

Chapter Four

Russia

The national and international profile of Russia's armed forces has risen over the past year. The military operation in Georgia in August undoubtedly improved the army's image within Russia, though it also revealed structural and technological weaknesses. Meanwhile, the Russian Navy and Air Force have deployed in areas of the world where there has not been a significant Russian military presence for some time, though these deployments have more to do with the harder line in Moscow's dealings with the US and its allies than with substantial improvements to military training or capabilities. While they may be an indication that increased funding is being made available to the armed forces, overall, progress in modernisation and reform remains slow. Russia's declared defence policy remains based on traditional notions of national defence and there is minimal commitment to international peace-support operations, although President Dmitry Medvedev has indicated a desire for a greater focus on this type of capability in order to assist in raising Russia's international profile. Defence-budget funding for peacekeeping was increased in 2008 to reflect this aspiration.

National pride in Russia's military forces, dented by the outcome of the Cold War, is being restored, not only by a more prominent international posture and the victory in Georgia, but also by a raised profile at home. For the first time since the Soviet era, the 9 May 2008 Victory Parade in Red Square involved a display of Russia's most up-to-date military equipment by troops of the Moscow Military District. The rationale behind the increased salience of the military can be seen in opinion polls showing that a large proportion of Russians believe their country faces a military threat. Similar polls show that the army's standing has improved since it was damaged by the wars in Chechnya and reports of poor conditions of service within the forces. And, although the population remains divided over whether a wholly professional force should replace conscription, there is increased support for the idea of military service more generally. In January it was reported that the Ministry of Defence was considering expanding the number of military colleges: currently around

8,000 students study at eight ground-force colleges, one naval college, a music college and seven cadet corps.

International military posture

The projection of Russian power abroad has largely been realised through a more capable navy. In February 2008, a naval battlegroup from the Northern Fleet led by the carrier *Admiral Kuznetsov* completed a two-month deployment, which included a period in the Mediterranean. This was one of the longest deployments undertaken by the Russian Navy since the Cold War, and it was hailed by military and political leaders in Moscow as a sign of Russia's re-establishment as a global maritime power and an exhibition of the capacity to defend its interests abroad. Similarly celebrated was the October 2008 deployment, first to the Mediterranean and then to the Caribbean, of the nuclear-powered missile cruiser *Pyotr Veliki* (Peter the Great), one of the most capable and modern ships in the Russian Navy, in the company of the anti-submarine destroyer *Admiral Chabanenko*. The stated objective of this deployment was to carry out joint naval training with the Venezuelan Navy. The mission exemplified the growing defence cooperation between Moscow and Caracas in a US sphere of influence. In October, it was announced that a permanent Russian naval facility was being constructed in the Mediterranean, at Tartus on the Syrian coast.

NATO and Europe

The continuing expansion of US and NATO activities into Russia's traditional sphere of interest is a driving force behind its current military posture. Certain of these activities are viewed as a direct threat by Moscow. While not assigning Membership Action Plan status to Georgia and Ukraine, at its Bucharest Summit in April 2008, NATO made clear that those countries would join the Alliance at some stage in the future. This angered Moscow as much as ongoing plans for two US ballistic-missile defence sites in Eastern Europe. Statements from the Russian General Staff in January 2008 indicated that Russia was considering strengthening its defence posture in

Kaliningrad in response to the planned installation of US interceptor missiles in Poland, which is viewed by Moscow as a threat to the Russian strategic nuclear deterrent. When Warsaw and Washington signed the agreement relating to the deployment on 20 August – in the middle of the crisis in Georgia – a Russian official said that Poland could become a target for a Russian nuclear strike. In early November, during an address to the Federal Assembly, President Medvedev stated an intention to deploy *Iskander* missiles in Kaliningrad. Russian–Ukrainian relations are another growing concern. Strained by the NATO aspirations of Ukraine’s President Victor Yushchenko, these relations are complicated by the issue of the lease of the Sevastopol naval base to Russia for its Black Sea Fleet. The lease is due to expire in 2017 and Kiev has said that it will not grant an extension.

The crisis in Russian–Western relations deepened with the suspension of the NATO–Russia Council in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Georgia. With a virtual cessation of all Russian participation in the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, possibilities for dialogue between Moscow and Europe over security issues are minimal. However, perhaps in an effort to address this issue, the Russian leadership has suggested the creation of a new security arrangement in Europe, either under the aegis of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe or under a new structure, as yet unspecified.

Central Asia and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO)

Central Asia is a key geographical element in Russia’s stronger military posture. President Medvedev has called for the CSTO to increase its military capability. Russia’s hopes for a strong CSTO may stem as much from a fear that the international community may fail in Afghanistan, leaving Russia’s southern perimeter exposed, as from a desire to increase Russian standing in the region as a counter to US and Western influence. On 12 September 2008, CSTO Secretary-General Nikolai Bordyuzha announced an intention to create a new military formation in addition to the existing Collective Rapid Deployment Force (CRDF). The CRDF currently numbers around 4,000 personnel from Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, grouped in ten battalions. While there are no details available on the composition of the new force, plans to reinforce the CRDF air component at Kant in Kyrgyzstan are under way, as are plans

to boost the capability of Russia’s 201st Motor Rifle Division in Tajikistan.

Policy, reorganisation and reform

Despite the raised profile of the armed forces and a growth in defence spending, the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff remain on the whole reluctant to reform and modernise. This reluctance can most clearly be seen in the apparent rift between Minister of Defence Anatoly Serdyukov and senior military officers unwilling to accept his reform plans. Serdyukov is carrying out a wide-ranging programme to civilianise military posts and reduce the overall number of posts in the Defence Ministry. It was reported in late 2008 that the ministry’s administration staff was to be reduced by 12,500 to 8,500 by 2012, while officer numbers were to be rebalanced in favour of junior officers. Serdyukov’s determination to pursue reform was highlighted by his refusal, in June, to allow Chief of the General Staff General Yuri Baluyevsky to continue in post beyond his 60th birthday, despite earlier indications that this would be authorised. Baluyevsky, who was subsequently appointed deputy secretary of Russia’s Security Council, was replaced by General Nikolai Makarov. In March 2008, Serdyukov was criticised for his plans to move naval headquarters to St Petersburg and to move the Academy of the Strategic Missile Troops out of Moscow for the first time.

In late 2007, it was reported that moves to reorganise military structures from divisions to brigade-level formations had gained momentum: 2007 saw the deployment of the 33rd and 34th independent motorised mountain brigades. (See *The Military Balance 2008*, p. 208.) A large-scale reorganisation of garrisons is also taking place. There are plans for 70 territorial garrisons, conforming to regional boundaries, and 109 local garrisons. Announcing the reorganisation, Director of Combat Training Lieutenant-General Vladimir Shamanov explained that the chain of command for garrisons would run from the Ministry of Defence to the Military District headquarters, thence through the territorial garrison headquarters to the local garrison.

The Interior Ministry is also undergoing restructuring. The commander-in-chief of the Internal Troops of the Interior Ministry (MVD), Army General Nikolai Rogozhkin, announced that these troops, which number some 200,000, had been reorganised, from seven districts to seven regional commands: Central, Urals, North Caucasus, Volga, Eastern, Northwestern and Siberian.

Personnel issues

In parallel to the improved profile of the military, a planned reduction in the standard conscript liability and signs of salary increases may mean that some of the more unpopular aspects of service are diminishing. The standard period of conscript service is to be reduced to 12 months in 2008–2009. At the same time, large numbers of conscripts continue to be found unfit for service for medical reasons and dismissed, while many conscripts join the armed services with medical conditions that limit their employability. Meanwhile, the demographic downturn that has been threatening to make military manning problematic in the future (see *The Military Balance 2008*, p. 208) may be set to slow. In February, Medvedev, then first deputy prime minister, stated that in 2007, Russia had recorded its highest birth rate for 25 years, with 1.6 million births, 122,000 more than in 2006. Furthermore, life expectancy is increasing. Nevertheless, the Slavic component of the population and, by extension, the armed forces is likely to continue to fall. To meet the demographic challenge as well as budgetary demands, the armed forces are to be reduced from an estimated current strength of 1.1m to 1m in 2013.

Professionalisation of Russia's permanent-readiness units has continued. The commander-in-chief of Ground Troops, Army General Aleksei Maslov, has announced that more than 30 extra permanent-readiness formations and units will be established by 2010. The Ground Troops currently have around 60 permanent-readiness formations and units, manned by 100,000 contract servicemen. Some doubt was however cast over the progress of the Ground Troops professionalisation programme by reports that a number of the troops serving in the 58th Army units that invaded Georgia were conscripted; it had previously been reported that nearly all those serving in the 58th Army were on contract. The Border Guard Service is now reported to be fully staffed by contract personnel. In June, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin announced that pay for those serving in permanent-readiness units was to be increased. A fund is to be set up to enable a reported 65,000 roubles to be paid to individuals monthly. The fund, which is expected to be worth 25 billion roubles in 2009, is anticipated to grow to 45bn by 2011. Greater pay increases were mooted for personnel working on-board submarines and in the Strategic Missile Forces, as well as for those in rapid-reaction units.

Key military capabilities and modernisation

The modernisation of the **strategic forces** remains a priority. Despite a reduction by around 1,000 warheads in 2007, Russian nuclear forces still hold around 5,200 operational warheads, with more than 8,000 in reserve or due for destruction. Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) number around 430 (63 fewer than in 2007), with 1,600 warheads. The number of silo-based *Topol-M* missiles is now 48, deployed in five regiments (see *The Military Balance 2008*, p. 206). By 2010, two further *Topol-M* missiles will be deployed. Mobile *Topol-M* systems continued to be deployed with the 54th Regiment at Teikovo, and full deployment of 34 mobile systems is expected to be complete by 2015. In 2007, Russia carried out flight tests on *Topol-M* ICBMs capable of carrying multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle (MIRV) warheads. The MIRVed *Topol*, known as RS-24, is expected to be deployed in 2009.

The long-awaited deployment of the new class of submarine, the *Borey* class, began in 2008 with the launch of the *Yuri Dolgorukiy*. The intention is to deploy six *Borey*-class submarines, each carrying 16 *Bulava* submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The aviation element of the Russian strategic nuclear deterrent increased by one Tu-160 long-range bomber in 2008. Russia's aspiration is to have up to 30 Tu-160s by 2030.

Aerospace remains a modernisation priority for Russia's **conventional armed forces**. Su-27M fighter aircraft continue to enter service, with two regiments due to be operational by the end of 2008. Details of the production of a fifth-generation aircraft under the Sukhoi Future Air Complex for Tactical Air Forces project have been finalised, and it is believed that the aircraft is due to enter service between 2013 and 2015. Meanwhile, the Su-35 multi-role fighter is to enter service by 2010; the Su-24M2 tactical bomber is being upgraded to give it an all-weather, day-and-night capability; and deliveries of the Su-34 continue, with approximately 70 due to be delivered to the air force by 2015.

In the ground forces, a new main battle tank (MBT) is to be introduced after 2010. The new tank is due to have a speed of between 50 and 60 kilometres per hour on good ground, with enhanced protection as well as guided missiles with a maximum range of 6,000–7,000 metres (the current maximum range is 4,000m). The T-90 MBT is likely to remain the key armoured component of the ground forces until 2025 while the new MBT, as yet publicly unnamed, is being introduced into service.

The overall forecast for conventional-force modernisation indicates that, between 2010 and 2015, the armed forces will purchase 116 combat aircraft and a large number of helicopters, some 700 tanks and more than 1,000 armoured personnel carriers (APCs). The navy is due to receive 12 new surface ships in the same time frame. According to Admiral Vladimir Masorin, commander-in-chief of the Russian Navy, the aspiration is to be able to deploy six carrier groups within the next 20 years, rivalling US maritime power.

