Unrealistic demands on Qatar reveal the real reasons behind the blockade

by Patrick Truffer (originally published in German). He has been working in the Swiss Army for more than 15 years, holds a bachelor’s degree in public affairs from the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zürich (ETH Zurich), and a master’s degree in international relations from the Free University of Berlin.

Among other things due to pressure from the USA, Friday last week, Qatar was presented with a list of thirteen demands compiled by Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain. The four countries require implementation of these demands until next Tuesday in order to lift the blockade that has been ongoing for more than two weeks. In the highly unlikely event of Qatar submitting to these demands, in the first year compliance with the demands would be checked by the four countries on a monthly basis, in the second year quarterly, and in the following ten years annually (“Arab states issue list of demands to end Qatar crisis“, Al Jazeera, June 23, 2017). In point of fact, this would amount to a relinquishment of sovereignty, and is from this aspect alone hardly acceptable. In view of this far-reaching attempted influence by the four countries on an independent sovereign state, the demand that Qatar should no longer interfere with the internal affairs of the four countries seems almost cynical. In addition, Qatar would have to pay reparation payments to the four countries for the consequences of its policy of recent years, without mentioning any sum. The list of demands clearly shows that the four countries are less concerned with limiting terrorism in the sense of western thinking, but more with extending their regional power, disciplining Qatar, and eliminating oppositional trends and voices critical of the regimes. However, no further consequences have been formulated in the event of Qatar not meeting the demands. There would probably be a lasting diplomatic and economic separation — military escalation is currently unlikely.

Not only is there demand that Qatar break off diplomatic relations with Iran, but also that it refrain from military cooperation with Turkey and a Turkish military presence in Qatar. But Qatar will hardly comply with this demands. On the contrary, the blockade has increased the importance of Qatar’s economic relations with Iran and Turkey. According to the Iranian Financial Tribune, Iran has been shipping around 1,100 tons of fruits and vegetables to Doha every day since imposing the blockade. In fact, this is only the beginning: to date, 66 tonnes of beef have been delivered, and a further 90 tonnes are expected. The delivery of large quantities of eggs, and steel for Qatar’s ambitious infrastructure projects could follow. Iran has also opened the airspace, which is crucial for deliveries from Turkey. In the roughly two weeks of the blockade, Turkey has been able to export around 32.5 million US dollars worth of goods to Qatar, 12.5 million US dollars of which were spent on foodstuffs — amounting to approximately three times the exports before the blockade and around 100 cargo aircraft (Daren Butler, “Turkey Rejects Call to Shut Military Base in Qatar“, Reuters, June 23, 2017). Even if Saudi Arabia does not want to allow interference in its regional sphere of influence either on the part of Iran or on the part of Turkey, the kingdom has achieved exactly the opposite with the blockade: strengthening of relations between Turkey, Iran and Qatar to the detriment of Saudi Arabians, along with opening up a lucrative sales market for the two supplying countries.

With the strategic support of the Muslim Brotherhood, Qatar attempted to cleverly utilise the dynamics during the Arab Spring in order to expand its regional political significance. However, in hindsight, this project must be regarded as not having been particularly successful. On the contrary, in doing so it triggered the ire of the monarchs, initiating a challenge to its power. To date, relations with the Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi have not recovered from this. Qatar’s open support for the Muslim Brotherhood during the Arab Spring, not least with the help of Al Jazeera, led also to a disagreement in 2014 among the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and withdrawal from Doha of the ambassadors of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain. According to the four countries’ demands, support of the Muslim Brotherhood should now definitely cease. Together with the Islamic State, al-Qaida, and the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Muslim Brotherhood should be designated as a terrorist group and be sanctioned by Qatar.

