contracts so far agreed cover the modernisation of T-72 tanks and the supply of spare parts and maintenance equipment for a range of naval and ground-force systems. Future contracts are expected to include Su-35 and Su-30 fighter aircraft, Yak-130 combat-training planes, Mi-17 and Mi-35 helicopters and air-defence systems such as the S-300PMU2 and *Tor*-M1.

Estimating Russian military expenditure

As ever, estimating the real scale of Russian military spending is fraught with difficulty, not least because of recent changes in the presentation of budget data. Taken at face value, the official national-defence allocation for 2008, R1,041bn, corresponded to 2.49% of GDP; however, as indicated in Table 21, this figure excludes funds made available for other military-related expenditures such as pensions and paramilitary forces, not to mention the rising level of subsidies provided to the defence-industrial sector for which figures are unavailable. Including these additional budget allocations brings overall defence-related expenditure for 2008 to around R1,570bn, or 3.76% of that year's GDP.

Using the prevailing market exchange rate for 2008, Russia's stated defence expenditure was worth US$41.9bn, or US$63.3bn with the additional expenditures factored in. However, when assessing macroeconomic data from countries in transition, the market exchange rate does not usually reflect the actual purchasing power of the domestic currency, and economists therefore use an alternative methodology to make currency conversions, known as Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). For example, in 2008 Russia's GDP measured US$1,680bn when converted at market exchange rates; however, the World Bank has also calculated that, in PPP terms, Russia's 2008 GDP was equivalent to US$2,288bn. If this crude methodology is applied to military spending, then total defence-related expenditure in 2008 would jump to the equivalent of US$86bn.

Note: Although PPP rates can be a useful tool for comparing macroeconomic data, such as GDP, of countries at different stages of development, because there is no specific PPP rate to apply to the military sector, its use in this context should be treated with caution. In addition, there is no definitive guide as to which elements of military spending should be calculated using available PPP rates.

Russia RUS

Russian Rouble r		2008	2009	2010
GDP	r	41.66tr	40.51tr	
	US$	1.68tr	1.37tr	
per capita	US$	11,941	9,806	
Growth	%	5.6	-7.5	
Inflation	%	14.0	12.3	
Def exp	US$[a]	86bn		
Def bdgt	r	1.00tr	1.21tr	1.25tr
	US$	40.48bn	41.05bn	
US$1=r		24.8	29.5	

[a] PPP estimate

Population 140,041,247

Ethnic groups: Tatar 4%; Ukrainian 3%; Chuvash 1%; Bashkir 1%; Belarussian 1%; Moldovan 1%; Other 8%;

Age	0–14	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–64	65 plus
Male	7%	4%	4%	4%	22%	4%
Female	7%	4%	4%	4%	25%	10%

Capabilities

ACTIVE 1,027,000 (Army 360,000 Airborne 35,000 Navy 142,000 Air 160,000 Strategic Deterrent Forces 80,000 Command and Support 250,000) Paramilitary 449,000

(Estimated 170,000 in the permanent readiness units)

Terms of service: 12 months conscription.

RESERVE 20,000,000 (all arms)

Some 2,000,000 with service within last 5 years; Reserve obligation to age 50.

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Strategic Deterrent Forces ε80,000 (includes personnel assigned from the Navy and Air Force)

Navy

SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC • SSBN 14

5 *Delta* III (1†) (3 based in Pacific Fleet, 2 based in Northern Fleet) (80 msl) each with 16 RSM-50 (SS-N-18) *Stingray* strategic SLBM;

4 *Delta* IV (3 based in Northern Fleet and 1 based in Pacific Fleet), (64 msl) each with 16 RSM-54 (SS-N-23) *Skiff* strategic SLBM;

2 *Delta* IV in refit in Northern Fleet (32 msl) each with 16 RSM-52 (SS-N-23) *Skiff* strategic SLBM;

2 *Typhoon* based in Northern Fleet (40 msl) each with 40 RSM-52 (SS-N-20) *Sturgeon* strategic SLBM; 1 *Typhoon*† in reserve based in Northern Fleet with capacity for 20 RSM-52 (SS-N-20) *Sturgeon* strategic SLBM and 1+ *Bulava* (SS-N-30) strategic SLBM (trials / testing);

1 *Yury Dolgoruky* (limited OC undergoing sea trials; 2 additional units in build)

Strategic Rocket Force Troops

3 Rocket Armies operating silo and mobile launchers with 430 missiles and 1,605 nuclear warheads organised in 12 divs (reducing to 8). Launcher gps normally with 10 silos (6 for SS-18) and one control centre

MSL • STRATEGIC 430

ICBM 385: 68 RS-20 (SS-18) *Satan* (mostly mod 4/5, 10 MIRV per msl); 180 RS12M (SS-25) *Sickle* (mobile single warhead); 72 RS18 (SS-19) *Stiletto* (mostly mod 3, 6 MIRV per msl.); 50 *Topol*-M (SS-27) silo-based/15 *Topol* M (SS-27) road mobile single warhead (5 regts); 1 regt RS-24 (MIRV)

Long-Range Aviation Command • 37th Air Army

FORCES BY ROLE

Bbr 2 heavy div with 4 regt at 3 air bases operating 79 bbr carrying up to 856 LRCM

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT • LRSA 79: 16 Tu-160 *Blackjack* each with up to 12 KH-55SM/RKV-500B (AS-15B *Kent*) nuclear ALCM; 32 Tu-95MS6 (*Bear* H-6) each with up to 6 Kh-55/RKV-500A (AS-15A *Kent*) nuclear ALCM; 31 Tu-95MS16 (*Bear* H-16) each with up to 16 Kh-55/RKV-500A (AS-15A *Kent*) nuclear ALCM

Test ac 10: 5 Tu-95, 5 Tu-160

Warning Forces 3rd Space and Missile Defence Army

ICBM/SLBM launch-detection capability. 5 operationalsatellites

RADAR (9 stations) 1 ABM engagement system located at Sofrino (Moscow). Russia leases ground-based radar stations in Baranovichi (Belarus); Balkhash (Kazakhstan); Gaballa (Azerbaijan). It also has radars on its own territory at Lekhtusi, (St. Petersburg); Armavir, (southern Russia); Olenegorsk (northwest Arctic); Pechora (northwest Urals); Mishelevka (east Siberia).

MISSILE DEFENCE 2,064**:** 32 SH-11 *Gorgon;* 68 SH-08 *Gazelle;* 1,900 S-300PMU/SA-10 *Grumble;* 64 S-400 *Growler*/SA-21 *Triumf;*

Space Forces 40,000

Formations and units withdrawn from Strategic Missile and Air Defence Forces to detect missile attack on the RF and its allies, to implement BMD, and to be responsible for military/dual-use spacecraft launch and control.

Army ε205,000 (incl 35,000 AB); ε190,000 conscript (total 395,000)

6 Mil Districts. Transformation continues with large manpower reductions in senior and middle officer ranks, replacing and transferring the warrant officer class' responsibilities to NCOs. There has been a rationalisation of structures and equipment to reflect existing organisations and equipment. The first priority was, from January to June, to reorganise 39 bdes. The second to reorganise by December, combat support organisations.