Russia is placing increased emphasis on **information warfare**. In January 2008, military officials addressing the tenth 'Information Solutions for Russia's Security' forum stressed the need to develop means of suppressing the state and military communications infrastructure of an adversary in any future conflict. In August, during Russia's military operations against Georgia, a number of unattributed cyber attacks on Tbilisi using 'denial of service' methods were reported.

Training exercises

The number and scale of training exercises and deployments increased across the services in 2008, with greater emphasis being placed on raising standards and improving training systems. (The first deputy minister of defence, Colonel General Alexander Kolmakov, who is responsible for training, has said that training methods are outdated and that a new combat training system needs to be developed.) The major exercises carried out in combined-arms and inter-agency scenarios concentrated on the defence of national borders from a variety of threats, both conventional and asymmetric. The three largest exercises took place in the North Caucasus, where the 58th Army and the Black Sea Fleet operated in a joint-force scenario in July; in Chelyabinsk, where Russian forces worked with Kazakh forces in the *Centre 2008* exercise; and in September, when Russian and Belarusian forces trained together in the *Stability 2008* exercise. (For more information see the table of exercises, p. 442.)

The August war with Georgia

The conflict with Georgia, which began on 7 August and lasted for five days, was the first time that Russian forces fought in a conventional operational setting since the end of the Cold War. Although it was a battle between two ill-matched opponents, the conflict highlighted a number of capability gaps in

the Russian forces that deployed to Georgia, as well as obvious strengths.


Russia's forces, which were mostly drawn from the North Caucasus Military District, were well-rehearsed in the scenario that involved crossing into the South Caucasus. Extensive training exercises under the title *Caucasus Frontier 2008* had taken place at various levels and with different force elements in the months leading up to August. The most recent, in July, had involved units from the 58th Army exercising in different republics in the North Caucasus (see the table of exercises, p. 442).

Russia's military action was launched, according to official sources in Moscow, in response to the 7 August attack by Georgian forces on Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, and it progressed rapidly, with logistical support either pre-positioned or loaded on vehicles. Prior to the Russian attack, Georgia had amassed forces that included ten light-infantry battalions, each made up of between two and four infantry brigades, special task forces and an artillery brigade.

Armoured units from the 19th Motor Rifle Division of Russia's 58th Army entered the Roki Tunnel connecting North and South Ossetia on 7 and 8 August. Their immediate objective was to establish a presence in South Ossetia. The main objective was to secure Tskhinvali. This was accomplished on 10 August, by which time 58th Army units had been joined by units from the 76th Airborne Division from Pskov (part of Russia's strategic reserve) and the 42nd Motor Rifle Division from Chechnya, plus Special Forces units, including from the Chechen East and West battalions. In total, Russian strength had grown to around 10,000 troops, with 150 pieces of armour, including T-62 and T-72 tanks and BMP-1 and -2 APCs. Russia did not deploy any of its more modern tanks or APCs. Georgian troops were overwhelmed by the Russian forces, which captured the Prisskih heights to the south of Tskhinvali, and most of the Georgian artillery positions on them, before taking control of Tskhinvali.

Meanwhile, Russian forces had opened up a second front in Abkhazia with troops of the 7th Airborne Division from Novorossiysk, units of the 76th Airborne Division from Pskov and marine infantry, which were landed from vessels of the Black Sea Fleet. These units moved south to secure the Senaki airfield and the port of Poti. By now the units that had re-taken Tskhinvali had moved towards Gori. At this stage it became clear that Russia intended to deploy its strength in Georgia beyond Abkhazia and South

Map 3 Russia's war with Georgia



Ossetia. In the meantime, the Black Sea Fleet began a naval blockade of the Georgian coast.

On 12 August, President Medvedev announced an official ceasefire, although Russia continued reconnaissance and raiding operations to seek and destroy or remove abandoned Georgian hardware and munitions. At this point, the objective for Russian forces was to deny Georgia the means to threaten its separatist regions with military force. The destruction of military infrastructure and equipment and the establishment of 'buffer zones' were thus the operational priorities in this phase. On 10 October, the newly deployed EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia 'verified that Russian armed forces [had] dismantled 12 checkpoints and one military base in the zone adjacent to Abkhazia and five checkpoints and one signal post in the zone adjacent to South Ossetia'.

There are a number of conclusions that may be drawn from the short conflict, including the following:

- Russian forces were well prepared for this operation, with sufficient logistical support and firepower to meet all objectives.
- Russia miscalculated Georgia's air-defence capabilities and failed to suppress its air-defence systems, with the result that the Russian Air Force lost seven aircraft. Ultimately, the majority of Georgia's air-

defence formations were destroyed by Russian infantry detachments. Russian pilots had never rehearsed the disabling of air-defence systems, largely because this had not been required in Chechnya. Moreover, Russian air forces were unable to provide direct fire support to ground troops.

- Georgian forces were able to operate at night to a greater degree than Russian forces, with few night-vision devices available to Russian infantry and tank units.
- The Russian ability to coordinate forces from different Military Districts and arms of service at short notice showed that command and control at the operational and strategic levels was well prepared.
- At the tactical level, there appeared to be a deficiency in Russia's C⁴ISR capability, with poor coordination between detachments and difficulty in locating enemy positions.
- Despite the varying degrees of modernisation in the Russian armed forces, there seemed to be little to indicate any broad change in doctrine. Notwithstanding the possibly restrictive impact of topography on operations, the sequential character of the operation in Georgia, which showed little sign of a joint or networked approach, indi-

cated that Russia has not adopted operating practices from twenty-first-century conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

- If reports of the use of the 'cyber' weapon to shut down key Georgian government and media sites are correct, this form of asymmetric warfare may now be judged to be part of Russian military doctrine.

Trends in violence in the North Caucasus

The security situation in the North Caucasus remained volatile during 2008. On 11 January 2008, the Russian Interior Ministry stated that there were between 500 to 700 militants in the region, and the Federal Security Service (FSB) reported that around 500 militants had been killed or captured, and at least 200 arms caches destroyed, in 2007. High youth unemployment has contributed to an increase in the number of militants. Recognising the transnational activities of militant groups and their financing from abroad, the FSB created a special unit aimed at dealing with the international and cross-border aspects of militancy. With the Russian Interior Ministry and other law-enforcement forces retaining the initiative and the capability to eliminate militants and prevent any major terrorist attacks, violent militant and criminal activity took the form of ambushes, skirmishes and the widespread use of improvised explosive devices. The number of attacks on law-enforcement personnel and civilians in Ingushetia and Dagestan exceeded numbers in Chechnya. Extremist Islamist violence appeared to be spreading, and in Ingushetia and Dagestan there was a continuing trend, which began in 2006, of attacks on Muslim clerics opposed to Wahhabism.

In **Chechnya**, President Ramzan Kadyrov stated on 20 February that he was in favour of offering a new amnesty for members of illegal armed groups. In the capital, Grozny, security incidents continued despite signs of reconstruction. There were also indications of rivalry between different official armed factions. In April, there was a clash between Kadyrov's forces and the Chechen East battalion, which operates under the aegis of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Russian Federal Defence Ministry. Attacks on law-enforcement and civil-authority personnel increased during the summer in the poorer and less controlled southern areas, particularly Urus Martan, Shali and Vedeno. In one incident, a group of more than 25 militants attacked the village of Benoi-Vedeno

and took 11 civilians hostage. Militant jihadist group the Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus (IEC) was behind much of the violence, and claimed to have killed 11 Chechen militiamen in a raid in Vedeno. The IEC also claimed to have ambushed a Special Forces unit on 4 June and to have carried out a bomb attack in Nazran, the capital of Ingushetia.

In **Ingushetia**, there was an increase in attacks on security forces and government authorities. On 1 July, Ingushetia's chief prosecutor stated that during the first five months of 2008 there had been 53 attempts on the lives of law-enforcement officers and servicemen, a fourfold increase over the same period in the previous year. There were two attacks on the Presidential Guard. The deputy head of the Supreme Court was assassinated, and there were attempts on the lives of the deputy minister of culture, the deputy chief of the Drug Control Department, the mayor of Nazran and the chief criminal investigator of Malgobek. A 'public warning' was issued in February by extremist groups stating that gambling and entertainment businesses would be 'punished' and some attacks took place, mostly during the summer. The violence has been accompanied by growing socio-political instability and inter-ethnic tensions, leading to concerns that a broader conflict might flare up in the republic. On 26 January, there was a public protest against Ingushetia's president, Murat Zyazikov. In May and June an estimated 85,000 people (out of a population of 450,000) signed a petition for the reappointment of former president, Ruslan Aushev.

In **Dagestan**, worsening economic conditions led to protests, and jihadist elements remained active, feeding off dissatisfaction with the government. Militant group Shariat Jama'at was responsible for much of the violence, which included attacks on security forces and government infrastructure. There was an increased number of security operations against militants and criminals over the year. In February, 1,500 Interior Ministry and FSB troops carried out an operation to eliminate a criminal gang led by Rappani Khalilov.

In **Kabardino-Balkaria** and **North Ossetia**, militants continued to target key officials and police personnel. The chiefs of the organised crime departments of the two republics were both assassinated. In Kabardino-Balkaria, the joint information centre for the republic's law-enforcement bodies made a public appeal to civilians to assist the authorities in addressing extremism.

RUSSIA – DEFENCE ECONOMICS

Following several years of impressive growth, due in large part to high oil and gas prices, the Russian economy is likely to slow significantly in 2008. Having remained relatively unaffected by global economic turbulence in the first half of 2008, a series of events in the second half of the year proved that Russia was not immune. Firstly, Russian military action in Georgia precipitated the sudden withdrawal of significant amounts of foreign capital. This was followed by a spectacular drop in oil prices and, finally, as the global credit crisis took hold, the Russian stock market suffered several dramatic falls and had to be closed on several occasions while a financial rescue package was negotiated.


The turmoil may have several long-term implications. It certainly appears to have demonstrated that Moscow is not, as had been thought by some, on the verge of becoming a global financial centre – at least not without major changes to the country's financial infrastructure. It has also highlighted the fact that Russia is hardwired into the global economy, and cannot escape the effects of external factors such as dollar- and oil-price shifts. In September, the government was forced to announce a \$100bn package to boost liquidity in the banking sector, but when it became clear that this cash was being hoarded by the largest banks instead of being lent, the Kremlin stepped up its efforts, with a further commitment to pump \$37bn in long-term loans into the biggest state banks. It is too early to tell what the longer-term effects of the crisis will be on Russian economic

growth, but tentative conclusions may be drawn about its effects in other areas. The capital flight that followed the Georgia campaign may give the Kremlin pause for thought regarding future military activities, while the significant financial losses suffered by the country's 'oligarchs' have significantly clouded the financial and economic outlook for the country. Whatever the broader economic outcome, it is likely that the government budget will suffer, and that the ambitious 2009–11 national-defence budget will need to be modified as a result.

The 2009 defence budget

Before the financial crisis finally hit the Russian economy, the government had outlined another significant increase in military spending for the period 2009–2011. Under the draft 2009 state budget, a total of R1,278bn was allocated to national defence, an increase of R225bn over the expected figure and a substantial 25% increase from the previous year. Unfortunately, changes made to the presentation of state budget documents over recent years have made the collection and analysis of military spending data more difficult. In 2005, federal budget classifications were revised and the national defence category was broadened to include certain military-related expenditures that had previously been allocated elsewhere. Then, in 2006, details of the State Defence Order were classified, and in 2007, the government adopted a new three-year budgetary framework, which many interpreted as an attempt by the outgoing Putin presidency to impose limits on the freedom of action of its successor. In 2009, out

Table 19 **Estimated Russian Defence Expenditure** as % of GDP



of a total defence budget of R1,278bn, only R712bn is declassified.

