Why did Turkey use M60’s to spearhead its Syria intervention?

Turkey suffered its first combat fatalities over the last weekend before their foray against Islamic State (ISIS) and Syrian Kurdish forces last Wednesday was a week old. What appeared to be militiamen fighting under the banner of the Arab-Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) alliance managed to, according to official Turkish sources, kill one Turkish soldier and wound three others by attacking their tanks seven kilometers south of the Syrian border-town of Jarabulus with rockets. Video footage ostensibly shows a tank being hit by a rocket fired by the SDF before igniting in a bright fireball:

[youtube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pg-rbEC0jXI&w=640&h=360]


Also on Tuesday another three Turkish soldiers were wounded when their tank came under fire west of Jarabulus.

Footage available of the Turkish incursion shows their M60 Patton tanks and ACV-15 armored personnel carriers (APCs) shielding allied Syria militiamen and the 350 or-so Turkish soldiers operating south of the border. This begs the following question: Why is Turkey spearheading such a major operation with its M60’s as opposed to its much more advanced and stronger Leopard 2 tanks?

Granted many of the Turkish M60’s have been overhauled and modernized by Israel, but they are still not the most reliable tank in the Turkish arsenal. Choosing M60’s to lead such a potential risky assault into enemy territory was certainly a questionable move given Turkey’s possession of hundreds of much more durable Leopard 2’s.

The [U.S. and Turkey] weren’t as aligned on the operation as their public statements indicated. […] While Turkey publicly cast the campaign as a joint operation with the U.S.-led military coalition, the first airstrikes carried out by Turkish jets on Jarabulus were done unilaterally, not under the coalition umbrella. — Adam Entous, Gordon Lubold and Dion Nissenbaum, “Turkish Offensive on Islamic State in Syria Caught U.S. Off Guard“, The Wall Street Journal”, 30.08.2016

Furthermore the exposure of these tanks to rocket fire, as brought to light during the Saturday incident, raises questions about how capable the current force in Jarabulus is to move further south from the border to fight its enemies. If anything their precarious situation in northwest Syria is not completely unlike the one faced by Israeli soldiers in Lebanon, during the closing stages of their last war with Hezbollah back in the summer of 2006.

When Israel launched Operation Change of Direction 11 the Israel Defense Forces planned to have helicopter-borne commandos working in tandem with their armour encircle Hezbollah in south Lebanon and secure the Israeli border from rocket attacks carried out by that group. It was an abysmal failure, poor coordination on the command level resulted in Israeli ground forces in Lebanon falling prey to well-organized Hezbollah ambushes. On one occasion a tank column consisting of 24 Merkava main battle tanks was ambushed by Hezbollah militants who fired anti-tank missiles from the hilltops, damaging at least 11 of the tanks. They even managed through small arms fire and mortars to suppress supporting Israeli infantrymen, making the ambush an overwhelming success. The tanks, foolishly operating on hilly terrain, quickly became sitting ducks for Hezbollah.

Beginning last week, Turkish Armed Forces started to move Leopard 2A4 tanks to the southern border. According to the Military Balance 2016, Turkey has 325 Leopard 2A4. It does not appear that these main battle tanks (MBTs) are in use by any of the armoured units currently deployed in operations against the Kurds in the south of the country, nor incursions into Syria or Iraq. It is most likely that these more capable MBTs are with units tasked with guarding Turkey’s northern border, where they probably would have to fight against a much more capable adversary, utilizing more modern and capable MBTs and Anti-Tank weapons

Beginning last week, Turkish Armed Forces started to move Leopard 2A4 tanks to the southern border. According to the Military Balance 2016, Turkey has 325 Leopard 2A4. It does not appear that these main battle tanks (MBTs) are in use by any of the armoured units currently deployed in operations against the Kurds in the south of the country, nor incursions into Syria or Iraq. It is most likely that these more capable MBTs are with units tasked with guarding Turkey’s northern border, where they probably would have to fight against a much more capable adversary, utilizing more modern and capable MBTs and Anti-Tank weapons.