FORCES BY ROLE

Comd 7 Army HQ

Tk	4 bde (each: 3 tk bn, 1 MR (BMP-2) bn, 1 armd recce bn, 1 arty regt, 1 SAM regt, 1 EW, 1 NBC, 1 engr coy)
MR	34 bde each (3 MR , 1 tk bn, 1 recce bn, 1 arty regt, 1 AT bn, 1 SAM regt, 1 EW, 1 NBC, 1 engr coy); 1 (coastal) bde; 1 trg regt
SF	9 (Spetsnaz) bde ; 1 SF Recce regt;
Air Aslt	2 bde (Ground Forces)
AB	4 (VdV) div (each: 2 para/air aslt regt, 1 arty regt); 1 (VdV) indep bde
Arty	1 div; 10 arty bde
SSM	10 bde each with 18 SS-21 *Scarab* (*Tochka*) (replacement by *Iskander*-M began during 2005 with 12 per bde)
MGA	1 div
AD	12 bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT 23,000: 250–300 T-90; 4,500 T-80/T-80UD/T-80UM/T-80U; 9,500 T-72L/T-72M; 3,000 T-72; 4,000 T-64A/T-64B; 150 T-62, 350 in store; 1,200 T-55
LT TK 150 PT-76
RECCE 2,000+ BRDM-2
AIFV 15,180+: 1,500+ BMD-1/BMD-2/BMD-3; 8,100 BMP-1; 4,600 BMP-2; 280 BMP-3; 700 BRM-1K; BTR-80A
APC 9,900+
  APC (T) 5,000: 700 BTR-D; 3,300 MT-LB; 1,000 BTR 50
  APC (W) 4,900+: 4,900 BTR-60/BTR-70/BTR-80; BTR-90
ARTY 26,121+
  SP 6,010**: 122mm** 2,780 2S1 *Carnation*; **152mm** 3,100: 550 2S19 *Farm*; 1,600 2S3; 950 2S5**; 203mm** 130 2S7
  TOWED 12,765: **122mm** 8,350: 4,600 D-30; 3,750 M-30 *M-1938*; **130mm** 650 M-46; **152mm** 3,725: 1,100 2A36; 750 2A65; 1,075 D-20; 700 M-1943; 100 ML-20 M-1937; **203mm** 40 B-4M
  GUN/MOR 820+
    SP 120mm 820: 30 2S23 *NONA-SVK*; 790 2S9 *NONA-S*
    TOWED 120mm 2B16 *NONA-K*
  MRL 3,976+: **122mm** 2,970: 2,500 BM-21; 50 BM-16; 420 9P138; **132mm** BM-13; **140mm** BM-14; **220mm** 900 9P140 *Uragan*; **300mm** 106 9A52 *Smerch*
  MOR 2,550
    SP 240mm 430 2S4
    TOWED 2,120: **120mm** 1,820: 920 2S12; 900 PM-38; **160mm** 300 M-160
AT
  MSL • MANPATS AT-2 3K11 *Swatter*; AT-3 9K11 *Sagger*; AT-4 9K111 *Spigot*; AT-5 9K113 *Spandrel*; AT-6 9K114 *Spiral*; AT-7 9K115 *Saxhorn*; AT-9 9M114M1 *Ataka;* AT-10 9K116 *Stabber*
  RCL 73mm SPG-9; **82mm** B-10
  RL 64mm RPG-18 *Fly*; **73mm** RPG-16/RPG-22 *Net*/RPG-26/RPG-7 *Knout*; **105mm** RPG-27/RPG-29
  GUNS 526+
    SP 57mm ASU-57; **85mm** ASU-85; D-44/SD44
    TOWED 526 **100mm**T-12A/M-55; T-12
AD
  SAM 2,465+
    SP 2,465+: 220 SA-4 A/B *Ganef* (twin) (Army/Front wpn – most in store); 225 SA-6 *Gainful* (div wpn); 550 SA-8 *Gecko* (div wpn); 350 SA-11 *Gadfly* (replacing SA-4/-6); 800 SA-9 *Gaskin*/SA-13 *Gopher* (regt wpn); 200 SA-12A (S-300V) *Gladiator*/SA-12B *Giant* (twin); 120 SA-15 *Gauntlet* (replacing SA-6/SA-8); SA-19 *Grison* (8 SAM, plus twin 30mm gun); SA-20 (S-400) *Triumph*
    MANPAD SA-7 *Grail* (being replaced by -16/-18); SA-14 *Gremlin*; 9K310 (SA-16) *Gimlet*; SA-18 *Grouse (Igla)*
  GUNS
    SP 23mm ZSU-23-4; **30mm** 2S6; **57mm** ZSU-57-2
    TOWED 23mm ZU-23; **57mm** S-60; **85mm** M-1939 *KS-12*; **100mm** KS-19; **130mm** KS-30
UAV BLA-06; BLA-07; Tu-134 *Reys*; Tu-243 *Reys*/Tu-243 *Reys-D*; Tu-300 *Korshun*; *Pchela-1*; *Pchela-2*
MSL • SSM ε200+: 200 SS-21 *Scarab (Tochka)*; SS-26 *Iskander* (*Stone*); FROG in store; *Scud* in store

FACILITIES

Bases	2 (each 1 MR bde; subord. to North Caucasus MD) located in Abkhazia/ South Ossetia, 1 located in Tajikistan, 1 located in Armenia
Training centres	6 (District (each = bde; 1 per MD)), 1 (AB (bde))

Reserves

Cadre formations, on mobilisation form

MR	11 div

Navy 142,000

FORCES BY ROLE

4 major Fleet Organisations (Northern Fleet, Pacific Fleet, Baltic Fleet, Black Sea) and Caspian Sea Flotilla

Northern Fleet

FORCES BY ROLE

1 Navy HQ located at Severomorsk

FACILITIES

Bases Located at Severomorsk and Kola Peninsula

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES 42
  STRATEGIC 12: 8 **SSBN**; 4 in reserve
  TACTICAL 22: 12 **SSN**; 3 **SSGN**; 7 **SSK**
  SUPPORT 8: 4 **SSAN** (other roles); 4 in reserve (other roles)
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 10: 1 **CV;** 2 **CGN** (1 in reserve); 1 **CG;** 7 **DDG** (1 in reserve)
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12: **FF** 8; **FS** 4
MINE WARFARE 10 **MCMV**
AMPHIBIOUS 5
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 20+

Naval Aviation

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT
  BBR 39Tu-22M *Backfire C*
  FTR 20 Su-27 *Flanker*
  FGA 10 Su-25 *Frogfoot*
  ASW 32: 14 Il-38 *May*; 18 Tu-142 *BearF/J*

TPT 27: 2 An-12 *Cub* (MR/EW); 25 An-12 *Cub*/An-24 *Coke*/An-26 *Curl*
HELICOPTERS
ASW 20 Ka-27 *Helix A*
ASLT 10 Ka-29 *Helix B*
SPT 15 Mi-8 *Hip*

Naval Infantry

Naval inf 1 regt with 74 MBT; 209 ACV; 44 arty

Coastal Defence

Coastal def 1 bde with 360 MT-LB; 134 arty
SAM 1 regt

Pacific Fleet

FORCES BY ROLE
Fleet HQ located at Vladivostok
FACILITIES
Bases located at Fokino, Magadan, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, Sovetskya Gavan, Viliuchinsk and Vladivostok
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SUBMARINES 23
STRATEGIC • SSBN 4: 3 and 1 in reserve
TACTICAL 20: 4 **SSN/SSGN** and 7 in reserve; **SSK** 6 and 3 in reserve
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 15: 1 **CG**; 5 **DDG** 3 in reserve; 9 **FFG/FF**
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 16 **PFM**
MINE WARFARE 9 **MCMV**
AMPHIBIOUS 4
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 15+

Naval Aviation

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT
BBR 17 Tu-22M *Backfire C*
FTR 30 MiG-31 *Foxhound* A
ASW 29: 15 Il-38 *May*; 14 Tu-142 *Bear* F/J
TPT 10 An-12 *Cub* (MR/EW); An-26 *Curl*
HELICOPTERS
ASW 31 Ka-28 (Ka-27) *Helix*
ASLT 6 Ka-29 *Helix*
SPT 26 Mi-8 *Hip* (TPT)

Naval Infantry

Inf 1 div HQ (Pacific Fleet) (1 arty bn, 1 tk bn, 3 inf bn)

Coastal Defence

Coastal Def 1 bde

Black Sea Fleet

The RUS Fleet is leasing bases in Sevastopol and Karantinnaya Bay, and is based, jointly with UKR warships, at Streletskaya Bay. The Fleet's overall serviceability is assessed as medium.