In spite of the repeated changes to the budgeting process and the reclassification of various sections of the budget, it is possible to draw some broad conclusions about Russian procurement spending and priorities in recent years. Domestic arms procurement, military-related research and development (R&D), and the repair and modernisation of arms and other military equipment take place within the framework of the State Defence Order, which is agreed annually on the basis of the State Programme of Armaments (GPV), a document that covers a ten-year period, the first five years of which are covered in detail. The history of GPV implementation is varied, but there was significant improvement after Vladimir Putin came to office as president in 2000: a programme for the period 1991–2000 was drawn up but never adopted and a successor programme for the period 1996–2005, approved by President Boris Yeltsin, was soon abandoned after it became clear that it was based on wildly optimistic macroeconomic forecasts. The next armaments programme, GPV-10, was approved by Putin in 2002 and was based on more realistic assumptions. At the heart of the programme was the acknowledgement that, rather than focusing on buying large quantities of new equipment, it was important to direct the majority of funds towards extensive R&D and invest in procurement at a later stage. This strategy has been broadly implemented. In 2002, R&D expenditure amounted to only R31bn, whereas in 2009 it is set to reach R164bn before levelling off. Funds are to start to shift from R&D into procurement from 2008 onwards, with full-scale procurement resuming from 2010.

The current modernisation phase is based on the latest State Programme of Armaments, GPV-2015, a classified document that covers approximately R5,000bn-worth of defence procurement, upgrades and maintenance programmes to 2015. Despite its classified status, it is known that GPV-2015 will focus on both the State Defence Order for conventional capabilities and Russia's nuclear deterrent force. Central to the document is the requirement that Russia be equipped by 2020 with a compact and modern nuclear deterrent that would guarantee 'unsustainable damage' to any first-strike aggressor. To meet this requirement, the programme calls for the acquisition of 36 new strategic silos, 66 *Topol-M* intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and 30 *Bulavas*, the submarine-launched variant of the *Topol-M*, together

with the slow production of Tupolev Tu-160 and Tu-95 strategic bombers armed with *Raduga* Kh-555 and Kh-101 extended-range cruise missiles. Conventional military systems in the current State Defence Order include 700 T-90 tanks, 1,500 BTR-80 armoured personnel carriers, BMP-3M infantry fighting vehicles, Su-34 fighter aircraft, Yak-130 advanced jet trainers, 156 new helicopters and S-400 missile systems. The order also outlines ongoing investment in the Sukhoi Future Air Complex for Tactical Air Forces fifth-generation fighter programme and *Borey*-class nuclear submarines. In July 2008, Putin announced that the modernisation plan was to be speeded up, and that around 70% of the national-defence budget was to be spent on weapons procurement, the repair of existing systems, R&D and testing and evaluation procedures by 2015, two years ahead of the original target date. This would be a striking achievement, given that this sector of the budget amounted to only 30% of the total in 2006.

Despite the substantial increase in military spending over the past decade, several problems are evident. The Russian military has a long way to go to recover from 20 years of mismanagement and neglect. Russia's strategic-deterrent force has shrunk from 1,398 ICBMs in 1991 to 430 in 2008. Only 12 nuclear-powered submarines, 20 major surface warships and one aircraft carrier remain in service with the Russian Navy, the last of which is routinely followed by two tugs in case of breakdown. Putin has made it clear that he is not satisfied with how the budget is being spent, observing that, despite the injection of large sums of money into the defence-industrial base, only a small amount of high-quality equipment is being produced. This is partly a consequence of ineffective management throughout the system. Over the coming years, as more of the budget begins to be allocated to procurement, the pressure will mount on Russia's defence industries to improve their performance. When output fell during the 1990s, several enterprises wound down their quality-management systems, and currently very few can display the ISO 9001 international quality symbol, with many advanced weapons programmes increasingly reliant on imported components. Significant efforts have been made in recent years to reform the defence-industrial base in preparation for the increased production of new equipment due to begin in 2010. With the approval of the country's Anti-Monopoly Service, measures have been introduced to rationalise a defence-industrial sector whose fractured

structure has put pressure on limited resources and caused in-country competition. In 2002, OPK Oboronprom was created to consolidate the rotary-wing sector; in 2006 it took responsibility for electronic warfare and in 2007 its remit was extended to cover aero engines, while major fixed-wing production has been consolidated in the state-controlled United Aircraft Building Corporation. But although progress has been made at the top end, integration and reform at lower levels of the industry have been limited, leading the president of the Russian League of Assistance to Defence Enterprises to conclude that the 'entire work pattern of the Russian defence industry is obsolete'.

Possibly the biggest threat to the future development of the armed forces, however, is posed not by industrial or organisational problems but by the impact of inflation on the real value of the defence budget. The Russian economy has struggled to absorb the huge growth in revenues from oil and gas exports and the substantial increase in domestic credit and capital inflows from abroad, with the result that consumer-price inflation (CPI) rose to 9.0% in 2006 and 9.7% in 2007. On the face of it, the official defence budget has risen ninefold since the year Putin became president, from R143bn in 2000 to R1,278bn in 2009. However, once inflation is taken into account, the increase is a less spectacular 350%, and Putin has suggested that the negative impact of inflation is a factor in the relatively low level of new weapons procurement. Another problem facing the Ministry of Defence is the process under which future budgets are constructed. Each year, the Ministry of Finance is obliged to base its calculations for the forthcoming three-year state budget on an inflation forecast provided by the Ministry of the Economy, but because no specific price deflator for the defence sector exists, for defence, CPI is used as the benchmark instead. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that inflation in the defence sector is significantly higher than it is in the wider economy and thus that CPI is not a useful tool for calculating future military budgets.

Georgia

The financial cost of the 2008 war with Georgia has not yet been fully calculated, although informed observers suggest that operational costs for the five-day conflict may have amounted to around R12.5bn. Russian military officials have pointed out, however, that any costs need to be balanced against the value of the large quantities of weapons seized from the

Table 20 **Draft Russian National Defence Expenditure 2009–11 (Rbm)**

Chapter 2 'National Defence'	2009	2010	2011
Armed forces of the Russian Federation	913.3	1,045.5	1,107.3
Mobilisation of external forces	6.6	6.1	6.1
Mobilisation of the economy	4.7	4.9	6.3
Collective peacekeeping	0.12	0.12	0.13
Military nuclear programmes	22.5	27.5	29.1
International treaty obligations	2.8	2.9	3.0
Applied R&D	164.8	157.8	153.7
Other	163.6	146.7	174.8
Total Chapter 2 'National Defence'	1,278.5	1,391.8	1,480.5
Additional defence-related security expenditure			
Internal troops	66.3	76.2	82.8
Security organs	185.4	201.2	219.5
Border troops	84.4	93.3	83.5
Subsidies to closed towns	18.5	19.3	n.a.
Ministry of emergencies	58.0	55.3	54.7
Military pensions	213.4	256.4	273.1
Total Defence-related Expenditure	1,904.5	2,093.5	2,194.1
as % of total federal expenditure	21.1	20.2	19.4

Georgian Army, which, according to Russian official figures, included 44 new T-72 tanks, dozens of armoured vehicles, artillery systems, air-defence systems and numerous small weapons and ammunition. In response to the conflict, Russian military commanders proposed a new medium-term modernisation and procurement plan that they suggested should be implemented alongside the GPV-2015 programme. In their review, commanders called for 1,400 new and upgraded main battle tanks to constitute 45 tank battalions, 4,000 infantry fighting vehicles and 3,000 armoured personnel carriers to equip 174 motor-rifle and parachute battalions, 60 *Iskander* missile systems for five missile brigades and 18 S-400 surface-to-air missile systems to equip nine air-defence units. The plan also noted the importance of reconnaissance, electronic warfare, precision-guided weapons and the GLONASS satellite network, and recommended that all Russian military helicopters should be equipped with modern missile-protection suites.

Estimating Russian military expenditure

As ever, estimating the real scale of Russian military spending is fraught with difficulty, not least because

of the various changes made to the presentation of budget data in recent years. Taken at face value, the official national-defence allocation for 2007, R821bn, corresponds to 2.48% of GDP, however, as indicated in Table 20, the official budget excludes funds made available for other military-related expenditures such as pensions and paramilitary forces. With these taken into account, overall defence-related expenditure reached around R1,216bn, or 3.68% of 2007 GDP. In addition, there is the revenue from arms exports, approximately US\$4.7bn in 2007, a proportion of which is thought likely to find its way into military coffers.

Translated into dollars at the market exchange rate, Russia's official 2007 national-defence allocation amounts to \$32.2bn – roughly equivalent to Saudi Arabia's annual defence expenditure. The additional defence-related items listed in Table 20 bring the total to US\$47.6bn – again, a much lower figure than the size of Russia's armed forces and the structure of its military-industrial complex would imply. Thus neither figure is especially useful for comparative analysis.

When assessing macroeconomic data from developing countries where the exchange rate does not fully reflect the purchasing power of the domestic currency, economists use an alternative methodology, known as Purchasing Power Parity (PPP). In 2007, Russian GDP measured US\$1,293bn when converted at market exchange rates; however, the World Bank calculated that in PPP terms, Russia's 2007 GDP was equivalent to US\$2,088bn. Therefore, if total defence-related expenditure in 2007 amounted to approximately 3.68% of GDP, in PPP terms, defence spending reached US\$76.8bn in that year. With the addition of revenue from international arms exports, it is possible that the total expenditure was in the region of US\$81.5bn.

Note: Although PPP rates can be a useful tool for comparing macroeconomic data, such as GDP, of countries at different stages of development, because there is no PPP rate specific to the military sector, its use in this context should be treated with caution. In addition, there is no definitive guide as to which elements of military spending should be calculated using the PPP rates that are available.

Russia RF

Russian Rouble r		2007	2008	2009
GDP	r	32.9tr	38.5bn	
	US\$ ^a	2.08tr	2.45tr	
per capita	US\$ ^a	14,769	17,455	
Growth	%	8.1	7.0	
Inflation	%	9.0	14.0	
Def exp	US\$ ^a	81.5bn		
Def bdtg	r	821bn	956bn	1,278bn
	US\$	32.21bn	36.35bn	

US\$1=r 25.5 26.3

^a PPP estimate

Population 140,702,094

Ethnic groups: Tatar 4%; Ukrainian 3%; Chuvash 1%; Bashkir 1%; Belarussian 1%; Moldovan 1%; Other 8%;

Age	0-14	15-19	20-24	25-29	30-64	65 plus
Male	7%	4%	4%	4%	22%	4%
Female	7%	4%	4%	4%	25%	10%

Capabilities

ACTIVE 1,027,000 (Army 360,000 Airborne 35,000 Navy 142,000 Air 160,000 Strategic Deterrent Forces 80,000 Command and Support 250,000) Paramilitary 449,000

(Estimated 170,000 in the permanent readiness units)
Conscription is to be reduced to 12 months in 2008-2009.

RESERVE 20,000,000 (all arms)

some 2,000,000 with service within last 5 years; Reserve obligation to age 50.