Given its emphasis on safety features the Israeli Merkava has been called the safest tank in the world. The death of some 30 Israeli soldiers and officers from the Israeli Armoured Corps, including two battalion commanders, along with the damage of a total 50 of their tanks by Hezbollah anti-tank missiles throughout that war, however, showed that those tanks were certainly not invulnerable.

In Syria, today, the Turks did not go in with the self-styled safest tanks in the world, but some of their older more ubiquitous tanks which should have, at best, played a supporting role to their more superior Leopard 2’s. These tanks have better mechanisms in place to minimize the effects of damage to the crew inside from fire; for example, its ammunition is separated from the crew in a different compartment in case it is ignited during the course of a fierce firefight.

The Leopard 2 is by no means perfect, and it is bound to start becoming more vulnerable with age given the introduction of new and much more lethal anti-tank missiles. Nevertheless it still remains the most formidable tank in the Turkish arsenal, and given the numbers Turkey has at its disposal it should really have been the tank to lead this operation.

Possible reasons Turkey might not have been able to deploy Leopards in this operation should be evaluated. Turkey is a large country and army bases closest to its southern border may not necessarily have had these tanks, or even had the required crew needed to man them given the large-scale arrests and detentions carried out by the government in the post-July 15 coup crackdown. Also, in spite of the fact that Turkey had long in mind to intervene in that part of northwestern Syria – in June 2015 Erdoğan and his top generals discussed to launch an incursion in that area using 2,000 troops, that plan was subsequently scrapped however following the Russian intervention and the ensuing warplane incident – the intervention did transpire very suddenly, without Washington being given any advanced warning before the opening salvos were fired on August 24.

Turkish and American officials said the Turkish military wanted to look decisive and to show loyalty to Mr. Erdoğan, particularly after the coup. — Adam Entous, Gordon Lubold and Dion Nissenbaum, “Turkish Offensive on Islamic State in Syria Caught U.S. Off Guard“, The Wall Street Journal”, 30.08.2016

This was at least partially because Turkey was presented with a clear casus beli, the heinous terrorist bombing of the Kurdish wedding in Gaziantep, which killed 53 people, many of them children, on August 20 and the shelling of Karkamış with several mortar rounds. Doing nothing quickly and decisive in response to such a heinous attacks, and only six weeks after the aforementioned coup attempt, would have made the Turkish government and military look weak in the eyes of the Turkish people at a critical juncture.

Alternatively the Turkish government could have declared it would eradicate all terrorists on its border and then proceeded to begin deploying and building-up a significant number of Leopard tanks on that frontier from elsewhere in the country — which might have given away the element of surprise.

However Turkey has had artillery, tanks and troops conspicuously deployed to that border for well over a year now. And surprise attack or not it was unlikely that ISIS militants would have fought to the death in defense of Jarabulus, a town right on the periphery of their so-called caliphate — which is why they chose to immediately pull out. Before this operation commenced it was well understood that ISIS tactically retreated from areas where it couldn’t feasibly dig-in and try to bleed out any attacking force. Furthermore the attack was going to be inevitable for the aforementioned reason that ISIS simply kept attacking Turkish towns and cities near the border.

The question which therefore should asked is: Should Turkey really have this offensive before it had its most effective weapons at the ready? Taking the time to build-up this more effective equipment might well have increased the chance the Turkish government and military could have achieved a much more clear-cut and decisive victory, which would have re-instilled any dwindling confidence the public might have begun to have in them.

With the current composition of forces in Syria, the Turks would be well advised not to advance further south into enemy territory and see firsthand just how susceptible its aged M60 fleet is to potentially devastating hit-and-run ambushes, not to mention mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Saturday’s attack was a clear warning of the devastating consequences Turkey faces if it doesn’t reconsider its force composition it has deployed to that war-ravaged morass of a country.