FORCES BY ROLE
1 Navy HQ located at Sevastopol, UKR
FACILITIES
Bases located at Sevastopol, Novorossiysk and Temryuk
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL SSK 2:1 (1 *Tango* in reserve)
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 11: 2 **CG**; 1 **DDG**; 8 **FFG/FS**
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10: 7 **PFM**; 3 **PHM**
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES
MCMV 7
AMPHIBIOUS 7: 4 *Ropucha;* 3 *Alligator*
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 6+

Naval Aviation

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT
FGA 18 Su-24 *Fencer*
ASW 14 Be-12 *Mail*
TPT 4 An-12 *Cub* (MR/EW); An-26
HELICOPTERS
ASW 33 Ka-28 (Ka-27) *Helix*
SPT 9: 1 Mi-8 *Hip* (TPT); 8 (MR/EW)

Naval Infantry

Naval inf 1 regt with 59 ACV; 14 arty

Baltic Fleet

FORCES BY ROLE
1 Navy HQ located at Kaliningrad
FACILITIES
Bases located at Kronstadt and Baltiysk
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SUBMARINES • TACTICAL SSK 2: 1 (and 1 in reserve)
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 5: 2 **DDG**; 3 **FFG**
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 22: 12 **PFM**; 10 **FF**
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES
MCMV 11: 10 (and 1 in reserve)
AMPHIBIOUS 4 *Ropucha*
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 8+

Naval Aviation

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AIRCRAFT
FTR 24 Su-27 *Flanker*
FGA 29 Su-24 *Fencer*
TPT 14: 12 An-12 *Cub*/An-24 *Coke*/An-26 *Curl*; 2 An-12 *Cub* (MR/EW)
HELICOPTERS
ATK 11 Mi-24 *Hind*
ASW 12 Ka-28 (Ka-27) *Helix*
ASLT 8 Ka-29 *Helix*
SPT 17 Mi-8 *Hip* (TPT)

Naval Infantry

Naval inf 1 bde with 26 MBT; 220 ACV; 52 MRL

Coastal Defence

FORCES BY ROLE
Arty 2 regt with 133 arty

SSM 1 regt with 8 SS-C-1B *Sepal*
AD 1 regt with 28 Su-27 *Flanker* (Baltic Fleet)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
AD 50 SAM

Caspian Sea Flotilla

The Caspian Sea Flotilla has been divided between AZE (about 25%), RUS, KAZ, and TKM.

FACILITIES
Base located at Astrakhan, Kaspiysk and Makhachkala

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES
FFG 1
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 6: 3 **PFM**; 3 **PHM**
MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 9: 5 **MSC**; 4 **MSI**
AMPHIBIOUS 6
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 5+

Naval Infantry

Naval inf 1 bde

NAVY EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
SUBMARINES 66
STRATEGIC 14
SSBN 14:
5 *Delta* III (1†) (3 based in Pacific Fleet, 2 based in Northern Fleet) (80 msl) each with 16 RSM-50 (SS-N-18) *Stingray* strategic SLBM
4 *Delta* IV (3 based in Northern Fleet and 1 based in Pacific Fleet), (64 msl) each with 16 RSM-54 (SS-N-23) *Skiff* strategic SLBM
2 *Delta* IV in refit in Northern Fleet (32 msl) each with 16 RSM-52 (SS-N-23) *Skiff* strategic SLBM
2 *Typhoon* based in Northern Fleet (40 msl) each with 40 RSM-52 (SS-N-20) *Sturgeon* strategic SLBM; 1 *Typhoon*† in reserve based in Northern Fleet with capacity for 20 RSM-52 (SS-N-20) *Sturgeon* strategic SLBM and 1+ *Bulava* (SS-N-30) strategic SLBM (trials / testing)
1 *Yury Dolgoruky* (limited OC undergoing sea trials; 2 additional units in build)
TACTICAL 52
SSGN 7:
5 *Oscar* II each with 2 single 650mm TT each with T-65 HWT, 4 single 553mm TT with 24 SS-N-19 *Shipwreck* tactical USGW
2 *Oscar* II (1 in reserve, 1 in refit), with 2 single 650mm TT each with T-65 HWT, 1 VLS with 24 SS-N-19 *Shipwreck* tactical USGW
SSN 17:
2 *Akula* II each with 4 single 533mm TT each with SS-N-21 *Sampson* tactical SLCM, 4 single 650mm TT each with single 650mm TT
5 *Akula* I each with 4 single 533mm TT each with SS-N-21 *Sampson* tactical SLCM, 4 single 650mm TT each with T-65 HWT; 3 *Akula I* in reserve (+RUS *Nerpa* undergoing trials for lease agreement with IND)
2 *Sierra* II with 4 single 533mm TT each with, SS-N-21 *Sampson* tactical SLCM, 4 single 650mm TT each with T-65 HWT/T-53 HWT
1 *Sierra* I in reserve†
4 *Victor* III (1 in reserve) each with 4 single 533mm TT each with SS-N-21 *Sampson* tactical SLCM, T-65 HWT
SSK 20:
15 *Kilo* each with 6 single 533mm TT each with T-53 HWT; 4 *Kilo* in reserve
1 *Lada* (Undergoing sea trials, expected ISD 2010) with 6 single 533mm TT, (2 additional vessels in build, planned for export)
SUPPORT • SSAN 8: 1 *Delta Stretch*; 1 *Losharik*; 2 *Paltus*; 3 *Uniform*; 1 *X-Ray*
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 57
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CV 1 *Kuznetsov* (capacity 18 Su-33 *Flanker D* FGA ac; 4 Su-25 *Frogfoot* ac, 15 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel, 2 Ka-31 *Helix* AEW hel,) with 1 12 cell VLS (12 eff.) with SS-N-19 *Shipwreck* tactical SSM, 4 sextuple VLS (24 eff.) each with 8 SA-N-9 *Gauntlet* SAM
CRUISERS 5
CGN 1 *Kirov* with 10 twin VLS (20 eff.) each with SS-N-19 *Shipwreck* tactical SSM, 2 twin (4 eff.) each with 20 SA-N-4 *Gecko* SAM, 12 single VLS each with SA-N-6 *Grumble* SAM, 10 single 533mm ASTT, 1 single ASTT with 1 SS-N-15 *Starfish* ASW, 1 twin 130mm gun (2 eff.), (capacity 3 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel) (2nd *Kirov* undergoing extensive refit currently non operational)
CG 4:
1 *Kara*, with 2 quad (8 eff.) each with SS-N-14 *Silex* tactical SSM, 2 twin (4 eff.) each with 36 SA-N-3 *Goblet* SAM, 2 (4 eff.) each with 20 SA-N-4 *Gecko* SAM, 2 quad (4 eff.) ASTT (10 eff.), (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)
3 *Slava* each with 8 twin (16 eff.) each with SS-N-12 *Sandbox* tactical SSM, 8 octuple VLS each with 8 SA-N-6 *Grumble* SAM, 8 single 533mm ASTT, 1 twin 130mm gun (2 eff.), (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)
DESTROYERS • DDG 14:
1 *Kashin* (mod) with 2 quad (8 eff.) each with SS-N-25 *Switchblade* tactical SSM, 2 twin (4 eff.) each with SA-N-1 *Goa* SAM, 5 single 533mm ASTT, 2 76mm gun
5 *Sovremenny* (additional 2 in reserve) each with 2 quad (8 eff.) each with SS-N-22 *Sunburn* tactical SSM, 2 twin (4 eff.) each with 22 SA-N-7 SAM, 2 twin 533mm TT (4 eff.), 2 twin 130mm gun (4 eff.), (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)
7 *Udaloy* each with 2 quad (8 eff.) each with SS-N-14 *Silex* tactical SSM, 8 octuple VLS each with SA-N-9 *Gauntlet* SAM, 2 quad 533mm ASTT (8 eff.), 2 100mm gun, (capacity 2 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)
1 *Udaloy* II with 2 quad (8 eff.) each with SS-N-22 *Sunburn* tactical SSM, 8 octuple VLS each with SA-N-9 *Gauntlet* SAM, 8 SA-N-11 *Grisson* SAM, 10 single 533mm ASTT, 2 CADS-N-1 CIWS (4 eff.), 2 100mm gun, (capacity 2 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)
FRIGATES 14
FFG 7:
1 *Gepard* with 2 quad (8 eff.) each with SS-N-25 *Switchblade* tactical SSM, 1 twin (2 eff.) with SA-N-4