ORGANISATIONS BY SERVICE

Strategic Deterrent Forces €80,000 (includes personnel assigned from the Navy and Air Force)

Navy

SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC • SSBN 15

6 *Delta III* (1+) (4 based in Pacific Fleet, 2 based in Northern Fleet) (80 msl) each with 16 RSM-50 (SS-N-18) *Stingray* strategic SLBM;

4 *Delta IV* (3 based in Northern Fleet and 1 based in Pacific Fleet), (64 msl) each with 16 RSM-54 (SS-N-23) *Skiff* strategic SLBM;

2 *Delta IV* in refit in Northern Fleet (32 msl) each with 16 RSM-52 (SS-N-23) *Skiff* strategic SLBM;

2 *Typhoon* based in Northern Fleet (40 msl) each with 40 RSM-52 (SS-N-20) *Sturgeon* strategic SLBM; 1 *Typhoon*† in reserve based in Northern Fleet with capacity for 20 RSM-52 (SS-N-20) *Sturgeon* strategic SLBM and 1+ *Bulava* (SS-N-30) strategic SLBM (trials / testing);

1 *Yury Dolgoruky* (limited OC undergoing sea trials; 2 additional units in build)

Strategic Missile Force Troops

3 Rocket Armies operating silo and mobile launchers with 430 missiles and 1,605 nuclear warheads organised in 12 divs. Launcher gps normally with 10 silos (6 for SS-18) and one control centre

MSL • STRATEGIC 430

ICBM 430: 75 RS-20 (SS-18) *Satan* (mostly mod 4/5, 10 MIRV per msl); 201 RS12M (SS-25) *Sickle* (mobile single warhead); 100 RS18 (SS-19) *Stiletto* (mostly mod 3, 6 MIRV per msl.); 54 *Topol-M* (SS-27) silo-based/road mobile single warhead (5 regts) – to be MIRVed during next 2-3 yrs

Long-Range Aviation Command • 37th Air Army

FORCES BY ROLE

Bbr 2 heavy div with 4 regt at 3 air bases operating 79 bbr

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT • LRSA 90: 16 Tu-160 *Blackjack* each with up to 12 KH-55SM/RKV-500B (AS-15B *Kent*) nuclear ALCM; 32 Tu-95MS6 (*Bear H-6*) each with up to 6 Kh-55/RKV-500A (AS-15A *Kent*) nuclear ALCM; 32 Tu-95MS16 (*Bear H-16*) each with up to 16 Kh-55/RKV-500A (AS-15A *Kent*) nuclear ALCM

Test ac 10: 5 Tu-95, 5 Tu-160

Warning Forces

ICBM/SLBM launch-detection capability. Limited number of satellites serviceable

RADAR 1 ABM engagement system located at Pushkino (Moscow). Russia leases ground-based radar stations in Baranovichi (Belarus); Sevastopol and Mukachevo (Ukraine); Balkhash (Kazakhstan); Gaballa (Azerbaijan). It also has radars on its own territory at Lekhtusi, (St. Petersburg); Armavir, (southern Russia); Olenegorsk (northwest Arctic); Pechora (northwest Urals); Mishelevka (east Siberia).

MISSILE DEFENCE 2,064: 32 SH-11 *Gorgon*; 68 SH-08 *Gazelle*; 1,900 S-300PMU/SA-10 *Grumble*; 64 S-400 *Growler*/SA-21 *Triumf*;

Space Forces 40,000

Formations and units withdrawn from Strategic Missile and Air Defence Forces to detect missile attack on the RF and its allies, to implement BMD, and to be responsible for military/dual-use spacecraft launch and control.

Army €205,000 (incl 35,000 AB); €190,000 conscript (total 395,000)

FORCES BY ROLE

6 Mil Districts (MD), 1 Special Region; 8 Army HQ, 1 Corps HQ, 7 District trg centre (each = bde – 1 per MD except NC)

Tk 3 div (each: 3 tk regt, 1 MR regt, 1 armd recce bn, 1 arty regt, 1 SAM regt, spt units)

MR 16 div (each: 3 MR regt, 1 tk regt, 1 recce bn, 1 arty regt, 1 AT bn, 1 SAM regt, 1 tk bn, spt units); 10 indep bde; 4 indep regt

SF 9 (Spetsnaz) bde

Air Aslt 2 bde
 AB 4 div (each: 2 para regt, 1 arty regt); 1 bde (trg centre); 3 indep bde (2 under GF control)
 Arty 2 div HQ; 16 arty bde ; 3 AT regt
 MRL 2 bde; 11 regt
 SSM 10 bde each with 18 SS-21 *Scarab (Tochka)* (replacement by *Iskander-M* began during 2005 with 12 per bde)
 MGA 5 div (all will be converting to motor rifle)
 SAM 12 bde; 1 regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT 23,000: 250–300 T-90; 4,500 T-80/T-80UD/T-80UM/T-80U; 9,500 T-72L/T-72M; 3,000 T-72; 4,000 T-64A/T-64B; 150 T-62, 350 in store; 1,200 T-55

LT TK 150 PT-76

RECCE 2,000+ BRDM-2

AIFV 15,140+: 1,500+ BMD-1/BMD-2/BMD-3; 8,100 BMP-1; 4,600 BMP-2; 240 BMP-3; 700 BRM-1K; BTR-80A

APC 9,900+

APC (T) 5,000: 700 BTR-D; 3,300 MT-LB; 1,000 BTR 50

APC (W) 4,900+: 4,900 BTR-60/BTR-70/BTR-80; BTR-90

ARTY 26,121+

SP 6,010: **122mm** 2,780 2S1 *Carnation*; **152mm** 3,100: 550 2S19 *Farm*; 1,600 2S3; 950 2S5; **203mm** 130 2S7

TOWED 12,765: **122mm** 8,350: 4,600 D-30; 3,750 M-30 M-1938; **130mm** 650 M-46; **152mm** 3,725: 1,100 2A36; 750 2A65; 1,075 D-20; 700 M-1943; 100 ML-20 M-1937; **203mm** 40 B-4M

GUN/MOR 820+

SP 120mm 820: 30 2S23 *NONA-SVK*; 790 2S9 *NONA-S*

TOWED 120mm 2B16 *NONA-K*

MRL 3,976+: **122mm** 2,970: 2,500 BM-21; 50 BM-16; 420 9P138; **132mm** BM-13; **140mm** BM-14; **220mm** 900 9P140 *Uragan*; **300mm** 106 9A52 *Smerch*

MOR 2,550

SP 240mm 430 2S4

TOWED 2,120: **120mm** 1,820: 920 2S12; 900 PM-38; **160mm** 300 M-160

AT

MSL • MANPATS AT-2 3K11 *Swatter*; AT-3 9K11 *Sagger*; AT-4 9K111 *Spigot*; AT-5 9K113 *Spandrel*; AT-6 9K114 *Spiral*; AT-7 9K115 *Saxhorn*; AT-9 9M114M1 *Ataka*; AT-10 9K116 *Stabber*

RCL 73mm SPG-9; **82mm** B-10

RL 64mm RPG-18 *Fly*; **73mm** RPG-16/RPG-22 *Net*/RPG-26/RPG-7 *Knout*; **105mm** RPG-27/RPG-29

GUNS 526+

SP 57mm ASU-57; **85mm** ASU-85; D-44/SD44

TOWED 526 **100mm**T-12A/M-55; T-12

AD

SAM 2,465+

SP 2,465+: 220 SA-4 A/B *Ganef* (twin) (Army/Front wpn – most in store); 225 SA-6 *Gainful* (div wpn); 550 SA-8 *Gecko* (div wpn); 350 SA-11 *Gadfly* (replacing SA-4/-6); 800 SA-9 *Gaskin*/SA-13 *Gopher* (regt wpn); 200 SA-12A (S-300V) *Gladiator*/SA-12B *Giant* (twin); 120 SA-15 *Gauntlet* (replacing SA-6/SA-8); SA-19 *Grison* (8 SAM, plus twin 30mm gun); SA-20 (S-400) *Triumph*

MANPAD SA-7 *Grail* (being replaced by -16/-18); SA-14 *Gremlin*; 9K310 (SA-16) *Gimlet*; SA-18 *Grouse (Igla)*

GUNS

SP 23mm ZSU-23-4; **30mm** 2S6; **57mm** ZSU-57-2

TOWED 23mm ZU-23; **57mm** S-60; **85mm** M-1939 *KS-12*; **100mm** KS-19; **130mm** KS-30

UAV BLA-06; BLA-07; Tu-134 *Reys*; Tu-243 *Reys*/Tu-243 *Reys-D*; Tu-300 *Korshun*; *Pchela-1*; *Pchela-2*

MSL • SSM ε200+: 200 SS-21 *Scarab (Tochka)*; SS-26 *Iskander (Stone)*; FROG in store; *Scud* in store

FACILITIES

Bases 2 (each = bde+; subord. to North Caucasus MD) located in Georgia, 1 located in Tajikistan, 1 located in Armenia

Training centres 6 (District (each = bde – 1 per MD)), 1 (AB (bde))

Reserves

Cadre formations, on mobilisation form

Tk 3 div;

MR 8 div; 6 bde

Arty 1 div; 4 indep bde

Hy arty 1 bde

Navy 142,000**FORCES BY ROLE**

4 major Fleet Organisations (Northern Fleet, Pacific Fleet, Baltic Fleet, Black Sea) and Caspian Sea Flotilla

Northern Fleet**FORCES BY ROLE**

1 Navy HQ located at Severomorsk

FACILITIES

Bases Located at Severodvinsk and Kola Peninsula

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES 42

STRATEGIC 12: 8 SSBN; 4 in reserve

TACTICAL 22: 12 SSN; 3 SSGN; 7 SSK

SUPPORT 8: 4 SSAN (other roles); 4 in reserve (other roles)

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 10: 1 CV; 2 CGN (1 in reserve); 1 CG; 7 DDG (1 in reserve)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 12: FF 8; FS 4

MINE WARFARE 10 MCMV

AMPHIBIOUS 5

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 130+

Naval Aviation**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

AIRCRAFT

BBR 38 Tu-22M *Backfire C*

FTR 20 Su-27 *Flanker*

FGA 10 Su-25 *Frogfoot*

ASW 31: 17 Il-38 *May*; 14 Tu-142 *Bear*

TPT 27: 2 An-12 *Cub* (MR/EW); 25 An-12 *Cub*/An-24 *Coke*/An-26 *Curl*

HELICOPTERS

ASW 42 Ka-27 *Helix A*
 ASLT 16 Ka-29 *Helix B*
 SPT 15 Mi-8 *Hip*

Naval Infantry

Naval inf 1 regt with 74 MBT; 209 ACV; 44 arty

Coastal Defence

Coastal def 1 bde with 360 MT-LB; 134 arty
 SAM 1 regt

Pacific Fleet**FORCES BY ROLE**

Fleet HQ located at Vladivostok

FACILITIES

Bases located at Fokino, Magadan, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, Sovetskaya Gavan, Viliuchinsk and Vladivostok

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**SUBMARINES 23**

STRATEGIC • SSBN 4: 3 and 1 in reserve
 TACTICAL 20: 4 SSN/SSGN and 7 in reserve; SSK 6 and 3 in reserve

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 15: 1 CG; 5

DDG 3 in reserve; 9 FFG/FF

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 16 PFM

MINE WARFARE 9 MCMV

AMPHIBIOUS 4

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 57

Naval Aviation**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT**

BBR 14 Tu-22M *Backfire C*
 FTR 30 MiG-31 *Foxhound A*
 ASW 36: 24 Il-38 *May*; 12 Tu-142 *Bear*
 TPT 10 An-12 *Cub* (MR/EW); An-26 *Curl*

HELICOPTERS

ASW 31 Ka-28 (Ka-27) *Helix*
 ASLT 6 Ka-29 *Helix*
 SPT 26 Mi-8 *Hip* (TPT)

Naval Infantry

Inf 1 div HQ (Pacific Fleet) (1 arty bn, 1 tk bn, 3 inf bn)

Coastal Defence

Coastal Def 1 bde

Black Sea Fleet

The RF Fleet is leasing bases in Sevastopol and Karantinnaya Bay, and is based, jointly with Ukr warships, at Streletskaia Bay. The Fleet's overall serviceability is assessed as medium.