Turkish ACV-15 APCs seen near the Syrian border on 25 August.

Turkish ACV-15 APCs seen near the Syrian border on 25 August.

Update: September 7, 2016
We have received several interesting comments in response to this article. Thank you for your feedback on different social media platforms or here in the comment section.

Matthew Doye argues that the Leopard 2A4s are guarding Turkey’s northern border because nearby Greece and Russia have more capable equipment than their adversaries on the southern border, who have been relying on asymmetrical tactics. Regarding the alternating periods of mutual hostility and reconciliation between Greece and Turkey and the strained relations between Ankara and Moscow after the Sukhoi Su-24 shootdown until Erdoğan expressed regret to Putin for that incident this June, the northern deployment of these kind of tanks makes sense. Apostolos Olokainourios added that the main Turkish Leopard 2A4 force is stationed with the 1st Army in Eastern Thrace (Greek-Turkish border) and that until December 2015 about 25% of the 1st army’s armoured vehicles (including 2A4s) have been transported to the Syrian border. But there’s a catch: it seems that all sources about these Turkish_armysubstantial redeployments from the border to Greek comes back to this article, which doesn’t make a very reliable impression.

Does it mean — as some of the commentator mentioned — that Turkish generals will refrain modern Leopard 2A4s from combat on the expense of aged M60s? These speculations have no grounds, but there are other explanations. According to Arda Mevlutoglu (Facebook / Twitter) the 5th Armored Brigade, which is responsible for the region around Jarabulus is equipped by un-modernised M60A3’s (Israel modernized 170 Turkish M60A1 which were newly deployed as M60T’s). Because the Brigade has enough M60A3 for an operation like “Euphrates Shield” in its current inventory, the Leopard 2A4 and also the M60T are only used as reinforcement. Observations that the Turkish Army has begun to move Leopard 2A4 to the south border region after the beginning of “Euphrates Shield” may support his theory.

Stefan Doelling thinks that the Turks don´t have proper HE-FRAG ammunition for their Leopard 2s which is necessary to effectively combat against soft targets (as an illustration of the effect of HE-FRAG ammunition see the video below demonstrates). For the L7s on the M60, however, they have a broad range of different ammo choices. According to Doelling the Canadians used their Leopard 1s alongside the newer Leopard 2s in Afghanistan for that reason. Although this is an interesting explanation we neither can confirm nor disprove it.

[youtube https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BYgDG8g9ErU&w=640&h=360]

Another interesting theory was added by Thomas Melber in the comment section below. He argues that Leopard 2s were not used in “Euphrates Shield” because “Germany may still have ‘a say‘ in the use of the [Turkish] Leopard“. We can’t completely rule that out. While we haven’t yet found anything concrete there may be some contractual restriction in the use of the Leopard 2, meaning the Turks are obliged to only use the tank in defense of their own territory.

When Germany delivered Turkey 300 BTR-60 from the former National People’s Army of the German Democratic Republic, the use of these armoured personnel carriers were limited for defence only (thanks to Marcus Seyfarth for this hint).

According to the Military Balance 2016 (revised with the M60T), the Turkish army has following numbers of main battle tanks in use:
– 325 Leopard 2A4
– 170 Leopard 1A4
– 227 Leopard 1A3
– 170 M60T
– 658 M60A3
– 104 M60A1
– 850 M48A5 T1/T2 (2,000 more in store)


This entry was posted in English, International, Security Policy, Syria, Turkey.