Gecko SAM, 2 1 30mm CIWS, 1 76mm gun, (2nd vessel on trials expected ISD 2010)
2 *Krivak* I each with 1 quad (4 eff.) with SS-N-14 *Silex* tactical SSM, 1 twin (2 eff.) with 20 SA-N-4 *Gecko* SAM, 2 quad 533mm ASTT (8 eff.), 2 x12 RL (24 eff.), 2 100mm gun, 2 x2 76mm gun (4 eff.), (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)
2 *Krivak* II each with 1 quad (4 eff.) with SS-N-14 *Silex* tactical SSM, 2 twin (4 eff.) each with 10 SA-N-4 *Gecko* SAM, 2 quad 533mm ASTT (8 eff.), 2 x12 RL (24 eff.), 2 100mm gun
2 *Neustrashimy* with 4 octuple (32 eff.) each with SA-N-9 *Gauntlet* SAM, 6 single 533mm ASTT, 1 RBU 12000 (10 eff.), 1 100mm gun, (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW) (3rd in build)

FF 7 *Parchim* II each with 2 quad (8 eff.) each with SA-N-5 *Grail* SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT (4 eff.), 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch 2* (24 eff.), 1 76mm gun

CORVETTES 23:
1 *Steregushchiy* with 2 quad (8eff.) with SA-N-11 *Grisson* SAM , 1 100mm gun,(4 units in build)
3 *Grisha* III with 1 twin (2 eff.) with 20 SA-N-4 *Gecko* SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT (4 eff.), 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch 2* (24 eff.)
19 *Grisha* V each with 1 twin (2 eff.) with 20 SA-N-4 *Gecko* SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT (4 eff.), 1 RBU 6000 *Smerch 2* (12 eff.), 1 76mm gun
1 *Scorpion* with 2 quad (8 eff.) with SS-N-26 *Yakhont* SSM, 1 100mm gun, (ISD expected 2011)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 75

PFM 37
13 *Nanuchka* III each with 2 triple (6 eff.) each with 1 SS-N-9 *Siren* tactical SSM, 1 twin (2 eff.) eq. with SA-N-4 *Gecko*, 1 76mm gun
1 *Nanuchka* IV with 2 triple (6 eff.) each with SS-N-9 *Siren* tactical SSM, 1 twin (2 eff.) eq. with SA-N-4 *Gecko*, 1 76mm gun
4 *Tarantul* II each with 2 twin (4 eff.) each with SS-N-2C *Styx*/SS-N-2D *Styx* tactical SSM
18 *Tarantul* III each with 2 twin (4 eff.) each with SS-N-22 *Sunburn* tactical SSM
1 *Astrakhan* Project 21630 (First of 5–7 on order)

PHM 11:
2 *Dergach* each with 2 quad (8 eff.) each with SS-N-22 *Sunburn* tactical SSM, 1 twin (2 eff.) with 1 SA-N-4 *Gecko* SAM, 1 76mm gun
9 *Matka* each with 2 single each with SS-N-2C *Styx* tactical SSM/SS-N-2D *Styx* tactical SSM

PHT 6:
1 *Mukha* with 2 quad 406mm TT (8 eff.)
5 *Turya* each with 4 single 533mm ASTT

PFC 21:
1 *Pauk* each with 4 single 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 1200 (10 eff.)
20 ε *Stenka*

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 37
MCO 2 *Gorya*
MSO 9 *Natya*
MSC 22 *Sonya*
MHC 4 *Lida*

AMPHIBIOUS: 42+

PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LPD
1 *Ivan Rogov* (capacity 4–5 Ka-28 (Ka-27) *Helix* ASW hel; 6 ACV or 6 LCM; 20 tanks; 520 troops)

LS 22

LSM 3:
3 *Polnochny*† B (capacity 6 MBT; 180 troops); (3 in reserve)

LST 19:
1 Ivan Green (Mod – *Alligator)* (capacity 1 Ka-29 Helix B; 13 MBT; 300 troops), (expected ISD 2010)
4 *Alligator* (capacity 20 tanks; 300 troops)
14 *Ropucha* II and I (capacity either 10 MBT and 190 troops or 24 APC (T) and 170 troops)

CRAFT 19+

LCM 6 *Ondatra*
LCU 3 *Serna* (capacity 100 troops)

ACV 10:
3 *Aist* (capacity 4 lt tank)
3 *Lebed*
2 *Orlan*
2 *Pomornik* (*Zubr*) (capacity 230 troops; either 3 MBT or 10 APC (T))

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 105+
A significant element of the RUS Auxiliary and Support Fleet (Estimated at 370+ vessels) is either no longer active, at extended readiness or awaiting disposal - the following is a considered and revised assessment of significant RUS operationally active logistics and support elements:
AOR 5 *Chilikin*
AOL 9: 2 *Dubna*; 2 *Uda*; 5 *Altay mod*
AORL 2 *Olekma*
AS 1 *Malina (Project 2020)*
ARS 9 *Goryn*
AR 4 *Amur*
ARC 7: 4 *Emba*; 3 *Klasma*
AG 2 *Amga* (msl spt ship)
ATS 10: 5 *Katun*; 2 *Neftegaz*; 3 *Ingul*
AH 3 *Ob* †
AGOR 4: 2 *Akademik Krylov*; 2 *Vinograd*
AGI 11: 1 *Balzam*; 3 *Moma*; 7 *Vishnya*
AGM 1 *Marshal Nedelin*
AGS(I) 24: 3 *Biya*; 19 *Finik*; 2 *Moma*
AGB 4 *Dobrynya Mikitich*
ABU 6: 2 *Kashtan*; 4 *Sura*
ATF 1 *Sorum*
TRG • AXL 2 *Smolny*

Naval Aviation ε35,000

4 Fleet Air Forces, each organised in air div; each with 2–3 regt with an HQ elm and 2 sqn of 9–10 ac each; configured recce, ASW, tpt/utl org in indep regt or sqn
Flying hours ε40 hrs/year

FORCES BY ROLE

Bbr	sqns with Tu-22M *Backfire C*
Ftr/FGA	sqn with Su-27 *Flanker*; 10 Su-25 *Frogfoot*; 58 Su-24 *Fencer;* 30 MiG-31 *Foxhound*
ASW	sqns with Ka-27 *Helix*; Mi-14 *Haze*-A; sqn with Be-12 *Mail*; Il-38 *May*; Tu-142 *Bear*
MR/EW	sqns with An-12 *Cub*; Il-20 RT *Coot-A*; Mi-8 *Hip* J

Tpt	sqns with An-12 *Cub*/An-24 *Coke*/An-26 *Curl*
ATK hel	sqns with Mi-24 *Hind*
Aslt hel	sqns Ka-29 *Helix*; 26 Mi-8 *Hip*
Tpt hel	sqns with Ka-25 PS *Hormone* C, Ka-27 PS *Helixe D*; Mi-6 *Hook*; Mi-14 PS *Haze* C