FORCES BY ROLE

1 Navy HQ located at Sevastopol, Ukr

FACILITIES

Bases located at Sevastopol, Novorossiysk and Temryuk

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES • TACTICAL SSK 2:1 (1 *Tango* in reserve)

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 11: 2 CG; 1 DDG; 8 FFG/FS

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 10: 7 PFM; 3 PHM

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES MCMV 7

AMPHIBIOUS 7: 4 *Ropucha*; 3 *Alligator*

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 90+

Naval Aviation**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT**

FGA 18 Su-24 *Fencer*
 ASW 14 Be-12 *Mail*
 TPT 4 An-12 *Cub* (MR/EW); An-26

HELICOPTERS

ASW 33 Ka-28 (Ka-27) *Helix*
 SPT 9: 1 Mi-8 *Hip* (TPT); 8 (MR/EW)

Naval Infantry

Naval inf 1 regt with 59 ACV; 14 arty

Baltic Fleet**FORCES BY ROLE**

1 Navy HQ located at Kaliningrad

FACILITIES

Bases located at Kronstadt and Baltiysk

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

SUBMARINES • TACTICAL SSK 2: 1 (and 1 in reserve)

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 5: 2 DDG; 3 FFG

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 22: 12 PFM; 10 FF

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES MCMV 11: 10 (and 1 in reserve)

AMPHIBIOUS 4 *Ropucha*

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT ε130

Naval Aviation**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE****AIRCRAFT**

FTR 23 Su-27 *Flanker*
 FGA 26 Su-24 *Fencer*
 TPT 14: 12 An-12 *Cub*/An-24 *Coke*/An-26 *Curl*; 2 An-12 *Cub* (MR/EW)

HELICOPTERS

ATK 11 Mi-24 *Hind*
 ASW 19 Ka-28 (Ka-27) *Helix*
 ASLT 8 Ka-29 *Helix*
 SPT 17 Mi-8 *Hip* (TPT)

Naval Infantry

Naval inf 1 bde with 26 MBT; 220 ACV; 52 MRL

Coastal Defence**FORCES BY ROLE**

Arty 2 regt with 133 arty

SSM 1 regt with 8 SS-C-1B *Sepal*

AD 1 regt with 28 Su-27 *Flanker* (Baltic Fleet)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AD 50 SAM

Caspian Sea Flotilla

The Caspian Sea Flotilla has been divided between Az (about 25%), RF, Kaz, and Tkm, which are operating a joint flotilla under RF command, currently based at Astrakhan.

FACILITIES

Base located at Astrakhan

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS • FRIGATES**

FFG 1

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 6: 3 PFM; 3

PHM

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 9: 5

MSC; 4 MSI

AMPHIBIOUS 6**LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT** ε15**Naval Infantry**

Naval inf 1 bde

NAVY EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**SUBMARINES** 67**STRATEGIC** 15**SSBN** 15:

6 *Delta* III (1†) (4 based in Pacific Fleet, 2 based in Northern Fleet) (80 msl) each with 16 RSM-50 (SS-N-18) *Stingray* strategic SLBM;

4 *Delta* IV (3 based in Northern Fleet and 1 based in Pacific Fleet), (64 msl) each with 16 RSM-54 (SS-N-23) *Skiff* strategic SLBM;

2 *Delta* IV in refit in Northern Fleet (32 msl) each with 16 RSM-52 (SS-N-23) *Skiff* strategic SLBM;

2 *Typhoon* based in Northern Fleet (40 msl) each with 40 RSM-52 (SS-N-20) *Sturgeon* strategic SLBM;

1 *Typhoon*† in reserve based in Northern Fleet with capacity for 20 RSM-52 (SS-N-20) *Sturgeon* strategic SLBM and 1+ *Bulava* (SS-N-30) strategic SLBM (trials / testing);

1 *Yury Dolgoruky* (limited OC undergoing sea trials; 2 additional units in build)

TACTICAL 52**SSGN** 7:

5 *Oscar* II each with 2 single 650mm TT each with T-65 HWT, 4 single 553mm TT with 24 SS-N-19 *Shipwreck* tactical USGW

2 *Oscar* II (1 in reserve, 1 in refit), with 2 single 650mm TT each with T-65 HWT, 1 VLS with 24 SS-N-19 *Shipwreck* tactical USGW

SSN 17:

2 *Akula* II each with 4 single 533mm TT each with SS-N-21 *Sampson* tactical SLCM, 4 single 650mm TT each with single 650mm TT

5 *Akula* I each with 4 single 533mm TT each with SS-N-21 *Sampson* tactical SLCM, 4 single 650mm TT each with T-65 HWT; 3 *Akula* I in reserve

1 *Sierra* II with 4 single 533mm TT each with, SS-N-21 *Sampson* tactical SLCM, 4 single 650mm TT each with T-65 HWT/T-53 HWT; 1 *Sierra* II in reserve

1 *Sierra* I in reserve†

4 *Victor* III (1 in reserve) each with 4 single 533mm TT each with SS-N-21 *Sampson* tactical SLCM, T-65 HWT

SSK 20:

15 *Kilo* each with 6 single 533mm TT each with T-53 HWT; 4 *Kilo* in reserve

1 *Lada* (Undergoing sea trials) with 6 single 533mm TT

SUPPORT • SSAN 8: 1 *Delta Stretch*; 1 *Losharik*; 2 *Paltus*; 3 *Uniform*; 1 *X-Ray*

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 61

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CV 1 *Kuznetsov* (capacity 18 Su-33 *Flanker D* FGA ac; 4 Su-25 *Frogfoot* ac, 15 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel, 2 Ka-31 *Helix* AEW hel,) with 1 12 cell VLS (12 eff.) with SS-N-19 *Shipwreck* tactical SSM, 4 sextuple VLS (24 eff.) each with 8 SA-N-9 *Gauntlet* SAM

CRUISERS 5

CGN 1 *Kirov* with 10 twin VLS (20 eff.) each with SS-N-19 *Shipwreck* tactical SSM, 2 twin (4 eff.) each with 20 SA-N-4 *Gecko* SAM, 12 single VLS each with SA-N-6 *Grumble* SAM, 10 single 533mm ASTT, 1 single ASTT with 1 SS-N-15 *Starfish* ASW, 1 twin 130mm gun (2 eff.), (capacity 3 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel) (2nd *Kirov* undergoing extensive refit currently non operational)

CG 4:

1 *Kara*, with 2 quad (8 eff.) each with SS-N-14 *Silex* tactical SSM, 2 twin (4 eff.) each with 36 SA-N-3 *Goblet* SAM, 2 (4 eff.) each with 20 SA-N-4 *Gecko* SAM, 2 quad (4 eff.) ASTT (10 eff.), (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)

3 *Slava* each with 8 twin (16 eff.) each with SS-N-12 *Sandbox* tactical SSM, 8 octuple VLS each with 8 SA-N-6 *Grumble* SAM, 8 single 533mm ASTT, 1 twin 130mm gun (2 eff.), (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)

DESTROYERS • DDG 15:

1 *Kashin* (mod) with 2 quad (8 eff.) each with SS-N-25 *Switchblade* tactical SSM, 2 twin (4 eff.) each with SA-N-1 *Goa* SAM, 5 single 533mm ASTT, 2 76mm gun 5 *Sovremenny* (additional 2 in reserve) each with 2 quad (8 eff.) each with SS-N-22 *Sunburn* tactical SSM, 2 twin (4 eff.) each with 22 SA-N-7 SAM, 2 twin 533mm TT (4 eff.), 2 twin 130mm gun (4 eff.), (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)

8 *Udaloy* each with 2 quad (8 eff.) each with SS-N-14 *Silex* tactical SSM, 8 octuple VLS each with SA-N-9 *Gauntlet* SAM, 2 quad 533mm ASTT (8 eff.), 2 100mm gun, (capacity 2 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)

1 *Udaloy* II with 2 quad (8 eff.) each with SS-N-22 *Sunburn* tactical SSM, 8 octuple VLS each with SA-N-9 *Gauntlet* SAM, 8 SA-N-11 *Grisson* SAM, 10 single 533mm ASTT, 2 x2 CADS-N-1 CIWS (4 eff.), 2 100mm gun, (capacity 2 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)

FRIGATES 17**FFG** 7:

1 *Gepard* with 2 quad (8 eff.) each with SS-N-25 *Switchblade* tactical SSM, 1 twin (2 eff.) with SA-N-4 *Gecko* SAM, 2 1 30mm CIWS, 1 76mm gun

3 *Krivak* I each with 1 quad (4 eff.) with SS-N-14 *Silex* tactical SSM, 1 twin (2 eff.) with 20 SA-N-4 *Gecko* SAM, 2 quad 533mm ASTT (8 eff.), 2 x12 RL (24 eff.), 2 100mm gun, 2 x2 76mm gun (4 eff.), (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW hel)

2 *Krivak* II each with 1 quad (4 eff.) with SS-N-14 *Silex* tactical SSM, 2 twin (4 eff.) each with 10 SA-N-4 *Gecko* SAM, 2 quad 533mm ASTT (8 eff.), 2 x12 RL (24 eff.), 2 100mm gun

1 *Neustrashimy* with 4 octuple (32 eff.) each with SA-N-9 *Gauntlet* SAM, 6 single 533mm ASTT, 1 RBU 12000 (10 eff.), 1 100mm gun, (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix* ASW)

FF 10 *Parchim* II each with 2 quad (8 eff.) each with SA-N-5 *Grail* SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT (4 eff.), 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 (24 eff.), 1 76mm gun

CORVETTES 23:

1 *Steregushchiy* with 2 quad (8 eff.) with SA-N-11 *Grisson* SAM, 1 100mm gun

3 *Grisha* III with 1 twin (2 eff.) with 20 SA-N-4 *Gecko* SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT (4 eff.), 2 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 (24 eff.)

19 *Grisha* V each with 1 twin (2 eff.) with 20 SA-N-4 *Gecko* SAM, 2 twin 533mm ASTT (4 eff.), 1 RBU 6000 *Smerch* 2 (12 eff.), 1 76mm gun

1 *Scorpion* with 2 quad (8 eff.) with SS-N-26 *Yakhont* SSM, 1 100mm gun, (ISD expected 2011)

PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 73

PFM 40

16 *Nanuchka* III each with 2 triple (6 eff.) each with 1 SS-N-9 *Siren* tactical SSM, 1 twin (2 eff.) eq. with SA-N-4 *Gecko*, 1 76mm gun

1 *Nanuchka* IV with 2 triple (6 eff.) each with SS-N-9 *Siren* tactical SSM, 1 twin (2 eff.) eq. with SA-N-4 *Gecko*, 1 76mm gun

4 *Tarantul* II each with 2 twin (4 eff.) each with SS-N-2C *Styx*/SS-N-2D *Styx* tactical SSM

18 *Tarantul* III each with 2 twin (4 eff.) each with SS-N-22 *Sunburn* tactical SSM

1 *Astrakhan* Project 21630 (First of 5–7 on order)

PHM 6:

2 *Dergach* each with 2 quad (8 eff.) each with SS-N-22 *Sunburn* tactical SSM, 1 twin (2 eff.) with 1 SA-N-4 *Gecko* SAM, 1 76mm gun

4 *Matka* each with 2 single each with SS-N-2C *Styx* tactical SSM/SS-N-2D *Styx* tactical SSM

PHT 6:

1 *Mukha* with 2 quad 406mm TT (8 eff.)

5 *Turya* each with 4 single 533mm ASTT

PFC 21:

1 *Pauk* each with 4 single 533mm ASTT, 2 RBU 1200 (10 eff.)