19 Responses to Why did Turkey use M60’s to spearhead its Syria intervention?

  1. Kemal says:

    The Turkish Army operates 508 modern main battle tanks with 120mm cannons (339 Leopard-2A4 and 169 M60T Sabra) and less than 1,400 older M60A3 TTS/M48A5T2 with 105mm cannons. In the past two years, all Leopard-2A4 and M6OT MBTs were stationed at the Turkish-Greek borders while a small number was kept in Etimesgut (Ankara) for training. After the failed coup attempt, about 80 Leopard-2A4 from the 2nd Armored Brigade in Istanbul and some M60T Sabra from the Eastern Thrace armored battalions have been transferred to the 5th Armored Brigade in Gaziantep and the 20th Armored Brigade in Sanliurfa, respectively. Syria is currently the most ATGM intensive environment so it makes no difference.

  2. Basel says:

    Whats up with the magically disappearing tank at 0:15? There has been someone really busy with this video.

    • igor says:

      Yes, this video document is actually a document of a scam.
      No tank was hit.

      • A Turkish soldier has been killed and another three have been injured in a Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) rocket attack in northern Syria, a military official has said. […] The official said rockets were launched at two Turkish tanks operating 7 kilometers south of Jarablus, the northern Syrian city freed from ISIL during the operation. — “Turkish soldier killed in YPG attack in north Syria“, Hürriyeat Daly News, 28.08.2016.

  3. hip11 says:

    The reason why the Turkey
    uses it’s M60 instead of Leopards
    is plain simple;
    they’r cheap.
    Imagine that expensive Leopard flaming up! Nope you can’t.
    And neither can Turkey high command.

    Every tank can be blown up. Today best chances for survival have Merkava and T90 which feature active defense (trophy & schtora).

  4. Michael says:

    The President fired the generals who could have told him he was making a mistake?

  5. Thomas Melber says:

    Besides, Germany may still have “a say” in the use of the Leopard.

  6. Daniel says:

    Turkey borders Russia? You mean a land border that is protect by the Leos? Where?

    I guess the Black sea ist a common sea border!

    Or do you consider Syria now as Russian territory?

  7. Kemal says:

    Two Turkish M60T Sabra tanks hit by ISIS ATGM Kornet near Al Rai, 3 KIA and 5 WIA

    • Three Turkish soldiers have been killed in a rocket attack by militants of the “Islamic State” (IS) group in northern Syria. They were the first deaths to be directly blamed on IS in the Turkish cross-border incursion.

      The rocket attack on two Turkish tanks was the first to be blamed on IS in Turkey’s cross-border incursion “Euphrates Shield” operation which began two weeks ago.

      IS targeted the tanks near the frontier town of al-Rai in an attack that also killed two members of the Free Syrian Army.

      A senior Turkish official said on Tuesday that two soldiers were killed immediately and five were injured. One of the wounded soldiers later died in hospital, according to an army statement.

      IS released a statement saying they used guided missiles to take out the tanks, alongside a suicide attack on Turkish-supported rebels in the region.

      Source: “Turkish soldiers killed in ‘IS’ rocket attack on tanks in northern Syria“, Deutsche Welle, 06.09.2016.

  8. Turkey’s military and procurement officials are mulling the options of upgrading hundreds of German-made Leopard 2 and U.S.-made M60 main battle tanks. One senior procurement official familiar with the program said that about 100 Leopard 2s and 300 M60s would go through an upgrade program. Industry sources say such upgrades would cost Ankara anywhere between $2 million to $3 million per tank. A bunch of 300 to 400 tank upgrades will have a total cost of more than $1 billion.

    The Leopard 2 upgrade contract would most likely be awarded to the German Rheinmetall’s three-partner, Turkey-based venture, RBSS. Rheinmetall’s partners are the Turkish armored vehicles manufacturer BMC and the Malaysia-based Etika Strategi. The M60s upgrade program would be performed by the Israeli Military Industries — it may mark the first Turkish-Israeli defense deal after the two former allies froze their diplomatic ties in 2010 but agreed on détente recently.

    Meanwhile, the Turkish government is expected to announce a bidding for the serial production of hundreds of Altays, Turkey’s first indigenous, new generation main battle tank. The Altay program involves the production of 1,000 tanks, with an initial bath of 250.