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 259 combat capable
- **BBR** 56 Tu-22M *Backfire C*
- **FTR** 79: 49 Su-27 *Flanker*; 30 MiG-31 *Foxhound*
- **FGA** 52: 5 Su-25 *Frogfoot*; 47 Su-24 *Fencer*
- **ASW** 27 Tu-142 *Bear* F/J*
- **MP** 44: 15 Be-12 *Mail**; 29 Il-38 *May**
- **EW • ELINT** 2 Il-20 RT *Coot-A;* 5 An-12 *Cub*
- **TPT** 37: 37 An-12 *Cub*/An-24 *Coke*/An-26 *Curl*

HELICOPTERS
- **ATK** 11 Mi-24 *Hind*
- **ASW** 105: 70 Ka-27 *Helix*; 20 Mi-14 *Haze*-A
- **EW 8** Mi-8 *HipJ*
- **ASLT** 28 Ka-29 *Helix*
- **SAR** 62: 22 Ka-25 PS *Hormone* C/Ka-27 PS *Hormone*-D; 40 Mi-14 PS *Haze* C
- **SPT** 36: 26 Mi-8 *Hip*; 10 Mi-6 *Hook*

MSL • TACTICAL
- **ASM** AS-10 *Karen*; AS-11 *Kilter*; AS-12 *Kegler*; AS-4 *Kitchen*; AS-7 *Kerry*; KH-59 (AS-13) *Kingbolt*

Coastal Defence • Naval Infantry (Marines) 9,500

FORCES BY ROLE

Naval inf	3 indep bde (*total:* 1 AT bn, 1 arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 tk bn, 4 naval inf bn); 1 indep bn; 3 regt; 1 indep regt;
Inf	1 div HQ (Pacific Fleet) (3 inf bn, 1 tk bn, 1 arty bn)
SF	3 (fleet) bde (1 op, 2 cadre) (*each:* 1 para bn, 1 spt elm, 2–3 underwater bn)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT 160 T-55M/T-72/T-80
RECCE 60 BRDM-2 each with AT-3 9K11 *Sagger*
AIFV 150+: ε150 BMP-2; BMP-3**;** BRM-1K
APC 750+
- **APC (T)** 250 MT-LB
- **APC (W)** 500+ BTR-60/BTR-70/BTR-80

ARTY 367
- **SP** 113: **122mm** 95 2S1 *Carnation*; **152mm** 18 2S3
- **TOWED 122mm** 45 D-30
- **GUN/MOR** 113
  - **SP 120mm** 95: 20 2S23 *NONA-SVK*; 75 2S9 SP *NONA-S*
  - **TOWED 120mm** 18 2B16 *NONA-K*
- **MRL 122mm** 96 9P138

AT • MSL • MANPATS 72 AT-3 9K11 *Sagger*/AT-5 9K113 *Spandrel*
- **GUNS 100mm** T-12

AD • SAM 320
- **SP** 70: 20 SA-8 *Gecko*; 50 SA-9 *Gaskin*/SA-13 *Gopher* (200 eff.)
- **MANPAD** 250 SA-7 *Grail*
- **GUNS 23mm** 60 ZSU-23-4

Coastal Defence Troops 2,000

FORCES BY ROLE

(All units reserve status)

Coastal Def	2 bde
Arty	2 regt
AD	1 regt with 28 Su-27 *Flanker*
SAM	2 regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT 350 T-64
AIFV 450 BMP
APC 320
- **APC (T)** 40 MT-LB
- **APC (W)** 280 BTR-60/BTR-70/BTR-80

ARTY 364
- **SP 152mm** 48 2S5
- **TOWED** 280: **122mm** 140 D-30; **152mm** 140: 50 2A36; 50 2A65; 40 D-20
- **MRL 122mm** 36 BM-21

AIRCRAFT • FTR 28 Su-27 *Flanker*
AD • SAM 50

Military Air Forces 160,000 reducing to 148,000 (incl conscripts)

4,000+ ac, 833 in reserve

HQ at Balashikha, near Moscow. The Military Air Forces comprise Long Range Aviation (LRA), Military Transport Aviation Comd (VTA), 5 Tactical/Air Defence Armies comprising 49 air regts. Tactical/Air Defence roles include air defence, interdiction, recce and tactical air spt. LRA (2 div) and VTA (9 regt) are subordinated to central Air Force comd. A joint CIS Unified Air Defence System covers RUS, ARM, BLR, GEO, KAZ, KGZ, TJK, TKM, UKR and UZB.

The Russian Air Force is embarking on a period that will see significant restructuring, both in terms of general organization as well as air base and unit structure.

Long-Range Aviation Command • 37th Air Army

Flying hours: 80-100 hrs/yr

FORCES BY ROLE

Bbr	2 heavy bbr div; 4 heavy regt (non-strategic); 4 heavy regt (START accountable) with 116 Tu-22M-3/MR *Backfire* C
Tkr	1 base with 20 Il-78 *Midas*/Il-78M *Midas*
Trg	1 hvy bbr trg centre with 4 Tu-22M-3, 4 Tu-95MS, 30 Tu-134 *Crusty*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 116 combat capable
- **BBR** 116 Tu-22M-3/Tu-22MR *Backfire C*
- **TKR** 20 IL-78 *Midas* /Il-78M *Midas*
- **TPT** 30 Tu-134 *Crusty*

Tactical Aviation

Flying hours 25 to 40 hrs/year

FORCES BY ROLE

Bbr/FGA	7 regt with Su-25A/SM *Frogfoot*; 1 regt with Su-34P *Fullback*; 1 bbr div plus 13 FGA regt with Su-24/Su-24M2 *Fencer*; Su-25

Ftr	9 regt with MiG-31 *Foxhound*; 9 regt with MiG-29 *Fulcrum* (24 being upgraded); 6 regt with Su-27 *Flanker* (incl Su-27SM); trg units with MiG-25 *Foxbat*
Recce	4 regt with MiG-25R *Foxbat*; 5 regt with Su-24MR *Fencer*
AEW	1 base with A-50 *Mainstay*/A-50U *Mainstay*
ECM	some sqn with Mi-8(ECM) *Hip J*
Trg	2 op conversion centres
SAM	35 regt with 1,900+ S-300 (SA-10) *Grumble* (quad) (7,600 eff.). First SA-20/S-400 (*Triumph*) bn op Elektrostal in Moscow region.

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 1,743 combat capable
BBR/FGA 807: 241 Su-25A/SM *Frogfoot*; 550 Su-24 *Fencer* (up to 7 upgraded to Su-24M2); 16 Su-34P *Fullback* (Su-27IB)
FTR 725: 188 MiG-31 *Foxhound*; 226 MiG-29 *Fulcrum* (24 being upgraded); 281 Su-27 (18 upgraded to 27SM) incl 40 Su-27SMK *Flanker*; 30 MiG-25 *Foxbat*;
RECCE 119: 40 MiG-25R *Foxbat**; 79 Su-24MR *Fencer**
AEW 20 A-50 *Mainstay* AEW/A-50U *Mainstay*
TRG 92**:** 40 MiG-29 *Fulcrum**; 21 Su-27 Flanker*; 15 Su-25 *Frogfoot;** 16 Su-24 *Fencer** (instructor trg)
HELICOPTERS 60 Mi-8(ECM) *Hip J*
UAV *Pchela*-1T; *Albatross*†; *Expert*†
AD • SAM • SP 1,900+ S-300 (SA-10) *Grumble (quad)* / S-400 (SA-20) *Triumph*
MSL • ARM AS-11 *Kilter;* AS-12 *Kegler*; AS-17 *Krypton*
ASM AS-14 *Kedge*; AS-15 *Kent*; AS-16 *Kickback*; AS-4 *Kitchen*; AS-7 *Kerry*
AAM R-27T (AA-10) *Alamo*; R-60T (AA-8) *Aphid*; R-73M1 (AA-11) *Archer*
BOMBS
Laser-guided KAB-500; KAB-1500L
TV-guided KH-59 (AS-13 *Kingbolt*); KAB-500KR; KAB-1500KR; KAB-500OD
INS/GPS/GLONASS guided KH-101; KH-555