20 ε *Stenka*

MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 37

MCO 2 *Gorya*

MSO 9 *Natya*

MSC 22 *Sonya*

MHC 4 *Lida*

AMPHIBIOUS: 45+

PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS • LPD

1 *Ivan Rogov* (capacity 4–5 Ka-28 (Ka-27) *Helix* ASW hel; 6 ACV or 6 LCM; 20 tanks; 520 troops)

LS 21

LSM 3:

3 *Polnochnyt* B (capacity 6 MBT; 180 troops); (3 in reserve)

LST 18:

4 *Alligator* (capacity 20 tanks; 300 troops)

14 *Ropucha* II and I (capacity either 10 MBT and 190 troops or 24 APC (T) and 170 troops)

CRAFT 20+

LCM 6 *Ondatra*

LCU 3 *Serna* (capacity 100 troops)

ACV 11:

3 *Aist* (capacity 4 lt tank)

3 *Lebed*

2 *Orlan*

3 *Pomornik* (*Zubr*) (capacity 230 troops; either 3 MBT or 10 APC (T))

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 370+

AOR 5 *Chilikin*

AORL 3: 1 *Kaliningradneft*; 2 *Olekma*

AOL 12: 2 *Dubna*; 5 *Uda*; 5 *mod Altay*

AS 1 *Malina* (Project 2020)

ASR 1 *Elbrus*

ARS 25: 1; 10 *Goryn*; 14 *Okhtensky*

AR 13 *Amur*

ARC 8: 4 *Emba*; 4 *Klasma*

AG 32: 2 *Amga* (msl spt ship); 30 *Bolva* (barracks ship)

ATS 15: 3 *Ingul*; 6 *Katun*; 2 *Neftegaz*; 1 *Prut*; 3 *Sliva*

AH 3 *Ob*

AWT 2 *Manych*

AGOR 4: 2 *Akademik Krylov*; 2 *Vinograd*

AGI 14: 3 *Alpinist*; 2 *Balzam*; 3 *Moma*; 6 *Vishnya*

AGM 1 *Marshal Nedelin*

AGS 61: 8 *Biya*; 19 *Finik*; 6 *Kamenka*; 7 *Moma*; 8 *Onega*; 2 *Sibiriyakov*; 11 *Yug*

AGB 4 *Dobrynya Mikitich*

ABU 12: 8 *Kashtan*; 4 *Sura*

ATF 12 *Sorum*

TRG 12

AXL 12: 10 *Petrushka* (possibly commercially owned);

2 *Smolny*

YDG 27 **YDT** 130+

Naval Aviation €35,000

4 Fleet Air Forces, each organised in air div; each with 2–3 regt with an HQ elm and 2 sqn of 9–10 ac each; configured recce, ASW, tpt/utl org in indep regt or sqn
Flying hours €40 hrs/year

FORCES BY ROLE

Bbr sqns with 58 Tu-22M *Backfire* C

Ftr/FGA sqn with 49 Su-27 *Flaner*; 10 Su-25 *Frogfoot*; 58 Su-24 *Fencer*; 30 MiG-31 *Foxhound*

ASW sqns with 85 Ka-27 *Helix*; 50 Ka-25 *Hormone*; 20 Mi-14 *Haze-A*; sqn with 15 Be-12 *Mail*; 35 Il-38 *May*; 20 Tu-142 *Bear*

MR/EW sqns with 5 An-12 *Cub*; 2 Il-20 RT *Coot-A*; 8 Mi-8 *Hip* J

Tpt sqns with 37 An-12 *Cub*/An-24 *Coke*/An-26 *Curl*

ATK hel sqns with 11 Mi-24 *Hind*

Aslt hel 30 Ka-29 *Helix*; 26 Mi-8 *Hip*

Tpt hel sqns with 22 Ka-25 PS *Hormone* C, Ka-27 PS *Helix* D; 10 Mi-6 *Hook*; 40 Mi-14 PS *Haze* C

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 245 combat capable

BBR 58 Tu-22M *Backfire C*FTR 79: 49 Su-27 *Flanker*; 30 MiG-31 *Foxhound*FGA 68: 10 Su-25 *Frogfoot*; 58 Su-24 *Fencer*ASW 20 Tu-142 *Bear**MP 50: 15 Be-12 *Mail**; 35 Il-38 *May**EW • ELINT 2 Il-20 RT *Coot-A*; 5 An-12 *Cub*TPT 37: 37 An-12 *Cub*/An-24 *Coke*/An-26 *Curl***HELICOPTERS**ATK 11 Mi-24 *Hind*ASW 155: 85 Ka-27 *Helix*; 50 Ka-25 *Hormone*; 20 Mi-14 *Haze-A*EW 8 Mi-8 *Hip J*ASLT 30 Ka-29 *Helix*SAR 62: 22 Ka-25 PS *Hormone C*/Ka-27 PS *Hormone-D*; 40 Mi-14 PS *Haze C*SPT 36: 26 Mi-8 *Hip*; 10 Mi-6 *Hook***MSL • TACTICAL**ASM AS-10 *Karen*; AS-11 *Kilter*; AS-12 *Kegler*; AS-4 *Kitchen*; AS-7 *Kerry*; KH-59 (AS-13) *Kingbolt***Coastal Defence • Naval Infantry (Marines) 9,500****FORCES BY ROLE**Naval inf 4 indep bde (*total*: 1 AT bn, 1 arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 tk bn, 4 naval inf bn); 3 indep bn; 3 regt; 1 indep regt;

Inf 1 div HQ (Pacific Fleet) (3 inf bn, 1 tk bn, 1 arty bn)

SF 3 (fleet) bde (1 op, 2 cadre) (*each*: 1 para bn, 1 spt elm, 2-3 underwater bn)**EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

MBT 160 T-55M/T-72/T-80

RECCE 60 BRDM-2 each with AT-3 9K11 *Sagger*

AIFV 150+: ε150 BMP-2; BMP-3; BRM-1K

APC 750+

APC (T) 250 MT-LB

APC (W) 500+ BTR-60/BTR-70/BTR-80

ARTY 367

SP 113: 122mm 95 2S1 *Carnation*; 152mm 18 2S3

TOWED 122mm 45 D-30

GUN/MOR 113

SP 120mm 95: 20 2S23 *NONA-SVK*; 75 2S9 SP *NONA-S*TOWED 120mm 18 2B16 *NONA-K*

MRL 122mm 96 9P138

AT • MSL • MANPATS 72 AT-3 9K11 *Sagger*/AT-5 9K113 *Spandrel*

GUNS 100mm T-12

AD • SAM 320

SP 70: 20 SA-8 *Gecko*; 50 SA-9 *Gaskin*/SA-13 *Gopher* (200 eff.)MANPAD 250 SA-7 *Grail*

GUNS 23mm 60 ZSU-23-4

Coastal Defence Troops 2,000**FORCES BY ROLE**

(All units reserve status)

Coastal Def 2 bde

Arty 2 regt

AD 1 regt with 28 Su-27 *Flanker*

SAM 2 regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT 350 T-64

AIFV 450 BMP

APC 320

APC (T) 40 MT-LB

APC (W) 280 BTR-60/BTR-70/BTR-80

ARTY 364

SP 152mm 48 2S5

TOWED 280: 122mm 140 D-30; 152mm 140: 50 2A36; 50 2A65; 40 D-20

MRL 122mm 36 BM-21

AIRCRAFT • FTR 28 Su-27 *Flanker*

AD • SAM 50

Military Air Forces 160,000 reducing to 148,000 (incl conscripts)

4,000+ ac, 833 in reserve

HQ at Balashikha, near Moscow. The Military Air Forces comprise Long Range Aviation (LRA), Military Transport Aviation Comd (VTA), 5 Tactical/Air Defence Armies comprising 49 air regts. Tactical/Air Defence roles include air defence, interdiction, recce and tactical air spt. LRA (2 div) and VTA (9 regt) are subordinated to central Air Force comd. A joint CIS Unified Air Defence System covers R, Arm, Bel, Ga, Kaz, Kgz, Tjk, Tkm, Ukr and Uz.

Long-Range Aviation Command • 37th Air Army

Flying hours: 80-100 hrs/yr

FORCES BY ROLEBbr 2 heavy bbr div; 4 heavy regt (non-strategic); 4 heavy regt (START accountable) with 116 Tu-22M-3/MR *Backfire C*Tkr 1 base with 20 Il-78 *Midas*/Il-78M *Midas*Trg 1 hvy bbr trg centre with 30 Tu-134 *Crusty***EQUIPMENT BY TYPE**

AIRCRAFT 116 combat capable

BBR 116 Tu-22M-3/Tu-22MR *Backfire C*TKR 20 Il-78 *Midas* /Il-78M *Midas*TPT 30 Tu-134 *Crusty***Tactical Aviation**

Flying hours 25 to 40 hrs/year

FORCES BY ROLEBbr/FGA 7 regt with Su-25A/SM *Frogfoot*; 1 regt with Su-34P *Fullback*; 1 bbr div plus 13 FGA regt with Su-24/Su-24M2 *Fencer*Ftr 9 regt with MiG-31 *Foxhound*; 9 regt with MiG-29 *Fulcrum* (24 being upgraded); 6 regt with Su-27 *Flanker* (incl Su-27SM); trg units with MiG-25 *Foxbat*Recce 4 regt with MiG-25R *Foxbat*; 5 regt with Su-24MR *Fencer*AEW 1 base with A-50 *Mainstay*/A-50U *Mainstay*ECM some sqn with Mi-8(ECM) *Hip J*

Trg 2 op conversion centres

SAM 35 regt with 1,900+ S-300 (SA-10) *Grumble* (quad) (7,600 eff.). First SA-20/S-400 (*Triumph*) bn op Elektrostal in Moscow region.

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 1,743 combat capable

BBR/FGA 807: 241 Su-25A/SM *Frogfoot*; 550 Su-24 *Fencer* (up to 7 upgraded to Su-24M2); 16 Su-34P *Fullback* (Su-27IB)

FTR 725: 188 MiG-31 *Foxhound*; 226 MiG-29 *Fulcrum* (24 being upgraded); 281 Su-27 (18 upgraded to 27SM) incl 40 Su-27SMK *Flanker*; 30 MiG-25 *Foxbat*;

RECCE 119: 40 MiG-25R *Foxbat**; 79 Su-24MR *Fencer**

AEW 20 A-50 *Mainstay* AEW/A-50U *Mainstay*

TRG 92: 40 MiG-29 *Fulcrum**; 21 Su-27 *Flanker**; 15 Su-25 *Frogfoot**; 16 Su-24 *Fencer** (instructor trg)

HELICOPTERS 60 Mi-8(ECM) *Hip J*

UAV *Pchela-1T*; *AlbatrossT*; *ExpertT*

AD • SAM • SP 1,900+ S-300 (SA-10) *Grumble* (quad) / S-400 (SA-20) *Triumph*

MSL • ARM AS-11 *Kilter*; AS-12 *Kegler*; AS-17 *Krypton*

ASM AS-14 *Kedge*; AS-15 *Kent*; AS-16 *Kickback*; AS-4 *Kitchen*; AS-7 *Kerry*

AAM R-27T (AA-10) *Alamo*; R-60T (AA-8) *Aphid*; R-73M1 (AA-11) *Archer*

BOMBS

Laser-guided KAB-500; KAB-1500L

TV-guided KH-59 (AS-13 *Kingbolt*); KAB-500KR;

KAB-1500KR; KAB-500OD

INS/GPS/GLONASS guided KH-101; KH-555

Military Transport Aviation Command-61st Air Army

Flying hours 60 hrs/year

FORCES BY ROLE

Air 9 regt incl. 5 indep regt; 1 div with 12 An-124 *Condor*; 21 An-22 *Cock* (Under MoD control); 210 Il-76 *Candid*

Civilian Fleet Some sqn (medium and long-range passenger)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT • TPT 293+: 50 An-12 *Cub*; 12 An-124 *Condor*; 21 An-22 *Cock* (Under MoD control); 210 Il-76M/MD/MF *Candid*

Army Aviation Helicopters

Under VVS control. Units organic to army formations.