Qatar’s regional influence is also to be restricted. In this context, there is additionally the almost medieval-seeming demand that Al Jazeera, along with Arabi21, Rassd, Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, and Middle East Eye be shut down. In addition to the financial resources resulting from the extraction and export of oil and natural gas, Al Jazeera is an important instrument of political power for Qatar. After all, the news channel reaches some 50 million Arabic-speaking and 200 million English-speaking viewers. But Al Jazeera is more than this: it is currently the most professional and pluralistic news channel in the region (Monika Bolliger, “Der Medienkrieg am Golf“, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, June 24, 2017). According to the four countries, the Arab population should only be hearing and seeing what the official media in the Gulf and the Nile provide them with (Inga Rogg, “Katar will nicht nachgeben“, NZZ am Sonntag, June 25, 2017). The fulfilment of this demand is just as unrealistic as the rest of the demands — if only because Middle East Eye, for example, has its offices in London. The supporting attitude of US President Donald Trump for this blockade casts a shadow over international protection of freedom of expression, but fits his own problematic attitude towards critical, free media.

The blockade imposed on Qatar and the demands are not about the fight against terrorism, but about the suppression of Qatar’s sometimes stubborn, non-compliant politics in comparison to the other GCC states. The goal of Saudi Arabia is containment of Iran and expansion of its regional power. It is using the GCC in order to achieve this goal, and is demanding unrestricted allegiance from its member countries. As in January 2016, the embassy of Saudi Arabia was stormed in Tehran, and Riyadh utilised this as a thrust to engage its GCC partners in a tough confrontational policy against Tehran, calling for the abolition of all diplomatic and economic relations between the GCC countries and Iran (Björn Müller, “Der Golfkooperationsrat – Bündnis der ‘negativen Solidarität’“, Pivot Area, June 11, 2017). Qatar did withdraw its ambassador from Tehran, but neither diplomatic nor economic relations were broken off. Iran still maintains an embassy in Doha, and Qatar one in Tehran. Moreover, Saudi Arabia wants to prevent Turkey from interfering, in particular also because the political roots of Turkish President Tayyip Erdoğan are within the Justice and Development Party (AKP), a party close to the Muslim Brotherhood. In this respect, the intergovernmental relations between Turkey and Egypt have been bad since the overthrow of the Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi by el-Sisi. This upheaval was supported by the Saudis, which also led to a cooling of Turkish-Saudi relations. The slow improvement of the Saudi-Turkish relations of the last two years now seems to have come to an abrupt end – not entirely to Iran’s displeasure.

 
Conclusion
From a regional point of view, a dangerous power game is developing in the Middle East between the regional powers, with Saudi Arabia (together with Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain), Turkey and Iran more or less stepping on each other’s toes. This especially involves expansion of its regional power, primarily at the expense of Iran, as well as the complete neutralisation of groups opposing and critical of the regime in the Middle East — this actually being the second phase of neutralising the Arab Spring and the few remaining groups in the Middle East. The blockade and the demands placed on Qatar have nothing to do with an intensified fight against terror in the region — this reasoning is merely an excuse. A long-term continuation of the blockade could, however, have a highly counter-productive effect on Saudi Arabia. Not only is Qatar benefiting from the situation, it is also delivering the emirate into Iran’s arms, strengthening the Turkish influence in the region, simultaneously straining Saudi-Turkish relations, and endangering the continuity of the GCC in its present composition. If there is further escalation, someone in Washington may end up being caught with his pants down.

More information

• Qatar’s National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) says it will employ the Swiss law firm Lalive to seek compensation for those affected by a decision of Gulf countries to cut ties with Doha and impose a blockade against it. The name of the firm was not revealed, yet. — “Qatar to hire Swiss lawyers to sue Gulf blockade states“, Al Jazeera, 30.06.2017.
• UN human rights commissioner Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein has condemned Saudi and other Arab countries’ calls for Al Jazeera to be shut down. “Whether or not you watch it, like it, or agree with its editorial standpoints, Al Jazeera’s Arabic and English channels are legitimate, and have many millions of viewers,” said Rupert Colville, spokesman for Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR). Demands to shut down the broadcaster represent an “unacceptable attack on the right to freedom of expression and opinion,” the UNHCR said on Friday. — “UN calls Qatar neighbors’ call to close Al Jazeera TV an ‘unacceptable attack’“, Deutsche Welle, 30.06.2017.

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