Military Transport Aviation Command• 61st Air Army

Flying hours 60 hrs/year

FORCES BY ROLE

Air	9 regt incl. 5 indep regt; 1 div with 12 An-124 *Condor*; 21 An-22 *Cock* (Under MoD control); 210 Il-76 *Candid*
Civilian Fleet	Some sqn (medium and long-range passenger)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT • TPT 293+: 50 An-12 *Cub*; 12 An-124 *Condor*; 21 An-22 *Cock* (Under MoD control); 210 Il-76M/MD/MF *Candid*

Army Aviation Helicopters

Under VVS control. Units organic to army formations.
Flying hours 55 hrs/year

FORCES BY ROLE

Atk hel	20 regt/sqn with 8 Ka-50 *Hokum*; ε620 Mi-24 *Hind*; 7 Mi-28N *Havoc* (300 by 2010)
Tpt/ECM	mixed regts with 35 Mi-26 *Halo* (hy); 8 Mi-6 *Hook*; ε600 MI-17 (Mi-8MT) *Hip H*/Mi-8 *Hip*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

HELICOPTERS
ATK 635: 8 Ka-50 *Hokum*; 620 Mi-24 *Hind* D/V/P; 7 Mi-28N *Havoc* (300 by 2015)
TPT/ECM ε643: 35 Mi-26 *Halo* (hy); 8 Mi-6 *Hook*; ε600 Mi-17 (Mi-8MT) *Hip H*/Mi-8 *Hip* Spt

Air Force Aviation Training Schools

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 980+
FTR MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; Su-27 *Flanker*; MiG-23 *Flogger*
FGA Su-25 *Frogfoot*
TPT Tu-134 *Crusty*
TRG 336 L-39 *Albatros*

FACILITIES

Aviation Institute	5 sqn regt with MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; Su-27 *Flanker*; MiG-23 *Flogger*; Su-25 *Frogfoot*; Tu-134 *Crusty* tpt; L-39 *Albatros* trg ac

Kaliningrad Special Region 10,500 (Ground and Airborne); 1,100 (Naval Infantry) (total 11,600)

These forces operated under the Ground and Coastal Defence Forces of the Baltic Fleet. Probably no MR (trg) regt end 2009.

Army

FORCES BY ROLE

MR	1 bde; 1 indep regt (trg) (disbanded by end 2009/early 2010)
SSM	1 bde with 12-18 SS-21 *Tochka* (*Scarab)*
Arty	1 bde
Hel	1 indep regt
AD	1 bde

FACILITIES

Bases	Located at Baltiysk and Kronstadt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT 811
ACV 1,239: 865; 374 look-a-like
ARTY 345 ARTY/MOR/MRL

Navy • Baltic Fleet – see main Navy section

Russian Military Districts

Leningrad MD 28,700 (Ground and Airborne); 1,300 (Naval Infantry – subordinate to Northern Fleet) (total 30,000)

Combined Service 1 HQ located at St Petersburg

Army

FORCES BY ROLE

MR	2 indep bde, 1 coastal bde
SF	1 (Spetsnaz) bde
AB	1 (VdV) div (2-3 air aslt regt, 1 arty regt)

Arty	1 bde,
SSM	1 bde with 12-18 SS-21 *Tochka* (*Scarab)*
AD	1 bde

Reserve

MR 1 bde

FACILITIES

Training Centre 1 located at Sertolovo (District)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT 300
ACV 2,350: 100; 2,250 look-a-like
ARTY 690 MOR/MRL

Navy • Northern Fleet – see main Navy section

Military Air Force

6th Air Force and AD Army

FORCES BY ROLE

PVO	2 corps
Bbr	1 div with 56 Su-24M *Fencer*
Ftr	1 div with 30 MiG-31 *Foxhound*; 55 Su-27 *Flanker*
Recce	1 regt with 20 Su-24MR *Fencer*; 28 MiG-25R/U *Foxbat*; some MiG-31
AEW/AWACS	A-50 *Mainstay*
Tpt	Sqns with An-12, An-24, An-26, Tu-134
Cbt spt	57 Mi-8 *Hip* (incl ECM), some Mi-8PPA, 38 Mi-24, 4 Mi-6

AD • SAM 525 incl S-300V

Moscow MD 86,200 (Ground and Airborne)

Combined Service 1 HQ located at Moscow

Army

FORCES BY ROLE

Comd	1(20th) Army HQ
Tk	2 Bde
MR	3 bde
SF	1 (Spetsnaz) bde; 1 AB recce regt
AB	2 div (each: 2 para regt, 1 arty regt)
Arty	1 div HQ (3 arty bde)
SSM	2 bde each with 12-18 SS-21 *Scarab* (*Tochka*) (may reduce to 1 bde)
AD	2 bde

Reserve

MR 1 bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT 2,500
ACV 3,100: 2,100; 1,000 look-a-like
ARTY 1,300 ARTY/MOR/MRL

Military Air Force

Moscow Air Defence and Air Army has 1 corps. Due to have additional AD regt (2 bn) equipped with S-400 SAM system.

FORCES BY ROLE

PVO Air	1 (32 PVO) corps 1 16th Air Army
Ftr	regts with 41 MiG-31 *Foxhound*, 45 MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; 30 Su-27
FGA	regts with 52 Su-25 *Frogfoot*, 80 Su-24 *Fencer*
Recce	regt with 55 Su-24MR
Tpt	regt with An-12, An-24, An-26, An-30, Tu-134
Cbt Spt	sqns with 98 Mi-8/ Mi-8PPA/sMV (incl 46 Mi-8(ECM)
Utl	sqns with Mi-8
Trg	30 MiG-29, 18 Su-27, 1 Su-25
UAV	*Pchela*-1T at Combat Training Centre, Egor'evsk, Moscow

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AD • SAM 600

Volga-Ural MD 55,000 (Ground and Airborne)

Combined Service 1 HQ located at Yekaterinburg

Army

1 Army HQ

FORCES BY ROLE

Comd	1 (2nd) Army HQ
Tk	1 bde
MR	4 bde; 3 bde (Tajikistan)
SF	2 (Spetsnaz) bde (may reduce to 1 bde)
AB	1 (VdV) bde
Arty	1 bde
SSM	1 bde each with 12-18 SS-21 *Tochka* (*Scarab)*
AD	1 bde

FACILITIES

Training Centre 1 located at Kamshlov (district)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT 3,000
ACV 2,300
ARTY 2,700 ARTY/MOR/MRL

Navy • Caspian Sea Flotilla see main Navy section

Military Air Force

5th AF and AD Army has no ac subordinated, incl storage bases

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT •
FTR 34 MiG-31
FGA Su-25 *Frogfoot*
TPT An-12; An-26
COMMS Mi-14
HELICOPTERS • SPT: Mi-6, 25 Mi-8 *Hip* (comms); Mi-24, 24 Mi-26
TRG MiG-25U, MiG-29, Su-25, Su-27; 300 L-39 *Albatros,* Mi-2 *Hoplite*

North Caucasus MD 88,600 (Ground And Airborne); ε1,400 (Naval infantry) (total 90,000)

including Trans-Caucasus Group of Forces (GRVZ)
Combined Service 1 HQ located at Rostov-on-Don

Army

FORCES BY ROLE

Army	1 (58th) Army HQ
MR	8 bdes; 1 bde (Armenia); 1 bde (South Ossetia (manning may reduce to 1,700 FSB)); 1 bde (Abkhazia); 2 Mtn bde
SF	2 (Spetsnaz) bde
Air Aslt	1 bde (ground forces)
AB	1 (VdV) div (2 air asslt regt,1 arty regt)
Arty	2 bde
SSM	1 bde each with 12-18 SS-21 *Tochka* (*Scarab)*
AD	2 bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT 800
ACV 2,000
ARTY 900 ARTY/MOR/MRL