Flying hours 55 hrs/year

FORCES BY ROLE

Atk hel 20 regt/sqn with 8 Ka-50 *Hokum*; ε620 Mi-24 *Hind*; 7 Mi-28N *Havoc* (300 by 2010)

Tpt/ECM mixed regts with 35 Mi-26 *Halo* (hy); 8 Mi-6 *Hook*; ε600 MI-17 (Mi-8MT) *Hip H*/Mi-8 *Hip*

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

HELICOPTERS

ATK 635: 8 Ka-50 *Hokum*; 620 Mi-24 *Hind* D/V/P; 7 Mi-28N *Havoc* (300 by 2015)

TPT/ECM ε643: 35 Mi-26 *Halo* (hy); 8 Mi-6 *Hook*; ε600 Mi-17 (Mi-8MT) *Hip H*/Mi-8 *Hip Spt*

Air Force Aviation Training Schools

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT 980+

FTR MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; Su-27 *Flanker*; MiG-23 *Flogger*

FGA Su-25 *Frogfoot*

TPT Tu-134 *Crusty*

TRG 336 L-39 *Albatros*

FACILITIES

Aviation 5 sqn regt with MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; Su-27

Institute *Flanker*; MiG-23 *Flogger*; Su-25 *Frogfoot*;

Tu-134 *Crusty* tpt; L-39 *Albatros* trg ac

Kaliningrad Special Region 10,500 (Ground and Airborne); 1,100 (Naval Infantry) (total 11,600)

These forces operated under the Ground and Coastal Defence Forces of the Baltic Fleet

Army

FORCES BY ROLE

MR 1 div (2 MR regt, 1 tk regt, 1 SP Arty regt, 1 MRL regt, 1 AT regt, 1 SAM regt, 1 indep tk regt, spt units) (cadre); 1 bde; 1 indep regt (trg)

SSM 1 bde with 18 SS-21 *Tochka* (*Scarab*)

Arty 1 MRL regt

Hel 1 indep regt

SAM 1 regt

FACILITIES

Bases Located at Baltiysk and Kronstadt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT 811

ACV 1,239: 865; 374 look-a-like

ARTY 345 ARTY/MOR/MRL

Navy • Baltic Fleet – see main Navy section

Russian Military Districts

Leningrad MD 28,700 (Ground and Airborne); 1,300 (Naval Infantry – subordinate to Northern Fleet) (total 30,000)

Combined Service 1 HQ located at St Petersburg

Army

FORCES BY ROLE

MR 2 indep bde, 1 naval bde

SF 1 (Spetsnaz) bde

AB 1 Air Aslt div (2 air aslt regt, 1 arty regt)

Arty 1 bde, 1 MRL regt, 1 AT regt

SSM 1 bde with 18 SS-21 *Tochka* (*Scarab*)

SAM 2 bde

Reserve

MR 4 Bde

FACILITIES

Training Centre 1 located at Sertolovo (District)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT 300
 ACV 2,350: 100; 2,250 look-a-like
 ARTY 690 MOR/MRL

Navy • Northern Fleet – see main Navy section**Military Air Force**

6th Air Force and AD Army

FORCES BY ROLE

PVO 2 corps
 Bbr 1 div with 56 Su-24M *Fencer*
 Ftr 1 div with 30 MiG-31 *Foxhound*; 55 Su-27 *Flanker*
 Recce 1 regt with 20 Su-24MR *Fencer*; 28 MiG-25R/U *Foxbat*; some MiG-31
 AEW/AWACS A-50 *Mainstay*
 Tpt Sqns with An-12, An-24, An-26, Tu-134
 Cbt spt 57 Mi-8 *Hip* (incl ECM), some Mi-8PPA, 38 Mi-24, 4 Mi-6

AD • SAM 525 incl S-300V

Moscow MD 86,200 (Ground and Airborne)

Combined Service 1 HQ located at Moscow

Army**FORCES BY ROLE**

Army 2 HQ
 Tk 1 div (3 tk regt (2 cadre), 1 MR regt, 1 SP arty regt, 1 MRL regt, 1 SAM regt, spt units); 1 div (2 tk regt (cadre), 2 MR regt, (some cadre), arty, MRL SAM, spt units cadre)
 MR 1 div (3 MR regt, 1 tk regt, 1 SP arty regt, 1 SAM regt, spt units); 1 div (2 MR regt, 2 tk regt, 1 SP Arty regt, 1 SAM regt, spt units); 1 indep bde
 SF 1 (Spetsnaz) bde; 1 AB recce regt
 AB 2 div (each: 2 para regt, 1 arty regt)
 Arty 1 div HQ (3 arty bde), 1 arty bde, 1 MRL bde, 1 MRL regt, 1 AT regt)
 SSM 2 bde each with 18 SS-21 *Scarab (Tochka)*
 AT 1 regt
 Trg 1 HQ (1 AD arty regt, 2 tk regt, 2 MR regt)
 SAM 3 bde

Reserve

Tk 1 div
 MR 1 bde

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT 2,500
 ACV 3,100: 2,100; 1,000 look-a-like
 ARTY 1,300 ARTY/MOR/MRL

Military Air Force

Moscow Air Defence and Air Army has 1 corps. Due to have additional AD regt (2 bn) equipped with S-400 SAM system.

FORCES BY ROLE

PVO Air 1 (32 PVO) corps 1 16th Air Army
 Ftr regts with 41 MiG-31 *Foxhound*, 45 MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; 30 Su-27
 FGA regts with 52 Su-25 *Frogfoot*, 80 Su-24 *Fencer*
 Recce regt with 55 Su-24MR
 Tpt regt with An-12, An-24, An-26, An-30, Tu-134
 Cbt Spt sqns with 98 Mi-8/ Mi-8PPA/sMV (incl 46 Mi-8(ECM))
 Utl sqns with Mi-8
 Trg 30 MiG-29, 18 Su-27, 1 Su-25
 UAV *Pchela*-1T at Combat Training Centre, Egor'evsk, Moscow

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AD • SAM 600

Volga-Ural MD 55,000 (Ground and Airborne)

Combined Service 1 HQ located at Yekaterinburg

Army

1 Army HQ

FORCES BY ROLE

Army 1 HQ
 MR 1 div (3 MR regt, 1 tk regt, 1 SP arty regt, 1 SAM regt, spt units); 1 div (2 MR regt, 2 tk regt, 1 SP arty regt, 1 SAM regt, spt units); 1 Mil Base (div) (3 MR regt) in Tajikistan; 1 indep PK bde;
 SF 2 (Spetsnaz) bde
 AB 1 bde
 Arty 2 bdes, 1 MRL regt
 SSM 2 bde each with 18 SS-21 *Tochka (Scarab)*
 SAM 2 bde

Reserve

Tk 1 div
 MR 1 div

FACILITIES

Training Centre 1 located at Kamshlov (district)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT 3,000
 ACV 2,300
 ARTY 2,700 ARTY/MOR/MRL

Navy • Caspian Sea Flotilla see main Navy section**Military Air Force**

5th AF and AD Army has no ac subordinated, incl storage bases

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIRCRAFT •
 FTR 34 MiG-31
 FGA Su-25 *Frogfoot*
 TPT An-12; An-26
COMMS Mi-14
HELICOPTERS • **SPT**: Mi-6, 25 Mi-8 *Hip* (comms); Mi-24, 24 Mi-26

TRG MiG-25U, MiG-29, Su-25, Su-27; 300 L-39 *Albatros*, Mi-2 *Hoplite*

North Caucasus MD 88,600 (Ground And Airborne); €1,400 (Naval infantry) (total 90,000)

including Trans-Caucasus Group of Forces (GRVZ) Combined Service 1 HQ located at Rostov-on-Don

Army

FORCES BY ROLE

Army	1 HQ
MR	1 div (2 MR regt, 1 tk bn, 1 air aslt regt, 1 SP arty regt, 1 SAM regt); 1 div (4 MR regt, 1 tk bn, 1 SP arty regt, 1 SAM regt, spt units); 1 div (4 MR regt, 1 SP arty regt); 1 Mil Base (div) 3 MR regt, 1 SAM regt, 1 tk bn (Armenia) 3 MR, 2 MR Mtn indep bde
SF	2 (Spetsnaz) bde
AB	1 Air Asslt (mtn) div (2 air aslt regt, 1 arty regt)
Arty	2 bde, 1 MRL bde, 1 MRL regt
SSM	2 bde each with 18 SS-21 <i>Tochka (Scarab)</i>
CW	1 (flame thrower) bn
SAM	2 bde; 1 regt

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT 800
ACV 2,000
ARTY 900 ARTY/MOR/MRL

Navy • Black Sea Fleet – see main Navy section

Military Air Force

6th AF and AD Army

FORCES BY ROLE

	390 cbt ac
Bbr	1 div with 62 Su-24 <i>Fencer</i> (some 32 likely to be retired)
Ftr	1 corps (4 regt with 105 MiG-29 <i>Fulcrum</i> ; 59 Su-27 <i>Flanker</i>)
FGA	1 div with 98 Su-25 <i>Frogfoot</i> ; 36 L-39
Recce	1 regt with 30 Su-24MR <i>Fencer</i>
ECM	1 sqn with 52 Mi-8 (ECM) <i>Hip J</i>
Tpt	Sqns with An-12, An-24, An-26, Tu-134
Cbt Spt	regts with 58 Mi-8PPA/SMV, 75 Mi-24,
Utl	4 Mi-6, 10 Mi-26
Trg	tac aviation regt

Siberian MD 52,000 (Ground and Airborne)

Combined Service 1 HQ located at Chita

Army

FORCES BY ROLE

Army	2 Army HQ (36 th and 41 st)
Tk	1 div (3 tk regt, 1 MR regt, 1 armd recce bn, 1 arty regt, 1 SAM regt, spt units)

MR	3 div (85 th , 122 nd , 131 st) (each: 3 MR regt, 1 tk regt, 1 indep tk bn, 1 armd recce bn, 1 arty regt, 1 AT bn, 1 SAM regt, spt units); 1 indep bde
SF	2 (Spetsnaz) bde
Air aslt	1 bde
Arty	1 div Hq, 3 arty bde, 3 MRL regt
SSM	1 bde each with 18 SS-21 <i>Tochka (Scarab)</i>
SAM	2 bde

FACILITIES

Training Centre 1 located at Peschanka (district)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT 4,000
ACV 6,300
ARTY 2,600 MOR/MRL

Military Air Force

14th AF and AD Army (HQ Novosibirsk)
200 cbt ac

FGA/bbr	some sqn with 30 Su-25 <i>Frogfoot</i> ; 56 Su-24M <i>Fencer</i>
Ftr	some sqn with 39 MiG-31 <i>Foxhound</i> ; 46 MiG-29 <i>Fulcrum</i>
Recce	some sqn with 29 Su-24MR <i>Fencer-E</i> ; MiG-25R/MiG-25U
Tpt	sqns with An-12, An-26
Cbt Spt	sqns with Mi-8PPA/sMV; Mi-24
Utl/Comms	sqns with Mi-8
AD • SAM	S-3000

Far Eastern MD 72,500 (Ground and Airborne); 2,500 (Naval infantry) (total 75,000)

Incl Pacific Fleet and Joint Command of Troops and Forces in the Russian Northeast (comd of Pacific Fleet) Joint Forces Command 1 HQ located at Petropavlovsk Combined Service 1 HQ located at Khabarovsk