    Source: Burak Ege Bekdil, “Turkey Mulling Upgrade to Leopard 2s, M60s“, Defense News, 18.10.2016.

  9. Well, upon reflection you’d have to say they sent the M60T in first to test the water, so to speak. After they realized how badly the M60’s performed they obviously thought they would send in the “best tank (type) in the world” , only to find that the 2A4 has long riden on its repuation than its ability in a modern battlefield.

    Although a touted 3rd generation design it has shown no better protective performance than the modified M60’s, plus the 2A4 is not an intented export design, its more of a obselete domestic model from Germany offloaded to a NATO ally. Many tabloids and websites have praised the Leopard 2 for its sophistication,durability and lethality but here we are seeing the truth of resting on ones laurels. 1980’s ‘advanced composite armour’ is not able to resist the punching power of anti-tank guided missiles in a fashion reminiscent of the AT-3 encounters of Israeli armor back in the Yom Kippur War, although the Israelis lost around 800 tanks. Although the inspiration of 3rd generation western tanks was to actually prevent loss of life the Leopard 2A4 has revealed a fatal flaw that can not be designed out of it without a subtanial redesign. The hull stored ammunition leaves a sizable concentration located in the forward left hand section with relatively low protection levels, once penetrated. This does not leave the Leopard 2A4/5/6/7 alone as many other designs contain some hull storage, including, Challenger 2, Merkava IV, Abrams(6) and of course many of the Soviet/Russian MBT’s, yet its small consolation for its now damaged reputation with numerous pictures or videos showing the results of massive internal detonation after being struck most probably by an ATGM.

    The question one could raise is what type of weaponary is the Leopard 2A4 really facing?
    Are we seeing anti-tank missiles of latest generation design or ones with a vintage similar or older to the Leopard itself? What have the Syrian Kurds been able to obtain?

    A brief tally of current known ATGM’s within the Syrian oppositions possession is listed below along with their service dates:

    AT3 – 1963 to present
    9K111 – 1970 to present
    9M113 – 1974 to present
    9K115 – 1979 to present
    9K115-2 – 1992 to present
    9M133 – 1998 to present
    HJ8 – 1985 to present
    MILAN – 1972 to present
    BGM71 TOW – 1970 to present

  10. M60T has shown itself vunerable to modern battlefield anti-tank guided missiles or ATGMs. Nothing being used in Syria is anything not already seen in battlefields of Iraq, Afghanastan or Yemen. M60T is nothing more than a iron coffin once modified by the people who should know about anti-tank missiles, Israel. Unfortunately the German made Leopard 2A4 is proving to be no better at resisting impacts and detonates with similar or greater ferocity. Once a front line tank with German forces it has since been sold off to (unwitting?) allies who are heavily under the impression of its supreme reputation.

    It has for a longtime been touted as a “modern 3rd generation advanced MBT” with sophisticated fire control sytem and high lethality, yet a good portion of the ATGMs it is facing are from a timeline similar or even older than the intial Leopard 2s debut of 1979. It also lacks basic modern day protective measures such as slat grill armor or reactive armor and appears to not even feature a simple active protection system (APS). Considering Turkey is a key Middle Eastern (region) ally this equates to failure of the greatest degree. Anyone with knowledge of conflicts in this hotspot would know anti-tank missiles are commonplace and to send an MBT in without putting some extra protective measures is putting lives at risk uneccessarily. Have they not learned the lessons of similar events like Iraqi M1A1AIM Abrams tanks or Saudi Arabian M1A2S tanks that have shown multiple catastrophic failures when struck (usually side on).

  11. Janus says:

    The massive destruction of Leopard 2 tanks was possible only AFTER those were abandoned and their crew evacuated by choppers. Then those were filled by ISIS with several kilos of explosives. No crew compartment penetration was reported, in fact, those wounded/dead were crewing the two lost M-60.

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