Navy • Black Sea Fleet – see main Navy section

Military Air Force

6th AF and AD Army

FORCES BY ROLE

390 cbt ac

Bbr	1 div with 62 Su-24 *Fencer* (some 32 likely to be retired)
Ftr	1 corps (4 regt with 105 MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; 59 Su-27 *Flanker*)
FGA	1 div with 98 Su-25 *Frogfoot*; 36 L-39
Recce	1 regt with 30 Su-24MR *Fencer*
ECM	1 sqn with 52 Mi-8(ECM) *Hip J*
Tpt	Sqns with An-12, An-24, An-26, Tu-134
Cbt Spt	regts with 58 Mi-8PPA/SMV, 75 Mi-24, 40 Mi-28N *Night Hunter*
Utl	4 Mi-6, 10 Mi-26
Trg	tac aviation regt

Siberian MD 52,000 (Ground and Airborne)

Combined Service 1 HQ located at Chita

Army

FORCES BY ROLE

Army	2 (36th and 41st) Army HQ (may reduce to 1 HQ)
Tk	1 bde
MR	4 bde
SF	1 (Spetsnaz) bde
Air Aslt	1 bde (ground forces)
Arty	2 arty bde
SSM	2 bde each with 12-18 SS-21 *Tochka* (*Scarab)*
AD	2 bde

Reserve

MR 6 Bde

FACILITIES

Training Centre 1 located at Peschanka (district)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT 4,000
ACV 6,300
ARTY 2,600 MOR/MRL

Military Air Force

14th AF and AD Army (HQ Novosibirsk)

200 cbt ac

FGA/bbr	some sqn with 30 Su-25 *Frogfoot*; 56 Su-24M *Fencer*
Ftr	some sqn with 39 MiG-31 *Foxhound*; 46 MiG-29 *Fulcrum*
Recce	some sqn with 29 Su-24MR *Fencer-E*; MiG-25R/MiG-25U
Tpt	sqns with An-12, An-26
Cbt Spt	sqns with Mi-8PPA/sMV; Mi-24
Utl/Comms	sqns with Mi-8

AD • SAM S-300O

Far Eastern MD 72,500 (Ground and Airborne); 2,500 (Naval infantry) (total 75,000)

Incl Pacific Fleet and Joint Command of Troops and Forces in the Russian Northeast (comd of Pacific Fleet)

Joint Forces Command 1 HQ located at Petropavlovsk

Combined Service 1 HQ located at Khabarovsk

Army

FORCES BY ROLE

Army	2 (5th and 35th) Army HQ (may reduce to 1 HQ)
MR	6 bde
SF	2 bde (SF may reduce to 1 bde)
Arty	3 bde
SSM	2 bde each with 12-18 SS-21 *Scarab* (*Tochka*)
MGA	1 div
AD	3 bde

Reserve

MR 6 Bde

FACILITIES

Training Centre 1 located at Khabarovsk (district)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT 3,000
ACV 6,000
ARTY 4,100 MOR/MRL

Navy • Pacific Fleet – see main Navy section

Military Air Force

11th AF and AD Army (HQ Khabarovsk)

FGA/bbr	1 regt with 23 Su-27SM; 97 Su-24M *Fencer*
Ftr	sqn with 26 MiG-31 *Foxhound*; ≤100Su-27 *Flanker*;
Recce	sqns with 51 Su-24MR *Fencer*
Tpt	regts with An-12, An-26
Cbt Spt	regts with Mi-8PPA/sMV
Comms	sqns with Mi-8; Mi-24, Ka-50
UAV	1 sqn with *Pchela*-1 (Arseniev, Primorskyy)

AD • SAM S-300P

Paramilitary 449,000

Federal Border Guard Service ε160,000 active

Directly subordinate to the President; now reportedly all contract-based personnel

FORCES BY ROLE

10 regional directorates
Frontier 7 gp

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIFV/APC (W) 1,000 BMP/BTR
ARTY • SP 90: **122mm** 2S1 *Carnation*; **120mm** 2S12; **120mm** 2S9 *Anona*
PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 14
FRIGATES 13
FFG 7 *Krivak III* each with 1 twin (2 eff.) with SA-N-4 *Gecko* naval SAM, 2 quad 533mm TT (8 eff.), 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch 2* (24 eff.), (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix A* ASW hel; 1 100mm)
FFL 6: 3 *Grisha* II; 3 *Grisha* III
CORVETTES • FS 1 *Grisha* V
PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 180
PFM 22:
2 *Pauk II* each with 1 quad (4 eff.) with SA-N-5 *Grail* naval SAM, 2 twin 533mm TT (4 eff.), 2 RBU 1200 (10 eff.), 1 76mm
20 *Svetlyak* each with 1 quad (4 eff.) with SA-N-5 *Grail* naval SAM, 2 single 406mm TT, 1 76mm
PFT 17 *Pauk I* each with 1 quad (4 eff.) with SA-N-5 *Grail* naval SAM, 4 single 406mm TT, 1 76mm
PHT 3 *Muravey*
PSO 12: 8 *Alpinist*; 4 *Komandor*
PFC 15 *Stenka*
PCC 36: 9 *Mirazh*; 27 *Type 1496*
PCI 12 *Zhuk*
PCR 32: 3 *Ogonek*; 7 *Piyavka*; 15 *Shmel*; 5 *Vosh*; 2 *Yaz*
PBF 31: 1 A-125; 1 *Mangust*; 1 *Mustang* (Project 18623); 15 *Saygak*; 12 *Sobol*; 1 *Sokzhoi*
LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 24: 1 AO
AK 10 *Neon Antonov*
AKSL 6 *Kanin*
AGS 2 *Yug* (primarily used as patrol ships)
AGB 5 *Ivan Susanin* (primarily used as patrol ships)
AIRCRAFT • TPT ε86: 70 An-24 *Coke*/An-26 *Curl*/An-72 *Coaler*/Il-76 *Candid*/Tu-134 *Crusty*/Yak-40 *Codling*; 16 SM-92
HELICOPTERS: ε200 Ka-28 (Ka-27) *Helix* ASW/Mi-24 *Hind* Atk/Mi-26 *Halo* Spt/Mi-8 *Hip* Spt

Interior Troops 200,000 active

FORCES BY ROLE

7 Regional Commands: Central, Urals, North Caucasus, Volga, Eastern, North-Western and Siberian

Paramilitary	5 (special purpose) indep div (ODON) (*each:* 2–5 paramilitary regt); 6 div; 65 regt (bn – incl special motorised units); 10 (special designation) indep bde (OBRON) (*each:* 1 mor bn, 3 mech bn); 19 indep bde
Avn	gp

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT 9
AIFV/APC (W) 1,650 BMP-1 /BMP-2/BTR-80
ARTY 35
TOWED 122mm 20 D-30
MOR 120mm 15 PM-38
HELICOPTERS • ATK 4 Mi-24 *Hind*

Federal Security Service ε4,000 active (armed)

Cdo unit (incl Alfa and Vympel units)

Federal Protection Service ε10,000–30,000 active

Org include elm of ground forces (mech inf bde and AB regt)

Mech inf	1 bde
AB	1 regt
Presidential Guard	1 regt

Federal Communications and Information Agency ε55,000 active

MOD • Railway Troops ε50,000

Paramilitary 4 (rly) corps; 28 (rly) bde

Special Construction Troops 50,000

SELECTED NON-STATE GROUPS

Security forces are active in the North Caucasus against a number of rebel groups opertaing in Chechnya, Daghestan, Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia and Ingushetia. The strength of these groups varies (Chechen rebels are believed to number between 2-3,000), and equipments include mines and IEDs, mortars, SALW