Army

FORCES BY ROLE

Army	2 HQ (5 th and 35 th); 1 (68) corps
MR	5 div (each: 3 MR regt, 1 tk regt, arty regt, 1 SAM regt, spt units); 1 div (formally MGA) (1 MR regt, 2 MGA regt, def units, spt units)
MGA	5 div (Converting MR) most (1 tank regt, 2 MR or MGA regt, arty regt, SAM regt)
SF	1 bde
AB	1 bde
Arty	4 arty bde, 3 MRL bde, 1 AT bde)
SSM	2 bde each with 18 SS-21 <i>Scarab (Tochka)</i>
SAM	3 bde

FACILITIES

Training Centre 1 located at Khabarovsk (district)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT 3,000
ACV 6,000
ARTY 4,100 MOR/MRL

Navy • Pacific Fleet – see main Navy section**Military Air Force**

11th AF and AD Army (HQ Khabarovsk)
 FGA/bbr 1 regt with 23 Su-27SM; 97 Su-24M *Fencer*
 Ftr sqn with 26 MiG-31 *Foxhound*; ≤100Su-27
Flanker;
 Recce sqns with 51 Su-24MR *Fencer*
 Tpt regts with An-12, An-26
 Cbt Spt regts with Mi-8PPA/sMV
 Comms sqns with Mi-8; Mi-24, Ka-50
 UAV 1 sqn with *Pchela-1* (Arseniev,
 Primorskyy)

AD • SAM S-300P

Paramilitary 449,000**Federal Border Guard Service** €160,000
active

Directly subordinate to the President; now reportedly
 all contract-based personnel

FORCES BY ROLE

10 regional directorates
 Frontier 7 gp

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

AIFV/APC (W) 1,000 BMP/BTR
 ARTY • SP 90: 122mm 2S1 *Carnation*; 120mm 2S12;
 120mm 2S9 *Anona*

PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 14**FRIGATES 13**

FFG 7 *Krivak III* each with 1 twin (2 eff.) with SA-N-4
Gecko naval SAM, 2 quad 533mm TT (8 eff.), 2 RBU
 6000 *Smerch 2* (24 eff.), (capacity 1 Ka-27 *Helix A* ASW
 hel; 1 100mm)

FFL 6: 3 *Grisha II*; 3 *Grisha III*

CORVETTES • FS 1 *Grisha V***PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 180****PFM 22:**

2 *Pauk II* each with 1 quad (4 eff.) with SA-N-5 *Grail*
 naval SAM, 2 twin 533mm TT (4 eff.), 2 RBU 1200 (10
 eff.), 1 76mm

20 *Svetlyak* each with 1 quad (4 eff.) with SA-N-5 *Grail*
 naval SAM, 2 single 406mm TT, 1 76mm

PFT 17 *Pauk I* each with 1 quad (4 eff.) with SA-N-5
Grail naval SAM, 4 single 406mm TT, 1 76mm

PHT 3 *Muravey*

PSO 12: 8 *Alpinist*; 4 *Komandor*

PFC 15 *Stenka*

PCC 36: 9 *Mirazh*; 27 *Type 1496*

PCI 12 *Zhuk*

PCR 32: 3 *Ogonek*; 7 *Piyavka*; 15 *Shmel*; 5 *Vosh*; 2 *Yaz*

PBF 31: 1 A-125; 1 *Mangust*; 1 *Mustang* (Project 18623);
 15 *Saygak*; 12 *Sobol*; 1 *Sokzhoi*

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 24: 1 AO

AK 10 *Neon Antonov*

AKSL 6 *Kanin*

AGS 2 *Yug* (primarily used as patrol ships)

AGB 5 *Ivan Susanin* (primarily used as patrol ships)

AIRCRAFT • TPT €86: 70 An-24 *Coke*/An-26 *Curl*/An-72
Coaler/Il-76 *Candid*/Tu-134 *Crusty*/Yak-40 *Codling*; 16 SM-92
HELICOPTERS: €200 Ka-28 (Ka-27) *Helix* ASW/Mi-24
Hind Atk/Mi-26 *Halo* Spt/Mi-8 *Hip* Spt

Interior Troops 200,000 active**FORCES BY ROLE**

7 Regional Commands: Central, Urals, North Caucasus,
 Volga, Eastern, North-Western and Siberian

Paramilitary 5 (special purpose) indep div (ODON)
 (each: 2–5 paramilitary regt); 6 div; 65 regt
 (bn – incl special motorised units); 10
 (special designation) indep bde (OBRON)
 (each: 1 mor bn, 3 mech bn); 19 indep bde

Avn gp

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

MBT 9

AIFV/APC (W) 1,650 BMP-1 /BMP-2/BTR-80

ARTY 35

TOWED 122mm 20 D-30

MOR 120mm 15 PM-38

HELICOPTERS • ATK 4 Mi-24 *Hind*

Federal Security Service €4,000 active
(armed)

Cdo unit (incl Alfa and Vypel units)

Federal Protection Service €10,000–30,000
active

Org include elm of ground forces (mech inf bde and AB
 regt)

Mech inf 1 bde

AB 1 regt

Presidential Guard 1 regt

**Federal Communications and Information
Agency** €55,000 active**MOD • Railway Troops** €50,000

Paramilitary 4 (rly) corps; 28 (rly) bde

Special Construction Troops 50,000**DEPLOYMENT****ARABIAN GULF AND INDIAN OCEAN**

Maritime Security Operations 1 FFG; 1 AOL

ARMENIA

Army 3,214; 1 tk bn; 3 MR regt; 74 MBT; 330 AIFV; 14 APC
 (T)/APC (W); 68 SP/towed arty; 8 mor; 8 MRL; 1 base

Military Air Forces • Tactical Aviation

1 AD sqn with 18 MiG-29 *Fulcrum*; 2 SAM bty with
 S-300V (SA-12A) *Gladiator*; 1 SAM bty with SA-6 *Gainful*

Air Base located at Yerevan

BELARUS**Strategic Deterrent Forces • Warning Forces**

1 radar station located at Baranovichi (*Volga* system; leased)

1 Naval Communications site

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

OSCE • Bosnia and Herzegovina 4

CÔTE D'IVOIRE

UN • UNOCI 11 obs

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC/CHAD

EU • EUFOR • Tchad/RCA 120; 1 hel det with 4 Mi-8MT

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

UN • MONUC 27 obs

GEORGIA

Two garrisons (Abkhazia and South Ossetia, each stated to be 3,800 strong [bde-plus]).

Army €7,600; Abkhazia 1 MR bde (peacekeeping force) at loc incl Gudauta; some troops may remain from former peacekeeping contingent at Gali; South Ossetia 1 MR bde (peacekeeping force) at loc incl Djava and Tskhinvali; **Military Air Forces** • Tactical Aviation; 5 atk hel

OSCE • Georgia 1

UN • UNOMIG 5 obs

KAZAKHSTAN

Strategic Deterrent Forces • **Warning Forces**

1 radar station located at Balkhash, (*Dnepr* system; leased)

KYRGYZSTAN

Military Air Forces €500; some Su-27 *Flanker*; 5+: 5 Su-25 *Frogfoot*; some Su-24 *Fencer* FGA; Army Aviation Helicopters; some Mi-8 *Hip* spt hel

LIBERIA

UN • UNMIL 6 obs

MIDDLE EAST

UN • UNTSO 4 obs

MOLDOVA/TRANSDNESTR

Army €1,500 (including €500 peacekeepers)

FORCES BY ROLE

2 MR bn (subord to Moscow MD)

EQUIPMENT BY TYPE

ACV 100

Military Air Forces 7 Mi-24 *Hind* atk hel; MI-8 *Hip* Spt Hel

SERBIA

OSCE • Kosovo 2

UN • UNMIK 1 obs

SIERRA LEONE

UN • UNIOSIL 1 obs

SUDAN

UN • UNMIS 123; 13 obs

Military Air Forces 1 hel det

SYRIA

Army and Navy 150

1 naval facility under renovation at Tartus

TAJIKISTAN

Army 5,500; 1 MR div (subord Volga-Ural MD); 54 MBT; 350 ACV; 190 Mor/MRL; 4 Mi-8 *Hip*

Military Air Forces 5 Su-25 *Frogfoot* FGA

UKRAINE

Navy • Coastal Defence • 13,000 including Naval Infantry (Marines) 1,100; Arty: 24; AIFV /APC (T) / APC (W): 102

Navy Black Sea Fleet; 1 Fleet HQ located at Sevastopol: **Strategic Deterrent Forces**. **Warning Forces**; 2 radar stations located at Sevastopol (*Dnepr* System, leased) and Mukachevo (*Dnepr* system, leased).

WESTERN SAHARA

UN • MINURSO 15 obs

Table 21 Selected arms procurements and deliveries, Russia

Designation	Type	Quantity	Contract Value	Supplier Country	Prime Contractor	Order Date	First Delivery Due	Notes
<i>Iskander-M</i> (SS-26 Stone)	SRBM	–	–	Dom	–	–	2007	5 <i>Iskander-M</i> bde due to be operational by 2015. To gradually replace <i>Tochka</i> (SS-21 <i>Scarab A</i>) and <i>Tochka-U</i> (SS-21 <i>Scarab B</i>) ICBM
T-72 and T-80	MBT	180	–	Dom	–	2006	2007	Some to be modernised. Number may be subject to change
BTR-80 and BTR-90	APC	100	–	Dom	–	2005	2006	Delivery status unclear
BMP-3	IFV	40	–	Dom	–	2007	–	Delivery status unclear
<i>Buk-M2</i> (SA-17 'Grizzly')	SAM	–	–	Dom	–	–	2009	To replace <i>Buk-M1-2</i> systems in service with Army AD
<i>Tor-M2</i> (SA-15 'Gauntlet')	SAM	–	–	Dom	–	–	2010	Bty formations. First AD regts due to be re-equipped by 2010–11
Project 22350 / <i>Admiral Gorshkov</i>	FFG	1	USD400m	Dom	Severnaya Verf Shipyard	2005	2009	Navy estimates need for up to 20 vessels by 2015
<i>Agat-class</i> (<i>Natya III</i>) / Project 266M	MSC	1	–	Dom	–	2000	2008	<i>Vitse-Admiral Zakharin</i> . Launched Jan 2008, ISD unclear
<i>Dyugon</i>	LCU	1	R200m (USD69m)	Dom	Volga Shipyard	2005	2007	Laid down 2006
Project 955 <i>Borey</i>	SSBN	3	–	Dom	Sevmash Shipyard	1996	2006	Lead SSBN, <i>Yuri Dolgoruky</i> launched Feb 2008. 2nd SSBN, <i>Aleksandr Nevesky</i> due 2009. 3rd SSBN, <i>Vladimir Monomah</i> , ordered 2006 and due 2011
<i>Typhoon</i>	SSBN Upgrade	1	–	Dom	–	1994	–	<i>Dmitriy Donskoy</i> modernised for testing of new <i>Bulava 30</i> (SS-NX-30) SLBM and will remain in service until <i>Borey-class</i> SSBN are operational
Su-34 <i>Fullback</i>	FGA	24	USD864	Dom	Sukhoi	2006	2006	Delivered in batches; 2 in 2006, 7 in 2007, 10 in 2008 and 5 in 2009–10. First 2 delivered Dec 2006
Medium Transport Aircraft (MTA) Project	Tpt ac	50	–	Dom/In	Irkut/HAL	2007	2014	In development. RF obliged to order at least 50 under deal signed with India in 2007
Tu-160 <i>Blackjack</i>	Bbr	30	–	Dom	UAC	2007	2012	Upgrade of 15 current Tu-160, plus 15 new bbr. 1 new bbr entered service Apr 2008
Yak-130 AJT (Advanced Jet Trainer)	Trg ac	200	–	Dom	Yakolev	2005	2009	To replace current L-39. Purchase to begin 2009 following flight testing
Mi-28N <i>Night Hunter</i>	Hel	8	–	Dom	Rostvertol	2005	2009	Plans for 45 to 67 Mi-28N. 2 hel delivered by Feb 2008