DEPLOYMENT

ARABIAN GULF AND INDIAN OCEAN
Maritime Security Operations 1 DDG; 1 AOE; 1 ATF

ARMENIA
Army 3,214; 1 MR bde; 74 MBT; 330 AIFV; 14 APC (T)/APC (W); 68 SP/towed arty; 8 mor; 8 MRL; 1 base
Military Air Forces • Tactical Aviation
1 AD sqn with 18 MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; 2 SAM bty with S-300V (SA-12A) *Gladiator*; 1 SAM bty with SA-6 *Gainful*

Air Base located at Yerevan

BELARUS
Strategic Deterrent Forces • Warning Forces
1 radar station located at Baranovichi (*Volga* system; leased)
1 Naval Communications site

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA
OSCE • Bosnia and Herzegovina 3

CÔTE D'IVOIRE
UN • UNOCI 7 obs

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC/CHAD
UN • MINURCAT 117; 1 hel det with 4 Mi-8MT

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO
UN • MONUC 28 obs

GEORGIA
Army ε3,400; Abkhazia 1 MR bde; South Ossetia 1 MR bde; **Military Air Forces** • Tactical Aviation; atk hel

KAZAKHSTAN
Strategic Deterrent Forces • Warning Forces
1 radar station located at Balkhash, (*Dnepr* system; leased)

KYRGYZSTAN
Military Air Forces ε500; some Su-27 *Flanker*; 5+: 5 Su-25 *Frogfoot*; some Su-24 *Fencer* FGA; Army Aviation Helicopters; some Mi-8 *Hip* spt hel

LIBERIA
UN • UNMIL 4 obs

MIDDLE EAST
UN • UNTSO 5 obs

MOLDOVA/TRANSDNESTR
Army ε1,500 (including ε500 peacekeepers)
FORCES BY ROLE
2 MR bn (subord to Moscow MD)
EQUIPMENT BY TYPE
ACV 100

Military Air Forces 7 Mi-24 *Hind* atk hel; MI-8 *Hip* Spt Hel

SERBIA
OSCE • Kosovo 2
UN • UNMIK 1 obs

SUDAN
UN • UNMIS 122; 12 obs; 1 avn unit
Military Air Forces 1 hel det

SYRIA
Army and Navy 150
1 naval facility under renovation at Tartus

TAJIKISTAN
Army 5,500; 1 mil base (201st - subord Volga-Ural MD) with (3 MR bde); 54 MBT; 350 ACV; 190 Mor/MRL; 4 Mi-8 *Hip*
Military Air Forces 5 Su-25 *Frogfoot* FGA

UKRAINE
Navy • Coastal Defence • 13,000 including Naval Infantry (Marines) 1,100; Arty: 24**;** AIFV /APC (T) / APC (W): 102
Navy Black Sea Fleet; 1 Fleet HQ located at Sevastopol: Strategic Deterrent Forces. Warning Forces; 2 radar stations located at Sevastopol (*Dnepr* System, leased) and Mukachevo (*Dnepr* system, leased).

WESTERN SAHARA
UN • MINURSO 15 obs

Table 22 **Selected arms procurements and deliveries, Russia**

Designation	Type	Quantity	Contract Value	Supplier Country	Prime Contractor	Order Date	First Delivery Due	Notes
Bulava 30 (SS-NX-30)	SLBM	_	_	Dom	_	_	2009	In development, production due to commence 2009. First test 2005. For *Borey*-class SSBN
T-72 and T-80	MBT	180	_	Dom	_	2006	2007	Some to be modernised. Number may be subject to change
BTR-80 and BTR-90	APC	100	_	Dom	_	2005	2006	Delivery status unclear
Buk-M2 (SA-17 '*Grizzly*')	SAM	_	_	Dom	_	_	_	To replace *Buk*-M1-2 systems in service with army AD
Tor-M2E (SA-15 '*Gauntlet*')	SAM	_	_	Dom	Almaz-Antey	_	2010	Bty formations. First AD regts due to be re-equipped by 2010–11
S-400 *Triumf* (SA-21 *Growler*)	AD	18 bn	_	Dom	_	_	2007	Two bn deployed by Mar 2009. Delivery status unclear
Project 22350 / *Admiral Gorshkov*	FFG	1	US$400m	Dom	Severnaya Verf Shipyard	2005	2009	Navy estimates need for up to 20 vessels by 2015. Delayed. First launch due 2011
Project 20380 / *Steregushchiy*-class	FS	4	_	Dom	Severnaya Verf Shipyard	_	2009	Second vessel (*Stoiky*) due 2010. Up to 20 planned. First vessel delivered
Agat-class (*Natya* III) / Project 266M	MSC	1		Dom		2000	2008	*Vitse-Admiral Zakharin*. Launched Jan 2008
Dyugon	LCU	1	R200m (US$69m)	Dom	Volga Shipyard	2005	2007	Laid down 2006. Delivery status unclear
Project 955 *Borey*	SSBN	4	_	Dom	Sevmash Shipyard	1996	2006	Lead SSBN, *Yuri Dolgoruky* launched Feb 2008. ISD due 2010. 2nd launch due 2009. 3rd vessel ordered 2006 and due 2011. Fourth vessel began construction 2009. Possible order of 8–10
Project 885 *Yasen*	SSN	6	_	Dom	Sevmash Shipyard	1993	2010	Construction of second vessel began July 2009. First of class, *Severodvinsk*, expected to be launched Dec 2009 and delivered late 2010. Delayed for financial reasons
Typhoon (Akula)-class	SSBN SLBM Upgrade	1	_	Dom	_	1994	_	*Dmitriy Donskoy* modernised for testing of new *Bulava* 30 (SS-NX-30) SLBM and will remain in service until *Borey*-class SSBN are operational
Seliger	Research Ship	2	_	Dom	Yantar Shipyard	2009	2011	Laid down July 2009. Second vessel due to be laid down 2010
Su-34 *Fullback*	FGA	24	US$864m	Dom	Sukhoi	2006	2006	Delivered in batches; 2 in 2006, 7 in 2007, 10 in 2008 and 5 in 2009–10. First 2 delivered Dec 2006
Su-35S *Flanker*	Multi-role ac	48	US$2.5bn	Dom	Sukhoi	2009	2015	Upgrade with new avionics, longer range radar and more powerful engines (air force)
Su-27SM, Su-30M2		16 (12 Su-27, 4 Su-30)	US$2.5bn	Dom	Sukhoi	2009	2015	Combined with above deal in contract worth US$2.5bn (air force)
Medium Transport Aircraft (MTA)	Tpt ac	50	_	Dom/IND	Irkut/HAL	2007	2014	In development. RUS obliged to order at least 50 under deal signed with India in 2007
Tu-160 *Blackjack*	Bbr	30	_	Dom	UAC	2007	2012	Upgrade of 15 current Tu-160s, plus 15 new bbr

Table 22 **Selected arms procurements and deliveries, Russia**

Designation	Type	Quantity	Contract Value	Supplier Country	Prime Contractor	Order Date	First Delivery Due	Notes
Yak-130 AJT (Advanced Jet Trainer)	Trg ac	200	_	Dom	Yakolev	2005	2015	To replace current L-39. Purchase to begin 2009 following flight testing
Mi-28N *Night Hunter*	Hel	8	_	Dom	Rostvertol	2005	2009	Plans for 45 to 67 Mi-28N. Delivery status unclear
Ka-52 *Hokum-B*	Atk/recce hel	30	_	Dom	Progress	2008	2009	Twin-seat version of Ka-50 *Black Shark* For air force. Final delivery 2012. Delivery status unclear
Searcher II	UAV	US$50m	_	ISR	IAI	2009	_	Contract incl *I-View 150* and *Bird-Eye 400*